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This thesis examines the occupation of the French department of the Nord in the First 
World War.  The focus is on the French responses to occupation, especially the way in 
which certain actions were understood as patriotic or non-patriotic – acceptable or 
unacceptable.  These behaviours are categorised and studied via three main themes, what 
might be termed collaboration, criminality, and resistance, although I argue for a 
reformulation of some of these Second-World-War conceptual categories, taking into 
consideration the specificities of this occupation.  It is demonstrated that the occupied 
French created their own war culture, a culture de l’occupé, based around notions of 
respectability, acceptability, and social-patriotic mores.  Those breaching the limits of 
these norms faced opprobrium and punishment, both during and after the war, although 
this was never as violent or extensive as elsewhere (such as occupied Belgium from 1918, 
or occupied Europe in 1944-5 and beyond).  For some, the moral economy was 
redefined, creating a situation in which criminality or misconduct became effective 
modes of survival.  This, combined with economic difficulties, led to a belief among 
chroniclers of occupied life that crime was increasing, and that young people were 
particularly involved in this.  Fears of moral corruption abounded.  The occupation 
culture demanded opposition to the Germans and expressions of patriotism, often 
containing a performative element.  This could be achieved through the protests of 
French notables, symbolic gestures carried out by the wider population, and active 
resistance involving a minority of occupés.  Whatever the success of resistance, some 
forms were praised after the occupation, with the French and British governments 
expressing their gratitude through compensation and medals.  The official occupation 
narrative in the post-war period became one of suffering and resistance, and suffering as 
resistance; but the occupation memory remained local, eventually overshadowed by that 
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In December 1918, an article appeared in the Nordiste press entitled ‘Les deux Pétain,’1 
eulogising the Marshal who had been met with a rapturous welcome in newly-liberated 
Lille in October.2  For the modern reader, the notion of ‘deux Pétain’ evokes the 
distinction between the hero of 1916 and the collaborationist he would later become, 
although here the distinction was between Pétain as an eloquent leader and a quiet soul.  
Nevertheless, the key figure of the occupation of 1940-44 was thus linked to the end of 
that of 1914-18.   
 
This is apt given a central aim of this thesis: to reinterpret analytical categories used by 
historians of the Second World War, reformulating them so that they are relevant for this 
earlier occupation, and to explore precursors to the Second-World-War experience.  This 
thesis examines a geographical borderland but also a moral and political borderland, in 
which pre-forms of resistance and collaboration sometimes blend into each other.  It uses 
the historiography relating to 1940-44 as a springboard but seeks to escape from the 
‘tyranny’ of the occupation – the predominance of Vichy in French collective 
consciousness.  ‘Occupation’ almost always evokes the Second World War.  The Nazi 
occupation and its attendant socio-cultural, ethnic and moral cleavages left scars across 
the continent.  The French in particular equate occupation with the Second World War, 
and especially with the collaborationist government in Vichy – yet this was not the only 
experience of military occupation in the twentieth century. 
 
                                                 
1 AML 4H280: L’Écho du Nord (3rd December 1918).   
2 AML 4H279: Le Progrès du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (31st October 1918); AML 4H280: L’Écho (31st 





This earlier, more localised occupation is relatively understudied, especially by 
Anglophone scholars.3  French historians are at the forefront of the revival of historical 
interest in this experience since the 1990s,4 but the topic still remains marginalised.   
Current studies tend to focus on the wider occupied area.5  This thesis takes a narrower 
approach, focusing on just one department – that of the Nord, 70% of which was 
occupied from 1914 to 1918.6  The subjects of inquiry are also less broad: rather than 
comprising a general history of the occupation, the concentration is on the French 
responses to the occupation, and the way in which the enemy presence was perceived and 
understood.  Historians have recently developed the idea of the culture de guerre,7 a 
‘broad-based system through which belligerent populations made sense of the war and 
persuaded themselves to continue fighting it.’8  This thesis argues for the existence of a 
culture de l’occupé, founded on a notion of respectability: unwritten, bourgeois social 
mores dictating what was considered as acceptable behaviour during the occupation, but 
also impacting how it was remembered. 
 
The occupied war culture is examined via a handful of key themes: notions of 
misconduct (what I term ‘mauvaise conduite’), criminality, and resistance.  I try to avoid 
anachronism and acknowledge that a certain conceptual elasticity is required to 
understand and document them.  These subjects provide an insight into the multifarious 
ways in which the French responded to occupation, exposing both the ‘underbelly’ and 
the more ‘positive’ sides to the occupation.  The idea – propagated by French writers 
                                                 
3 For the only English-language books on the topic, see Helen McPhail, The Long Silence: Civilian Life 
under the German Occupation of Northern France, 1914-1918 (London, 1999); Richard Cobb, French 
and Germans, Germans and French: A Personal Interpretation of France under Two Occupations, 1914-
1918/1940-1944 (Hanover, New Hampshire, 1983). 
4 See, for example, Annette Becker, Oubliés de la Grande Guerre: Humanitaires et culture de guerre 
(Paris, 1998); idem, Les cicatrices rouges 14-18: France et Belgique occupées (Paris, 2010); Philippe 
Nivet, La France occupée 1914-1918 (Paris, 2011). 
5 However, many unpublished mémoires de maîtrise have been local studies.  See bibliography.  
6 Yves-Marie Hilaire (ed.), Histoire du Nord Pas-de-Calais de 1900 à nos jours (Toulouse, 1982), p.206. 
7 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the 
Present (Cambridge, 2005), p.159. 
8 Leonard V. Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, France and the Great War, 1914-





since 19189 – of widespread patriotism and resistance as the most common and almost 
unique response to the German presence will thus be called into question somewhat.  
This thesis will demonstrate that there was much resistance, which did not always fit 
neatly into established categories, but also many other ways in which the French adapted 
to occupation, often influenced by the notion of respectability – including a precursor to 
collaboration and accommodation,10 here seen as part of the same phenomenon. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis draws upon various archives.  The bulk of documentation comes from the 
Archives départementales du Nord, and the archives municipales of Lille and Tourcoing.  
The aim is an in-depth study of the most important area and the archives within this 
area, and a less systematic trawl of other archives.  The result is an occasional 
preponderance of examples emanating from Lille, Roubaix or Tourcoing, rather than 
some of the smaller communes, towns and villages of the Nord.  This is because these 
were (and are) the highest population centres, and the areas where most documentation 
was kept.11 
 
Material consulted includes police reports, court and municipal administrative 
documents, letters between municipal authorities and the Germans, German posters, 
diaries of occupied French people, transcripts of interviews with French people 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Jean-Claude Auriol, Les ténèbres de l’occupation (Fontenay-le Comte, 2008); Henri de 
Forge and Jean Mauclère, Feuilles françaises dans la tourmente.  Les héros de la presse clandestine dans le 
Nord envahi, 1914-1918 (Paris, 1932);  Claudine Wallart, C’était hier, le département du Nord… Le 
Nord en Guerre – 1914-1918 (Lille, 2008). 
10 See ‘Accommodements’ in Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande, 1940-1944 (Paris, 1995), 
pp.181-361; Rab Bennett, Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and 
Collaboration in Hitler’s Europe (London, 1999), p.43-5.  For uses in the context of 1914-18, see 
Sébastien Debarge, ‘Fourmies, ville occupée pendant la Grande Guerre,’ mémoire de maîtrise sous la 
direction d’Annette Becker (Lille III, 1997), p.165; Becker, Cicatrices, p.15; Philippe Nivet, ‘Les femmes 
dans la France occupée (1914-1918),’ in Marion Trévisi and Philippe Nivet (eds.), Les femmes et la guerre 
de l’Antiquité à 1918 (Paris, 2010), p.299. 
11 The population of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing was about 450,000 in November 1918.  SHD 17N394: 
‘Rapport sur l’aide apportée par les troupes britanniques à la population libérée pendant l’avance du 1er 





repatriated from the occupied area, and French government citations.  Local newspapers 
were also examined, as was a wide range of published material, such as memoirs and 
histories of the occupation, and not just that of the Nord.  Historians always look 
through the eyes of the powerful; it is possible there may have also been a different 
culture de l’occupé among the ‘classes populaires’ or others, less focused on respectability 
than that which dominates this thesis.  Indeed, often those held in disdain by the 
adherents of the culture did not themselves buy into it.  Thus whilst the culture put 
forward here perhaps seems cohesive, it merely provides one tool through which we can 
better understand this occupation, and does not explain all occupation behaviours, 
motivations, or world-views. 
 
Lacunae appear in the archival record, due to the whims of contemporary archivists, as 
well as the ravages of time.12  Particular problems were created due to the destruction or 
loss of sources both during the final German retreat of 1918 and the events of the Second 
World War.  During the occupation itself the creation of documents was restricted 
because of a lack of paper, as well as German regulations governing most correspondence 
between communes or with unoccupied France.13  Consequently, often it is impossible to 
follow the whole sequence of events, a problem acknowledged here but not reiterated 
throughout the thesis.  Unless a sequel is mentioned, it should be assumed that related 
documentation has been lost.  
   
Further, the subjects studied represent experiences and perspectives that were not easily 
preserved in textual or other forms.  For example, people were not likely to boast about 
acts of resistance during the occupation itself, given the consequences of such claims; and 
                                                 
12 For example, British military police files covering northern France were poorly conserved, and virtually 
all appear to have been destroyed by a failure to repair the roof of a leaky hut.  Thanks to Julian 
Putkowski for this information. 
13 ADN 9R792: German poster for France and Belgium, 3rd April 1917; Bulletin de Lille (henceforth 
BdL), nº169 (25th June 1916), ‘Actes de l’Autorité allemande: Proclamation du Genéral Commandant 






even less likely to document behaviours and mindsets running contrary to the accepted 
norms, such as acts of criminality or relations with the Germans.  All evidence is 
rendered questionable by the variety of restrictions and authorial motives, from 
vengeance to self-praise, a problem heightened in the inter-war period when occupation 
conduct was even more contested.  I am studying perceptions more than the objective 
reality, making this uncertainty itself a subject of study.  Practically all sources used 
should therefore be considered to be a priori problematic as definitive indicators of 
historical ‘truth.’  Authorship issues also arise, with documents often lacking a designated 
author or date, or information on the authors.  I have endeavoured to be explicit about 
the problems such sources pose.   
 
Sources are in French, the local patois, and English.  Some attempt has been made to 
engage with German sources, within the limits of the author’s current linguistic 
capacities, but only in a cursory manner.  Flemish sources have not been consulted, partly 
because the focus is on the francophone culture, partly because the greater part of the 
Flemish-speaking Nord was not occupied.  Further, leading French historians on the 
subject focus almost exclusively on French-language sources. 
      
The thesis is thus based on a rigorous investigation of considerable Anglo-French archival 
material, reinforced by secondary sources, especially the recent historical work on this 
occupation (and occupations in general), and on the wider First World War experience.  
This allows for a detailed local study to be understood in a wider context; conclusions are 
inevitably suggestive but hopefully informative for the greated occupied area from 1914-












Oubliés de la Grande Guerre? 
The general consensus among historians is that the occupation faded rapidly from 
public-collective and historical memory,14 in France and beyond.  The first period of 
‘forgetting’ comprised the inter-war years; the second started with the occupation of the 
Second World War, which overshadowed that of the First15 and has dominated French 
memory ever since.16  Indeed, by the ‘revival’ period in the history of the 1914-18 
occupation in the 1990s, Annette Becker felt justified in entitling her book on the 
occupied population (and prisoners of war) Oubliés de la Grande Guerre.17 
 
The French memory of First World War was characterised by the primacy of the soldiers’ 
experience: combatants were seen as victims of violence, whereas the violence suffered by 
unarmed civilian populations was ignored.18  The memory of the combatants’ suffering 
was ‘hypertrophied,’ whereas a ‘hyperamnesia’ surrounded the civilian experience, 
especially that of the occupied populations.19  Becker and others argue that these two 
phenomena were inextricably connected, as the formerly occupied populations sought to 
re-insert themselves into the national wartime narrative of trench combat.  Even on 
monuments to combatants, the French only commemorated those who had died (hence 
                                                 
14 Françoise Thébaud, La femme au temps de la guerre de 14 (Paris, 1986), p.45; John Horne, 
‘Demobilizing the Mind: France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919-1939,’ French History and 
Civilization. Papers from the George Rudé Seminar, vol. 2 (2009), p.115; Nicolas Beaupré and Christian 
Ingrao, ‘Marginaux, marginalité et marginalisation durant la guerre,’ in Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and 
Jean-Jacques Becker (eds.), Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre, 1914-1918: Histoire et Culture (Paris, 
2004), p.767; Margaret H. Darrow, French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the Home 
Front (New York, 2000), p.5, 282-3; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 1914-1918: 
Understanding the Great War (London, 2002), (trans.) Catherine Temerson, p.54, 89, 200-201. 
15 Thébaud, Femme, p.45. 
16 Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford, 2001), pp.1-20; Henry Rousso, The 
Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), (trans.) Arthur 
Goldhammer; Éric Conan and Henry Rousso (eds.), Vichy: an Everpresent Past (Hanover, New 
Hampshire, 1998), (trans.) Nathan Bracher; Richard J. Golsan, Vichy’s Afterlife: History and 
Counterhistory in Postwar France (Lincoln, 2000); Betrand M. Gordon, ‘The “Vichy Syndrome” 
Problem in History,’ French Historical Studies, 19:2 (1995), pp.495-518; Olivier Lalieu, ‘L’invention du 
“Devoir de mémoire,”’ Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, 69, Numéro spécial: D’un siècle l’autre (2001), 
pp.83-94; Pierre Nora, ‘Le Syndrome, son passé, son avenir,’ French Historical Studies, 19 :2 (1995), 
pp.487-493. 
17 Nivet, France, p.10. 
18 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, Understanding, p.45. 





the name monuments aux morts).20  This refusal to commemorate and remember the 
living placed great strain on the remembered experience of occupied civilians, situated on 
the margins of an already marginalised wartime experience (that of civilians at the home 
front).  For Becker, this is why most monuments in the occupied region were ‘normal’ 
monuments aux morts,21 which evoked the ‘normalité de la souffrance’ – the inhabitants 
of the Nord, like all other French people, had suffered and died for la patrie.  In fact, ‘on 
finit par être tellement culpabilisé d’avoir été différent dans la guerre qu’on nie des 
souffrances exemplaires pour mieux oublier ces temps où la région était différente, donc 
soupçonnable d’abandon des valeurs du patriotisme ou d’héroïsme.’22 
 
However, there are a few monuments in the Nord dedicated specifically to the 
occupation, all built in the inter-war period.23  Indeed, during this time and among those 
who had lived through it, there was a local memory of the occupation.  This memory was 
mainly one of victimhood, suffering, and resistance (or suffering as resistance).  It was 
expressed further through ceremonies dedicated to key occupation events or persons,24 
the regional press,25 and inter-war texts on occupied France.26  A centralised memory also 
existed in the form of medals and other expressions of governmental gratitude or 
                                                 
20 Becker, Oubliés, p.362. 
21 See documents in ADN 70J215. 
22 Becker, Oubliés, p.365. 
23 Ibid., p.365-6; idem, ‘Mémoire et commémoration: les “atrocités” allemandes de la Première Guerre 
mondiale dans le nord de la France,’ Revue du Nord, 74:295 (April-June 1992), p.339; idem, ‘D’une 
guerre à l’autre: mémoire de l’occupation et de la résistance: 1914-1940,’ Revue du Nord, 76: 306 (July-
September 1994), pp.453-65; AML 4H76: Séance of Lille’s Conseil Municipal, 9th February 1920 and 9th 
December 1923. 
24 See AML 4H322: Adjoint du mairie de Lille, L Banbrine, to M. Walker (Consul d’Angleterre), 15th 
October 1919; Président du Conseil d’Admiministration du Matin to mayor, 21st May 1919, et passim; 
AML 4H322 bis; Progrès (20-21st October 1920); Le Matin (20th October 1919); AML 4H75: Poster, 
‘Comité Jacquet: Pose d’un plaque commémorative,’ Lille, 21st May 1923; AML 4H76: Le Réveil du 
Nord (20th May 1923), Edouard & Fernard Plouvier de Lille, Chévaliers de la Légion d’Honneur, 
Souvenir de la Fête du 5 Mai 192; AML 4H75-8, passim. 
25 See especially articles in Progrès, La Croix du Nord, La Dépêche de Lille et de la Région du Nord, and 
L’Écho du Nord, in AML 4H279-80, 282-3 and 4H75-8. 





recognition awarded to former occupés in the 1920s and 1930s.27  Yet even this local 
memory had begun to fade by the mid- to late-1930s, so much so that authors such as 
Antoine Redier decried ‘l’injurieux oubli dans lequel la frivolité publique’ had ‘étouffé 
depuis vingt ans’ the memory of certain resisters.28  This was exacerbated by the 
dominance of the second occupation in both French culture and historiography since 
1945, the final nail in a coffin that has only recently been re-opened, its decaying 
contents now the subject of preservation and examination. 
  
In recent years that the ‘memory boom’ surrounding the First World War has been 
reconfigured to include the forgotten experience of civilians.29  This historiographical 
trend, which began in the 1990s with the first studies into ‘culture(s) de guerre,’30 
eventually encompassed and revived the historical memory of the occupation.  The first 
rigorous historical work was published in 1979 by Robert Vandenbussche,31 but Becker 
and her students have been at the forefront of such research – Becker herself has 
published two books, one volume of edited diaries, and numerous articles on the subject 
since 1990.32  Since 1986, she and others have also supervised dozens of mémoires de 
maîtrise on the occupation.33   This was a specifically local historiography which is 
something of the past, with most historians in Paris now doing a Masters rather than 
maîtrise.  My approach is somewhat different from Becker, who tends to highlight 
                                                 
27 See, for example, the entirety of AN BB32/1-4, 300-301; AN F23/14, 373-78.  The gaps may also 
contain relevant information, especially for AN BB32/5-299.  Unfortunately, a comprehensive study of 
these files was not possible in the timeframe.  See also: ‘Active Resistance’ chapter and Nivet, France, 
p.332-4. 
28 Antoine Redier, Les Allemands dans nos maisons (Paris, 1937), p.307. 
29 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth 
Century (Michigan, 2006), p.6. 
30 Winter and Prost, Great War, p.159. 
31 Robert Vandenbussche, ‘Le pouvoir municipal à Douai sous l’occupation (1914-1918),’ Revue du 
Nord, 61:241 (April-June 1979). 
32 Becker, Oubliés; Cicatrices; ‘D’une guerre’; ‘Mémoire’; idem, ‘Introduction,’ Revue du Nord, 80: 325 
(April-June 1998), pp.251-4; idem (ed.), Journaux de combattants et de civils de la France du Nord dans 
la Grande Guerre (Lille, 1998). 
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suffering and patriotism as the most common, central experience,34 which implies that 
she largely buys into the occupied world-view.  I look at the different responses to the 
occupation, of which patriotism is but one end of a complex spectrum, but avoid 
interpreting these in moralistic terms.  I study the understandings and cultures of the 
time, separating them from my own analysis and judgement.   
 
The revival of the occupation (not exclusively that of the Nord) as a legitimate subject 
was arguably cemented by a special issue of the Revue du Nord dedicated to this subject 
in 1998 – the year of the publication of Becker’s first occupation-related book.35  Since 
1945, other published works have dealt with the wider occupation, but these were few 
and far between until the 1990s36 – especially concerning the Nord, where the 
occupation experience was only documented briefly in local histories, and even they only 
appeared from the 1970s onwards, mainly written by two authors.37  The most recent 
work, by Philippe Nivet, focuses on the entire occupied area.38  There was therefore a gap 
of at least 25 years during which the occupation of northern France of 1914-18 was 
studied only rarely by French and British/Anglophone historians.  History and memory 
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are not one and the same, but neither historians nor the local populations cultivated this 
memory after 1940.  This thesis is part of the trend shedding light once more onto this 
dark period, focusing on one department in particular.   
 
The Specificity of the Nord 
Why the Nord?  Firstly, it was the most populous occupied department, with a wartime 
population of 1,176,000, according to German census data.39  This provided a large 
source base and also meant that a study of this department would reflect the experience 
of the vast majority of occupied French people, most of whom lived in the Nord.  The 
results of the study are therefore instructive and representative, whilst also remaining part 
of a local specificity. 
 
Secondly, the Nord is a maneageable area close to important towns, and their archives.  
Also, limiting the study geographically allowed for a fuller understanding of material 
concerning this area.  Maximum time could be spent in the most important archives, 
allowing an in-depth picture of occupied life to emerge.  This is one of the major 
advantages of regional studies. 
 
Thirdly, the Nord has intriguing regional specificities.  It is at its heart a borderland, with 
the north-westerly coastal frontier of the North Sea set against the Belgian border 
running along the entire eastern limits of the department.  Along with its sister 
department, the Pas-de-Calais, it was ‘set apart from the rest of France [looking] 
northward, towards Belgium and the Netherlands, rather than to the south.’40  The Nord 
had been a ‘corridor for invasion’41 – there had been much territorial shifting since the 
Middle Ages, depending on the results of the most recent war.  In particular, the area was 
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contested between France and the Spanish-Austrian Netherlands, attaining a semblance 
of a fixed border in the treaty of Utrecht in 1713.42  Prior to this, ‘the region had been 
affiliated with the Dukes of Burgundy to the north and considered itself Flemish.’43  The 
1713 border remained relatively stable throughout the eighteenth century until the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, when France’s territory extended eastwards.  It 
was only after the 1820 treaty of Courtrai that the Franco-Belgian border started to 
crystallise, although even then it remained relatively fluid, with local inhabitants crossing 
it at will.44  Indeed, Lynne Taylor argues that ‘the Franco-Belgian border is a political 
artifice.  The social, cultural and economic trade between the French and the Belgian 
communities along the border largely ignores the border’s existence.’45 
 
There was considerable population movement, but it was mainly one-way: 230,000 
Belgians lived in the Nord by 1900, and 35,000 others had become naturalised 
Frenchmen; yet more engaged in seasonal or daily migration in order to work in French 
factories.46 In 1911, 91% of foreigners in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were Belgian.  
There was still a degree of xenophobia directed towards these immigrants, although this 
would not reach its apogee until the inter-war period.47  One result was linguistic 
diversity – there was a significant population with Flemish as its mother tongue located 
by the north-eastern border regions of the department, in the arrondissements of 
Dunkirk and Hazebrouck.  This was despite the fact that French had made considerable 
progress from the late-nineteenth century due to Third Republic policies requiring 
French as the language of instruction in schools and the military, as well as the banning 
of Flemish as the language of catechism in 1890.  Many communes in the Nord ignored 
this latter law, and cultural-linguistic institutions like the Comité flamand de France 
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combated linguistic hegemony whilst affirming their loyalty to the nation.48  Overall, the 
Flemish population remained staunchly pro-France.49  Yet these issues remained, for the 
most part, confined to what would later become the unoccupied Nord. 
 
The department was primarily urban: by 1914, 71% of the population lived in 
agglomerations of 2,000 or more, compared to a national average of 56%.50  Indeed, in 
1911 French Flanders was the most densely populated area in France, with 967.5 
inhabitants per square kilometer.51  That same year the industrial-urban triangle of Lille, 
Roubaix and Tourcoing had a population of over 600,000 – which would have been the 
second largest French agglomeration outside of Paris, had the municipalities been 
unified.52  The large, urban population of this triangle was the result of increased 
industrialisation since the mid-nineteenth century – also the reason for the large influx of 
Belgian workers.53  Heavy industry, mainly the production of cast iron and steelwork, 
was important and was fuelled by the department’s coal mines and those of neighbouring 
Pas-de-Calais.54  Heavy industry employed over 15,000 people in the Nord; 10,000 of 
whom worked in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing.55  It was a large operation: in 1913, the 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais region produced 17.9% of France’s cast iron, and 31.4% of her steel.  
World-famous firms such as the Compagnie de Fives-Lille built railway bridges and steel 
frameworks for railway stations all over the world, such as the Gare d’Orsay, and bridges 
in Romania, Spain, and Egypt.56  
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But the backbone of Nordiste industry was textile manufacturing.  Nearly 40% of 
French cotton, 85-90% of linen, 40% of wool and 30% of cloth was produced here.57  
Roubaix was the world leader in cloth production.58  The textile industry employed 
about 225,000 people, many of whom were women working in semi-skilled jobs, aided 
by technological advances.  Often factories were run by paternalistic men hailing from 
large industrial families.  Such industrial dynasties represented a new form of notability, 
with leading factory-owners playing a role in local politics,59 such as Charles Delesalle, 
mayor of Lille during the occupation.60 
 
The success of heavy industry and textile manufacturing led to a diffusion of other 
industries.  The first glassworks in France was established near Douai and Maubeuge, 
and the manufacture of cement and other building materials flourished.61  Not all sectors 
prospered, though, and the Nord was noticeably handicapped by the slow development 
of chemical manufacturing (a leading industry in the early twentieth century), and its 
outdated canal network.62 
 
Agriculture was another boon to the department.  Its flat plains represented ‘one of the 
richest agricultural areas of France’ and had been ‘intensely cultivated for centuries.  The 
soil is good, and cereals, tubers such as potatoes, beets and turnip, fodder crops and 
industrial crops, such as flax, chicory, tobacco and sugar beets’ were all grown here.63  
Sugar beet production in particular reflected the area’s dominance in this sector: in 1913, 
‘la plus importante sucrerie du monde’ was located in Escaudoeuvres, near Cambrai.64  
Intensive farming extended beyond sugar beet, and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais had the 
highest wheat productivity of Europe, especially in le Cambrésis in the Nord, where 
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production surpassed 35 quintals per hectare in 1910.65  Such intensive agriculture 
allowed for densely-populated rural areas to exist.66  In total, the region of the Nord-Pas-
de-Calais provided 8% of France’s wheat production, 12% of apples, and 30% of sugar, 
despite the fact that the land constituted just 2.2% of French territory and its inhabitants 
only 7% of the population.67 
 
Highly urbanised areas experienced great social inequality:68 the ‘classes dirigeantes’ 
possessed the vast majority of the economic fortune, rendering the middle classes rather 
weak, and the ‘classes populaires’ very poor.  This was exacerbated by housing for 
workers that had been rapidly created, was cramped and provided a very poor sanitary 
environment.  Infant mortality was high until 1900, after which mild improvements 
were visible.  The lot of the working classes was made even harder when faced with 
below-average levels of education: the number of men possessing a ‘diplôme supérieur au 
certificat d’étude’ (thus having experienced education beyond the age of 13) was 7.7%, 
the number of women 6%, compared to a national average of 10.4% and 8.5% 
respectively.69 
 
The working class represented about 60% of the population of cities like Lille,70 and this 
shaped the political culture: ‘Dans la région du Nord, aux paysages économiques très 
marqués et aux statuts sociaux fort inégaux, les comportements politiques avaient 
toujours pris une forte tonalité sociale.’71  Social inequality encouraged workers to 
support socialism, which worried the ‘catégories sociales aisées.’72  Belgian socialism 
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greatly influenced the workers of the Nord.73  Syndicalist groups bloomed, and those 
taking a socialist bent had over 100,000 members.74  Indeed, the Nord was a ‘hotbed for 
socialist and syndicalist activities, particularly in the densely populated, working-class 
Lille urban area.’75  Roubaisien Jules Guesde and his ideology dominated the socialist 
movement, although leftists were divided until the creation of the SFIO in 1905, after 
which date the Fédération du Nord was the second largest in the party, with 11,000 
adherents.76  Socialist victories in Roubaix in 1892 and Lille in 1896 demonstrated the 
‘threat’ of socialism, and were subsequently met with a ‘réconquête “libérale”’ in Roubaix 
in 1901 by Eugène Motte and in Lille in 1904 by Charles Delesalle.77  By 1914 the SFIO 
had 14 deputies in the region, especially around Lille and Valenciennes – progress was 
slow, despite seemingly widespread support, but nevertheless ‘Le Nord constitue 
indéniablement un des bastions du socialisme français.’78  (See Fig. 1 for an electoral map 
of the Nord). 
 
Certain segments of the bourgeoisie and peasants were mainly concerned with the 
defence of property – leading rural areas such as le Cambrésis to become bastions of 
centralism.79  The Radicals, on the other hand, comprised an important political force: 
the mayors of Tourcoing, Roubaix and Cambrai in the early twentieth century were all 
Radicals, although this label was notoriously slippery.80  They were seen as arbiters of the 
left-right dispute, hailing from complex origins (whether industrial or agricultural) and 
represented the moderate left.  Concerned with maintaining a certain status quo, they 
nevertheless remained anticlerical and laïque, willing to ally with socialists or centrists, 
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but never with Catholics.81  The latter – the  Catholic, conservative right – ‘bénéficie 
encore d’une audience remarquable qui, bien que se réduisant peu à peu depuis 1900, lui 
permet de faire front.’  This was especially the case in rural areas, although its audience 
always remained greater than its actual parliamentary influence.82  Whatever their 
political leaning, members of the political class tended to be bourgeois: négociants, 
commerçants, entrepreneurs, industrialists, landlords.  By combining economic and 
political influence, they essentially became the new ‘notables’ of the Nord.83 
 
Debates between left and right largely mirrored (and focused on) those between 
anticlericals and clericals.   This was exacerbated and rendered more complex in the Nord 
because of its curious mix of socialist sentiment and fairly widespread Catholic piety.  As 
a rule Catholicism flourished in rural areas but did less well in the cities,84 although 
despite this generalisation, Lille remained ‘une capitale religieuse et l’un des pôles les plus 
dynamiques du catholicisme français.’85  Many in the Nord had been unhappy with the 
1905 separation of Church and State, with some religious communities consequently 
migrating to Belgium to seek refuge.86  After 1905, there was a shift leftwards among 
certain constituencies towards accepting some aspects of anticlericalism, but Catholics 
remained divided over the best course of action: some supported the ideas of l’abbé 
Lemire, a député-priest willing to integrate as best as possible into the Third Republic; 
others remained monarchists and virulently anti-Republican.87  Inbetween 1905 and 
1914, there had been numerous clashes, both metaphorically and physically, between 
Catholics and the state (or supporters of its anticlerical policies).88  By 1914, ‘les 
catholiques, persécutés par la législation anticléricale, luttent pour le maintien de la 
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liberté d’enseignement et réclament la proportionnelle scolaire.’89  This combat also took 
the form of Catholic leagues and movements, with youth movements attracting about 
10,000 members in the Nord by 1913, especially in Flanders, Tourcoing and le 
Cambrésis.90  Female Catholic leagues attracted massive numbers: in Cambrai in 1912, 
the Ligue patriotique des Françaises ‘rassemble 73 823 ligueuses.’91  Despite increasingly 
common anticlericalism, the Nord therefore remained surprisingly Catholic given its 
demographic constituency.92  Yet whether Catholic or not, most Nordistes remained 
loyal to France, if not necessarily the Republic, which would have implications for their 
approach to occupation. 
 
Among the Francophone population there also existed a regional patois,93 a variation of 
the Picard dialect, named ch’ti after its speakers’ pronunciation of soft ‘s’ and ‘c’ sounds.  
Like most French patois, it was primarily spoken by the lower classes, playing a central 
role in the popular poems and songs of the region.94  There were a few literary works, 
most notably the poems and chansons populaires of Auguste Labbé (alias César 
Latulupe),95 who founded a society in 1906 charged with protecting the patois of Lille.96   
 
Some of these specificities of the Nord coalesced to aid the development of a local 
identity and culture.  Nordistes seized any opportunity for public gatherings and 
celebrations, whether watching puppet shows conducted in the local dialect, carnival 
processions of the wooden géants du Nord, or engaging in Catholic celebrations of Joan 
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of Arc.97  A strong worker culture meant that many passed much of their spare time in 
the numerous estaminets and débits de boissons.  In Lille in 1910, there existed an 
enormous 3,900 estaminets.98  Outside of drinking holes, workers turned to music for 
leisure: the Fédération des musiques du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais had 50,000 members 
in 1912.  Pigeon-fancying provided a popular outdoor activity, with at least 20,000 
colombophiles subscribed to the regional federation in 1908.99 
 
These regional specificities, cultures and identities could react in interesting and different 
ways to the German presence.  Yet what was the overall experience of occupation?  This 
context is needed before a deeper examination of the key themes outlined can take place. 
 
The Occupation in Context 
From the outbreak of war until September 1914, German troops marched through 
Belgium and northern France in an execution of the Moltke-Schlieffen Plan.100  
Although the invasion was stopped in its tracks by the Battle of the Marne on 5-12th 
September,101 the front still shifted until October-November.  This invasion period was 
characterised across northern France and Belgium by ruthless German policies and 
atrocities, both real and imagined, including rape, pillage, mass executions, and the use of 
civilians as human shields.102  Such atrocities were reported in the Allied press. An article 
of The Times of 22nd September 1914 chronicled the shooting of one Abbé Délébecque, 
‘falsely arraigned as a spy’ because he was carrying letters from French soldiers to their 
families.  He was the seventh priest in the diocese of Cambrai shot by the Germans.103  
Another article reports details of the Germans burning down houses and killing civilians 
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in Douai.104  After the invasion, German actions would be investigated by Allied powers, 
most notably by the British Bryce Report.105  John Horne and Alan Kramer have 
demonstrated that such atrocities, dismissed as overblown propaganda after the war, were 
in fact widespread, and based on the false German belief that the population was 
comprised of francs-tireurs waging a guerrilla war, just as in 1870-1.106 
 
As Belgians fled to the Nord, the local populations became aware of atrocities.107  In the 
Nord itself, one of the most infamous German acts involved the burning village of 
Orchies after German soldiers alleged that they had been fired on by francs-tireurs.108  
The terror of the invasion period would have lasting consequences for the culture de 
l’occupé, and illustrates that the Germans had their own culture de guerre.      
 
Until October 1914, Nordistes had hoped that an Allied counter-attack would push the 
Germans out of the department, but the initial German race to Paris had created a period 
of limbo.  Lille had been declared a ‘ville ouverte’ on 1st August 1914, meaning that 
despite the presence of a fortress and garrison, the city would not be defended.  On 24th 
August 1914, the French military left, along with some members of the civilian 
administration – a move that some denounced as abandonment.109  From this date until 
the beginning of October, Lille was neither occupied by the Allies, nor the Germans. The 
inhabitants had their first encounter with the Germans when a scouting party entered the 
town on 2nd September and occupied the hôtel de ville.110  During this brief incursion, 
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the first of many clashes between French and German authorities occurred when one 
Lieutenant von Hoffel physically assaulted the Préfet du Nord, who had been blamed for 
having ordered men of military age to leave Lille for the French front.111 
 
Lille was reoccupied by French troops on 3rd October.  For the next ten days, clashes 
took place between French and German troops within the city’s limits as the Germans 
laid siege.  On 13th October 1914, after 1,500 houses and 882 other buildings had been 
destroyed by artillery fire, the defending French forces capitulated.112 
 
70% of the department was in German hands by mid-October 1914.  At this time the 
Germans occupied part or all of ten French departments113 (see Fig. 2) – abut 3.7% of 
French territory and 8.2% of her population,114 over two million people.115  Thus after 
the invasion ‘came the extended static period, the occupation proper.’116  Trench warfare 
ensured that the front would remain relatively stable for four years, meaning that these 
areas remained under German dominance until October-November 1918, depending on 
the specific locality.  Lille, for example, was liberated on 17th October 1918,117 whereas 
inhabitants of Avesnes had to wait until 7th November 1918 for their deliverance.118 
 
The way in which the Germans administered the Nord was similar to policies used in 
other occupied French departments, all of which were considered as front-line areas 
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(Etappen) by the Germans, as opposed to the General-Government pseudo-civilian rule 
existing in most of Belgium.119  Occupied France was thus under military rule.  A general 
administrative framework existed: next to each commanding general of one of the seven 
army groups in occupied France was an Etappeninspektor, charged with liaising between 
the interior and the fighting troops, providing the latter with food, accommodation, and 
transport.  Below him was an Etappenkommandant, a high-ranking officer representing 
the highest authority to which French people could appeal, and whose powers were 
likened to that of a ‘little king.’120  Each Kommandant and his Kommandantur 
controlled from one to forty French communes, and possessed wide-ranging personnel, 
with its own administrative staff initially composed of soldiers, but later of German 
civilians, including female secretaries.  The Kommandant rarely lasted for the duration of 
the occupation, reassigned to different sectors or fronts.  Economic committees 
(Beutesammelstellen) working alongside the Etappeninspektor had the goal of best 
procuring the resources of the occupied territory, mainly through requisitions – these 
were replaced from 1916 by Wirtschaftskompanien.  Three police forces existed: the 
German gendarmes, sometimes including Landsturm (reserve troops made up of old 
men); a military police formed of soldiers exempt from front-line service; and the secret 
police, involved in counter-espionage.121  The French population frequently had to lodge 
troops on their way to the front, often feeding them and doing their washing.122  As such, 
there were two types of German soldier in the occupied region: members of the army of 
occupation, and soldiers from the fighting army, temporarily encountering the French 
whether en route to the front, or on leave from the front. 
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The French administration was sidelined at all but municipal level.  No departmental 
assemblies met during the occupation.  The Germans nominated Sous-Préfets such as 
those of Avesnes and Cambrai, and mayors like that of Etroeungt.  Whilst the Prefect 
was still present – until his deportation in 1915 and replacement with the Sous-Préfet 
d’Avesnes123 – his role was never more than consultative.  The Germans dealt with the 
mayors and municipal councillors of French communes, using them as middle-men to 
fulfil German orders and communicate such demands to the local populations.  In many 
ways, this meant that municipalities found themselves ‘entre le marteau et l’enclume,’ as 
Sébastien Debarge puts it.124  The French police and judicial system was still permitted to 
operate, but its powers had been greatly curbed (see the ‘Criminality’ chapter), and 
ultimately the Germans remained dominant in all spheres of life. 
 
The occupied region was cut off from the rest of the world – Herbert Hoover described 
occupied France and Belgium as a ‘vast concentration camp.’125  The Germans ‘needed 
the occupied population’ and did their ‘best to keep them there,’ such as erecting a 
30km-long electric fence along the Belgian-Dutch border,126 and posting sentries along 
the Franco-Belgian border, making these territories into ‘vast prisons for their 
inhabitants.’127  Correspondence between communes was forbidden for all but civil 
servants, and contact with the outside world was illegal and difficult.128  Public 
circulation was limited to specific times unless a pass could be presented, and permission 
was required to move between communes – permission which few outside of French 
authorities were granted.129  French civilians were ordered to kill their carrier pigeons to 
prevent communication with the Allies, a measure particularly resented by the 
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colombophiles.130  The French press was forbidden, apart from publications approved 
and edited by the Germans, such as the occupation-wide Gazette des Ardennes, or the 
local Bulletin de Lille and Bulletin de Roubaix.131  Freedom of expression was thus 
curbed, especially anti-German sentiment.132  Such policies led to a feeling of acute 
isolation among Nordistes, as among the population of the entire occupied area.133 
 
Almost every aspect of life was regulated by the Germans, via manifold ‘mesures 
vexatoires,’134 from public hygiene measures135 to the imposition of German time (an 
hour ahead of French time), which was enforced with spot-checks; if an occupé was 
asked the time and provided French time, a punishment would be administered.136  
Some have seen this and other policies – such as the banning in some schools of the 
French history syllabus, the replacement of street names with German ones, or the raising 
of German flags in public places – as representative of a ‘Germanisation.’137  Others 
disagree.138  It can be argued that such policies were more short-term markers of 
dominance – indeed, the overwhelming official German attitude appeared to involve 
disdain and cultural superiority139 – never constituting a concerted effort to eradicate 
Frenchness.  The occupation was a means to an end, not an end in itself 
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Whatever the logic behind them, rules and regulations flooded the occupied Nord, as 
elsewhere.  The distinction between public and private spheres was weakened, 
particularly by policies requiring the occupés to keep doors to houses open at night in 
case of bombardment, and the obligation to affix a regularly-updated list of occupants to 
the front entrance of all properties.140  The possession of a photographic identity card was 
compulsory in Lille from September 1915, slightly later elsewhere.141  Thousands of 
posters informed the population of these rules, as well as the punishments for any 
infractions142 – often inevitable.  As Marc Blancpain wrote, ‘Les “avis”, “ordonnances” et 
“ordres” du commandement des étapes et des commandements locales sont si 
nombreuses que “la faute est devenue la règle.”’143  An Englishman’s account of life in 
occupied Roubaix professed similar views: ‘I do not believe that anyone took a vicious 
delight in disobeying these commands, but they were so many and so varied that if one 
were not very careful indeed one was sure to find oneself at cross-purposes with the 
authorities.’144  Punishment could involve fines, imprisonment, or even death, depending 
on the infraction.145  The extent and nature of punishment can be seen in the 
condemnations published in the Bulletin de Lille.  From 1914 until July 1918, 658 
people were condemned to a total of 246 years, 11 months and eight days of détention 
simple; 115 people to a total of 3 years, five months and one day of détention moyenne; 
and 34 people to a total of 267 years and seven months of travaux forcés.  Fines were 
frequent: 85 people were sentenced to ‘87.118’ Marks of ‘amendes simples’; whilst 78 
people faced 37 years, four months and 24 days’ imprisonment with a fine of 1,000 
francs, plus a fine of ‘161.920’ Marks and five years, eight months and 25 days’ 
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imprisonment.  21 were condemned to death, and three to 30 years’ réclusion.146  In 
addition, there were numerous less-formal punishments.  These demonstrate German 
attempts to subjugate the population, part of what some have labeled the ‘régime de 
terreur’ or German ‘terrorisation’ of the local population.147 
 
French economic life effectively came to a standstill during the occupation.  This was 
partly due to restrictions on freedom of movement and communication preventing trade 
beyond the communal limits.  Combined with German prescriptions relating to import 
and export of goods and materials, this led to what Georges Gromaire called ‘le 
commerce paralysé.’148  A large percentage of the workforce was mobilised or fled the 
invasion, thus the majority of the population of occupied France and the Nord was 
female.149  Further, the Germans requisitioned goods and buildings from private 
individuals, agriculture, and industry alike, as well as requisitions of occupés themselves, 
who were forced to work for the German authority.150  Inhabitants were required to 
declare a variety of material due for requisitioning (even underwear),151 although many 
did not – the Germans knew this so carried out widespread searches, punishing 
individuals found to be in breach of the regulations, and blurring the distinction between 
pillage and genuine requisitions.152  Occupés at the time, and various French people 
afterwards described German acts as ‘pillage systématique,’ an attempt to destroy the 
economy of the occupied region both to win the war, and to hinder post-war 
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development.153  Whatever the case, the effects of these policies on the wartime economy 
were clear: unemployment was widespread, with large towns of the Nord awarding 
secours de chômage to up to 43.02% of the population,154 leading to a lack of income 
which could be pumped back into the local economy.   
 
Finances were strained further by the fact that occupés were required to pay numerous 
taxes, on an individual and municipal/communal level.  Some counted as ‘war 
contributions’ to pay for the upkeep of occupation troops, legal under article 49 of the 
1907 Hague Convention.155  Others were fines levied on communes for alleged bad 
behaviour of inhabitants, the French administration, or even simply because of Allied 
attacks elsewhere – as was the case when Valenciennes and Roubaix were fined in 
response to the Allied bombing of Alexandria and Haïfa in June 1915.156  The sums 
demanded were enormous – for instance, by the end of the war the administration of 
Croix had paid taxes of 1,100,000 francs, war contributions of 8,339,66.68 francs, and 
fines of 2,030 francs.157  Taxes and contributions usually forced municipal councillors 
and clergymen to appeal to wealthy compatriots to help fill the gaps in the 
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administration’s coffers.158  Individual taxes included the infamous dog tax, failure to pay 
resulting in the destruction of the dog.159 
 
The Germans requisitioned gold and francs, and introduced paper money.  These were 
the bons de villes, bons communaux and bons de monnaie, issued grudgingly by the 
communes because of their illegality – French law only permitted the creation of such 
currency with the approval of central government.  These bons effectively constituted 
‘IOUs,’ listing sums which would be repaid after the cessation of hostilities.160  Such 
money could not be used to pay German taxes and fines, which therefore meant the 
depletion of any existing gold or franc stocks.  Also, the circulation of essentially 
worthless paper money undermined economic stability and confidence, exacerbating the 
widespread penury of the occupied population. 
 
Food was a primary concern for the occupés, representing the strongest recurring theme 
in occupation diaries,161 because a near-famine developed as the occupation went on.  
This was due to German requisitions of foodstuffs and appropriation of agricultural land, 
extracting local resources to serve the German war effort, as well as aforementioned 
restrictions on movement and trade.  As food became rarer, inflation grew rapidly, 
aggravating the situation.  The population’s health subsequently declined: diseases such 
as scurvy became common,162 and malnutrition was widespread, which some suggest was 
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the reason for numerous women no longer menstruating163 – thus for some, biological 
realities changed during the occupation.164  Local administrations, but also French, Allied 
and neutral governments, and eventually even the Germans recognised the danger for the 
occupied population.  As such, from April 1915, neutral aid organisations intervened to 
feed French and Belgian occupés.  These were Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Relief 
in Belgium (CRB), and its French subsidiary, the Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la 
France (CANF), both sometimes referred to as Hispano-américain and later Hispano-
néerlandais relief efforts.165  Tens of thousands (or more) would have died were it not for 
these aid organisations,166 although it was only with much deliberation that Britain 
allowed CRB-CANF transport ships to pass through the naval blockade.167  Even with 
this aid, many experienced malnutrition, general poor physical health caused by further 
privations of gas and coal,168 and mental health problems caused by the stress of 
occupation and the risk of bombardment.169  
 
Added to these sufferings was the threat of deportation.  The line between evacuation 
and deportation is a blurred one for this occupation,170 with the Germans engaging in the 
forcible removal of populations on a frequent basis during 1916 and early 1917.  The 
Germans moved about 20,000 people – men, women and children – from Lille-Roubaix-
Tourcoing to the Ardennes in Easter 1916, allegedly ‘pour atténuer la misère’ of the 
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occupés which had been exacerbated by ‘L’attitude de l’Angleterre.’171  These were the 
most infamous deportations, and because of the presence of women they became known 
as the ‘enlèvement des jeunes filles’ across the occupied area.172  (There is some debate as 
to whether the primarily female nature of deportation was a reality or perception, 
although that such a perception should exist is significant).  There was international 
outcry at German actions,173 which may explain the apparent winding-down of 
deportations after January 1917 – although forced labour continued in one form or 
another.174 
 
However, population movement still occurred until the end of the war in two other 
forms.  The first involved repatriations from the occupied area to unoccupied France.175  
Evacuees were transported through Switzerland to Évian or Annecy, where they were 
interviewed by the French military Service des Renseignements and became refugees 
within their own country.176  In total, about 500,000 people were evacuated from the 
occupied area during the war,177 including 10% of the Nord’s population.178  The logic 
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behind these removals from the occupied zone seems to have been one of the Germans 
removing ‘bouches inutiles’ and keeping the potentially productive human material.179 
 
The second was hostage-taking.  The Germans, mirroring tactics used in the Franco-
Prussian War,180 took certain occupés hostage to assure the fulfilment of German 
demands or to dissuade the population from engaging in hostile acts.  Sometimes the 
French were permitted to nominate hostages, sometimes the Germans chose them; often 
hostages were local notables, and had to spend at least a night in a prison.181  However, 
occasionally the Germans took larger numbers of hostages and sent them to camps 
outside of France, such as in Lithuania or, for most Nordiste hostages, Holzminden in 
Germany.  There, these ‘civilian prisoners’ faced further restrictions and suffering, but 
most returned home after a certain period of internment.182 
 
The occupation of the Nord and northern France more generally from 1914 until 1918 
was therefore above all an experience of suffering.  Hardship generally increased after 
1916 as German rule tightened in response to the military losses of that year (at the 
Battles of the Somme and Verdun), and to the heightened effects of the Allied naval 
blockade.  It has been suggested that harsher German measures, such as the use of 
deportation and more frequent use of forced labourers, may have been a way of winning 
over hungry Germans, particularly women.183  If this is the case, then the policies of 
occupation from 1916 in some sense represent what Horne has called ‘remobilization,’184 
an attempt by the Kaiserreich to bolster support for the war and reinvigorate Germany’s 
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own culture de guerre.  These policies may also have reflected a growing desperation; this 
is nominally perceived to be the explanation of German policies during the liberation 
period, involving scorched earth tactics and the forced evacuation of French civilians 
from the shifting front.185  Kramer argues that the exploitation of occupied territories and 
the attendant destruction of property, industrial and agricultural capital arose from 
strategic, political and economical calculations.186  Isabel Hull believes that the 
explanation lies within wider German (Prussian) military culture, which had developed a 
totalising logic since the Franco-Prussian War, crystallised in the conflict with the 
Herero.187 
 
Yet although occupation was an unpleasant experience for French civilians throughout 
the entire four years, it was never as violent as that of the Eastern Front, which seem to 
have been forerunners to those of the Second World War.188  Nevertheless, in the Nord 
as elsewhere, total war led to total occupation, to adapt Peter Holquist’s summary of the 
First World War’s effects on Russia.189  Hull believes that the extent of the German 
instrumentalisation of the civilian population, the expropriation of wealth, and the 
destruction of infrastructure ‘merits without hyperbole the word “total.”’190  Economic 
woes, hunger, penury, restrictions on liberty of movement and expression, forced labour, 
deportation, the presence of hundreds of thousand of German troops nearby – in short, a 
‘total’ occupation – suggest that Nordistes would have had extremely limited choices and 
courses of action.  Yet, as Taylor has pointed out for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the 
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Second World War, whilst the Germans desired to be so, they were not in fact 
omnipotent.191  Choices and actions were restricted and subsequently took on greater 
symbolism, but there still remained a surprising and interesting range of responses to the 
occupation.  Such reactions were guided by the culture de l’occupé, a differing form of 
wider war culture inevitably coloured by daily contact with the enemy.  It is to these 
choices, perspectives, understandings – this culture – that this thesis now turns.
                                                 





Part I – Une sacrée désunion: mauvaise conduite 
 
Collaboration is associated with the Second World War and, up until 1940 at least, was a 
neutral word meaning ‘working together.’  Its meaning later became more loaded, 
involving moral repugnancy and ideological perversion, particularly associated in French 
cultural and historical memory with the Vichy regime in what Henri Rousso calls the 
‘Vichy syndrome.’1  The word ‘collaboration’ is therefore problematic for an analysis of 
this earlier occupation, yet underlying notions are relevant.  In 1914-18 the occupation 
was more limited geographically, but more limiting for the occupied population; there 
were choices to be made nonetheless, based around symbols and actions.  The boundary 
between patriotism and treason was fluid, often crossing the grey area of 
‘accommodement’2 or more simply ‘survival.’ 
 
In this environment, French war culture morphed into a different culture de l’occupé.  
Central to this was the notion of respectability, involving unwritten but widely-accepted 
social mores combined with patriotism, which dictated what was perceived as correct and 
incorrect behaviour.  It informed French interaction with the thousands of German men 
living alongside them.  Many were aware of this moral-patriotic framework and the 
potential criticism from compatriots for a perceived breach of the limits of respectability.  
This was an extension of wider French war culture, outlined by Jean-Yves Le Naour:  
À l’heure où les Français versent leur sang pour la patrie menacée, il est 
intolérable que certains se défilent et s’affranchissent de leur devoir. 
 La surveillance collective, voire l’autosurveillance, rappelle les 
individus à l’ordre: tous doivent avoir une conduite irréprochable, sans 
quoi se battre est une tromperie, l’idéal est sali et la victoire 
compromise.3 
 
                                                 
1 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome. 
2 Whitaker summarises this attitude: ‘Before long people in Roubaix began to settle down under the new 
rêgime [sic] – not at all with the calmness of despair, but because they thought it was as well to make the 
best of a bad job.  Anyway, the war would be over at Christmas, and there was no use making a fuss.’  
Whitaker, Under the Heel, p.31. 





The next two chapters examine perceived breaches of this moral-patriotic framework, 
broadly defined.  The reality behind accusations of wrongdoing is almost impossible to 
discern, although an attempt will be made to judge the ‘real’ scale of such behaviours.  
Nevertheless, the perceptions themselves prove a fascinating subject of study, a doorway 
into the culture de l’occupé.  I will highlight the forms that misconduct was perceived to 
have taken, and argue that types of behaviour were criticised which do not fall into the 
remit of the loaded, anachronistic term ‘collaboration,’ and which were not necessarily 
illegal.4  Subsequently, a new conceptual category for understanding the ‘dark side’ of 
this occupation, and perhaps others, is proposed.  That category is ‘mauvaise conduite.’ 
 
Defining mauvaise conduite 
On 8th November 1918, the Applancourt sisters from Prisches were under investigation 
for their occupation conduct.  It was alleged they told the Germans that their father was 
hiding weapons, leading to his imprisonment.  They were also accused of having German 
lovers; one daughter admitted this was true.  The episode illustrates the conflation of 
treason and sexual misconduct.5  It is unclear what the truth is, although their mother 
spoke of her ‘déshonneur’ at her daughters’ ‘relations avec l’ennemi.’6  Whatever the 
reality, the witnesses interviewed did not approve of the actions of the sisters; the 
investigating gendarme stated that he was examining their mauvaise conduite 
(misconduct or bad behaviour).7  This term does not relate uniquely to occupation 
behaviour – mauvaise conduite existed as a concept before the war8 – and the term was 
not employed all that frequently.  Nevertheless, people from the occupied area did 
occasionally use the term mauvaise conduite to describe behaviour that was, to them, 
                                                 
4 Becker, Cicatrices, p.296. 
5 ADN 9R1197: Prisches, Lotard, report nº231, 8th November 1918. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 





deplorable from a moral-patriotic standpoint.9  It was interchangeable with the word 
‘inconduite,’10 but I opt for mauvaise conduite, partly echoing Gromaire’s notion of 
‘mauvais éléments.’11  Its antithesis was belle conduite, for which individuals were praised 
after the war.12 
 
This notion provides a springboard from which to launch a new conceptual category.  I 
use mauvaise conduite as an umbrella term to describe forms of behaviour not all labelled 
explicitly under this rubric at the time, but perceived in a negative light by occupied, and 
occasionally non-occupied, compatriots.  It refers to any kind of complicity, not just to 
actions which were illegal or harmed compatriots, although the multiple forms of 
misconduct were intertwined, in perceptions and possibly in practice.  Certainly, all 
actions viewed as misconduct received similar opprobrium whether in diaries, interviews 
with repatriated individuals, or post-war police reports or trials.  Sexual relations were 
derided as much as denunciations; friendly relations were scorned as much as commerce 
with the Germans. 
 
The ‘respectable’ behaviour against which mauvaise conduite was placed involved acts 
such as refusing to work for the Germans, remaining hostile to and avoiding all forms of 
intimacy with the enemy, and staying ‘dignified’ despite daily privations.  Against this 
framework, legal actions such as sexual or friendly relations with Germans, or leading a 
lifestyle considered overly lavish, could only be perceived as betraying the community.  
Misconduct also veered into the illegal, although legal, semi-illegal and illegal misconduct 
were often conflated – complicity never came alone, because of the need to redefine the 
                                                 
9 See, for example, SHD 17N433: Sûreté Générale, 3e Armée Britannique, État-Major, Procès-verbal 21st 
December 1917, testimony of Henri Duquenne (Courchelettes); ADHS 4M513: Évian, Rapatriés, report 
nº1264, 28th April 1917; nº675, 5th February 1917.  
10 See, for example, SHD 19N547: G.Q.G., État-Major-Général, 2e Bureau, S.R.A., Note pour les S.R. 
d’Armée, 14th August 1916; SHD 17N433: Mission Française de Sûreté Générale attachée à la 4e Armée 
Britannique, Procès-verbal nº238, 7th February 1918 (Auby).   
11 Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.334. 
12 ADN 15J87: Commission Historique du Nord, Questionnaire de la Guerre de 1914, Département du 





community as one of suffering, both for the occupied population and the fighting French 
soldiers.  Any affront to the community of suffering, whether sleeping with Germans or 
actively spying for them, suggested further complicity; the abandonment of the local 
community for the enemy could never be purely symbolic.   
 
To examine all aspects of mauvaise conduite, and to highlight the way in which illegal 
and legal misconduct was conflated, it is necessary to outline the Third Republic’s legal 
understanding of ‘collaboration’ (as Renée Martinage calls it).  In the only work 
specifically dealing with collaboration in the First World War, Martinage explains that 
this emanates from articles 77-79 of the code pénal, involving the crime of ‘intelligence 
avec l’ennemi.’13  This covered passing information of military or political nature to 
enemies and carrying out espionage on their behalf, but also ‘fournir aux ennemis des 
secours en soldats, hommes, argent, vivres, armes ou munitions.’14  This legal definition 
of these crimes against state security meant that engaging in any form of commerce with 
the enemy, as well as aiding them on a more obvious ‘intelligence’ level, constituted 
treason.  Yet, for many, this legal understanding was not the final word.  Less clearly-
defined ‘antipatriotic’ behaviour, theoretically exempt from punishment and arguably less 
important in the eyes of French law, was frequently perceived as equally repugnant and 
worthy of punishment (or at least disdain) by the local populations themselves.  
Consequently, any sort of ‘relations’ (sexual, friendly, commercial or other) with the 
Germans were deemed unsavoury, if not illegal, and thus comprised mauvaise conduite.  
Often legal misconduct was said to occur alongside illegal misconduct.  It must be stated 
that the use of the term mauvaise conduite does not reflect a judgement on the 
historian’s part – instead it is based on contemporary perceptions and culture. 
                                                 
13 Renée Martinage, ‘Les collaborateurs devant la cour d’assises du Nord après la très Grande Guerre,’ 
Revue du Nord, 77:309 (January-March 1995), p.99-101, including footnotes.   





I – Collaboration horizontale?  Sexual mauvaise conduite 
 
Notions of mauvaise conduite were always heavily gendered – it was seen as a 
fundamentally female phenomenon.1  This ties in with the demographic of the Nord, but 
also with the idea that collaboration was linked to weakness and submission.  Even after 
the Second World War this was still the case: Anne Simonin argues that the 
collaboratrice remains the key feature of French collective memory of this war – 
collaboration itself, as Sartre argued, being ‘la collaboration’ for a reason, constituting 
‘une activité féminine.’2  Indeed, as Philippe Nivet has demonstrated, in 1914-18 this 
gendering of collaboration was the cornerstone of the non-occupied French view of the 
occupied populations as ‘Boches du Nord.’3 
 
The primary form of this misconduct involved intimate relations between French women 
and Germans.  Nivet and Le Naour have studied this topic in depth, highlighting the 
view of such women as ‘mauvaises Françaises’ or ‘femmes à Boches’ by their compatriots 
on both sides of the trenches.4  Sexual relations with the Germans were viewed as a moral 
crime, a transgression of what Le Naour calls ‘l’interdit patriotique.’5  Sexual misconduct 
was perceived as occurring on a large scale: the Commissaire de Police of Comines, 
interviewed at Évian on 20th December 1917, estimated that eight out of ten women had 
frequented the Germans, bourgeois women as much as working-class women – the latter 
                                                 
1 Redier noted that: ‘Des écrivains ont raconté les orgies nocturnes de cette racaille: ils ont pris tant de 
plaisir aux ébats de femmes sans nom ni patrie qui vivaient alors de la guerre et se vendaient aux 
Allemands, qu’ils n’ont pas du tout, ces Français, pensé aux autres, à nos femmes, à nos filles, 
délibérément jetées dans des bouges orduriers par les barbares.’  Antoine Redier, Allemands, p.242-3. 
2 Anne Simonin, ‘La femme invisible: la collaboratrice politique,’ Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, 
société, N°9 (September-December 2009), p.1 and 3, accessed online on 5th July 2011 at www.histoire-
politique.fr 
3 Nivet, Boches. 
4 Ibid., pp.387-421; idem, ‘Femmes’; idem, France, pp.279-92; Le Naour, Misères, pp.276-300; idem, 
‘Femmes tondues et répression des “femmes à boches” en 1918,’ Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine, 47:1 (January-March 2000), pp.148-158. 





‘qui ont au moins l’excuse de la souffrance et de la misère.’6  Repatriated inhabitants from 
Valenciennes estimated that 60% of women engaged in debauchery with the Germans.7  
Even if the reality was less dramatic, the belief that this was the case and the disdain in 
which such women were held was central to the culture de l’occupé – and this belief was 
ubiquitous.  Accusations of sexual misconduct flood documents relating interviews of 
repatriated or liberated people from all occupied departments, and Nordistes feature 
prominently.8  Nivet describes this as an obsession of the occupied populations,9 and Le 
Naour notes that ‘la figure de la “femme à boches” se figure dans la quasi-totalité des 
témoignages.’10  Becker believes these are not purely witness testimony, because ‘Le 
conflit n’est pas fini, tous les moyens sont bons pour vaincre, et accuser des milliers de 
femmes de rapports avec l’occupant est une façon d’exonérer les hommes incapables de 
gagner la guerre.’11  For Becker, the reality is that ‘les rapports entre femmes françaises et 
hommes allemands ont été alors très limités,’12 but the truth is imposible to verify; the 
obsession itself is the only verifiable fact.   
 
There was a difference between ‘frequenting the Germans’ (always implying intimacy, 
usually sexual) and general ‘debauchery’ (which may have been less likely to involve 
sexual acts, but other unrespectable actions such as drunkenness or dancing).  Often 
actions regarded as sexual did not involve sex but constituted a breach of the limits of 
acceptability, such as playing an accordion in the presence of Germans.  Indeed, a man 
being in a room with a woman on her own was unrespectable, even more so if the man 
was a German.  Yet there was also a distinction between public and private intimacy, 
with public displays of closeness usually perceived as more reprehensible, and private 
intimacy more based on assumptions.  Further, some forms of evidence are more 
                                                 
6 ADHS 4M519, Commissariat d’Évian, interrogatoire nº3362, 20th December 1917, cited in Le Naour, 
‘Femmes tondues,’ p.152. 
7 ADHS 4M352, report nº356, 19th December 1916, cited in Nivet, Boches, 388. 
8 See ADHS 4M513, 517-20; SHD 17N433, 19N547, 19N1571, passim. 
9 Nivet, Boches, 387. 
10 Le Naour, Misères, p.276. 






objective than others: rumour and rapatrié testimony is more questionable than witness 
statements in police reports, for instance. 
 
Archival evidence demonstrates the extent of the fixation – see the following tables. 
 
Statistical breakdown of suspect individuals in January-April 1917 interviews with 
rapatriés 
Total number of suspect indivudals 1,566 
Number of Nordistes among all suspects 1,237 
Number of female Nordistes among all suspects 928 
Total number of female Nordistes accused of sexual misconduct 690 
13 
Statistical breakdown of suspects compiled by the British I(b) Intelligence Service, 
July-October 1918 
Total number of suspect individuals identifiable by sex 797 
Total number of women among all suspects 702 
Total number of women from the Nord 416 
Total number of female Nordistes signalled as: mistresses of 
Germans, prostituting themselves or family members to the 
Germans, having intimate relations with Germans, having 
been treated for venereal disease, having children born of 
German fathers, or being on ‘good’ or ‘friendly’ terms with 
Germans (usually implying sexual intimacy) 
362 
14 
French Deuxième Bureau suspect lists also contain many women accused of intimacy 
with the Germans, although files devoted to the Nord are lacking.15 
                                                 
13 ADHS 4M513, passim.  ‘At least,’ because often the suspect’s gender and crime is unclear, and I have 
yet to carry out a statistical survey of the remaining Évian interrogations listed above. 
14 US NA Record Group 120: entry 198, and Record Group 165.  Thanks to Tammy Proctor for sending 





Lifting the Veil: Liberation 
Documents remain of post-liberation investigations carried out in a small section of the 
Nord – effectively Lille’s metropolitan area16 – by French gendarmes primarily attached 
to the British Army.17  These inquiries concentrated on almost 500 women, all accused of 
having engaged in sexual misconduct (mainly prostitution) with Germans.18  It thus 
appears that this form of misconduct was scrutinised more frequently than others.  This 
may be linked to the soldiers’ wartime inhibitions and rumours regarding the infidelity of 
wives and girlfriends, even in unoccupied France – many wrote of the ‘désordres et 
débauche dans le sexe feminine,’19 suggesting that occupied women were a priori viewed 
as suspects.  In any case, such inquiries were also conducted in spring 1917 when the 
Germans retreated to the Siegfried-Hindenburg line, leaving numerous villages to be 
recaptured by the Allies.20  Investigating such misconduct in the Aisne-Nord sector in 
April 1917, commissaire spécial Busch distinguished three types of suspect women: those 
who had children born of German fathers, those who had intimate relations with the 
Germans (including prostitutes), and those who underwent medical visits and had 
venereal disease.21  These categories of suspect behaviour are present in all investigations 
into female conduct. 
 
Whilst the post-liberation investigations into female behaviour were more numerous, 
they were often less detailed than investigations into male misconduct (see below).  As 
with all documents on mauvaise conduite, these gendarme reports may not be wholly 
representative, since the documents that survive seemingly constitute only a randomly 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 See, for example, SHD 17N207: lists of suspects in Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
16 ADN 9R1196.  The communes present are: Croix, Flers, Lannoy, Leers, Lys, Mouvaux, Roubaix, 
Toufflers, Wasquehal and Wattrelos. 
17 See ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 David Englander, ‘The French Soldier, 1914-18,’ French History, 1 (1987), p.57. 
20 Smith et al., France, p.119. 






preserved part of a much larger original corpus.22  Perhaps because of the widespread 
nature of these inquiries, and the large number of suspects investigated, such reports are 
considerably shorter than the procès-verbaux concerning male mauvaise conduite.  These 
‘female mauvaise conduite’ reports usually comprise a few lines, detailing the woman’s 
actions during the occupation, whether she had undergone ‘medical testing’ for venereal 
disease at the hands of German or French authorities, and finally whether the gendarme 
thought it prudent for her to undergo such tests at the time of writing and/or be expelled 
from the liberated region.  This appears to have been the only punishment used against 
these particular women, even for those who were said to have been involved in what 
might be viewed as more ‘serious,’ ‘illegal,’ and ‘antipatriotic’ actions (such as 
denouncing compatriots).23  This attests to the temporary nature of these rapid 
investigations and their conclusions, although expulsion is hardly a mild punishment. 
 
What is clear is that numerous witnesses, and indeed the investigating French authorities, 
did believe that misconduct had taken place during the occupation – and devoted 
considerable amounts of manpower and time to uncover the ‘truth.’  However, the 
gendarmes also investigated tales of German atrocities, of pillage and destruction during 
the German retreat, and occasionally of resistance on the part of the occupés24 – thus 
they were not specifically ordered to investigate mauvaise conduite exclusively.  Indeed, 
often cases of resistance are mixed with tales of collaboration: one report into activities in 
the commune of Rejet-de-Beaulieu noted that six English soldiers were hidden by locals 
for four to five months, until they were denounced by other inhabitants.25   
 
Yet many reports are dominated by the sexual conduct of these women, not necessarily 
‘antipatriotic’ conduct.  Indeed, in some cases the sexual conduct of women is described 
as questionable or even deplorable, although they are not seen as a suspect from the 
                                                 
22 Fitzpatrick, ‘Signals,’ p.835-6.  Fitzpatrick refers to letters of denunciation being randomly preserved. 
23 ADN 9R1196: Croix, Chasseing, 7th November 1918. 
24 See ADN 9R1197, passim. 





‘point de vue national,’26 or not perceived to have caused harm to or denounced their 
compatriots.27  Sometimes women’s sexual relations with the Germans were confirmed, 
but the investigator concluded with ‘Je ne crois pas qu’on puisse lui reprocher des faits 
d’espionnage ou de dénonciation.’28  It was only legal treason that could be punished and 
judged.  This seems to demonstrate, paradoxically, both the non-occupied French 
authorities’ understanding of the complexity of occupied life, but also a lack of 
comprehension of the culture de l’occupé, which conflated sexual and other misconduct, 
viewing them as inextricably linked and equally reprehensible.  
 
Prostitution 
One sub-branch of sexual misconduct was prostitution.  It is extremely difficult to 
determine whether reports of prostitution are true, not only in the sense of whether 
women accused of such actions carried them out, but if they did, also whether they 
perceived of it as prostitution in the same way the gendarmes and the French authorities 
did.  Further, according to the historian Benoît Majerus, in his work on wartime 
prostitution in Brussels, ‘les prostituées sont en quelque sorte doublement des 
“Oublié[e]s de la Grande Guerre” […]: en tant que membres des populations occupées et 
en tant que marginales de ces sociétés.’29  As a marginal section of a marginalised 
population, itself rather occluded from First World War historiography and memory, 
prostitutes and the reality of prostitution prove an elusive topic to study. 
 
Nevertheless, Nivet remarks that many women admitted being prostitutes during Évian 
interrogations, and concludes that ‘L’essor de la prostitution semble avoir été important 
                                                 
26 Ibid., Croix, Porceaux, 9th November 1918; Mouvaux, Fontaneau, 1st November 1918; Mouvaux, 
Déprez, 30th October 1918; Roubaix, Feóx-Courtis, 31st October 1918. 
27 Ibid., Croix, Duhain, 8th November 1918; Lannoy, Mignot, 4th November 1918; Lannoy, Huilliez, 14th 
November 1918. 
28 Ibid., Leers, Hectrin, 3rd November 1918. 
29 Benoît Majerus, ‘La prostitution à Bruxelles pendant la Grande Guerre: contrôle et pratique,’ Crime, 






en zone occupée.’30  Of the 490 women investigated in November 1918, 178 were 
explicitly mentioned as being prostitutes or suspected as such (via the phrase ‘passe pour 
s’être livrée à la prostitution’)31 – and most of the phrases used to describe the remaining 
women suggest prostitution, such as statements like ‘s’est livrée plusieurs fois aux soldats 
allemands.’32  From the language of reports it seems that prostitution was perceived by 
investigating authorities as worse than a ‘normal,’ spontaneous relationship between 
French women and Germans.  This was despite the fact that the latter could be seen as 
more ‘collaborationist,’ especially considering that – theoretically – the act of prostitution 
meant that certain Germans were ‘spending’ valuable resources rather than leaving them 
to the military, not to mention the threat of these soldiers contracting venereal disease!  
Not everyone agrees that prostitution was solely a negative act, with one recent author 
arguing that ‘Les putaines ont fait autant de dégâts dans l’armée allemande que les canons 
de 75 français.’33  As Majerus notes: ‘En période de guerre, la prostitution est encore plus 
fortement stigmatisée qu’en temps de paix. Elle est à l’opposé de l’image qu’un pays en 
guerre se fait de lui-même […] Dans un pays coupé de son armée, le devoir patriotique 
est jugé particulièrement important. Il permet de poursuivre la lutte contre l’ennemi sur 
le home front. La prostituée apparaît dans ce contexte comme traître.’34  This is also 
explained by the focus on the safety of Allied soldiers and the fear of venereal disease, as 
well as more general concerns about racial purity and national hygiene, which further 
developed across Europe in the post-war period.35   
 
                                                 
30 Nivet, France, p.283. 
31 ADN 9R1196: Croix, report by Poreaux, n°154, 7th November 1918.  Henceforth the words ‘report by’ 
will be omitted and the format will be: ‘Locality, name of report author, report number (if available), 
report date.’ 
32 Ibid., Wasquehal, Fleury, n°97, 5th November 1918. 
33 Jean-Claude Auriol, Ténèbres, p.40. 
34 Majerus, ‘Prostitution,’ p.7-8.  Italics in orginal.  See also Becker, Cicatrices, p.240-1. 
35 See, for example, Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London, 1998), 
pp.77-105.  For such fears during the war itself, see Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, L’enfant de l’ennemi, 





Indeed, evidence of women officially recognised as prostitutes or ‘femmes de mauvaise 
vie’ by the Germans was seen as incriminating for the women, not the national enemy.  
Such evidence could comprise being a registered prostitute (cartée), having undergone 
medical examinations or time in hospital recovering from venereal disease, or even having 
been arrested by the Germans for unlicensed prostitution or propagation of venereal 
disease.36  This was not conceived of by post-liberation French authorities as proof of 
questionable behaviour on the Germans’ part: they were not alive to the possibility that 
Germans may have forced thousands of ‘innocent’ women to undergo medical 
examinations, treating them like prostitutes, which numerous occupation memoirs and 
later histories claim did happen.37  Any woman who underwent a medical exam at the 
hands of the Germans was instantly suspect in the eyes of French authorities – 
representative of what Stéphane Audouin-Rouzeau describes as a French 
‘syphilophobie,’38 and of the ‘péril vénérien,’39 a fear of venereal disease and national 
degeneration heightened by the war, and an arguably rational fear of disease spreading 
among the troops.  As is thus evident, both the French and Germans shared this fear, and 
the German ‘contrôle sanitaire totale, véritable dictature prophylactique’40 thus rendered 
many occupées suspect in the eyes of the post-liberation French (particularly military) 
authorities.   
 
The extent of German control and the number of prostitutes can be gleaned through 
statistical information: on I(b) subject lists, 64 Nordistes are accused of prostitution;41 at 
least 65 appear in the Évian testimonies examined.42  German documents concerning 
prostitutes having undergone medical treatment (seemingly for venereal disease) in 
                                                 
36 ADN 9R1196: Croix, Duhain, n°276, 9th November 1918 and Chasseing, n°294,10th November 1918; 
Wasquehal, Fleury, n°78, 5th November 1918, et passim. 
37 See, for example, Trochon, Lille, p.128-9; Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.459-63; Redier, Allemands, 
p.46. 
38 Audoin-Rouzeau, L’enfant de l’ennemi, p.155. 
39 Le Naour, Misères, p.127.  
40 Ibid., p.142. 
41 US NA Record Group 120: entry 198, and Record Group 165. 





various hospitals in Lille, and who were discharged in December 1916, list at least 1,221 
women (some of whom came from Belgium).43  By the liberation, 6,200 women 
‘appartenant à tous les mondes’ had been treated for VD in the four dispensaires of Lille 
– although not all had been prostitutes, the Commissaire de Police of Lille nevertheless 
provided these statistics in the middle of a paragraph about prostitution, which had ‘pris 
des proportions considérables dès l’arrivée des allemands [sic].’44  In Tourcoing, just one 
lazaret had treated 410 women by 31st December 1916.45  Prostitution and attendant 
controls therefore seem to have existed on a large scale.  It was not just the Germans who 
took a dim view of prostitution (and female sexual conduct) for hygiene reasons – the 
local French administration and religious authorities in the occupied territory continued 
pre-war anti-prostitution and anti-VD policies, thus mostly supported German measures 
(although not the enforced medical visits on women who were not prostitutes), viewing 
prostitution as a ‘fléau’46 and also talking of the ‘Péril Vénérien [sic].’47 
 
However, any contact with Germans does appear to have also been perceived by the non-
occupied French authorities as morally and physically dangerous and contagious: in all of 
the aforementioned 490 post-liberation investigations in the Nord, Germans are 
mentioned, even in those regarding women who are not explicitly described as 
prostitutes.48  These cases only come to light because of contact with the Germans.  Thus 
there seems to be some confusion for the investigating gendarmes about what exactly 
they were looking for – sexual misconduct or patriotic misconduct, or both, with each 
one reinforcing the other.  Further, not all cases of intimate relations with Germans were 
automatically perceived as prostitution: in one extraordinary case, one Mlle Lenoy of the 
commune of Lannoy responded to accusations that she had had intimate relations with, 
                                                 
43 AML 4H265 bis: ‘Dispensaire des filles soumises.’  The list is incomplete and messy, so it is impossible 
to know the complete number. 
44 ADN 9R584: Report of Commissaire de Police de Lille, 12th November 1918. 
45 AMT H4A30: Refuge de Femmes, Boulevard Gambetta 270, 15th January 1917. 
46 AML 4H265 bis: Bureau d’Hygiène to the mayor, 22nd November 1916. 
47 AML 4H123: Dr Calmette, ‘Ce qu’il faut dire à nos Jeune Gens en prévision de leur départ possible 
loin de leur foyer familial,’ April 1917, p.1.  Original emphasis. 





and even married, a German infantry sergeant by stating: ‘L’amour n’a pas de Patrie.’  
The report continues: ‘Malgré cela sa conduite n’était pas scandaleuse,’49 clearly 
demonstrating that the focus is on sexual behaviour – although Lenoy’s comments reflect 
non-patriotic rather than anti-patriotic sentiment. 
 
Living it Up 
Not all investigating gendarmes, and especially occupés themselves, were so forgiving.  
Stock phrases reappear throughout the reports, used to describe the actions of the 
women, and these provide an insight into the nature and perception of sexual mauvaise 
conduite.  Women who ‘faisait la noce/la fête,’ who were seen or heard to be dancing, 
singing and listening to music with the Germans, and who frequented or were 
frequented by the Germans, or even those who showed a ‘sympathetic attitude’ towards 
the Germans, were considered to be morally suspect.50  Indeed, during the war the Xe 
Armée compiled lists of ‘personnes suspectes’ and ‘habitants douteux’ (as well as 
‘personnes sûres’) in occupied territory likely to be re-conquered in an Allied advance; 
two women in Caudry and two in Denain were listed as suspects because they ‘font la 
fête avec les Allemands.’51  Thus the merest hint at a positive (or even the absence of a 
negative) attitude towards the Germans, and even friendly rather than overtly sexual 
actions, gave rise to suspicion amongst the local population.  Dancing, singing, and 
generally having a good time with Germans appears to have been perceived as a particular 
brand of antipatriotic mauvaise conduite. 
 
In the commune of Wattrelos, a cabaretière is mentioned in a gendarme’s report as 
having received Germans at her home, which was a place ‘pour consommer et danser’ 
                                                 
49 Ibid., Lannoy, Ghesquier, n°29, 15th November 1918. 
50 Ibid., Croix, Duhain, n°123, 6th November 1918 and n°254, 8th November 1918; Dupuis, n°193 and 
n°199, 7th November 1918 and n°245, 8th November 1918; Fleury, n°156, 9th November 1918; Duchain, 
n°183, 7th November 1918; Roubaix, Paris, n.d. (seemingly 25th-27th October 1918); Flers, Beaussart, 
n°59, 5th November 1918; Lys, Fontaneau, 29th October 1918, et passim. 
51 SHD 19N1571: ‘Renseignement’ cards, Caudry and Denain.  There was seemingly a difference 
between being ‘suspect’ and ‘douteux’ – both appear in ‘2° Bureau S.R., Zone des missions d’Agents du 





(she was also said to be the mistress of a German and had undergone a sanitary visit).52  
The occupés (during and after the occupation) themselves looked on such behaviour with 
disdain and suspicion, as can be viewed in the testimony of one Mme Thibaux regarding 
the conduct of Mme de Metz, a fellow inhabitant of Solre-le-Château.  Other than the 
denunciations for which de Metz was allegedly responsible, her behaviour was also 
suspect because she had had relations with German soldiers throughout the occupation, 
especially gendarmes, many of whom were her lovers.  Further, ‘C’était constamment, et 
nuit et jour, des fêtes chez elle, on y dansait et on y faisait de la musique.’53 
 
In her Évian interrogation, rapatriée Mme Gondry of Hautmont stated that Daria 
Gregoire and her sister Marguerite – daughters in a family of German sympathisers, with 
their father and their brother working voluntarily for the Germans – ‘se rendaient 
fréquemment chez Madame RAMART, Louis, où un nommé LACROIX…..22 ans [sic], 
jouait de l’accordéon et où l’on dansait et chantait.’54  The fact that such details are 
mentioned suggests that they were regarded as scandalous: combined with her other 
behaviour, they provided the final proof of the moral corruption of such women.  In a 
post-war document regarding a woman who allegedly prostituted herself during the 
occupation, the following damning sentence was underlined: ‘Elle festoyait avec eux et se 
saoûlait [sic].’55  Thus, just as in Belgium, feasting and partying became ‘l’ultime signe de 
l’infamie […] l’injustice par excellence, l’image même de la trahison du Malheur 
commun, l’inversion du deuil et de la faim.’56 
 
Flaunting luxury and wealth became another form of mauvaise conduite.  There was 
sometimes a class element to this, perhaps linked to puritanical Catholicism.  In Lille, the 
                                                 
52 ADN 9R1196: Wattrelos, Hussier, n°43, 8th November 1918. 
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l’Armée Britannique, Prévôté de D-1), 16th November 1918.  Testimony of Mme Thibaux. 
54 US NA Record Group 120: Entry 198 – Procès-verbal, declaration de Madame GONDRY, Marie, 
rapatriée de Hautmont, Nord, 1918. 
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female workers of the textile mills (filatures) displayed no sense of economy: they 
‘cherchent à satisfaire surtout leur désir de gourmandise plutôt que de rechercher un peu 
de bien être [sic] ou de parer aux besoins les plus urgents; c’est ainsi qu’on voit des 
femmes, des mères de famille, acheter dans les pâtisseries des bonbons et chocolats, alors 
que les riches s’en privent.’57  Public displays of joy and extravagance were unfitting 
during wartime, when the occupied population believed it was engaged in unified, 
dignified suffering for France – a ‘Calvary’ according to many in the pious Nord.58   
 
During the occupation itself, police reports from the Commissariat central of Lille 
mention ‘délits’ of people (usually cabaret owners, often female such as Mme de Metz) 
having ‘laissé danser et jouer de la musique sans autorisation.’59  This may simply refer to 
probable laws regarding the permission required to put on shows or other forms of 
entertainment, but it may be said even in this dry list there seems to be an underlying 
notion that such behaviour was simply not acceptable given the circumstances.  Further, 
judging from other sources, it is likely that such cabarets had Germans as their clientele, 
with female occupées joining them.60  This still remains as evidence that not everyone 
forwent enjoyment during the occupation, contrary to what the majority of narratives of 
the occupation (memoirs and histories) lead the reader to believe. 
 
The contempt in which these women were held is explicit: Séraphine Descamps from 
Trélon was said to live a scandalous life with German officers.61  In the commune of Lys-
lez-Lannoy, according to the mayor, one Mme Terrasse had always demonstrated ‘good’ 
behaviour before the war.  However, during the occupation she demonstrated ‘une 
conduite déplorable’: although she was not a prostitute, ‘sa maison était fréquentée par 
                                                 
57 ADHS 4M513: report nº989, 14th March 1917. 
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59 See, for example, AML 4H267: Commissariat central de Lille, ‘crimes, délits, évènements’ report of 11-
12th December 1916, et passim. 
60 Roubaisien David Hirsch noted on 12th July 1915 that ‘Tous les cafés fermés jour et nuit sauf quelques-
uns exclusivement pour les allemands [sic].’  Becker, Journaux, p.242. 





beaucoup de soldats allemands,’ one of whom had been her lover, with whom she often 
walked in the street and ‘faisait la fête.’  She was consequently expelled from her home by 
her father-in-law, moving in with her aunt in Leers, where her conduct was ‘très 
repréhensible [sic]’ – ‘sa maison était le rendez-vous des policeman [sic] ennemis, et 
beaucoup de marchandises et denrées saisies par eux étaient achetées par elle et revendues 
à son bénéfice.’62  The negative judgement of her behaviour is palpable – once again, 
sexual and other misconduct are linked – and is closely tied to wider social mores, held 
by all classes.  For example, in July 1915 a woman from Tourcoing who had left ‘le 
domicile maternel pour vivre en concubinage’ with a Frenchman was refused the 
allowance to which she had been entitled whilst living with her mother, because the 
municipality thought that this would encourage ‘l’inconduite de cette fille’ and would be 
‘contraire à tout principe de morale.’63  This is an example of pre-war morality, but there 
are ways in which this combines with a culture de l’occupé to create a new morality. 
 
Many women engaged in sexual misconduct were seen as not only betraying their 
country, but their husbands at the front, and polite society.  Often the extra detail ‘le 
mari est sur le front/mobilisé/prisonnier’ was added without commentary by those 
interrogated at Évian,64 and post-war investigators.65  This critical detail spoke for itself, 
its concise phrasing full of the restraint seen as lacking in these women.  Overall, at least 
270 married women from the Nord were suspected by interrogated refugees of intimate 
relations with the Germans.66  A wartime French intelligence report about occupied Lille 
suggests that such relationships may have actually represented attempts to ameliorate the 
situation of husbands, brothers and sons who were prisoners-of-war.67  Nevertheless, the 
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65 See ADN 9R1196. 
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view of refugees was simplistic: ‘Les femmes de mobilisables même, se prostituent sans 
vergogne.’68 
 
One patois song allegedly written during the occupation by Labbé,69  entitled ‘A l’ 
Poubelle les Paillaisses à Boches,’ expresses anger at women who danced and drank 
alcohol in the company of Germans – and also demonstrates their lack of social mores 
and morals in saying that these women replied to the vendors of the German-published 
Bulletin de Lille, who would cry out the name of that paper, by shouting ‘Putain de 
Lille!’ at them.70  Such a nickname for the paper could comprise a form of resistance 
against the German-imposed order, but Labbé clearly does not see this as such.  Instead, 
he hints that these women came from the lower class, or had no manners – and thus 
perhaps that it was no surprise that they would ‘frequent’ the Germans.  Labbé wrote 
another two songs on the subject of female misconduct, one being ‘Chin qu’on vo’ 
pendant la guerre (Occupation de Lille par les Allemands).’  The first thing he thought 
worth mentioning in his list of what one sees in Lille during the war was female 
misconduct: 
Mais j’ vos tell’mint d’faits révoltants 
Qu’ malgré mi je m’mets in colère 
Trop d’femm’s sont bien avé l’s all’mands 
V’là chin qu’on vo’ pendant la guerre.71 
 
Labbé’s evident outrage continues in the second and third verses, noting that ‘L’soir 
ch’est honteux d’vir dins les coins/Chés femm’s dins les bras des Alboches,’ and explicitly 
mentioning the possibility of German-born children: ‘Je n’ s’ros point surpris l’an 
prochain/D’ vir des p’tits prussiens v’nir au monte/Dins les choux d’août, ch’est 
                                                 
68 Ibid., report nº496, 17th January 1917 (Valenciennes). 
69 Auguste Labbé, A la Guerre comme à la Guerre: les Boches A Lille – Recueil de chansons lilloises écrites 
pendant L’Occupation Allemande, par Auguste Labbe alias César Latulupe, ex-prisonnier civil du bagne 
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certain/Qu’ pus d’eun’ femm’ récolt’ra d’ la honte.’72  Labbé’s other song dealing with 
‘suspect’ women, entitled ‘Les Bochartes,’ was ostensibly written on 5th August 1915.  
The second verse is striking: 
Oubliant cheux qu’à l’ frontière 
S’ font brav’mint crever la peau 
Chés Bochart’s, plus bass’s que tierre, 
Trahi’ ch’nt leu’ sang, leu’ drapeau, 
Près des Alboch’s, chés friponnes, 
Pour plaire à chés scélérats, 
Ell’s se font lâches et espionnes 
In débinant nos pauf’s soldats, 
Chés femm’s sans honneur, 
Monstres et sans pudeur 
N’ont point pour deux doupes d’ cœur.73 
 
The language used reflects the disdain in which the author, and often the occupied 
population at large, held women who were ‘with the Germans.’  Intimacy with the 
Germans was an intolerable transgression and a form of treason.74   
 
The orgy-like atmosphere evoked when women are said to have received Germans and 
danced or listened to music evidently increases the suspicion regarding their sexual 
conduct, but also suggests that they were engaged in what may be termed expressions of 
happiness, pleasure, or even amusement during this period of sombre ‘martyrdom.’  
These became, as in Belgium, ‘véritable[s] image[s] inverse[s] du malheur quotidien vécu 
par la population.’75   The act of expressing positive emotions and enjoyment was 
frowned upon during a period of war, when Frenchmen were dying for their country, 
and occupés engaged in ‘dignified martyrdom.’76  Nevertheless, as the paper Le Mercure 
segréen noted in June 1918, ‘les provinces martyres ne produisent pas que des saints.’77  
These women were perceived as morally and patriotically suspect, and therefore a mental 
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leap from ‘positive attitude towards the Germans’ to ‘sexual relations with the Germans’ 
was often made, or insinuated; and vice versa.  This once again demonstrates the 
conflation of sexual and other misconduct, a blurring which started with but extended 
beyond the occupés.  Indeed, it is unclear whether investigating gendarmes were more 
focused on sexual behaviour, acting under a brief similar to that of the police des moeurs, 
or on sexual and moral-patriotic conduct.  Women suspected of actions on either side of 
the spectrum were likely to have been expelled from the liberated area during the Allied 
reoccupation.78   
 
It is not clear what happened after their expulsion: perhaps their experience matched that 
of certain ‘femmes de mauvaise vie’ expelled from the Allied zones des armées throughout 
the war, sent to triage camps and kept away from the front.79  Thus it can be argued that 
the aforementioned police reports demonstrate a concern for sexual behaviour above 
patriotic behaviour, even if the latter is taken into consideration; as well as a desire for 
short-term punishments.  Yet such reports also hint at widespread relations between 
French women and Germans during the occupation, with often minimal recognition 
from the authorities of the difficult position in which the population (particularly the 
female part) found itself.  There is little acknowledgement that relationships with 
Germans, even prostitution, sometimes offered the only means of survival for many 
women.80 
 
Sexual mauvaise conduite was the primary form of misconduct, according to the culture 
de l’occupé.  Relations with Germans were considered shameful, unpatriotic betrayals; 
breaches of acceptability and respectability.  Yet in reality and in the perceptions of the 
occupied population, mauvaise conduite went beyond the purely sexual, and was not the 
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sole reserve of women – although they were often still seen as the main perpetrators, with 





II – General mauvaise conduite 
Beyond sexual misconduct, mauvaise conduite took many other forms, in some ways 
prequels to what became crystallised as collaboration in the Second World War. 
 
Denunciations 
On 10th June 1915, retired teacher and diarist M. Blin from Auchy-lez-Orchies described 
the ‘sensational’ events taking place at the hôtel de ville.  The Germans had installed a 
‘placard vitré fermé à clef’ for which the accompanying sign stated: ‘Documents à la 
disposition du public.  Lettres anonymes dans lesquelles les Français calomnient (sic) 
[Blin’s ‘(sic)’] leurs compatriotes.’  Blin was disgusted but perversely hopeful on seeing 
this, noting: ‘Cette plaie honteuse, étalée au plein jour, cette mis au pilori de lâches 
accusations formulées dans une crudité révoltante, arrêtera peut-être, désormais, la plume 
des vilains personnages qui ont l’impudeur d’employer ce procédé indigne de vrais 
Français.’1  The following day, many people came to read the anonymous letters,2 and on 
12th June Blin himself took a closer look, remarking: 
Beaucoup de curieux stationnent devant le placard.  Je remarque 
particulièrement deux nouvelles lettres: La 1ère est signée: “une âme 
dévouée pour vos soldats” (Est-ce bien son âme… & un dévouement 
gratuit?); - la seconde: “une amie dévouée pour l’Allemagne.”  Elles 
émanent donc de femmes, comme la plupart des autres.3 
 
Blin therefore highlights another aspect of the culture de l’occupé: those who denounced 
compatriots to the Germans were overwhelmingly perceived to have been women, often 
those also engaging in sexual misconduct.4  Nivet agrees, remarking: ‘Les interrogatoires 
de rapatriés font fréquemment le lien entre relation intime et collaboration,’5 and later, 
‘La forme de collaboration la plus lourde de conséquences reste les dénonciations.’6  This 
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conflation of sexual comportment and other forms of mauvaise conduite was crucial to 
the culture de l’occupé, and was key to ideas regarding denunciators.   
 
Gromaire put forward both the demographic and cultural arguments for female 
denunciation, writing that ‘Il y avait plus de femmes que d’hommes parmi les mauvais 
éléments, à cause du surnombre des femmes et des rapports familiers qui s’établissaient 
entre ce genre de femmes et les envahisseurs.’7  It is true that accusations of denunciation 
or being an indicateur for the Germans swamp archival documents concerning localities 
across the Nord, whether Évian interrogations or post-war investigations.8  The primacy 
of the dénonciatrice/délatrice (both terms were used) is evident.  Mme Louvion from 
Masnières was said to be intimate with a German Sergeant-Major, ‘faisait la noce’ with 
him and others, and was also dénonciatrice.9  Mme Gilain from Croix was ostensibly 
responsible for denouncing her husband, leading to his imprisonment and subsequent 
death in prison.  It was claimed she did so in order to sleep with Germans.10  Valentine 
Gregoire from Hautmont allegedly engaged in intimate relations with the Germans, as 
did her two daughters Daria and Marguerite, who also underwent a medical visit three 
times a week and putatively denounced inhabitants hiding copper.11  In Valenciennes, 
Mlle Leroy, 
a eu plusieurs amants.  Elle recevait ostensiblement jour et nuit et tirait 
ses moyens d’existence de la générosité de ses amis de passage […] Elle 
était connue sous le nom “Casque d’Or” et pour s’attirer toute l’amitié 
des allemands elle dénonçait les habitants […] Aussi était-elle très 
redoutée et tout le monde en avait peur.12 
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Again, it is clear to see the conflation of illegal but unacceptable sexual conduct with 
genuinely illegal misconduct. 
 
The link between relations/contact with the Germans and denunciation may not have 
always been justified, as non-occupied French authorities realised.  A summary of a 
convoy of rapatriés from Anzin noted that the Germans constantly carried out 
perquisitions, but the public was wrong to think that they originated from deunciations – 
every individual entering the Kommandantur, often for a personal matter, was 
immediately suspected of being a denunciator, and every victim of a search immediately 
accused their neighbour as responsible.13  Thus the strong belief in widespread 
denunciations could be based on misunderstandings, but misunderstandings which 
formed around the norms of the culture de l’occupé – with its notions of good and bad 
behaviour. 
 
Further examples of French people allegedly denouncing compatriots to the Germans 
exist for the Nord, although the numbers are not as great as may be imagined: 14 women 
among those subject to the immediate post-liberation investigations were linked to 
denunciations, although for others denunciation was often implied;14 42 women and one 
man from the Nord were signalled as possible denunciators/indicateurs during the Évian 
testimony examined;15 I(b) files relate 8 suspected female denunciators, 3 male, and one 
entire family.16  This relatively small number of named denunciators does not, however, 
given an indication of the full extent of denunciation; many denunciations were 
anonymous, thus it would have been difficult for occupés to provide accurate 
information on the authors.  Yet the perception of frequent denunciation was strong.  
Indeed, in some localities, such as Douai, it was said that letters of denunciation were so 
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commonplace that the Germans were both shocked and amused by this.17  Across the 
Nord, according to rapatriés, the Germans mocked the ‘Français qui se mordent entre 
eux.’18  This may be linked to the argument that the Germans actively encouraged 
denunciation,19 and does explain the predominance of denunciation as a theme in inter-
war occupation histories and memoirs.20  
 
Men were also believed to have been denunciators.  The mayor of Saint-Rémy-Chaussée 
allegedly threatened his administrés with denunciation if they did not do what he said.21  
In Denain, the adjunct to the mayor, M. Delphien, was also said to have threatened 
people with denunciation, for similar reasons.22  The curé of Anstaing accused the mayor 
of denouncing the fact that he had hidden photographic equipment,23 although the 
investigation into the matter concludes that this was not the case.24  The German-
nominated mayor of Boussois, M. Boulogne, was accused by an administré of having 
denounced people to the Germans for being involved in cross-border trade.25  M. 
Lesaffre, adjunct to the mayor of Comines, appears to have denounced a compatriot to 
the Germans for hiding his car – this letter of denunciation was also printed in a local 
paper (Le Progrès du Nord) on 12th June 1919 – a few days before investigations began.26   
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The diary of David Hirsch also speaks of denunciation, except it was Hirsch who was the 
victim: the Germans searched his shop, telling him that they were alerted by a letter of 
denunciation, which eventually led them to his hidden stock.  He had to go to the 
nearest police station the following day.27  Perhaps the letter was a forgery intended to 
sow distrust among the population, but that would not explain how the Germans came 
to know of Hirsch’s hidden goods. 
 
It is evident that the local populations believed a large number of denunciations took 
place during the war, and often that they (as with the aforementioned curé) viewed 
possibly arbitrary German actions against them as a directed ‘attack’ resulting from 
denunciations.  The difficulty in knowing what really happened can be seen in the 
explanation given, in a postwar work, for the arrest of Labbé: ‘par suite d’une indiscrétion 
ou d’une dénonciation, notre barde Lillois fut arrêté par des agents de la Polizei Wache et 
incarcéré à la Citadelle, au secret le plus absolu.’28 
 
Many denunciations may have been in the imaginaire, but genuine cases did exist.  In 
Tourcoing, according to police reports, in May 1915, 
Un individu s’est présenté au poste de Gendarmes […] il a dénoncé des 
voisins non-inscrits […] 
Le dénonciateur se vengerait sous prétexte qu’il est agacé par eux 
parce que son fils travaille chez Selliez à Roubaix, pour le Compte [sic] 
des allemands [sic].29 
 
Irma Lemaire from Fourmies admitted, during her repatriation interview, that she had 
denounced the mayor for possessing alcohol and for engaging in gold trafficking in 
Belgium; she claimed that the mayor got his revenge by stopping her allocation.30  In 
another case, in Mouvaux in December 1916, a French woman was responsible for 
German gendarmes carrying out minute searches of the local French police station.  The 
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Germans found nothing, and admitted to the Commissaire that they had been acting in 
response to a letter of denunciation written by a woman.  The French police later 
discovered her identity.31 
 
Further, men and women were punished for denunciations in the post-war period.  For 
instance, Eugène Delforge from Monchecourt (an arrondissement of Douai) was found 
guilty in October 1920 of intelligence avec l’ennemi, and subsequently sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment.  This intelligence mainly involved denunciations: among others, he 
denounced a woman for hiding a gun; another woman for travelling without a pass; five 
hidden French soldiers; and, on numerous occasions, the mayoral adjunct for hiding 
weapons and harbouring an escaped English aviator.32  That same month, Mme Auvertin 
of Lille was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for having denounced an alsacien man 
who had been hiding from the Germans; he was subsequently punished with over ten 
years’ imprisonment.33   
 
The consequences of denunciations could sometimes seemingly outweigh the crime: in 
Tourcoing in July 1915, French women had denounced French gendarmes Rousseau and 
Scritte for purportedly calling the Germans ‘cochons,’ which led to Rousseau’s 
imprisonment for six months (Rousseau claimed the women had misheard the word 
‘couchez’).34  One Mme Anvelier was found guilty of this fact in January 1922, and was 
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment;35 Julie Hoedt was also sentenced for this crime in 
July 1923, punished (in abstentia) with deportation to ‘une enceinte fortifiée.’36  Renée 
Martinage has demonstrated, using the same judicial documents, that most of the 43 
persons condamned from 1919-25 by the Cour d’assises du Nord for ‘collaboration’ had 
                                                 
31 ADN 9R750: Comissaire de Police de Mouvaux to Prefect, 6th December 1918. 
32 ADN 2U1/444: Cour d’assises du Nord (henceforth CAN), n°73, arrêt du 23 Octobre 1920. 
33 Ibid., n°81, 12th October 1920.  For more court documents, see ADN 2U1/445-8; 2U2/515, 
2U274/174; 3U281/31-78; 3U303/6; 3U303/7.  
34 AMT H4A29: Rapport concernant l’affaire des agents Scrittes and Rousseau, n.d; ADN 9R745: 
German poster, Tourcoing, 12th July 1915.  
35 ADN 2U1/446: CAN, n°3, 23rd January 1922. 





been found guilty of denunciation.37  There was therefore some truth behind accusations 
regarding this act, but mauvaise conduite also took other forms.   
 
Working for the Germans 
Some occupés of both sexes were believed to have engaged in voluntary work for the 
Germans.  The true extent of voluntary work cannot be known, but the number of actual 
volunteers appears to have been low – for example just 157 French civilians were working 
for the Germans in Tourcoing in late June 1915.38  In Mouvaux, 12 people were reputed 
to have worked for the Germans – one of whom, Arthur Vercaigne, also spied for them.39 
 
Other evidence suggests that voluntary labour involving a minority of people was 
commonplace,40 but there may be further documentation in German sources.  
Nevertheless, the I(b) lists contain seven people listed as such, all men, two of whom – a 
father and son – were said to have been working voluntarily in a munitions factory.41  
Others are listed as working for the Germans, but it is not clear whether this was 
voluntarily or not – indeed it was often difficult to make this distinction during the 
occupation because the Germans forced workers to sign documents demonstrating that 
they had chosen to work for them ‘voluntarily.’42  Often occupation accounts note with 
pride that the German policy of forced labour was implemented precisely because there 
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February 1917 (Denain); nº828, 28th February 1917 (Fourmies); nº788, 22nd February 1917 
(Nord/Valenciennes); nº653, 2nd February 1917; nº989, 14th March 1917 (Aulnoye); nº988, 14th March 
1917 (Wazemmes); nº980, 14th March 1917 (Tourcoing); nº951, 10th March 1917 (Fives-Lille/Lille); 
nº1057, 20th March 1917 (Courrières, Liévin and Valenciennes); nº1069, 22nd March 1917 (St-Amand-
les-Eaux); nº1074, 21st March 1917 (St-Amand-les-Eaux and Rennegies); nº1207, 24th April 1917 (Lille); 
nº1127, 17th April 1917 (Lille); nº1174, 21st April 1917 (Tourcoing); nº1168, 21st March 1917. 
41 Ibid., procès-verbal, déclaration de Madame Marie Gaundry, rapatriée de Hautmont, Nord (1918). 





were so few volunteers,43 but the fact that there were some, albeit few, voluntary 
labourers is notable.  Such people shocked their fellow occupés, who found their actions 
morally and patriotically repugnant, although it seems likely that those forced to carry 
out war-related tasks by the Germans may have also come under attack from 
compatriots.  Redier cites the testimony of a woman who claims to have been forced to 
work in the fields for the Germans, along with voluntary workers – she notes that she saw 
‘une chose affreuse.  Des femmes, des Françaises, se battaient entre elles pour être assises à 
côté du conducteur allemand!’  The occupied population did not take kindly to seeing 
this group working for the Germans: ‘Les gens sur la route nous criaient: “Voyez cette 
racaille, ces ordures qui passent!”’44 
 
Among the subjects of the November 1918 investigations, fifteen suspected prostitutes 
were accused of working voluntarily for the Germans.45  In October 1920, one Georges 
Gomy was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment after being found guilty ‘d’avoir, dans 
l’arrondissement de Lille, en 1914, 1915, 1916, entretenu avec les sujets d’une puissance 
ennemie une correspondance, en travaillant volontairement pour le dit ennemi à des 
travaux de défense militaire.’46  In January 1921, Belgian Frédéric Henri Dejaeghère from 
Fives-Lilles was sentenced to five years’ detention for denunciations, but also for having 
worked voluntarily for the Germans, particularly commanding a company of other 
French volunteers to help with the destruction of the Usine des Forges in Denain.47  A 
handful of other people were also sentenced for working for the Germans in a variety of 
capacities, from making sandbags to engaging in German perquisitions and 
requisitions.48  The number of people found guilty of this is low, and the severity of the 
                                                 
43 Becker writes of the occupés’ ‘refus massif du volontariat.’  Becker, Oubliés, p.59.  Nivet, however, 
draws on the work of Pierre Baucher to suggest that the number of volunteers may have increased as the 
occupation continued: idem France, p.293. 
44 Redier, Allemands, p.255-6. 
45 See ADN 9R1196, for example Croix, Dupuis, n°217, and Poreaux, n°240, 8th November 1918.  All 
came from Croix. 
46 ADN 2U1/444: CAN, n°72, 21st October 1921. 
47 ADN 2U1/445: CAN, n°20, 21st January 1921. 





punishments is not surprising – working for the Germans without being forced 
constituted legal collaboration.  It is therefore no less shocking that within the culture de 
l’occupé, such volunteers were treated as traitors – a clandestine publication from 
November 1915 used that exact word to describe ‘ceux et celles qui travaillent pour 
l’autorité Allemande [et] assistent au pillage de nos villes, mettent nos usines à sac, 
saccagent le matériel de nos fabriques, assistent au délabrement de la France à la ruine du 
pays, travaillent contre ceux qui doivent défendre notre Patrie.’49  
 
During the occupation, certain municipalities refused to pay, or provide allocations de 
secours to, those who worked freely for the Germans.  This was the case in 
Valenciennes.50  Yet elsewhere, such volunteers falsely accused municipal authorities of 
doing so: in Tourcoing, an employee of the bureaux de secours aux chômeurs was 
arrested by the Germans in April 1917.  In a letter to the Kommandant, the acting 
mayor noted that ‘Le motif de cette arrestation consisterait, paraît-il, en ce que cet 
employé aurait récemment refusé de continuer à verser des secours à un ouvrier 
travaillant actuellement pour l’Autorité allemande.’  The mayor continued to explain that 
this employee was merely conforming to the rules dictating that anyone ‘qui se crée des 
ressources, soit par son travail, soit de toute autre manière, cesse, par cela même, d’avoir 
droit à l’assistance.  La mesure prise au sujet de cet ouvrier n’est donc pas spéciale […]’51  
As the occupation continued, the reverse occurred – the Germans ordered municipalities 
to withdraw financial assistance from occupés refusing to work for them.52  The Germans 
sometimes promised to provide French workers with a certificate stating that they were 
                                                 
49 ADN 3U281/77: 1er C.A. Région, Conseil de Guerre, Plainte nº613, Inventaire des pièces de la 
procédure suivie contre la nommée Rouvaux née Henneguin Marguerite Joséphine inculpée d’intelligence 
avec l’ennemi: La Liberté – Organe n’ayant passé par aucune censure.  Bulletin de propagande patriotique.  
15th November 1915. 
50 Nivet, France, p.294. 
51 AMT H4A32: 1er adjoint ffons de Maire Thérin, to Kommandant, 17th April 1915. 






being forced to work;53 thus the occupiers were aware of the culture de l’occupé which 
perceived French people working for the Germans in a negative light. 
 
In Tourcoing in June 1915, the Germans demanded the municipality provide workers to 
clean the railway station.54  The municipality complied, ordering the police to procure 
the required number of workers.  One of these was M. Cesse, whose wife wrote to the 
mayor, asking if her husband could be exempted from such work because:  
j’ai quatres [sic] petits enfants en bas âge et le cinquième qu’il [sic] va 
venir et nous somme critiques [sic] par le monde et nous avons beaucoup 
de Chagrin tout [sic] les deux et nous voulons réparez [sic] notre honneur 
si vous le voulez bien j’espère Monsieur Dron que vous ne refuserais [sic] 
pas ma demande S.V.P. car nous somme [sic] dans la désalations [sic] tout 
[sic] les deux.55 
 
It seems that the source of Mme Cesse’s distress was the affront to her family’s honour 
and the attendant criticism resulting from her husband’s employment by the Germans.  
Over two years later, in Roubaix, a diarist demonstrated the disdain in which the 
majority of occupés held those perceived to be working for the Germans of their own free 
will:   
L’opinion bourgeoise n’est pas favorable aux travailleurs roubaisiens qui, 
se rendant volontairement à la convocation des Allds, travaillent dans les 
environs de Wambrechies & Linselles.  Outre leur salaire journalier de 7 
fr, ils rapportent bois, fèves, haricots, pommes de terre, etc. qu’ils vendent 
bon prix.  humanité [sic], conscience, patriotisme, honnêteté, tous les 
sentiments qui rendent l’homme digne s’effacent devant un étroit 
égoïsme!56 
 
This reaction to ostensibly voluntary labourers outlasted the occupation, as seen in a 
letter from one Mlle Munch to the mayor of Lille, dated 9th November 1918.  She had 
spent the occupation with her mother in her village of Pérenchies, and her only brother 
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was killed in a gas attack.  The letter praises the courage of the French army and 
demonstrates her belief that the mayor and Lille suffered a Calvary.  She attached a poem 
she wrote in 1916 against Belgian and French men digging German trenches voluntarily.  
The poem speaks directly to these workers, starting by ‘vouvoyant’ and then ‘tutoyant,’ 
suggesting that she was talking to one worker in particular.  The men are told that ‘pour 
vos frères vous faites des tombeaux [… ]/Pour de l’argent, oh!’  She invokes a desire for 
revenge which will manifest itself when French soldiers ‘puniront sans pitié les méchants,’ 
because: 
Tu as souillé mon sol sacré 
Tournant des armes à l’Allemagne 
Tu es pour tes frères, étranger 
Puis, loin de France, va mourir oublié.57 
 
This self-identified ‘française de cœur [sic]’ therefore points to the existence of French 
(and Belgian) civilians working for the Germans.  Even if they were not doing so 
voluntarily, in the eyes of Munch there is no distinction: working for the Germans was 
treasonous and cowardly.  The fact that she mentions money suggests that perhaps she 
was writing about voluntary labourers, which would certainly explain her hatred and 
desire for revenge.  However, not all occupés were as unforgiving as Munch: twelve-year-
old Yves Congar, living in occupied Sedan, explained the problem in his entry for 4-7th 
January 1917: 
oui, nous travaillons contre les Français!, oui, nous y somme forcés! – Ah, 
Français, ne venez pas nous dire après la guerre: “c’est honteux, demi-
boches, qui travaillez pour eux”, car on vous répondrait: “pourquoi avez-
vous abandonné lâchement ce sol de la patrie que vous avez juré de défendre 
jusqu’à la mort ?.” [sic]’58 
 
Correct as Congar may be, there were nevertheless a small number of genuine volunteers, 
who evoked great emotions amongst the occupied population, but who have been all but 
wiped out from the occupation histories and other occupation accounts. 
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Even rarer than suggestions of voluntary labour were accusations that certain occupés 
worked for the German police or secret service.  Although some men were suspected of 
and later charged with espionage/intelligence avec l’ennemi,59 once again it was believed 
that most potential spies were women – particularly those ostensibly engaging in sexual 
misconduct.  A handful of women reappear in the testimony of repatriated people from 
Lille, mentioned as potential spies, usually the mistresses of Germans (including the 
Prince of Bavaria) who had allegedly moved freely within and outside the occupied 
area.60  It seems possible that some such women were indeed spying for the Germans, 
whereas other accusations were probably rumour based on pre-existing relations with the 
Germans.  For instance, Mme Pourez-Conteran from Roubaix was labelled by a rapatrié 
as being susceptible ‘de se livrer à l’espionnage’ because she had ‘relations intimes’ with 
German officers and had been the mistress of Kommandant Hoffmann, for whom she 
served as an interpreter.61  A considerable number of similar accusations are found in 
Évian testimony, I(b) suspect lists, and the October-November 1918 investigations.62 
 
Non-occupied French authorities were cautious about such reports, especially the 
commonplace conflation of sexual and illegal misconduct.  In a note to interpreters 
attached to the British Army regarding their duties in the event of an advance, interpreter 
Letore drew on his experience from the spring 1917 advances, warning: 
l’expérience m’a prouvé que la rumeur publique pouvait faire trop 
rapidement et par conséquent injustement, des espionnes de toutes les 
femmes ou filles de mauvaise vie qui ont eu des rapports intimes avec les 
Allemands.  Ces femmes et ces filles doivent être suspectes, c’est entendu; 
ce ne sont pas sûrement des espionnes […] les personnes qui accusent ont 
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beaucoup souffert de la brutalité boche [… et] peuvent inconsciemment 
exagérer les faits.  Celles qu’elles accusent ont beaucoup souffert aussi.  
[…]  Personne n’a plus que moi horreur de ces femmes qui peuvent 
descendre si bas; l’horreur n’exclut pas la pitié cependant; certainement 
elle ne doit pas nous entrainer [sic] à l’injustice.63 
 
This demonstrates the seriousness with which non-occupied French, especially military, 
authorities regarded accusations of espionage; but also that these authorities sometimes 
held more nuanced views than the occupés themselves.  The culture de l’occupé, with its 
strict norms, its simplistic, Manichean labelling and its quick judgements, largely ignored 
the subtleties of occupied life with which most people struggled.  Given the complexities 
of occupation, and the fact that some – primarily those engaging in mauvaise conduite – 
do not appear to have bought into the culture de l’occupé, perhaps there was a 
performative element to occupied culture; or at the very least to accusations made by 
rapatriés, and later by the liberated French. 
 
Despite this, Allied authorities and the occupied population did seem to agree on what 
constituted negative behaviour, firmly situating the norms of the culture de l’occupé 
within a wider national-patriotic framework.  The Belgian military outlined those to be 
considered suspect or undesirable in a 1917 publication concerning the future 
reoccupation of German-controlled territory.  This status was conferred to anyone: 
suspected of currently being in relations with the enemy; voluntarily in the service of the 
enemy or having ‘méchamment servi sa politique ou ses desseins’; having given refuge to 
enemy agents or having facilitated their mission; having hidden enemy soldiers or agents 
or having given them civilian clothes during the German retreat; having ‘méchamment,’ 
by denouncing a real or imagined fact, exposed someone to enemy searches, 
investigations or punishments; having given pigeons or telegraph installations to the 
enemy; signalled as having had intimate or friendly relations with enemy subjects during 
the war, or having given them moral or material support; having voluntarily given the 
                                                 
63 SHD 17N393: ‘Devoirs des interprètes en cas d’avance.  Conseils de l’O.I. LETORE aux Interprètes du 





enemy, for whatever reason, any material, merchandise, object or vehicle with direct 
military implications; having voluntarily given the enemy CRB goods; having engaged in 
fraud for the benefit of the enemy; being of enemy nationality or having married an 
enemy subject; being an Allied deserter; breaking the Allied-imposed rules.64 
 
Apart from the last two categories, the types of people listed here comprise almost all 
those engaging in mauvaise conduite.  It appears that this list was drawn from the 
testimony of rapatriés, representing an acknowledgment of actions genuinely occurring in 
occupied territory.   
 
These forms of behaviour, breaches of occupied respectability, had been greatly 
stigmatised throughout the war, and when the liberation came, many Nordistes informed 
the authorities of suspect individuals.  This is itself a fascinating subject of study, one 
which allows a better understanding of the male specificity within the notion of mauvaise 
conduite.
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III – Post-war Denunciations and the Male Specificity 
Denunciations from October 1918 
Liberation and post-liberation inquiries were not always carried out on the initiative of 
the French authorities or individual gendarmes: often it was the inhabitants themselves 
who called for investigations.  M. Albert, an interpreter attached to the British Army, 
noted that upon arriving in the commune of Eccles on 11th November 1918, he received 
a verbal complaint from numerous inhabitants accusing three inhabitants of having 
worked for the Germans as spies and denunciatiors.  He asked for a written, signed 
complaint, which he received the following morning.1 
 
Here the inhabitants evidently felt a sense of urgency, a need to inform French 
authorities of mauvaise conduite as soon as possible, and no doubt also felt a desire for 
punishment, albeit at the hands of the French authorities and the judicial system.  Becker 
sees such denunciations in a gendered light, arguing that is was as if, ‘une fois la guerre 
terminée, on revenait à une dichotomie ordinaire: non seulement les héros auraient 
souffert sur les champs de bataille, mais ils auraient été trahis par des ennemis de 
l’intérieur, leurs femmes.’2  Yet it seems that more complaints were made during the war 
by rapatriés than after the cessation of hostilities. 
 
Nevertheless, post-war complaints, attempts to get those suspected of mauvaise conduite 
punished by the French authorities, are much more frequent than popular violence and 
physical reprisals, and in many cases were made a surprisingly long time after the 
liberation.  Such complaints will here be considered as denunciations, following the 
definition of Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately of ‘spontaneous communications 
from individual citizens to the state […] containing accusations of wrongdoing by other 
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citizens or officials and implicitly or explicitly calling for punishment.’3  Indeed, 
gendarme reports occasionally mention that the subject of an inquiry was brought to 
their attention via ‘dénonciation.’4  The phenomenon of post-war denunciations, distinct 
from denunciations made to the Germans during the occupation,5 is extremely 
interesting.  These post-war denunciations can be understood in the context of the war’s 
effect on society, for denunciation has flourished in war and occupation in the twentieth 
century.  During the First and Second World Wars: 
the new situation of “total” mobilization of society in the belligerent 
countries produced new patterns of behavior that included widespread 
denunciation (even in nondenunciatory England) of spies, saboteurs, 
Germans, suspected Fifth Columnists, and so on.  Of course, in wartime 
all states insist that patriotism – a citizen’s allegiance to the nation-state – 
override all other loyalties.6    
 
This is not to say, as shall be demonstrated, that all denunciations of mauvaise conduite 
were motivated by patriotic sentiment, nor that they were necessarily true accounts of 
events.  Nevertheless, these post-war denunciations are implicitly understood – by the 
authors and, it seems, the authorities – as the opposite of the occupation denunciations 
(denouncing compatriots to the Germans), although the symbolic, linguistic difference 
between délation (perceived as a negative act of betrayal and treason) and dénonciation 
(seen as a patriotic-civic duty) is rarely present.7 
 
Denunciation of mauvaise conduite took numerous forms.  Most frequently, inhabitants 
signed petitions, in large numbers, decrying the behaviour of notables (usually the mayor 
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or the personnel of the mairie) during the occupation, and calling for further 
investigations.  One such example is a petition from inhabitants of the commune of 
Saint-Rémy-Chaussée to the ‘Général Commandant la mission française attachée à 
l’armée britannique,’ sent on 11th January 1919: 
Les soussignés, habitants de la commune de St Rémy Chaussée, [sic] 
canton de Berlaimont Nord, [sic] ont l’honneur d’appeler votre attention 
sur les faits et agissements du maire de leur commune pendant la guerre.  
Ils ont sériéusement [sic] à se plaindre des vexations de tout qu’ils ont eu à 
subir, et n’hésitent pas à déclarer qu’ils ont souffert au moins autant que 
de l’occupation étrangère.8 
 
This petition has fifty signatures, and accuses the mayor of being involved in arbitrary 
requisitions, of refusing to pay the inhabitants the military and other allocations to which 
they were entitled, of a ‘despicable’ personal attitude towards the Germans (including 
providing them with food and other goods), and of ‘La facilité avec laquelle il livrait aux 
allemands [sic] les hommes, les femmes, les jeunes filles, les dénonçant en cas de refus, et 
leur faisant infliger des amendes ou de la prison.’9  Here is an example of the distinction 
between types of denunciation: the mayor’s alleged wartime denunciation, a betrayal of 
compatriots, contrary to this petition’s patriotic denunciation.  Of course, it is possible 
that the author and signatories did not perceive of their actions as denunciation, even in a 
positive sense, but it can be viewed as such.10   
 
Yet the subsequent investigation into both the writing of the petition and the mayor’s 
actions during the occupation highlights the complexities of the situation.  Mixed witness 
testimony of varying reliability abounds, and the role of public rumour is evident.  One 
M. Raviart stated in his police interview that: ‘Je reproche au Maire Lescaillez de m’avoir 
désigné pour travailler pour les allemands, [sic] malgré ma volonté,’ and demonstrates his 
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belief that the mayor refused to pay his allocation even though his daughter was ill – just 
one of many such statements in this file.  Such accusations may indeed be true, but they 
may also reflect an inability of the general population to comprehend the difficulties 
facing mayors and municipal administrations, and the way in which the population 
could exaggerate the ability of such notables to resist the Germans (discussed later).  
However, his testimony ends with an extremely common phrasing: ‘J’ai entendu dire que 
ce Maire [sic] avait trafiqué avec les boches [sic] mais je ne pouvais vous donner aucun 
renseignement à ce sujet.’11  This demonstrates that public rumour surrounding the 
actions of the mayor was widespread, and there is a sense that, even though Raviart did 
not know anything of the mayor’s alleged commerce with the Germans, the fact that he 
had heard people talking about this made it worth mentioning – and almost made it a 
truth unto itself.   
 
Rumour 
Writing about post-war judicial inquiries into ‘inciviques’ in Belgium during the 
occupation, Thierry Lemoine noted that the majority of investigations were ‘conclues par 
un non-lieu ou un sans suite,’ which highlights the primacy of rumour; but, Lemoine 
asks, ‘l’état de guerre n’est-il pas caractérisé par un régime d’incertitude générale, pesant 
tant sur les conditions matérielles des lendemains que sur les “faits” qui ne sont plus 
communiqués qu’au compte-gouttes par des médias censurés?’12 
 
Lemoine notes that such an atmosphere was even stronger in an occupied area cut off 
from the rest of the world, craving information, and thus a return to the oral tradition – 
including rumour – is to be expected.  He goes on, drawing on the arguments of Marc 
Bloch, according to whom ‘les périodes de guerre sont des moments privilégiés pour “le 
surgissement au jour de manifestations de la conscience collective émanant de sociétés 
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fragilisées et rendues vulnérables par le conflit, prêtes à régresser dans ces circonstances 
vers des stades sociaux antérieurs”.’  Investigations were carried out in liberated Belgium 
for military reasons, but also to satisfy public opinion, tormented by four years of 
occupation, humiliation and privation.13  It seems plausible that the authorities 
investigating mauvaise conduite in northern France had similar motives, even if the 
public results (i.e. judicial cases) were considerably less numerous than in Belgium.14  As 
Lemoine points out, no matter what the content of the rumours visible in the sources, 
these demonstrate the emotion, mainly the fears and the desires, of those living in the 
occupied area.  In hiding behind rumour, the majority of witnesses could publicly express 
their prejudices and fantasies, however unrespectable.15  This explains how a largely 
‘bourgeoise’ and Christian society – with all this implies regarding repressed sexuality – 
could seemingly easily speak of ‘orgies’ and hedonistic, debauched parties, which mixed 
‘excès de table et de boissons’ to create ‘les plaisirs licencieux.’16  Such a perception of 
mauvaise conduite has already been demonstrated to have existed in occupied France.   
Further, Lemoine argues that public rumour plays a role in social cohesion – against the 
deterioration of social links resulting from war, rumour has a binding effect as members 
of a social group bond through sharing rumours based on exclusion (inciviques in 
Belgium17 and those associated with mauvaise conduite in the Nord).  Lydia Flem poses 
the question, ‘pourquoi la rumeur?’ Her response is: ‘Pour dire la peur et lui donner un 
visage.  Pour énoncer le désir et l’angoisse, et dénoncer un bouc émissaire et surtout pour 
se sentir solidaires.’18  Rumours reflect social tensions rather than creating them, and offer 
a means of circulation for collective fantasies.  Indeed, Bloch himself noted that rumours 
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only propagate on one condition: ‘trouver dans la société où elle se répand un bouillon de 
culture favourable.’19 
 
Rumours are a form of perception, ‘une perception inexacte, ou mieux encore une 
perception inexactement interprétée.’20  However, lebelling testimony rumour ‘est en fait 
une déqualification,’ assuring that it ‘ne mérite pas d’être crue.’21  Yet ‘L’existence d’un 
phenomène rumoral’ around a subject should not invalidate the possibility of its 
existence, ‘la rumeur ne faisant alors que transmettre des informations hors des voies 
officielles.’22  As Bloch noted, ‘Il n’y a pas de bon témoin; il n’y a guère de déposition 
exacte en toutes ses parties.’23  Rumour should thus be seen as a window into the world 
of those creating and spreading the information, rather than dismissed as untrustworthy 
hearsay.  Potential rumours surrounding mauvaise conduite offer opportunities to 
understand the mindset of the occupied population, and a means by which the culture de 
l’occupé can be studied.   
 
Mobile Motives: Duty or Revenge? 
It is important to take into consideration the potential motives of petitions and letters of 
denunciation sent to French authorities in the post-war period.  In the Lescaillez affair, 
there is some evidence to suggest that more than a sense of patriotic duty lay behind the 
petition.  One M. Bernier states that the author of the petition, M. Martin, came to his 
house in March 1919 and asked the family if they would like to sign.  Bernier said that 
he knew nothing of the affair, but Martin added, “Si vous voulez dire ce que je vais vous 
dire, vous serez récompensé.” Bernier maintained that he had nothing to say, so Martin 
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left.24  This calls into question the validity of the signatures, and possibly even the later 
witness statements – although naturally this single statement could be false, an attempt to 
defend the mayor and sully the reputation of Martin.  Indeed, it must be noted that it 
was Lescaillez himself who told the gendarmes that they should interview Bernier, stating 
on 11th April 1919 that the previous day three inhabitants (one of whom was Bernier) 
had come to him, telling him that ‘si on nous interrogait au sujet de la petition [sic …] 
nous dirions ce que nous savons à ce sujet.’25  Overall, the statements are contradictory 
and confusing, a fact to which a handwritten summary of the case attests.26  A similar 
problem can be seen in the investigation into alleged mauvaise conduite of the mayor of 
Bachy.  A letter of complaint signed by numerous inhabitants was sent to the Préfet, but 
the Commissaire Spéciale de Lille noted that Samain ‘a la réputation dans la commune 
d’être un plaignant systématique.’27 
  
Thus it is impossible to tell if petitions resulted from genuine grievances and a desire for 
punishment, possibly resulting from a misunderstanding of the position of the mayor 
during the occupation.  They may have been what Fitzpatrick classifies as ‘manipulative’ 
denunciations28 – some form of vengeance, an attempt at personal gain, or political 
manoeuvring.  This latter point was a commonplace defence of the mayors or municipal 
councillors against allegations of mauvaise conduite.  The mayor of Crèvecœur-sur-
Escaut was accused of having close relations with the Germans, putting personal interest 
before that of his administrés, and even threatening them with German punishments.  In 
a letter to the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai, the mayor denied all wrongdoing, calling the 
petition ‘un véritable tissu de mensonges qui ne peut résister à un examen sérieux’ and 
stating: ‘C’est d’ailleurs la campagne électorale qui commence, menée par mes ennemis 
                                                 
24 ADN 9R1193: Saint-Rémy-Chaussée, Affaire Lescaillez, procès-verbal, Vernet, 12th April 1919.  
Statement of M. Bernier. 
25 Ibid., procès-verbal, Vernet and Hudault, 12th April 1919.  Statement of M. Lescaillez. 
26 Ibid., handwritten note, n.d., n.a. 
27 Ibid., Bachy, Commissaire Spécial de Lille to Prefect, 11th August 1919. 





politiques.’29  He went on to explain that he had made enemies in his political career 
because of the greed, desire for money, and jealousy of one’s neighbour rife amongst the 
peasantry.30  These enemies were using the occupation (and the difficult position in 
which the mayor found himself) against him, for their own benefit rather than out of any 
moral-patriotic sentiment.  It is not clear whether the French authorities believed this 
version of events, but they did want to discover the truth – the Sous-Préfet of Cambrai 
asked the Préfet for an ‘enquête contradictoire’ into the actions of the mayor.31   
 
Other examples of an alleged political understanding of denunciations existed in 
Comines,32 and Ligny-en-Cambrésis – where, in June 1920, the municipality ordered the 
replacement of the teacher of the local boys’ school for general occupation misconduct.33  
The Inspecteur de l’enseignement primaire argued that the teacher was a pawn in a 
political game: the new municipal council was formed of poilus who wanted to ‘mettre à 
mal l’ancien maire,’ but the latter defended himself and threatened the councillors with 
sensational revelations, ‘Alors on s’est ravisé, et on a trouvé un bouc émissaire: 
l’instituteur.’34 
 
It is unsurprising that the accused denied wrongdoing, and understandable that 
politicians would accuse their political enemies of being behind the denunciations or 
accusations.  Whether true in these cases, it can be assumed that such motivations were 
behind some denunciations and accusations, hinting at the rapid degeneration of the 
Union Sacrée during the immediate post-Armistice period. 
 
                                                 
29 ADN 9R1193: Crèvecoeur-sur-Escaut, mayor to Sous-Préfet of Cambrai, 5th October 1919.  Original 
emphasis. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., Crèvecoeur-sur-Escaut, Sous-Préfet of Cambrai to Prefect, 17th October 1919. 
32 ADN 9R1229: Comines, Procès-verbal, Biarnais, n°77, 4th July 1919.  Testimony of M. Lesaffre. 
33 Ibid., Ligny-en-Cambrésis, Extrait du Registre aux Délibérations du Conseil Municipal de la Commune 
de Ligny-en-Cambrésis, séance of 10th July 1920. 





Men who had been at the front during the war also signed post-war petitions against the 
actions of mayors and municipal councillors.  These men, by definition absent during the 
occupation, could only formulate opinions based on rumour, demonstrating its strength 
and centrality to the culture de l’occupé.  This was the case in Bachy35 and Râche.36  
However, the most striking case is that of Denain, where two adjuncts to the mayor were 
‘l’objet de plaints émanant de la “Ligue des Poilus” de cette ville.’37  Thus it was the 
former combatants who led the campaign against these two notables – not only did they 
write letters to French authorities, but they carried out their own investigations.38  This 
demonstrates the strength of feeling among those who did not live through the 
occupation, for whom the conduct of the occupied population (especially notables) was 
seen as an important issue – and mauvaise conduite, in their eyes, had to be punished.  
Whether this emanated from a feeling of solidarity with the occupied population, a desire 
to help them right the wrongs of the occupation, or more simply suspicion of the 
occupied population,39 is unclear.  What is clear, however, is that these denunciations  
were understood in terms of civic-patriotic duty: ‘Je prends sous ma responsabilité de 
vous écrire cette lettre, pour vous donner quelques renseignements sur la mauvaise 
administration de la commune.’40  Denunciations were also an expression of outrage that 
the justice system had not investigated or punished the suspect individuals up to this 
point.   
 
Anonymous denunciations also became formulised in postcards, the front of which 
comprised a photo of the mayor with German soldiers, the back containing a brief 
accusation.  This was the origin of the investigation in Crèvecoeur-sur-Escaut: one 
                                                 
35 ADN 9R1193: Bachy, Petition to Delugé Préfectoral, 20th July 1919; Petition to Commandant de place 
de Bachy, n.d.; Petition to Président du Conseil Ministère de l’Intérieur [sic], 27th May 1919; Report, 
Rossey, 29th July 1918. 
36 ADN 9R1229: Râches, Procès-verbal, Déburcaus and Hatte, 17th February 1919. 
37 ADN 9R1193: Denain, Préfet to Général Commandant 1re Corps d’Armée, 2nd October 1919. 
38 Ibid., Sous-Préfet of Valenciennes to Prefect, 23rd September 1919. 
39 During the war, ‘many poilus felt that the issue of collaboration, “la question des embochés”, required 
prompt action once the fighting had ceased.’  Englander, ‘French Soldier,’ p.65.  





postcard sent to the Préfet involved a photo showing the mayor and his family standing 
in a courtyard with German gendarmes.  The message on the back is short and simple: 
‘Quand comptez-vous révoquer ce maire vendu aux Boches,’ signed by ‘un indigné’ (Fig. 
3.1-3.2).41  Another copy of this postcard was sent to the Ministre de l’Intérieur; 
although it is also anonymous, the handwriting appears different, as is the message: it is 
longer, containing detail on what the mayor and his family were alleged to have done 
wrong, and it also numbers the subjects of the photo, listing their names (Fig. 3.3-3.4).42  
One of the most bizarre anonymous denunciations is a twenty-verse song regarding the 
actions of the mayor of Marcq-en-Barœul, a copy of which was forwarded to the Préfet 
by the Commissaire de police of Marcq-en-Barœul.  It was accompanied by a photo 
showing the mayor’s son sitting down next to a German soldier (Fig. 4).  In the letter the 
Commissaire stated that because of the photo and the song, ‘il sera, très 
vraisemblablement, beaucoup parlé de ces hommes dans la période électorale 
prochaine.’43  The political implications of occupation (mis)conduct are therefore 
evident.  The song itself is entitled ‘Complainte dédiée au Maire de Marcq,’ and speaks 
of a village abandoned by its mayor who, out of fear of imprisonment, ‘trahit ce que 
commande/La résponsabilité’ and ‘Abdique l’autorité.’44  Mention is made of one of his 
sons, presumably the one in the photo, who ‘fait bon ménage/Hélas avec l’étranger.’45  
The mayor is accused of being too friendly with the Germans, of helping them choose 
hostages, and of not resisting German demands (particularly linked to the enlèvements of 
1916).  The penultimate verse sums up the way a mayor was supposed to have acted 
during the occupation: 
 Il faillait à la contrainte 
Céder, c’est bien reconnu 
Mais d’abord lutter sans crainte 
Pour notre droit méconnu. 
Car sans cette résistance 
                                                 
41 ADN 9R1193: Crèvecoeur-sur-Escaut, postcard to Prefect, stamped 31st July 1919.  Original emphasis. 
42 Ibid., postcard to Ministre de l’Intérieur, stamped 12th July 1919. 
43 ADN 9R1229: Marcq-en-Barœul, Commissaire de police to Prefect, 13th September 1919. 
44 Ibid., Complainte dédiée au Maire de Marcq, first verse. 





Le calme est cher acheté 
Ce n’est plus de la prudence 
Et c’est de la lâcheté.46 
 
This is a rather surprising admission in an accusatory denunciation: the author recognises 
that, of course, resisting all German demands was impossible during the occupation – 
but a symbolic resistance, some form of protest or attempt at negotiating, was needed 
before the inevitable acquiescence.  This attitude was widely understood and accepted 
(see ‘Respectable Resistance’ chapter).  Thus mayors who acquiesced to German demands 
too readily, without protest, could be perceived as having behaved badly: this was 
mauvaise conduite, worthy of post-war denunciation, even if it was not total 
‘collaboration.’  Precisely because everything that happened during the occupation was 
ambiguous – everyone dealing with the Germans in one way or another – former occupés 
were always suspectible to post-war questioning.  This contrasts somewhat with post-
Second-World-War France, where there was a conscious taking of sides and a clearer 
sense of who had done what; after the occupation of 1914-1918, many had engaged in 
some relations with the Germans as well as some resistance, so it was often up to the 
courts to decide one’s fate in symbolic, representative cases.   
 
Women who were sexually involved with or had other relations with Germans also faced 
anonymous denunciations, although these were made to gendarmes already in the 
process of investigating suspect sexual behaviour, immediately after the liberation.47  The 
phenomenon of anonymous denunciation raises further questions: why did certain 
people denounce anonymously?  Does this make the denunciations any less legitimate or 
more suspect?  It could be the case that the stigma of denunciation as a negative act 
(délation), evident throughout the occupation, still held some power even over 
apparently ‘patriotic’ dénonciations – causing the authors to remain anonymous.  
Perhaps these denunciators feared reprisals if the denounced discovered their authorship, 
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an understandable fear regarding denunciations of notables.  Maybe some anonymous 
denunciations were unfounded, ‘manipulative’ denunciations intended to damage the 
reputation of the subject.  For anonymous denunciations on postcards containing 
photographs of notables with Germans, perhaps a French person simply saw the 
photograph and perceived it as an example of mauvaise conduite, without considering 
the circumstances behind it or even knowing any details whatsoever about the people in 
the photo.  Anonymous denunciations, just like all others, nevertheless demonstrate an 
apparent desire for the punishment of questionable occupation conduct, as well as a 
belief that the French judicial system would help in this regard (even if it had not done so 
up until the time of writing).  Thus this mauvaise conduite is seen as being so 
reprehensible that the highest echelons of French power should be concerned with it.  
 
Many of those who wrote denunciations to the French authorities, who gave statements 
to investigating gendarmes, and even the French authorities themselves, seemed not to 
understand the difficult position in which municipal administrations (and aid 
organisations) found themselves during the occupation.  One apparent example can be 
found in the ‘affaire Berteaux’ in Fourmies.  M. Berteaux was the ‘sécretaire de Mairie 
délégué central du service du ravitaillement’ during the occupation.  He was accused after 
the liberation – following a denunciation48 – of having been involved in commerce with 
the Germans, giving a German officer 400,000 francs, setting up a shop which sold only 
German goods at prices the local population could not afford, and selling the comité de 
ravitaillement’s goods (destined exclusively for the local population) to the Germans.49  
Further, he allegedly often stated ‘Je suis neutre,’ exchanged gifts with German officers, 
and his wife made German flags.50  The investigating policeman interviewed Berteaux in 
June 1919, and noted that he did not deny the accusations.  Berteaux stated: ‘Si j’ai livré 
                                                 
48 ADN 9R1193: Fourmies, affaire Berteaux, seemingly Secrétariat Général du Comité du Ravitaillement 
des Régions Libérées to Prefect, 21st June 1919. 
49 Ibid., Fourmies, Commissaire de police to Directeur de la Sûreté Générale, Paris, 27th November 1918; 
Commissaire de police to Sous-Préfet à Avesnes, 15th June 1919.  





des marchandises aux diverses allemands [sic] c’est parce que j’étais obligé de “mettre de 
l’huile dans la machine” […] Je suis couvert par les délégués americains [sic] et ceux du 
comité Hispano-néerlandais.51 
 
Not only did Berteaux himself explicitly state that some form of mauvaise conduite was 
necessary to ‘oil the machine’ – so did his fellow comité de ravitaillement members.  
Defending the actions of Berteaux, one M. Droulers wrote a letter to the President of the 
CANF, stating that: 
Je me fais un devoir de vous signaler la situation pénible qui est faite à M. 
Berteaux par une enquête de gendarmerie qui donne satisfaction aux plus 
basses rancunes et qui dénote une ignorance absolue des difficultés et des 
obligations auxquelles il ne pouvait se soustraire vis-à-vis des allemands 
[sic] sans compromettre gravement le fonctionnement du ravitaillement.52 
 
He later states: ‘Le cas de M. Berteaux est celui de nombreux délégués, on semble ignorer 
la nécessité de leurs rapports avec l’ennemi et la compromission qu’ils devaient subir dans 
l’intérêt de la population.’  Therefore not only were some form of relations, obviously 
friendly ones, not unpatriotic, but they were necessary for the correct functioning of aid 
work.  Berteaux’s actions were thus legitimate and successful.  This view was reinforced 
by the summary of the CRB séance of 27th April 1919, at Vervins, its first meeting since 
the liberation.  Unanimous support was expressed for Berteaux, who was said to ‘a 
conduit à bien pendant trois années et demie une tâche à la fois très lourde et très délicate 
exigeant une dépense de temps et de force considérables et que, grâce à sa clairvoyance 
avisée, il a réussi à franchir les pas les plus difficiles résultant du fait de l’occupation.’53  
More striking is the CRB’s clear directive to its former delegates regarding the way in 
which the French government would understand its actions during the occupation.  
Delegates had a duty to combat any suspicion, insult or stain against the organisation, 
especially from non-occupied compatriots. 
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Des confusions et des incompréhensions regrettables doivent appeler 
notre intervention et nous ne devons pas supporter qu’une analogie, fût-
elle lointaine et indulgente, s’établisse dans certains esprits entre notre rôle 
et celui des trafiquants, que nos rapports obligés avec les services 
allemandes soient confondus avec des compromissions intéressées et 
coupables.54 
 
This is an explicit admission that those who did not suffer the occupation would not be 
able to understand the complexities of the situation, that there was a distinction between 
administrative relations with the Germans which were necessary for the good of the local 
area, and outright unpatriotic and morally suspect relations.  Yet those writing petitions, 
involved in denunciations, and giving statements to investigating gendarmes often 
themselves do not appear to have seen a difference between the most extreme forms of 
mauvaise conduite and accommodement.  This was perhaps because they were not part 
of the administration, so simply were not aware of the extreme difficulties faced, but 
possibly also because they genuinely judged certain acts to be morally repugnant, whether 
there were ‘mitigating circumstances’ or not.  This was the uncompromising culture de 
l’occupé.   
 
There were accusations of aiding the Germans in various ways against numerous 
municipalities, such as that of Saint-Rémy-Chaussée, where the mayor was accused of 
aiding the Germans in requisitions, of refusing to pay allocations or paying them late, 
and of being responsible for forced labour.55  This may demonstrate the population’s 
ignorance of the state of municipal finances which had been completely drained by the 
Germans, and of the fact that mayors had to sign German documents or face severe 
reprisals.  Some occupés seem to have held an exaggerated idea of the ability of 
municipalities to resist German demands.  The ‘municipalisation du pouvoir’ was 
encouraged by the Germans so that they could ‘faire plus facilement pression pour 
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l’exécution de leurs exigences.’56  With increased municipal power came increased 
responsibility, and thus greater chances of being accused of wrongdoing by the 
population at large.  Indeed, the non-occupied French authorities were aware of the 
complexity of the administrative situation and did stress that dealings with the Germans 
did not automatically comprise ‘complaisance’ with the Germans – sometimes 
municipalities had to co-operate to avoid reprisals, and this was not a legitimate 
incrimination against a mayor or civil authority, especially for ‘les magistrats d’un ordre 
modeste.’57 
 
However, some accusations are more likely to be true than others, particularly those 
corroborated by numerous witnesses from all walks of life, recorded by police 
investigations.  Accusations that may not be true, or were proven false nevertheless 
provide an insight into the culture de l’occupé, specifically popular perceptions.  They 
attest to a widespread belief in misconduct, and an acknowledgement of the 
representational and conceptual framework born of occupation and crystalised by the 
liberation, which the authors of untrue accusations used to their advantage.   
 
Political Misconduct? 
What Nivet calls ‘collaboration politique’58 – municipal, administrative forms of 
mauvaise conduite perpetrated mainly by men – were taken seriously by the French 
authorities.  Time-consuming investigations took place in at least thirty communes, all 
but two of which involved accusations of questionable occupation conduct on the part of 
the mayor, the municipal council, adjuncts to the mayor, secretaries to the mairie, or 
gardes-champêtres.59  Only six of these thirty investigations concluded that the 
                                                 
56 Bukowski, ‘Cambrai,’ p.60. 
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accusations were true, and even among these six there are calls for further investigation.60  
The majority of the other investigations contain no official verdict and are thus 
inconclusive.   
 
Frustratingly, guilty verdicts rarely state what (if any) punishments the accused faced.  In 
Neuville-en-Ferrain, the investigating gendarme concluded that ‘le garde-champêtre 
Walcke aurait eu une attitude servile à l’égard des allemands [sic] […] Il était dans les 
meilleurs termes avec la Kommandantur et les gendarmes allemands.’61  Yet further 
investigations were carried out, the conclusions of which are not preserved, and no 
mention of punishment is made.  In the commune of Catillon, Messieurs Dambrine and 
Pamart (the adjunct and the secretary to the mayor respectively) were arrested after being 
found guilty of various forms of intelligence avec l’ennemi, but no further information is 
given.62  Judging by Martinage’s study into judicial punishment of ‘collaborators,’ it was 
likely that many such suspects were not punished at all, which begs the question, what 
was the goal of the investigations?  Were they simply satisfying the demands of the local 
populations, or were they genuine investigations – representing real suspicions on the 
part of the French authorities – which perhaps arrived at conclusions different from the 
expected ones, or which discovered behaviour which was questionable but not punishable 
under French law? 
 
Arguably some of the most interesting conclusions of these investigations are those 
stating that the accusations made against the subject of an inquiry were clearly false, or 
that not enough information was discovered to justify further inquiry (which happened 
on four occasions).63  The inquiry which took place in Wasnes-au-Bac as a result of a 
denunciation of the mayor, for example, discovered that the author was the daughter of 
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61 ADN 9R1193: Neuville-en-Ferrain, Commissaire Spécial de Lille to Prefect, 21st June 1919. 
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the signatory of the letter, who wrote the accusation in her father’s name.  Further, the 
letter denounced the actions of the mayor after the liberation, saying he was hoarding 
food supplies.  The investigation concluded that not only was the authorship false, but so 
too was the claim, and it was suggested that the young lady be invited to the mairie and 
told to ‘ne plus imiter la signature de son père,’ and ‘cesser toute communication 
épistolaire avec l’Administration.’64  This links back to the above discourse on 
denunciation.    
 
The actions of which people were accused or suspected are interesting regardless of 
‘objective reality,’ precisely because some people believe that they could have happened.  
In Catillon, as mentioned above, the secretary to the mayor and adjunct to the mayor 
were arrested, charged with intelligence with the enemy, increasing the price of CRB 
goods and keeping the profit, stealing CRB goods, forgery and use of false documents, 
swindling, and embezzlement.65 
 
Much of this may be deemed ‘financial mauvaise conduite,’ and is representative of 
numerous accusations of questionable occupation behaviour.  The key figures in the 
mayoral administration of Râches were accused of engaging in similar conduct.66  In 
Boussois, the mayor was said to have allowed CRB flour to be used to bake bread for the 
Germans, contravening international law.67  Accusations of commercial/financial 
mauvaise conduite are the most prevalent among male suspects, and are nearly always 
laid against municipalities and mayors.68  Outrage at such actions is understandable: 
stealing from the local comités de ravitaillement or the CRB, or raising food prices and 
those of various goods for profit, prevented the functioning of aid services and 
jeopardised the survival of the local population.  More general ‘fraud’ – creating false 
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65 ADN 9R1229: Catillon, Commissaire Divisionnaire to Procureur de la République, 28th April 1919. 
66 Ibid., Râches, Procès-verbal, Déburcaus and Hatte, 17th February 1919. 
67 Ibid., Boussois, Brigadier de Gendarmerie to Jeumont (neighbouring commune ), 8th January 1919. 






money and purposefully selling poor-quality or home-made goods, among other things 
(see the following chapter) – had a similar effect, as did withholding allocations, although 
the veracity of this is even more questionable.  Selling or furnishing goods to the 
Germans obviously encroaches into illegal, intelligence/commerce avec l’ennemi 
territory, which would explain why detailed investigations were carried out into 
allegations of this type of behaviour.   
 
Other types of mauvaise conduite were purported to have taken place.  One mobilised 
Frenchman, for some reason in the occupied territory and not arrested, is said to have 
worked as a secret policeman for the Germans, by spying on and reporting conversations 
he heard on Croix’s tramway – and he was also responsible for numerous house 
searches.69  Perhaps he did so in order to avoid punishment for being a mobilisable 
behind enemy lines.  Garde-champêtre Leclerq, of Bachy, apparently distributed the 
Gazette des Ardennes of his own free will, which was seen as an ideological, anti-patriotic 
crime by the inhabitants.70  Similarly, there were cases where the mayors and municipal 
councillors were accused of forcing the inhabitants to work for the Germans, threatening 
them with punishments if they did not, such as the mayor of Saint-Rémy-Chaussée, who 
is reported to have said: ‘Si tu ne marches pas de bonne volonté au travail pour les 
allemands, [sic] tu marcheras par force.’71  In Lille, according to I(b) lists, at least two 
Frenchmen worked for the German secret service,72 and in Roubaix two Belgian or 
French civilians appear to have aided the Germans in their ‘enlèvement.’73 
 
The I(b) suspect lists also shed light on ‘male’ and ‘ideological mauvaise conduite.’  Of 
the 95 men listed, 39 are reported as having engaged in traffic or trade with the enemy –
in gold, flour, or other goods.  Among these was the mayor of Tainsiers, also noted as 
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71 Ibid., Saint-Rémy-Chaussée, Vernet and Sallé, procès-verbal, 10th March 1919.  Testimony of Georges 
Wanty. 
72 US NA Record Group 120, Entry 198: I(b) 259 (1918); I(b) 273 (23rd June 1918). 





having frequently received officers at his house and having been on friendly terms with 
the Germans.74  These may be seen as inevitabilities of the occupation – in order to 
preserve what little influence they had left, mayors would have needed to have good 
relations with the Germans, in the model of Robert Vandenbussche’s modus vivendi.75  
This may also be the reason behind the inclusion in the list of M. Defives of St-André-
les-Lille, said to have been in constant touch with the Kommandantur as a municipal 
councillor and on friendly terms with the Germans;76 or for M. Dumontier of Comines, 
who kept a cinema exclusively for German use, and whose daughter was the fiancée of a 
German soldier.77  Perhaps the same could not be argued for M. Minon of Villers-sire-
Nicole, a clerk at the mairie accused of traffic with the enemy.78  
 
Further ideologically-charged examples are visible: M. Dutrieux of Raismes was 
employed by the Germans as a foreman at the Fabrique Franc-Belge and acted as an 
informer,79 whereas some men are listed as having written articles for the Gazette des 
Ardennes – such is the case for for M. Toque at Fourmies who was actually interned at 
Holzminden when his entry was added to the list.80 
 
Mauvaise conduite was therefore perceived as existing in male and female forms, 
conflating personal immorality with patriotic perversion.  The occupés were permanently 
suspicious of each other – as the Allied authorities were of the occupés themselves – 
seeing any sign of goodwill towards the Germans as a marker of deeper compromise and 
unpatriotic tendencies.  Friendship and especially sexual intimacy with Germans was 
often reconfigured to mean working voluntarily, spying, denouncing – a whole range of 
actions believed to be just as reprehensible as the initial friendliness/intimacy.  The 
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culture de l’occupé thus condemned any breaches of respectable, patriotic social relations; 
of wartime norms dictating that the enemy must be hated.  Beyond post-war 
denunciations, or rapatriés during the war listing suspect individuals, how did the wider 
occupied population react to those who had broken the unwritten rules of occupation?  





IV – Retribution and Revenge: Popular Reprisals 
Revenge during the Occupation 
Acts of revenge or expressions of disgust concerning suspect individuals were not – as 
may be expected – limited to the liberation or post-war period.  On this topic more 
references can be found in the literature on the occupation, perhaps because revenge 
carried out during the occupation itself may be viewed as a form of resistance.  Many 
sources testify to verbal attacks against individuals, usually women believed to have been 
engaging in intimate relations with the Germans or those working voluntarily for the 
Germans, during the occupation.1  Insults such as ‘Bocharte’ and ‘femme à Boches’ were 
used frequently, plus variations such as ‘Bochette’ or ‘Bochesse’2 – and for all those 
engaging in mauvaise conduite, including men, ‘embochés.’3  Unsurprisingly, the 
Germans forbade such insults, and diarists mentioned cases of people punished for this.4  
Redier, writing of women who were German mistresses, stated that, ‘On osait à peine 
regarder ces femmes en place, car on allait en prison pour leur avoir déplu.’5   
 
Despite or perhaps because of this, some occupés explicitly expressed their desire for 
post-war revenge, retribution, or justice in memoirs.6  Others did so during the 
occupation itself.7  Jean-Claude Auriol notes the existence of a pamphlet stating:  
Regardez sur vos corsages où leurs doigts se sont posé, [sic] il y a une tâche 
[sic] faite du sang des innocents de Lille, Laon, Montmédy et d’ailleurs.  
Nous avons noté que vous êtes des femmes à boches et vous allez le payer 
cher.  Aucune femme ne doit être la “putaine” d’un boche.  Honte à 
vous.8 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.248. 
2 Nivet, France, p.339. 
3 ADHS 4M513: report nº1167, 21st April 1917 (Lille); Nivet, France, p.339; AML 4H280: L’Écho (24th 
December 1918). 
4 Becker, Journaux, Degnitère diary, 2nd October 1915, p.187; Hirsch diary 16th July 1915, p.242.  
5 Redier, Allemands, p.263. 
6 Ibid., p.327. 
7 Nivet, ‘Femmes,’ p.311-12. 





Clandestine tracts circulated in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and Bruxelles throughout the 
war, three of which used similar, insulting language to criticise those engaging in 
mauvaise conduite (these publications are examined in more detail in the ‘Active 
Resistance’ chapter).9  The title of one such publication, Les Vidanges, gives an 
indication of the attitude its authors held towards embochés.  The only copy yet 
discovered dates from January 1917, and comprises a list of suspect individuals, often 
described in a humorous and insulting way.  The explanation of the list highlights a 
mindset critical to the wider culture de l’occupé: 
Nous publions une 1ere [sic] liste exacte et contrôlée sur les immondes 
femelles et les dégoûtantes personnages faisant commerce et le reste avec 
nos ennemis. 
Pendant que le mari, père, frère, ou fils se trouve au front ou dort 
sous huit pieds de terre, ces ordures font la noce, et prostitue [sic] sous la 
botte allemande, son être sa famille, sa Patrie ! .... 
La Patrie et la famille ne doivent pas souffrir de cette éclaboussure.  
Les femmes que nous dénonçons à la vindicte des honnêtes gens se sont 
enrolées [sic] à leur manière sous les drapeaux de l’envahisseur, elles ont 
choisi la place qui convenait à leur insanité; Certaines pensent profiter des 
automobiles de l[e]urs amis et gagner l’Etranger le jour de leur prochaine 
retraite, mais qu’importe, nous les retrouverons un jour, et leurs noms 
aura été jeté comme des ordures….. à la poubelle !..... ŒIL DE LYNX.10 
 
Once again, it is primarily women who are the object of this criticism.  Even during the 
occupation, therefore, there were some attempts to punish, target, and ostracise those 





                                                 
9 See ADN 3U281/77: 1er C.A. Région, Conseil de Guerre, Plainte nº613, Inventaire des pièces de la 
procédure suivie contre la nommée Rouvaux née Henneguin Marguerite Joséphine inculpée d’intelligence 
avec l’ennemi: La Liberté (15th November 1915); Les Vidanges: ‘Bulletin concernant le chapitre de la 
malpropreté à Bruxelles, Lille, Roub-Tourcoing (1st January 1917, No.1, edition B); La Vérité, nº1 (Lille, 
15th December 1915). 





From Fiction to Fact 
Maxence van der Meersch attributes much importance to attacks on suspect individuals 
in his novel Invasion ’14 – Fanny, the wife of an absent Belgian soldier, is subject of 
physical abuse in a bread queue because she was pregnant by a German.11  This may seem 
far-fetched, imbued with a heavy sense of poetic licence, but it appears to have some basis 
in actual events, although it is not clear whether the young van der Meersch, only 11 in 
October 1918, witnessed or knew about them.12  Marc Blancpain, in his 1980 memoir of 
the occupation, also refers to similar incidents: 
En revanche, celles qu’on appelait “les femmes à boches” [sic] étaient haïes 
et, démasquées, vivaient dans le danger; on brisait leurs vitres à coups de 
cailloux; montrées du doigt, elles étaient bousculées et frappées 
sournoisement dans la rue ou dans les longues files d’attente du 
ravitaillement; on chantait derrière elles ou sous leurs fenêtres des 
complaintes ordurières et menaçantes; malades, on les laissait crever chez 
elles en disant: “Elles n’ont que ce qu’elles méritent.” 
On profita parfois de l’obscurité des soirs d’hiver pour les pousser 
dans un canal ou dans les eaux glacées d’une rivière.13 
 
Archival evidence suggests there is some truth behind van der Meersch and Blancpain’s 
prose.  In Denain, according to repatriated occupés, there were ‘véritables batailles de 
femmes’ in 1914 – those who worked freely for the Germans, nicknamed the ‘femmes à 
sacs,’ were hit, insulted, threatened with having their hair cut.14 
 
The first example of popular vengeance in Lille occurred on 12th February 1915.  As a 
police report indicates, a group of about one-hundred ‘manifestants sont allés 
spontanément’ to an estaminet run by a Belgian man suspected of having denounced 
hidden French soldiers.  The crowd threw stones at the window, smashing the glass, 
                                                 
11 Maxence van der Meersch, Invasion ’14 (London, 1937; originally Paris, 1935), (trans.) Gerard 
Hopkins, p.273-6. 
12 Le Naour, ‘Femmes tondues,’ p.151. 
13 Blancpain, Quand Guillaume, p.246.  The municipal police of Lille reported bodies of men and women 
found in the canal throughout the occupation, but the coroner always lists suicide as the cause of death.  
See AML 4H266-71. 





causing a few hundred francs’ material damage.  No-one was injured, and three hours 
later ordered was restablished, with no arrests made.15 
 
Similar events took place, again in Lille, on 4th March 1915, this time targeting a woman: 
a crowd of about 500 people ‘huait’ 39 year-old Mme Devildre, on boulevard Victor 
Hugo.  A French policeman helped to accompany Devildre home, seemingly attempting 
to ameliorate the disorder which could engender German reprisals for the entire city.  
During the walk ‘des pierres ont été lancées contre la femme Devilde par des enfants, et 
des femmes qui la suivaient en la traitant de “putain”.’  Devilde called two passing 
German soldiers, but their intervention exacerbated the anger of the crowd.  Once at her 
sister’s house, the sister called for more German soldiers, and about ten came to disperse 
the crowd – shots were fired, but no-one was injured.  Devilde had also been molested by 
crowds on 2nd and 3rd March.16   
 
An interesting case is related in a letter from one Kleeberg, working for the German 
military police at the Kommandantur of Lille, to M. Pollet, Chef de la Police Civile de 
Lille, on 19th April 1915: 
Le 18/4/15 un rassemblement s’était formé vers 1 heure de l’après-midi 
[…] autour d’une femme française de condition moyenne.  La 
malheureuse femme était maltraitée par plusieurs femmes pour des raisons 
qui ne me sont pas connues.  On lui arrachait ses vêtements on lui 
donnait [sic] des cous [sic] de pied et on lui arrachait les cheveux.  En 
même temps on entendait pousser des cris tels que “Elle tient avec les sales 
boches” etc.17 
 
It is curious that such similar events took place so close to each other and so relatively 
early on in the war.  However, there is an explanation: this was the beginning of what 
became known as the affaire des sacs. 
                                                 
15 ADN 9R581: Report of the Commissaire de Police du 5e arrondissement of Lille contained within a 
report by the Commissaire Central de Lille to Prefect, 12th February 1915. 
16 AML 4H273: Report from the Commissaire de police du 7e arrondissement, 4th March 1915. 
17 AML 4H274: Kleeberg, Commandanture de Lille, Police militaire, to Chef de la Police Civile de Lille, 





The traditional narrative of this affaire is that a series of strikes occurred in textile 
factories from April to July 1915, primarily in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, and that these 
workers and their employers decided to stop producing sandbags for patriotic reasons.18  
Although industrialists and local notables did play an important role (see the ‘Respectable 
Resistance’ chapter), the strikes actually started with crowds of outraged (seemingly 
working-class) people refusing to allow the workers to enter the factories, launching 
verbal and physical attacks including pulling hair and beatings.19  Many victims and 
perpetrators were women.  These attacks, which in some sense have an element of 
charivari about them,20 were a means of reinforcing the culture de l’occupé.  In 
particular, they explicitly demonstrated what was acceptable or not according the moral-
patriotic norms: in this case, making sandbags which would aid the German war effort 
was clearly unacceptable.   
 
L’affaire Orlianges 
Even association with those who were believed to be making sandbags could morally 
contaminate an individual.  One case study demonstrates this, and the strength of 
perceptions of mauvaise conduite: on 24th June 1915 in Roubaix, inhabitants of the cul 
de Four of the 4th arrondissement were ‘très surexités [sic]’ against their local 
Commissaire de Police, M. Orlianges.  They reproached him for frequenting the cabaret 
Bonte, a ‘lieu mal réputé’ whose owner (Mme Bonte) ‘aurait installé un atelier où l’on 
fabriquerait des sacs pour l’armée allemande.’  The preceding evening, about one-
hundred people waited for Orlianges at the cabaret’s exit and openly threw ‘des ordures’ 
at him.  Orlianges called on a German gendarme who came to his aid, even firing a shot 
into the crowd before his revolver was knocked from his hand.  The Commissaire 
Central did not know how these events ended, but noted that ‘Cet incident fait l’objet de 
                                                 
18 Nivet, France, p.227-9; Becker, Cicatrices, p.176. 
19 See ADN 9R716, 726, 735, 753; AMT H4A32; AML 4H121. 
20 For a description of charivari, see Eugene Vance, ‘Le Jeu de la feuillée and the Poetics of Charivari,’ 
MLN, 100:4, French Issue (September 1985), p.85; Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘The Reasons of Misrule: 






toutes les conversations ce matin.’21  Did Bonte really work for, and allow (or even force) 
other women to work for the Germans?  It is hard to say for certain, but another 
statement backs up this accusation: ‘Depuis un mois et demi, j’ai quitté la maison que 
j’habitais rue de l’Epeule 29, parce que les allemands [sic] avaient pris possession de mes 
ateliers pour faire travailler à leur compte, sous la direction d’une femme Bonte, pour les 
ouvrières…. [sic]’22 
 
The attack on Orlianges actually came after disorders the previous day, the full details of 
which are unclear.23  Mlle Bert and her aunt had been attacked by a crowd of between 
one-hundred and a thousand people,24 who hit them, knocked them to the floor, and 
pulled them by their hair.  They did so because they believed the women worked for the 
Germans.  One woman, who admitted her involvement in the disturbance and violence, 
noted that the quartier had experienced frequent scenes of disorder ‘à cause des femmes 
qui travaillent pour les allemands [sic].’25  After the attack, Bert went to see Orlianges at 
the Commissariat.  According to public rumour, Bert was his mistress, and he was 
protecting her.26  When Bert left the Commissariat, she went to visit one of the women 
who attacked her, but with whom she had argued, to excuse herself for what had 
happened.  Her father also came, ‘et lui a adressé des reproches véhéments relativement 
au fait pour lequel elle avait été assaillie; elle lui jura n’avoir pas fait de sacs, mais elle ne 
put convaincre personne parmi les gens.’  Respectability is visible here: Bert, after being 
attacked, wanted to set the record straight, but even her father felt disgraced by the 
accusations against her.  
 
                                                 
21 ADN 9R726: report of Benet, 24th June 1915, cited in Commissaire Central to mayor of Roubaix, 5th 
July 1915 (‘Au sujet de la conduite de M. ORLIANGES’), p.8. 
22 Ibid., testimony of M. Georges Puravelle, cited in a report from Commissaire de police Barthouil, 28th 
July 1915, cited in a report from Wargnier to Prefect, 15th August 1915, p.18.  Original emphasis. 
23 See conflicting testimony in ibid. 
24 Ibid, testimony of Célina Lernoux (26th June 1915) in report of Benet, 5th July 1915, p.12-13. 
25 Ibid., testimony of Mme Dubus (25th June 1915), p.9-10. 





When Orlianges came ‘pour la reconduire,’ insults were hurled at him, Bert and her 
father, by a crowd a few-hundred strong.  The shop owner claims to have returned home 
in order to avoid the scene, but later heard that horse manure had been thrown at 
Orlianges.27  Orlianges’s apparent relations with a woman believed to work for the 
Germans, and another woman apparently running a sandbag operation, turned him into 
a target for popular reprisals.  He had breached the culture de l’occupé and was punished 
accordingly. 
 
The documents do provide the perspective of 24 year-old dressmaker Fernande Bert, 
who noted that 
en sortant de chez ma tante […] j’ai été assaillie par un certain nombre de 
femmes qui m’attendaient pour me frapper parce que l’on m’accuse de 
faire des sacs pour les Allemands.  [Les femmes] se sont approchées de moi 
pour me battre.  Mme Dubus, en me voyant, m’a dit: “Ah, c’est vous, on 
vous reconnaitra [sic] après la guerre”.  Puis elle m’arracha mon châpeau 
[sic] et me porta plusieurs coups de poing sur la tête et le corps.  Plusieurs 
autres femmes suivirent cet exemple.28 
 
Bert claimed she did not work for the Germans, and chose to go to Orliange’s office 
herself to press charges against her assailants.  Once here, the assailants were persuaded by 
Orliange that they had been mistaken in assuming Bert worked for the Germans, and 
were charged with persuading the rest of the crowd of this.  But the crowd refused to 
listen, and it was at this point that horse manure and insults were thrown at Bert, her 
father, and Orlianges, with the majority being aimed at Orlianges.29  Orlianges’s 
reputation was poor, both among the population and the police, and his breach of 
occupation acceptability exacerbated his situation.30 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., testimony of Fernande Bert (28th June 1915), p.15-16.  Sometimes also referred to as Fernande 







For whatever reason – in response to such threats or a genuine crise de conscience – 
many in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing refused to continue working until roughly late-July 
1915, when harsh German measures quelled the public disorder and punished 
absentees.31  This appears to offer an explanation for the lack of similar disorders and acts 
of public retribution until the liberation.  However, this did not, according to reports 
from rapatriés, stop certain women voluntarily making sandbags for the Germans 
elsewhere, for instance at Anzin and Valenciennes.32 
 
Postwar Popular Purges? 
From October 1918, few ‘purges’ like those seen in the aftermath of the Second World 
War took place.33  This was perhaps linked to the rapid Allied re-occupation, which 
imposed its own strict controls, dissuading mass disorder; perhaps also because of 
aforementioned military investigations into and removal of suspect individuals.  Yet some 
acts of popular retribution did occur.  On the evening of 19th October 1918, ‘une bande 
de jeunes gens accompagnés de femmes a parcouru diverses rues du quartier St-Maurice 
[in Lille] en manifestant devant les maisons où des femmes avaient entretenu des 
relations intimes avec les soldats allemands.’  Five women had their houses targeted, and 
vandalism and theft was carried out: windows were smashed, money and property (which 
the crowd claimed the women had obtained as favours from the Germans) was stolen.34  
That same evening, a crowd of 200 men and women (possibly the same people) 
vandalised and stole from a pâtisserie and an estaminet whose owners were ‘connues pour 
avoir exercé le commerce avec les allemands [sic] pendant l’occupation.’35  A police report 
from the next day (20-21st October 1918) explained that similar scenes occurred in the 
8th arrondissement: at the house of a woman who had lodged a German, all the window 
panes were smashed with stones, and the crowd broke into the house to steal certain 
                                                 
31 See AMT H4A32 passim; ADN 9R745: German poster, Tourcoing, 12th July 1915. 
32 ADHS 4M513: report n°746, 15th February 1917; n°769, 19th February 1917; n°780, 20th February 
1917; n°951, 10th March 1917. 
33 See, for example, Fabrice Virgili, La France  “virile”: Des femmes tondues à la libération (Paris, 2000). 
34 ADN 9R1240: Commissaire special de Lille to Prefect, 20th October 1918. 





objects.  Window panes were smashed at another woman’s home, and ‘une maison 
connue pour avoir fait fait du commerce et entretenue des relations avec les allemands 
[sic], a été mis au pillage par une foule d’inconnus.’  The female owner had been warned 
in advance and kept her distance.36 
 
A police report concerned the sacking of a house believed to belong to a married woman 
said to have had a German lover during the occupation, and to have engaged in 
commerce with the enemy.  The owner of this house was actually her aunt, and the 
suspect – one Mme Terasse – had already fled the commune.37  For Le Naour, such 
police reports ‘sont d’un étonnant silence et cachent des réalités certainement très 
violentes derrière des phrases laconiques et pudiques,’ such as ‘La population s’acharna 
contre elle […]’38  Thus there were some unofficial, fairly violent ‘purges’ – and there 
were probably further unreported examples of this, or reported examples for which the 
documents are missing – yet here the crowds appear to have wanted to remove the wealth 
accumulated during the occupation by certain suspects, and to damage their buildings, 
rather than any more permanent or serious punishment of the suspects.  This may make 
their expression of anger representative of a desire to punish outside the realms of the 
law, which they saw as inadequate, and a recognition that the suspects had not broken 
any laws but had still behaved badly, that they had still in some way ‘betrayed’ their 
patrie.  Mauvaise conduite was not confined to legal definitions.     
 
A few sources also mention female head-shaving taking place, one of the most infamous 
symbols of popular punishment of alleged collaborators during the Liberation of the 
Second World War.39  As Le Naour notes, attempting to study and shed light on similar 
                                                 
36 AML 4H271: Commissariat Central de Lille, ‘crimes, délits, évènements,’ report of 20-21st October 
1918. 
37 ADN 9R1196: Croix, Cousinet, 17th November 1918; report from the British Army, 14th November 
1918. 
38 Le Naour, ‘Femmes tondues,’ p.153. 
39 See, for example, Virgili, La France; idem, ‘Les “tondues” à la Libération: le corps des femmes, enjeu 
d’une réaproppriation [sic],’ CLIO. Histoire, femmes et sociétés, 1 (1995), accessed online on 1st June 





events during and after the liberation of the First World War leads to ‘un mur de silence 
bien plus insurmontable que celui du secret honteux de 1944: en effet, si les sources et les 
archives abondent en ce qui concerne la seconde libération, on ne recense guère de 
manifestation des odieuses tontes à l’issue de la Première Guerre mondiale.’40  But there 
is some hard evidence of head-shavings.  In his inter-war book Occupied 1918-1930: A 
Postscript to the Western Front, British journalist Ferdinand Tuohy noted of reoccupied 
northern France: ‘Not a few of the black-listed ones – women – were found to have been 
shorn by fellow-citizens as a stigma of shame,’ although he also hints at more serious 
methods of retribution, for ‘others were come upon with their throats cut.’41  Further, Le 
Naour cites the testimony of peasant soldier Grenadou, referring to the liberation of 
1918: ‘Quand on arrivait dans ces pays-là, ils réglaient leur comptes, de vieilles querelles 
du temps des Allemands.  Ils coupaient les cheveux aux bonnes femmes.  Tu parles d’un 
cirque!  On trouvait pas [sic] ça à notre goût.’42  A photographer from Valenciennes 
testified to head-shavings in November 1918.43  Thus, although not as widespread as in 
Belgium in 1918,44 nor as in Second-World-War France, some popular, physical reprisals 
did occur in northern France and the Nord in particular.  Curiously, this phenomenon, 
even if it was limited in nature due to the absence of the latent civil war which explained 
the explosion of popular justice in 1944-5,45 is rarely mentioned in accounts of the 
occupation and liberation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
notes ‘the perennial commonplace of parades of women with shaven heads during the purges that 
followed the Liberation in both literature and cinema.’  Elizabeth Brunazzi, ‘The Question of Colette and 
Collaboration,’ Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, 13: 2 (Autumn 1994), p.282. 
40 Le Naour, ‘Femmes tondues,’ p.148-9. 
41 Ferdinand Tuohy, Occupied 1918-1930: A Postscript to the Western Front (London, 1931), p.18.  
The phrase ‘black-listed ones’ refers to Allied intelligence lists of suspect individuals. 
42 Grenadou, paysan français (Paris, 1978), p.131, cited in Le Naour, ‘Femmes tondues,’ p.149. 
43 Nivet, France, p.343. 
44 For the Belgian experience, see Laurence van Yypersele, ‘Sortir de la guerre, sortir de l’occupation: les 
violences populaires en Belgique au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale,’ Vingtième siècle. Revue 
d’histoire, 83 (July-September 2004), pp.65-74.  Here, even Allied soldiers joined in with acts of popular 
revenge, such as destruction of property and female head-shaving (p.67).  See also, van Ypersele and 
Rousseaux, ‘Leaving the War’; Laurence van Ypersele, ‘“Au nom de la Patrie, à mort les traîtres!”.   La 
répression des inciviques belges de 1914 à 1918,’ Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société, 3 
(novembre-décembre 2007), accessed online on 22nd June 2009 at www.histoire-politique.fr. 





An Incomplete Jigsaw 
As Fitzpatrick notes, Diderot’s encyclopaedia states that ‘One is inclined to think that the 
delator is a corrupt man, the accuser an angry man, and the denouncer an indignant 
man.’46  This does not mean that all denunciations, or indeed accusatory witness 
testimonies and mentions of mauvaise conduite, are inherently false.  It is here contended 
that there must be truth behind at least some of the denunciations, accusations, and 
witness testimonies studied; perhaps a greater truth than has previously been admitted by 
French historians.  But whatever the ‘historical truth’ regarding the behaviours and 
actions of individuals, there was an undeniable fixation with mauvaise conduite among 
both the Allied authorities and many occupés themselves.  For the latter, perceived 
breaches of the acceptable, respectable norms of wartime society comprised a betrayal 
which at best undermined the wider claims of dignified suffering, and at worst threatened 
national survival.  Both during and after the war, retribution and justice was demanded 
concerning those ostensibly engaging in such unrespectable actions.  The complexities of 
occupied life were to a large extent brushed aside in the Manichean culture de l’occupé, 
with one form of misconduct leading to accusations of further forms.  Personal morality 
and patriotism were conflated, as were legal and illegal actions, to form an idea of wider 
mauvaise conduite.  These allegedly unpatriotic behaviours, however, were just one set of 
responses to the occupation, arguably based on survival instincts.  Despite the seemingly 
simplistic nature of the culture de l’occupé concerning mauvaise conduite, occasionally a 
moral-patriotic grey zone was acknowledged.  This could be the case regarding the 
behaviours and actions discussed here, but it was most noticeable in the reality and 
discourse surrounding another response to occupation: engaging in acts of criminality.
                                                 





V – Moral Borderlands: Criminality during the Occupation 
Examining mauvaise conduite has already required a blurring of the lines between the 
illegal and legal definitions of behaviours and actions in occupied France.  This chapter 
leans towards the legal, comprising a study of general criminality during the period, 
another neglected area in works on the occupation.  Committing a crime during the 
occupation represents another form of misconduct – albeit one that took place between 
collaboration and resistance.1  Such actions provided the keys to survival for certain 
occupés, yet they clearly infringed upon the important notion of respectability.  It is thus 
pertinent to use the term ‘mauvaise conduite criminelle’ to reflect this distinction, even if 
it is rather forced, as none of the categories studied in this thesis are hermetically sealed 
off from one another.  The fluidity of power structures regarding policing, and the 
notion of a moral economy are central to understanding the possible forms of action and 
behaviour in occupied France, of which mauvaise conduite and ‘resistance’ were just two 
examples bookending a broader spectrum of activity.  Mauvaise conduite criminelle was 
located in this grey area.  Just as the trenches shifted the physical front, so the occupation 
altered the internalised socio-cultural-moral front among the local population. 
 
This chapter explains the situation of the French police force, possibly explaining high 
levels of crime.  This is followed by an examination of crime proper – outlining the most 
common occupation crimes: theft (which could be to the detriment of Germans or 
French), fraud, speculation and profiteering, and smuggling.  I will end by highlighting 
how the role of young people in crime was a great concern for contemporaries.  These 





                                                 






Recently, historians of the First World War have noted the ‘need to look more closely at 
the way that societies negotiated a new wartime moral economy, adapting prewar moral, 
legal and religious norms to create acceptable wartime values which had their own 
internal logic.’2  The values of mauvaise conduite form part of this, but the altered moral 
economy is most visible when studying criminality during the occupation. 
 
The term ‘moral economy’ requires some explanation.  It was most associated with E.P. 
Thompson, describing the ‘traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper 
economic functions of several parties of the community.’3  Thompson perceived the 
moral economy ‘as a popular consensus about what distinguishes legitimate from 
illegitimate practices, a consensus rooted in the past and capable of inspiring action.’4  
The prevailing concept of the moral economy in the social sciences has emphasised 
conflict and resistance, particularly regarding Third World insurrections – such as James 
C. Scott’s study of peasant rebellions in early twentieth-century Burma and Vietnam.5   
 
In occupied France, it appears that the moral economy shifted amongst a certain part of 
the population, making previously illegitimate actions (such as theft and fraud) seem 
more acceptable.  It was legitimate for an individual to have access to the basic social 
goods needed for survival,6 whatever form that access may take.  This view is mirrored in 
Invasion ’14, in which van der Meersch writes of the revolution in moral values which 
took place, with one woman who had never committed a crime being forced to steal by 
                                                 
2 Heather Jones, Jennifer O’Brien, and Christoph Schmidt-Supprian, ‘Introduction: Untold War,’ in 
Untold War, p.15. 
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Present, 50 (1971), pp.76. 
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circumstances.7  For some, survival replaced conventional morals, yet on the collective 
level such actions were still illegitimate, subverting respectability.   This was partly 
because of pre-war socio-cultural understanding of social goods and the means of access 
to these, enforced by the French administration and law.  For functionaries in the police 
or municipal government, the moral economy remained encoded in juridical documents; 
engaging in criminal acts undermined the collective good, removing social goods from 
their legitimate owners and thus fracturing the social relations underpinning the moral 
economy itself.  Mauvaise conduite criminelle threatened the stability and survival of 
local areas, not just during the occupation but also after the liberation. 
 
Methodological Challenges 
Documents related to crime pose well-known problems.  Police reports and statistics 
evidently only demonstrate reported crimes, therefore only offering a glimpse into the 
reality of criminality – albeit a useful and often suggestive one.  Thus the reality of 
criminality is as occluded as that of mauvaise conduite.  Further, in the case of foreign 
occupation, the question of what constituted crime, and whose laws were being broken, 
is raised.  The Germans criminalised many forms of previously legal activities,8 and in 
some cases actions viewed by them as illegal could be said to represent resistance, such as 
refusing to work for the Germans.  This was particularly the case because, just as Sophie 
de Schaepdrijver states for Belgium, ‘L’autorité allemande était ressentie comme 
foncièrement illégitime.’9  Breaking the laws and rules of an illegitimate power was 
therefore a perfectly legitimate course of action for the occupied population.  Whether 
this constituted ‘real’ criminality is thus questionable, but here this issue is here engaged 
with only occasionally, as resistance is examined in Part II of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
7 Van der Meersch, Invasion, p.115. 
8 Such as opening or closing house doors outside of specifically allotted times – see ADN 9R745, German 
poster, Tourcoing, 30th June 1915. 





Many relevant documents are of German provenance, obfuscating their usefulness as 
indicators of criminal activity regarded as such by the occupied population.  Whilst some 
limited French sources do exist, the way in which the French police was sidelined during 
the occupation means that these represent only a fraction of what was occurring.  A final 
problem is born out of the interpretation of documents on criminality, particularly crime 
statistics.  It is difficult to know whether the type and extent of criminality was directly 
caused by the occupation, or whether a particular subset of the population would be 
engaged in similarly criminal activities during peacetime.  It is worth attempting to 
engage with these issues, but important to outline the challenges faced at the outset. 
 
This chapter examines criminality on a local scale, focusing predominantly on Lille-
Roubaix-Tourcoing, for which sources are fairly comprehensive.  Concentrating on the 
largest towns of the department is not necessarily representative geographically-speaking, 
but can be justified by their large populations.  I aim to assess the possibilities and 
peculiarities of occupied life, to demonstrate the multitude of actions and decisions open 
to those among the population willing to infringe upon social and legal conventions.  By 
doing so, I will shed light on further ‘dark spots’ in the history of the occupation.   
 
To study criminality, it is necessary to touch upon the phenomenon of policing, 
although the archival documentation related to this is lacking, meaning the reflections on 
this subject will be unavoidably fleeting and incomplete. 
 
Policing 
In November 1918, the Commissaire de Police of Vieux-Condé, Fresnes, Escautpont 
and Crespin summarised his force’s occupation experience: 
Les mauvais instincts se font jour, quelques civils participent au pillage avec 
les soldats ou cambriolent des maisons; le travail a cessé, il faut s’organiser 
[…]  La police est débordée par des besognes de toute nature.  Néanmoins, 
elle assure le maintien de l’ordre, constate les crimes et délits et en livre les 





entravée, parfois impossible.  La surveillance des fraudeurs en denrées est 
faite.10 
 
Thus the French police force was permitted, and able, to operate during the occupation, 
but there is a suggestion that it could not cope with the scale of criminality.  Perhaps this 
was because it had too few men, and/or because the occupation provided a particular 
breeding ground for crime.  The Commissaire explained that the German civil police 
force was set apart from its French counterpart by its main aim of searching for those 
who harboured Allied soldiers and helped them to escape.  It was also involved in the 
creation of espionage networks by paying ravitailleurs for denunciations.  Such ‘gens 
tarés’ were occasionally even employed as fully-paid German policemen.11  Here, a 
dichotomy between the French and German police forces can be seen, a split of power 
whereby the French police worked for, and the German police against, the population – 
the Germans using undesirable individuals for this.  This is a precursor in some ways to 
the ‘rival police forces’ of Second-World-War France,12 albeit with fewer complexities.  
The latter part of the report highlights that the Germans were suspicious of the French 
police, occasionally arresting French policemen.13 
 
Power struggles between the two forces were a regular occurrence and, unsurprisingly 
given the Germans’ heavy-handed governance and strong military presence, this was 
more of a problem for the French police than for the Germans.  The former frequently 
attempted to carry out German demands, at least regarding the maintenance of order, a 
policy with which it agreed and which may be seen as practically the only real common 
ground between the French and German authorities.14  Yet this was no guarantee of 
German non-interference or non-punishment.  On 25th August 1916, the Commissaire 
                                                 
10 ADN 9R512: Report of the Commissaire de police de Condé, Vieux-Condé, Fresnes, Escautpont and 
Crespin; ‘Situation pendant la guerre de 1914-19198,’ to Sous-Préfet à Valenciennes, 28th November 
1918. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Richard Vinen, The Unfree French: Life Under the Occupation (London, 2006), pp.128-132. 
13 ADN 9R512: Report of the Commissaire de police de Condé. 





Central of Lille posted a policeman next to the Palais Rameau, who could intervene if 
gatherings banned by the Germans occurred.  However, that evening the Germans 
arrested the policeman in question, stating that only the German military police was 
involved with maintaining order in this respect.  The following day, the Commissaire 
asked the mayor to intervene on the policeman’s behalf,15 only to discover that that he 
had been released earlier that day.16 
 
Exemplary of these clashes and pre-existing tensions was an incident of 6th April 1916: 
Commissaire de Police Boinet of the 8th arrondissement of Lille was walking outside at 
8.25pm when two German soldiers shouted at him.  A heated conversation took place.  
The Germans informed him that he was breaking curfew without a valid pass.  Boinet 
stated that he did not need one: policemen were permitted to circulate without 
permission, and he was their boss.  Finally, one soldier confiscated his ID card and told 
him to report to the local police office the next morning.  Boinet annoyed the soldier by 
stating, “Si vous voulez […] Mais oui, si vous voulez.  Je ne vous dis rien de malhonnête, 
vous n’avez donc pas à vous froisser.”17  The language and tone used by Boinet 
demonstrate his frustration, and the importance of respectability is evident, with Boinet 
maintaining a respectful (if occasionally sarcastic) tone towards the Germans, but himself 
being treated with disrespect (see Fig. 5).   
 
The next morning, before Boinet was due at the relevant police station, the same German 
soldier called at his house, eventually kicking his door off the hinges.  Boinet complained 
about this to the Commissaire Central, asking that his letter be forwarded to the German 
authorities in order to punish the soldier.18  The Germans responded that Boinet was in 
                                                 
15 AML 4H274: Commissaire Central de Police of Lille to mayor, 26th August 1916, nº3227. 
16 Ibid., 26th August 1916, nº3243. 
17 ADN 9R580: Ville de Lille – Commissariat de Police du 8e arrondissement, Commissaire de Police 






the wrong, and that his report was in fact ‘inconvenant’ in its tone and content.19  The 
precariousness and instability of the French police’s situation is evident, as is the 
importance Boinet placed on respectable social relations. 
 
Yet the power struggle did not exclusively involve the French and German police forces.  
Aware of the discordance and the changing power structures, certain members of the 
wider population often used the situation to their advantage, in a further example of 
mauvaise conduite and of social inversion.  This occurred as early as November 1914, 
when Mme Lefebvre complained to the Germans about the condemnation of her 18 
year-old  sister, sentenced by the tribunal correctionnel de Lille to two years’ 
imprisonment for theft.  Lefebvre asserted that this was an act of vengeance on the part of 
the French police, because her sister had had intimate relations with German soldiers and 
her (Lefebvre’s) husband worked ‘aux automobiles’ for the German military authority.  
Lefebvre claimed that she was ‘molestée par la police française, qui perquisitionne chez 
elle et chez sa sœur et lui a fait retirer les secours qu’elle avait.’  Her complaint was passed 
on to the head of the German military police and then to the Kommandant.  The latter 
asked that the policemen in question be punished, but the mayor of Lille stated that 
before taking any descisions, he wanted an inquiry establishing the truth of the 
complaint, which seemed to be a way for ‘une femme de mauvaise vie d’appitoyer [sic] 
l’autorité allemande sur son sort en travestissant impudemment des actes de vol pour 
lesquels sa sœur a été condamnée par la justice.’20  This hints at the idea of an abuse of 
occupation power structures, with those at the bottom of the social hierarchy – the 
unrespectable ‘femmes de mauvaise vie’ – playing off the Germans against the French 
police. 
   
                                                 
19 Ibid., Loben (S. Lieut and police officer) to Commissaire Central, 17th April 1916. 
20 ADN 9R556: Extrait des Procès-verbaux de la Commandature de Lille, Séance du 21 Novembre 1914 





This was a commonplace occurrence.  In July 1915, the Commissaire Central of Lille 
wrote to the mayor, noting that: 
Depuis un certain temps, les agents de police, chaque fois qu’ils 
interviennent, soit pour conduire des ivrognes au violon, soit pour toutes 
autres causes, sont généralement menacés d’une dénonciation à l’Autorité 
militaire allemande […]  Etant donné que chaque fois que; les [sic] agents 
procèdent à l’égard d’un délinquant c’est un ennemi en plus qu’ils se 
créent, il arrivera un moment où le désir de s’éviter tout ennui incitera les 
agents à négliger leur devoir et ils fermeront les yeux plutôt que 
d’intervenir, de sorte que notre police, fortement réduite en nombre, 
complètement désarmée et constamment menacée d’arrestation, ne 
constituera plus qu’une force plus apparente que réellle [sic] et incapable 
de maintenir l’ordre plusque [sic] jamais nécessaire.21 
 
The Commissaire gave an example of this worrying state of affairs in action.  On 11th 
July 1915, three French policemen from the sixth arrondissement arrested ex-convict 
Constant Hugo for drunkenness and physical violence towards his wife.  During the 
journey from Hugo’s house to the police station, Hugo ‘ne cessa de dire à l’agent Mullier, 
qui le conduisait, qu’il le dénoncerait à la Commandanture.’  This is exactly what 
happened: Hugo denounced not only Mullier, but all the policemen present at the 
station.  He claimed that he was physically assaulted and insulted on the pretext that he 
worked for the German authority.  The Commissaire stated that this was false, because 
he had personally instructed all police personnel to abstain from all acts of violence, and 
‘de ne faire ni actes ni réflexions pouvant être interprêtés [sic] comme hostiles à l’Autorité 
allemande.  Rien jusqu’ici n’a démontré que ces instructions n’étaient pas 
scrupuleusement suivies.’  Yet Hugo’s complaint did indeed lead to the arrest, by the 
Germans, of those agents who could have mistreated him – although an internal police 
investigation demonstrated that they had not done so.  Hugo was bruised, but this was in 
fact a result of his wife having thrown household objects at him in order to defend 
herself, a fact she freely admitted.  The Commissaire Central therefore ended his letter by 
asking the mayor to persuade the Germans to release the arrested policemen.22   
                                                 






A case where the conclusion is visible is that of M. Willerval, a policeman from 
Tourcoing.  He was brought before a Conseil de guerre on 13th March 1916, accused of 
aiding, feeding and clothing hidden French soldiers from September to October 1915.  
Strikingly, the accusers were in fact the soldiers themselves.  The defence, led by M. 
Spéder, the interpreter at the mairie, rubbished such claims.  Spéder argued that the 
‘soldiers’ were in fact vagabonds who had been convicted during and before the 
occupation.  Labelling them as ‘deserters’ from the French army, Spéder explained how 
their previous criminal record exempted them from being in the army.  He purported 
that their motivation for denouncing Willerval was survival: they presented themselves to 
the Germans as French soldiers and denounced Willerval to reduce their sentences, in the 
hope that they would still be in a German prison at the end of hostilities, to avoid the 
French justice system.  The Conseil was swayed by Spéder’s case, and Willerval was 
acquitted.23 
 
Spéder defended more French policemen from accusations on the part of the occupied 
population.  In July 1915, two Tourquennois policemen (Scrittes and Rousseau) were 
accused by two women of having insulted the Germans whilst accompanying soldiers in 
finding lodgings.  Spéder’s defence noted that a certain part of the population ‘comprend 
mal son obligation de loger’ and subsequently complained about the French police’s role.  
This was especially the case in houses and cabarets which in peacetime were ‘déjà en 
guerre avec la police ou sa surveillance’ and which ‘se trouvent très vite prêts à user par 
vengeance de répressaille [sic] envers elles.  Ceci doit certainement être la raison du cas 
qui nous occupe.’24  Again, a reversal of the social hierarchy is evident here: those 
normally ‘en guerre’ with the police could assert their dominance during the occupation.  
It is not clear what happened to Scrittes, but Rousseau was sentenced to 6 months’ 
imprisonment in Germany for his alleged insults towards the Germans.25  The influence 
                                                 
23 ADN 9R753: Séance du Conseil de Guerre du 13 mars 1916. 
24 AMT H4A29: Rapport Concernant les Agents Scrittes et Rousseau, n.d.  Spéder seems to be the author.   
25 Ibid., note from von Tessin, Kommandantur of Tourcoing, nº603, 10th July 1915; ADN 9R745: 





such denunciations could have is therefore evident.  Other denunciations of the French 
police took place in Tourcoing in August 1916.26 
 
Misuse of power structures took forms beyond denunciations.  During the night of 17-
18th February 1918, the owner of an estaminet in Lille discovered an intruder behind the 
bar.  A small fight ensued, after which the thief, later identified as Julien Devolder, 
managed to escape with various goods.  According to the owner, ‘Pour opérer, Devolder 
était vêtu d’une capote et coiffé d’un calot de soldat allemande. [sic]’  After Devolder had 
run away,  the owner found documents in German on the floor, containing the 
inscription ‘2 Batt. Res. Feldart, Rgt. 44. 17.11.18, libellé au nom d’un nommé Kar. 
Hofsommer.’27  Perhaps Devolder had stolen the clothes and papers from a German 
soldier.  Whatever the case, the Germans arrested Devolder and still had him in custody 
at the time of the writing of the police report.28   
 
Yet this bizarre incident was not as isolated as might first be imagined: a month earlier, 
three Frenchmen and a French woman had been arrested for ‘escroquerie et complicité 
d’escroquerie de marchandise.’  One of the men had ‘usurpé la qualité de la police 
militaire allemande pour saisir une certaine quantité de savons.’29  This and the above 
examples represent just some cases of mauvaise conduite criminelle that blur the 
boundaries between infractions of a legal nature, and those of a socio-patriotic nature. 
 
There are other examples hinting at the wider population’s acknowledgement that the 
Germans were the dominant force.30  This shift in power played a role in increased 
criminality, because the French police was restricted in its actions, and because occupés 
perceived (with some justification) the French police as lacking authority in any 
                                                 
26 ADN 9R752: Commissaire Central to Prefect, 16th August 1916, a. and b. 
27 AML 4H270: Ville de Lille, Commissariat Central de Police, report, ‘crimes, délits, évènements,’ 18-
19th February 1918. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 14-15th January 1918. 





meaningful sense.  Further, the nature of German occupation created previously 
nonexistent avenues of action, offered new choices, and ‘forced’ some to pursue criminal 
actions out of sheer necessity.   
 
What, then, was the legal and practical reality of the dual authority concerning the 
French police force and justice system?  For local French authorities, this was unclear: 
indeed, in October 1916 the Procureur de la République of Lille wrote to Governor von 
Graevenitz stating his understanding of legal procedure for criminal cases, and asking for 
verification of this.  He spoke of the ‘difficultés […] qui peuvent entrainer [sic] certaines 
divergences de vues entre des juridictions fonctionnant parallèlement depuis bientôt deux 
ans, et produire même, parfois, une confusion de pouvoirs involontaire.’31  Von 
Graevenitz explained that a French person suspected of having committed a crime only 
fell under German jurisdiction if the act was committed against Germans or the German 
authority – in all other cases, ‘la solution de l’affaire pénale ressortit à la compétence des 
tribunaux français.’32  This demonstrates a German desire to maintain authority over 
those whose actions affected them directly, whilst distancing themselves from the more 
general role of peace-keeping.  This may partially explain the seemingly high level of 
criminality, examined below.  However, committing a crime against another French 
person often involved a breach of German regulations, such as the curfew – as well as of 
the Union Sacrée.  The French juridical machinery nevertheless sputtered along with 
reduced powers during the occupation, with tribunaux correctionels still taking place and 
arrest warrants still issued on behalf of local juges d’instruction.33  This side of French 
law-and-order policies is less well documented than policing, hence the focus will be on 
the latter. 
 
                                                 
31 ADN 9R325: Procureur de la République of Lille to von Graevenitz, 12th October 1916. 
32 Ibid., von Graevenitz to Procureur de la République, 1st February 1917 (‘Tribunal de la 
Kommandantur Impériale Nº286 IIIa’). 
33 See AML 4H271: report, 5-6th July; ADN 9R253: Inspecteur de l’Assistance publique du Nord to 





The French police force faced a confusing legal situation, the threat of denunciations to 
the Germans, and German interference, but also dwindling numbers of personnel.  The 
following table demonstrates the decline in police numbers for the Lille area. 
 
Commune 
Nº of police before the 
occupation – gardes 
champêtres and gardes 
civils respectively 
Number in 1916 
Cysoing 4, 25 4, 14 
Haubourdin 6, 51 6, 0 
Lannoy 14, 60 8, 29 
Lille (Nord) i.e. La Madeleine  4, 60 4, 60 
Lille (Ouest) 6, 70 2, 0 
Lille (Sud-Est) 14, 0 3, 0 
Pont-A-Marcq At least 1 garde-champêtre 2, 0 
Quesnoy-sur-Deule 1, 8 1, 0 
Roubaix (Ouest) 5, 24 5, 8 
Seclin 1, 48, and 1 garde chasse 8, 0, 0 
Tourcoing (Nord-Est) 12, 24 10, 0 
Tourcoing (Sud) 19, 15 19, 11 
         34 
 
Such was the seriousness of the manpower crisis that in March 1916 the Commissaire 
Central of Lille wrote a report explaining the current state of affairs and suggesting 
actions to be taken come the liberation to maintain (or restore) public order.  This report 
also expressed fears of popular reprisals during the liberation, even summary executions, 
due to the number of personnel which was barely sufficient to fulfil its current duties.  A 
plan was drawn up regarding rapid responses to and dispersal of crowds.35  By October 
1918, the police force of Lille had diminished so greatly that the mayor had to appeal to 
                                                 
34 ADN 9R245: list of police personnel dated 1916, ‘Département du Nord.  Arrondissement de Lille.’  
Different statistics are provided in ADN 9R580: Commissaire Central intérimaire (de Lille), ‘mésures à 
prendre,’ 24th March 1916 (122 professional agents and 130 auxiliary agents); AML 4H274: n.a., 
typewritten document, 5th May 1916 (444 police personnel, including administrators). 





those retired policemen who had not already been called up during the occupation, and 
others, to plug the personnel gap.36   
 
The reduced force had trouble combating criminality.  This was the case regarding the 
Jardin-Lardener in the Fives-Lille area, where in May 1917 inhabitants complained that 
surveillance was suspended for an hour each day, and ‘on profite pour y faire des 
déprédations.’37  The policeman guarding the jardin had to leave the premises for lunch, 
whereas before the occupation there was enough food for the guard to eat his lunch on 
duty.  Now, the gardener acted as a replacement during the lunch break, because no 
other policemen were available – most also engaged in surveillance.38  This hints at the 
scale of crime and criminality, given that nearly all locations from where goods could be 
stolen needed to be under constant police observation.  Even a gap in the surveillance of 
an hour or so could lead to theft or other crimes.  Indeed, on the same date, 26 locations 
and buildings were watched constantly by the French police, requiring a total of 55 
policemen.39  Sometimes agents de l’octroi also engaged in surveillance, particularly of 
locaux d’alimentation and boulangeries, although there was confusion over jurisdiction, 
and occasionally professional rivalries.40 
 
The Germans sometimes ordered the French police to increase surveillance, such as in 
the main railway station of Tourcoing in May 1917, where wooden planks from the 
fences were being stolen every day.41  This had been a problem since at least March of 
that year, when people were using the holes in the fence to steal more wood from inside 
                                                 
36 AML 4H274: standard letter template from mayor to ‘Monsieur,’ 4th October 1918; letter template 
from the Secrétaire Général to ‘Monsieur,’ 12th October 1918. 
37 AML 4H274: mayor of Lille to Commissaire Central, 5th May 1917. 
38 Ibid., Commissaire Central to mayor, 8th May 1917, n°12411. 
39 Ibid., ‘Endroits où des agents sont de service en permanence,’ 3rd May 1917. 
40 AML 4H103: Président du Comité Exécutif de la Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France, 
District de Lille, to mayor, 2nd September 1916; Commissaire Central of Lille to mayor, 23rd April 1917; 
Directeur de l’octroi to mayor, 13th April 1917.   





the station.42  This suggests the willingness with which the local population would turn 
to theft if possible.  In both cases, the blame for theft fell on the occupied population, 
and the responsibility for preventing further occurrences lay with the French 
municipality.  The French police could engender punishments and criticism from the 
Germans by overstepping its alleged duties, but also by not going far enough in its 
actions; it was in this respect just like the wider occupied population, between a rock and 
a hard place. 
 
The police were also prevented from other work by having to accompany the Germans 
during requisitions43 – an act that the police viewed a means of maintaining public order 
rather than collaboration.  If verbal or physical disputes broke out between the French 
population and the Germans during requisitions, this could result in punishments for the 
entire population of a town or commune; by accompanying the Germans, French 
policeman reduced the likelihood of this.  Such aid provided to the Germans by the 
French police gave rise to a feeling of betrayal among certain occupés.  This sentiment is 
visible in the resistance tract La Liberté, a self-confessed ‘Bulletin de propagande 
patriotique’ distributed in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area.  In the 15th November 
1915 issue, a lengthy article entitled ‘POLICE’ appeared, beginning with emotional and 
literary language explaining how the population had seen the ‘Gardiens vigilants’ as ‘le 
symbole personnifié du Patriotisme et de l’équité’ – but they were wrong, and ‘depuis le 
jour de la prise de possession de notre ville de Roubaix; ces pantins se sont mis à la 
disposition des matadors Allemands [sic], les ont cicéronnes, [sic] renseignés, servis avec 
une affabilité dont rougiraient les Peaux Rouges!...’44  Condemning recent ‘mœurs 
brutales’ of the Roubaix police, the article noted that the only thing distinguishing the 
French police from the Germans was the absence of a belt buckle with Gott mitt Uns on 
                                                 
42 Ibid., nº906, 16th March 1917. 
43 For example, a Commissaire de Police of the 4th arrondissement of Lille accompanied Germans in their 
searches for weapons in inhabited buildings.  ADN 9R581: Ville de Lille, Commissariat Central de Police, 
report, ‘crimes, délits, évènements,’ 3-4th January 1915. 





it.  The police chief was blamed for allowing French agents to become ‘valets’ for the 
Germans.45  The disdain for and disappointment in the French police on the part of the 
author (and perhaps the wider population) is clear.   
 
During the occupation the local French police force found itself under great pressure and 
criticism from both the French and Germans.  This had a knock-on effect on criminality.  
Despite close German surveillance, the occupés were able to engage in a surprising 
number of criminal actions.  The occupied zone became an environment in which crime 
could be legitimised as the best or only means of survival, and thus the moral economy 
was reconfigured.  Such a response to the occupation was adopted by certain occupés, 
pitting survival instincts against respectability. 
 
Theft 
The most widespread crime carried out during the occupation was theft.  The link 
between penury, hunger and theft is clear,46 so perhaps this is unsurprising.  On the other 
hand, this phenomenon (and crime in general) seems largely absent from post-1918 
memoirs or histories, even in recent historiography.47 
 
Police reports for Lille and Tourcoing,48 the Bulletin de Lille and German posters for all 
the Nord contain virtually daily accounts of theft.  It is pertinent to split these into two 
types, matching the conflicting jurisdictions, i.e. thefts carried out to the detriment of 
fellow occupés, and those committed to the detriment of the Germans.  The latter could 
be perceived as a form of resistance, although it would be an exaggeration to insinuate 
that all theft of German property was carried out simply because the owner was German.  
Becker writes of the ‘délits d’ordinaire’ for which the occupés were punished by the 
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Germans, but expands upon this by calling them ‘délits de patriotes.’49  This seems too 
positive a view, an attempt to view the occupation through a monochrome filter 
representing an attachment to and participation in the post-war culture according to 
which virtually all occupés were resisters.  Theft and crime carried out to the detriment of 
fellow occupés is a different category.  This was a betrayal of the Union Sacrée, and of the 
population’s claim, often repeated or hinted at in even the most recent historiography, to 
be suffering together in dignity, for France.50   In this sense, it could be said to constitute 
a particular brand of mauvaise conduite – anti-patriotic and criminal behaviour, rather 
than what was perceived as criminally unpatriotic behaviour, whatever the judicial system 
stated. 
 
This examination of theft will take into account both types.  However, the criminal 
aspect of the occupied population, concerned with survival according to a redefined 
moral economy, did not always make as clear-cut a distinction between the nationality of 
the victims of crime as will be made here.  The differentiation of the two ‘victim’ groups 
was not necessarily made by the occupied population itself. 
 
Thefts From Germans 
Thefts committed to the detriment of individual German soldiers or ‘the German 
authority’ constitute those crimes that are most visible in the documentation, thus 
seemingly the most widespread.   Such crimes were highlighted by the Germans via lists 
of punishments, such as in the ‘Justice Militaire Allemande’ section of the Bulletin de 
Lille.  The Germans also considered ‘theft’ the possession and/or use of goods which they 
believed should be handed to them during requisitions, although this distinction is clear 
in the sentences.  The thefts dealt with here are those labelled as such, rather than other 
crimes which could be construed as theft.   
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‘Anti-German’ thefts were commonplace.  On 26th May 1916, the Bulletin published a 
warning: ‘Dans ces derniers temps, le nombre des vols d’objets, grands ou petits, commis 
par des gamins, sur les voitures allemandes transportant des colis postaux s’est multiplié.’  
What followed was a list of punishments: 13 males sentenced to between seven and 28 
days’ ‘de privation moyenne de la liberté’ and one male sentenced to 14 days’ detention.  
The next set of punishments would be harsher, it was stated.51  Perhaps the relatively 
short length of these prison sentences resulted from a lack of incarceration space caused 
by a large criminal population, rather than the lenience alluded to in the announcement 
itself.  A week later, the problem had not been solved, and another notice was published 
in the Bulletin, almost word-for-word the same as the above.  Only three people were 
punished this time,52 but this highlights the increasing problem of thefts from German 
vehicles. 
 
Similar announcements and posters appeared throughout the occupation.  Although they 
were supposed to underline the consequences of infractions of German regulations, they 
offer the historian an insight into the fact that such laws were being breached on a regular 
basis – and that the German régime was neither as omnipotent as it nor later occupation 
accounts claimed.  This mirrors Taylor’s findings regarding Nord-Pas-de-Calais in World 
War II.53  The difference in this earlier occupation was that it was both the French and 
German authorities who found themselves constrained, partly due to a less clear-cut co-
operation between the two police forces. 
 
On 26th May 1916, the Bulletin informed readers of the punishment of 36 individuals 
(25 men and 11 women) for theft since January 1916, ranging from 14 days to 7 weeks 
in prison.54  This may seem like a small number over a rather long period, but it 
represents one of the longest lists of punished individuals appearing in the Bulletin, 
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indicating the predominance of theft of ‘German-owned’ goods amongst occupation 
crimes.  These announcements also emphasise the fact that many of the perpetrators were 
young children, who were often left with nothing to do once schools were closed – 
because of lack of heating, for health reasons, or because the building or teaching 
material had been requisitioned by the Germans.55  This touches upon a key occupation 
concern, discussed in detail later: the moral well-being of the population, particularly the 
youth. 
 
French police reports hint that such a concern may have been justified, registering a fairly 
large number of thefts committed by youths to the detriment of the Germans, 
particularly from German vehicles.  On 5-6th October 1916, a woman aged 52 and four 
boys (aged 12-14) were investigated for stealing clothes from a German transport 
vehicle.56  The procès-verbal was carried out by French policemen, even though the 
‘victim’ was the German authority – this was a few months before von Graevenitz 
outlined the jurisdictional separation, demonstrating the confused situation in which the 
French police found itself.  French policemen, until ordered to cease, did not draw a 
distinction between crimes committed against Germans or fellow Frenchmen.57   
 
Thefts committed to the detriment of the Germans also highlight the blurring of moral 
boundaries.  For example, on 19-20th June 1916, three men aged 17, 19, and 20 were 
arrested ‘pour vol d’environ 50 échevaux [sic] de coton au préjudice de l’Armée 
allemande, pour le compte de laquelle ils travaillaient depuis quelque temps.’58  These 
young men worked for the Germans, although it is not clear if they did so voluntarily.  
Even if they had been forced, this would still have most probably drawn them disdain 
from the local population; yet they also stole from the Germans.  Was this a form of 
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resistance, a simple exploitation of the situation to increase their chances of survival, or 
something else? 
 
Thefts From Fellow Occupés 
Evidence for theft carried out by occupés to the detriment of compatriots at first seems 
harder to discover, recorded in French police documents at a time when the police was 
overstretched.  However, evidence does exist, and serves to illuminate this rather ‘dark’ 
aspect of the occupation – providing another form of mauvaise conduite and further 
calling into question the almost hagiographic accounts of the occupation.  Becker 
mentions only briefly that there were thefts committed between occupés,59 but attempts 
no further examination.   Yet François Rouesel, member of the Chambre de Commerce 
of Roubaix, hints at the extent of theft in his unpublished memoirs.  He noted that 
despite the rigours of the German military police, the numerous imprisonments and 
deportations to Germany, ‘la sécurité n’a pas existé dans notre ville pendant la guerre au 
point de vue des vols et des cambriolages.’60  Given the predominance of theft in 
occupied life suggested here, this section aims to provide the beginnings of a rectification 
of this historiographical oversight. 
 
Returning to the Bulletin, beyond the German proclamations there is evidence of ‘inter-
occupé’ theft in the ‘Chronique locale’ section.  For example, the Bulletin of 18th May 
1916 notes that: ‘Le 8 mai, Gruson Louis, 44 ans […] a été arrêté pour vol de légumes, 
dans différents jardins […] Il a comparu devant le Tribunal correctionnel le 10 mai, et a 
été condamné à 6 mois de prison, il était en état de récidive.’  This is representative 
because the most commonplace sub-category of theft was stealing food; it also indicates 
the role pre-war criminals played in occupation crime. 
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The contents of the Bulletin suggest that crime continued or increased during the 
occupation.  In March 1916, it published a warning to its readers to be wary of 
pickpockets who had been operating at the Marché de Wazemmes and the locaux de 
ravitaillement.61  The existence of pick-pockets at a market, especially one in a working-
class quartier of Lille like Wazemmes, is hardly shocking.  What is striking, though, is the 
need to publish such a warning, presumably to inform readers of the (growing?) scale of 
the problem.  A few months later, a pickpocket was caught red-handed: the 37 year-old 
woman was found in possession of purses, wallets, and ID cards, and sent to the Maison 
d’arrêt.62  The theft of identity cards could have led to serious punishment for the 
owners.63 
 
There is some evidence of organised crime during the occupation and the extremes to 
which it led people.  In Lille on 21st December 1915 the body of a sergent de ville was 
found in a pond.  Investigations concluded that he had been murdered, and quickly led 
to the arrest of four men between 27 and 32 years old recently suspected of stealing 
poultry in the neighbourhood.  The sergeant had been keeping these men under 
surveillance, which one of the suspects admitted was the reason for his murder.64  The 
surprisingly rapid arrests demonstrate that the French police was not entirely powerless.  
Perhaps it was only the murder that spurred the police into action, with thieving so 
widespread and commonplace that until a more serious crime was committed the police 
would or could not intervene, merely watch.   
 
A ‘bande de malfaiteurs’ operated in Roubaix, and one of its leaders was executed in 
1917 for possessing a revolver.65  He had twice been arrested for theft during the 
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occupation, and before the war ‘se livrait à la rapine.’66  Therefore, strict German curbs 
on everyday activity did not manage to stop criminal actions, even (especially?) those of 
organised gangs of pre-war criminals. 
 
The Bulletin also highlights frequent ‘small-scale’ thefts, presumably carried out by 
desperate individuals.  For instance, the 6th June 1916 issue contained ten mentions of 
theft, whether thefts committed since the last issue four days before, or those charged 
with theft during this period.67  These reports were so frequent that, presumably to 
counterbalance the damaging effect on the population’s morale, a section entitled ‘Acte 
de probité’ was sometimes published.  An example of this is a man who found 100 bread 
tickets and returned them to their owner, earning the Bulletin’s congratulations.68  Thus 
not every item that disappeared was necessarily stolen, although it seems that this was 
probably the case for most ‘disappearances.’ 
 
Directly after the tragedy of the explosion of the Dix-huit ponts of 11th January 1916,69 
the Bulletin informed its readers that some unscrupulous individuals were taking 
advantage of the situation by entering the ruins and stealing goods.  One such person was 
caught and condemned to two months’ imprisonment.  The article ends with a plea: 
‘Respectez donc le malheur! Respectez les ruines!’70  Thus the ruins of the explosion of 
the Dix-huit ponts were not being respected, just as the ruins of the invaded territories 
themselves were not, despite calls for dignity and fraternity in suffering.  Indeed, other 
examples mentioned in the Bulletin are equally striking, such as thefts from churches71 or 
tombs.72  These may reflect the reconfigured moral economy, the way in which 
criminality permeated occupied life, and the extremes to which people were pushed by 
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hunger and penury.  Whatever the case, the Bulletin’s constant reports of thefts of 
foodstuffs,73 clothes and shoes,74 as well as money and various objects,75 presents an 
image of widespread ‘inter-occupé’ theft. 
 
The French Police and Theft 
Police reports offer further insight into criminality, allowing an assessment of the 
constituency of the criminal population.  Examples of youths committing crime abound.  
This is particularly the case for another type of theft: those carried out from new 
organisations which had a particular set of consequences unique to the occupation, i.e. 
thefts to the detriment of the population as a whole, and the town.  This comprised 
stealing goods belonging to the CRB or the CANF, overwhelmingly carried out by 
children or adolescents.  In Lille, between 23rd and 30th November 1917 alone, six boys 
aged between 10 and 15 were the subject of procès-verbaux for having stolen foodstuffs 
and other goods from CANF transportation vehicles.76  The young constituency of the 
criminal population may be due to the demographic changes of the war and the 
occupation; it was perhaps inevitable that youths formed the backbone of the new 
‘criminal class’ – or at least the ‘thieving class.’  Perhaps some parents encouraged their 
children to commit such acts, hoping that their infantile status would protect them from 
the harshest of punishments.  However, the Germans made it clear that parents would be 
punished for the misbehaviour of their children.77  No matter the reason, children and 
adolescents were often involved in occupation crime. 
 
Yet youths were not alone in committing thefts to the detriment of the CRB/CANF.  
These thefts took place since the CANF’s inception and grew in scale throughout the 
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war.  In May 1917, thefts from supply wagons were affecting the relief effort.78  At the 
end of February 1918, two women and a man were arrested for having stolen regularly 
from the CANF over a period of 18 to 20 weeks,79 and in July one young man of 17 stole 
17,852 francs ‘au préjudice de la Ville.’80  On one night in August 1918, 480 boxes of 
condensed milk were stolen from the CANF depot at the Descamps factory in Lille,81 
where dozens more had been stolen the preceding March.82  Further, CANF dock 
workers repeatedly stole goods in 1918.83    
 
The French were willing to work with the Germans in order to prevent these crimes.  At 
the end of May 1917 the mayor of Lille informed the Kommandantur that thefts of eggs 
from wagons were becoming more frequent.  The preceding day, almost 1,000 eggs had 
been stolen.84  This foreshadows the situation in the Second World War, whereby French 
authorities were most willing to work with the Germans regarding food provisioning.85  
Sometimes the authors of these thefts were discovered, providing a warning against 
oversimplified conclusions concerning criminality.  In January 1918, for example, it was 
discovered that the authors of the theft of briquettes from the local coal depot were in 
fact German soldiers,86 and from February to April 1918 further thefts were attributed to 
Germans, notably from CANF wagons and depots.87  However, most thieves were 
occupés, as the numerous accusations of those working for the CANF attest.88   
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Police reports suggest there was a correlation between the number of thefts committed 
and the length of the occupation – unsurprising given the increased suffering and hunger 
as the war continued.  However, reports for Lille regarding 1914 and 1915 are 
incomplete, because of the fire at the hôtel de ville in April 1916.89  This may give a 
distorted view of events.  Yet it seems that until mid-1915, the French police were 
concerned mostly with maintaining good relations between the local population and the 
Germans, performing tasks such as investigating thefts carried out to the detriment of the 
Germans,90 and sometimes crimes committed by Germans.91  From 1916 onwards, the 
police focused mainly on theft, both to the detriment of the aid organisations or the 
town, and against individuals.  In August 1916 there were no fewer than 27 recorded 
thefts (or people arrested or investigated for theft) in Lille.92  There was at least a theft a 
day for all but 3 days of the month.93  Many involved youths (particularly boys) stealing 
potatoes or coal.94   
 
Mauvaise conduite and pure criminality did not always go hand-in-hand.  On 12-13th 
August 1916, 22,000 francs was stolen from Mme Rosse, ‘tenancière de la maison de 
tolérance.’95  This was a large sum, even given inflation which that year meant a loaf 
bread cost 6 francs,96 suggesting that Rosse’s clients were Germans and her trade 
booming.  Perhaps stealing from such a woman would have been regarded as preferable 
to stealing from the CANF/CRB, although as this chapter demonstrates, the moral 
economy of some occupés was as broken as the financial economy.  Penury naturally 
provided ample motives for crime.  Such reasoning is apparent in the words of the 
occupés themselves.  Four people were arrested and interrogated by French police for 
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stealing from Lille’s wood depot in April 1918.97  All gave similar statements to 48 year-
old Arthur Dumont, who admitted to the theft, but justified his actions because his 
family had been without coal for six days.  It was the first time he stole wood;98 indeed, 
the attached reports on the individuals charged stated that all had good habitual conduct 
and morality.  They and their families were well noted in the commune, and they were 
not drunks, debauched, libertines, and did not live in concubinage.99  In short, they were 
upstanding, respectable members of the community, who seem to have turned to theft as 
a last resort, out of a survival instinct brought on by the hardships of the occupation.  
They were not prime examples of unrespectable, antipatriotic mauvaise conduite.   
 
Yet criminality was its own form of misconduct, and demonstrates that – contrary to 
much literature on the occupation – not all occupés lived in solidarity.  The reality was 
more complex.  In May 1917, the Commissaire Central of Roubaix wrote to the mayor, 
explaining the criminal situation.  He spoke of thefts caused by hunger and injustice, and 
of the idea that many were profiting from the war.  The springboard for this message was 
‘une affaire de vol qui paraît conçu sous l’empire des sentiments méritant d’être relevés et 
auxquels il faut prêter une réelle attention.’  That afternoon, three mothers had entered 
an épicérie and picked up 5kg of beans, leaving 5fr in payment.  Yet they had been 
informed that, rather than the 1fr a kilogram they had paid, the beans cost 6.5fr a kilo.  
Consequently, the owner gave chase – a passing policeman intervened and took all 
involved persons to the Commissariat.  The Commissaire stated: ‘l’égalité dans le 
malheur est une fiction navrante.’  He explained that everyday ‘le scandale augmente, la 
spéculation n’a plus de frein’ and the poor were dying of hunger – which he feared could 
lead to pillage. ‘On murmure très fort, on supporte mal les provocations qui s’aggravent 
et l’affaiblissement physique produit son reflexe [sic] sur le moral qui s’affaisse et sur la 
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conscience, qui, tout à l’heure, ne réagira plus… [sic]’  The Commissaire wanted to 
signal  
la situation d’un côté le peuple qui hurle à la faim mais qu’un reste de 
conscience maintient encore dans la bonne voie et d’autre part les 
exploiteurs – ils sont légion – qui vivant bien, noçant sans se cacher, se 
permettent toutes les fantaisies, haussent à leur gré les produits de toute 
nécessité sans se soucier des grincements de la population affamée.101 
 
The occupied Nord was not an exemplar of patriotic unity; criminal and other mauvaise 
conduite were widespread, worrying the Commissaire. 
 
It is impossible to know whether survival was the motive for crimes, but desperation 
rather than targeted malice most probably guided the actions of many thieves of the 
occupation.  Yet there is evidence of theft from the very aid organisations that were 
helping to ameliorate the situations engendering crime.  Such confusion is also evident in 
discussions of non-criminal mauvaise conduite – and for some, like diarist Suzanne Beck 
from the occupied Aisne, the connections were evident.  She linked personal and sexual 
morality:   
voleuses, délatrices, prostituées, appartiennent au même groupe, voire 
sont les mêmes personnes; elle accuse la pauvreté, l’exclusion, la solitude, 
et ne s’étonne donc pas que les réfugiées, des quasi-étrangères, soient en 
première ligne des “femmes à soldats”, certaines se retrouvant “en 
situation intéressante”.102 
 
Such a link was often drawn in the later investigations into sexual misconduct, with 
details of thefts seen to reinforce the case for mauvaise conduite103 – moral, sexual and 
patriotic perversity were inextricably linked.  Becker suggests that German requisitions 
constituted legalised theft,104 which altered the moral situation in which the occupés 
found themselves.  The impact of German pillage and the hunger and poverty caused by 
the occupation may indeed have altered the moral compass of the population, just as 
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front-line soldiers of both sides often turned to theft for survival.105  The Germans had 
legitimised theft as a means of access to social goods, and the occupied population itself 
internalised and acted upon such reasoning: the moral economy was thus reconfigured.  
The line between criminal instinct and survival is equally blurred when examining other 
types of crime. 
 
Fraud and Speculation 
Fraud encompasses numerous criminal activites, but its meaning here includes 
‘escroquerie,’ ‘détournement’ of goods and money, as well as profiteering, the fabrication 
of false money and the illegal selling of goods.  Also included is a crime particular to the 
occupation, that of being a ravitailleur, i.e. someone who transported goods (particularly 
foodstuffs) across communal and national borders in order to sell them to the occupied 
population.  For the occupying Germans, fraud consisted of possessing and/or selling 
contraband, including the selling of goods without declaring the sale.  Punishment 
ranged from four weeks’ ‘arrêt’ up to 5 years in prison and a 10,000-Mark fine.106  
Depending on who the ‘victims’ were, and on the specific nature of the crime, fraud can 
thus be perceived as a form of mauvaise conduite criminelle.  The occupied and non-
occupied population was united in its contempt for those considered ‘war profiteers,’107 
people exploiting the wartime situation to enrich themselves.  Yet fraud may in some 
cases be perceived as a form of resistance.  Speculation is often indistinguishable from 
fraud, and is naturally a key feature of war profiteering.  Black markets, fraud, and 
speculation, are common phenomena during military occupations and at home fronts 
during total war.108  In this respect, the situation in northern France was similar to that in 
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Belgium,109 and had parallels with Second-World-War France.110  However, these themes 
have received little attention regarding northern France in the First World War. 
 
Fraud Concerning Aid Organisations 
On 3rd April 1916, the CANF warned the occupied population that its goods could not 
be sold to anyone else.  It also reiterated the extraordinary nature of the CRB and 
CANF’s efforts – goods had been transported across the Atlantic, then to Holland, 
through Belgium, and to northern France, without a single centime of personal profit.  
As such, ‘En face de ce désintéressement universel, aucun Français, nous en sommes 
certains, ne voudra compromettre le bon renom de notre région du Nord, en spéculant 
sur le prix de vivres dont chaque parcelle est due à des efforts uniquement inspirés par le 
dévoûment [sic] et la générosité.’111  However, another poster warned that re-selling of 
CANF goods was continuing to occur, comprising ‘opérations scandaleuses’ which could 
lead to a cessation of all aid, endangering the lives of the entire occupied population.112  
This was was not mere rhetoric, as it had only been with considerable effort that the ‘soul 
of the CRB’ Herbert Hoover113 and others had convinced the Allies to allow CRB/CANF 
goods to bypass the blockade.  The British in particular feared that the Germans would 
seize the goods themselves, leading to tight restrictions on the functioning of the aid 
operations, including an agreement with the Germans not to requisition CRB goods.114  
Members of the occupied population selling CRB/CANF goods broke these regulations 
– particularly if they sold their goods to Germans.  
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CRB/CANF regulations were legally binding.  The mayor of Lille noted that each 
inhabitant was only entitled to an amount of goods matching personal or family needs, 
and that the observation of this condition was itself crucial to the continuation of such 
aid in the commune.115  Any infraction of this constituted criminal fraud.  Yet CANF-
related fraud was a persistent thorn in the French authorities’ side, despite the willingness 
of the Juge d’instruction to issue arrest warrants for suspects.116  This was why French 
police and agents de l’octroi monitored ravitaillement buildings.117  Further posters 
invoking the Code pénal appeared regularly to remind the population of the illegality 
and repercussions of CANF fraud.118  This did not solve the problem: for instance, from 
September to mid-December 1916, 35 abuses occurred across Lille, including attempting 
to procure goods without a valid card, theft, taking more than the permitted ration, and 
attempting to bribe a guard.119    
 
The population itself believed in widespread CANF-related fraud and price-hikes on the 
part of bakers and food sellers, but also on the part of the local administration and 
CANF employees.  Abuses of power were perceived to be taking place in mairies across 
the Nord.  The mood and logic was very similar to that visible in Belgium, where ‘La 
hantise du profitariat était bien ancrée.’  With so many people receiving aid, ‘il devait 
donc – se disait-on – fatalement y avoir de l’abus.’  It was clear that some profited from 
the situation, leading to the opinion: ‘Endurer patriotiquement la pénurie, tout cela était 
bel et bien, mais pourquoi était-ce toujours aux mêmes de donner l’exemple?’120 
 
Such was the strength of this belief and the accompanying disgust that in April 1917 the 
mayor of Lille put up a poster rubbishing such rumours.  He warned the population 
                                                 
115 AML 4H103: Maire de Lille, ‘Extrait du Registre aux Arrêtés du Maire de Lille,’ n°1679, 18th March 
1918. 
116 See, for example, AML 4H270: report, 12-13th March 1918. 
117 See, for example, AML 4H103: Directeur de l’octroi, CANF, District de Lille,’ 13th April 1917. 
118 Ibid., CANF, ‘Avertissement au public,’ 3rd April 1916.  This poster invoked articles 491, 496 and 505 
of the Code pénal providing punishments for those caught engaging in fraud. 
119 Ibid., mayor to CANF, 18th December 1916. 





against ‘des rumeurs calomniatrices que des personnes mal informées ou de mauvaise foi 
font courir dans notre population’ which spread ‘grâce aux conditions dans lesquelles 
nous vivons, avec une déplorable intensité.’  These ‘attaques aussi odieuses qu’injustifiées’ 
targeted men who had devoted soul and body to ravitaillement for more than two years, 
who were above all suspicion and who deserved the admiration and gratitude of 
everyone.  The mayor admitted that such a complex operation may have led to some 
minor abuses, and concluded: 
Il est donc temps que cette campagne d’insinuations perfides s’arrête, et 
nous sommes décidés à déférer à la Justice les calomniateurs sans scrupule 
qui chercheraient à ternir la réputation de vos concitoyens les plus 
méritants et les plus dévoués. 
Vous avez fait preuve, dans les terribles années que nous 
traversons, d’un esprit de patience, de concorde et de solidarité dont je 
vous suis profondément reconnaissant, et je ne doute pas que vous soyez 
décidés à y persévérer jusqu’au bout.121 
 
Key themes of the occupation are visible here: the idea of inter-French solidarity, the 
importance of respectability and thus the painfulness of accusations of wrongdoing, and 
the heavy burden laid upon French municipalities and administrators.  Such a poster 
seems to reflect the post-war view of mauvaise conduite, i.e. that a small minority acted 
badly and unpatriotically, and to insinuate that this was any more than a fringe 
occurrence is unpatriotic and simply mistaken.  Yet the poster also demonstrates the 
fracturing of the Union Sacrée, the strength of rumours and internecine squabbles 
amongst the occupied population, a fracturing caused by widespread perception of 
misconduct, whatever the realities.   
 
Suspicion of CANF fraud was also common in Roubaix and Tourcoing, where the 
mayors followed the same pattern, highlighting the selflessness and importance of the 
CANF’s mission, and not allowing a few mistakes to undermine the entire project.122  In 
November 1916, anonymous handwritten posters appeared across Tourcoing in local 
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CANF depots and markets, accusing its employees of fraud and favouritism.  Friends of 
the mayor were said to benefit from better rations than the wider population, whilst the 
CANF employees themselves were accused of passing goods ‘entre amis.’123  In response, 
the mayor published a poster underlining the integrity of the provisioning process and its 
personnel, and explaining that fraud could not happen because of the various checks and 
measures in place.  Those few cases of wrongdoing that had existed were dealt with 
rapidly, and indeed could not function for an extended period due to surveillance.124  
Despite this, the Commissaire Central was concerned that this campaign of ‘dénigrement 
systématique’ might outlast the occupation, as it appeared to have a political bent.  The 
Socialist Party in particular seemed ‘très documenté sur ce qui se passe à 
l’alimentation.’125  There is a suggestion here that such a campaign might actually be 
justified by the actions of the CANF.  Similar ‘diffamations’ were made against the 
CANF committee and municipality of Roubaix.126 
 
On occasions the wider occupied population seemed correct in its suspicion of CANF 
members.  In Lille, a 65 year-old CANF contrôleur was found guilty of fraud involving 
paid subscriptions in return for coal that never materialised.  He was charged and sent to 
the Parquet.127  In Hellemmes, the adjunct to the mayor and member of the local CANF 
branch was relieved of his functions on 3rd October 1917.  He had breached numerous 
regulations, although actually to the population’s benefit, such as giving people flour as 
well as their bread rations.128  The CANF operation, therefore, seems to have provided 
the perfect breeding ground for fraud. 
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The wider population also engaged in various forms of fraud.  In an inter-war book of 
occupation poetry, a poem entitled ‘Fraudeuse’ (dated July 1916) attacks a woman who 
stole grain in order to make bread,129 depriving fellow occupés of their grain ration.  The 
poem reflected reality: most recorded cases of fraud concern bakers or their assistants 
procuring excess grain or bread for themselves, using CANF grain in their products; or 
members of the wider population purchasing such contraband bread.130  This blurs the 
line between theft and fraud.  Such was the scale of fraud by 1916 that the municipality 
of Lille upped its surveillance of goods and food depots, actively punishing culprits.131  
This phenomenon was not confined to Lille: in Tourcoing in December 1916, the police 
launched a series of raids to seize fraudently-acquired foodstuffs, especially rice, from 
shopkeepers.132  From then on, French authorities were obsessed with curbing fraud.  
Usually, once someone was caught red-handed,133 the municipality demanded that they 
pay a fine.  Only after a refusal to do so would the decision to pursue judicial action or 
remove them from their job be taken.134 
 
This obsession was justified, as the scale of fraud was enormous, and suspects were 
sometimes involved in other mauvaise conduite.  In Lille, in June 1918, nine men were 
arrested by the French police on suspicion of trafficking various goods, from sugar to 
gold.  Their houses or establishments were searched.  Many of these men had links to the 
Germans, having engaged in commerce with them, or having frequented German 
establishments and personnel.  Most had previous criminal records and were considered 
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as being of dubious morality.135  These arrests were part of a police operation to discover 
who had been illegally hoarding sugar – in the preceding days, all sugar supplies in Lille 
had dried up, before hundreds of kilograms reappeared at considerably inflated prices.136  
The Germans slowed proceedings, especially because numerous suspects worked in banks 
controlled by the Germans.  Soldiers explained that goods seized by the French police 
that had been bought from Germans could not be confiscated.137  The suspects also 
attempted to play the Germans against the French police, sometimes successfully,138 but 
some policemen nevertheless prevailed: in one shop, they discovered 77 100kg-sacks of 
crystallised sugar, a crate containing a dozen kilograms of sugar ‘en morceaux,’ and two 
cellars brimming with an estimated 400 cases of sugar (containing about 25kg each).139   
 
However, fraud did not comprise the purchase or selling of contraband foodstuffs alone.  
In Lille, a man was sentenced by the Tribunal correctionnel to 8 days’ imprisonment and 
a fine of 200 francs for the creation and sale of a ‘poudre de savon’ which contained no 
soap.  His punishment was to serve as an example to the numerous other speculators and 
falsifiers who ‘ont une pièce de monnaie […] à la place du cœur,’ and whose god was 
their wallet.140  Making and selling alcohol – banned by French and German authorities 
in the occupied area in 1914141 – was another form of fraud.142  It was dangerous in other 
ways: in Tourcoing in 1916, a man was blinded and another two died after drinking 
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home-made gin.143  Overall, alcohol fraud was relatively limited.  Another type, however, 
was more widespread: smuggling. 
 
Fonceurs and ravitailleurs 
Two terms were used to describe those engaging in smuggling – fonceurs and ravitailleurs 
– both loaded with positive and negative connotations, reinforcing the grey moral area in 
which such activities were located.  According to Redier, fonceur meant different things 
in war and peace.  In peacetime,  fonceurs were ‘fraudeurs audacieux qui brûlent la 
politesse aux douaniers et passent la frontière par d’incroyable chemins connus d’eux 
seuls.’  In wartime, he maintains, ‘foncer’ became a profession unto itself, a lucrative 
occupation for people with little or no honesty willing to buy goods in one area, and 
resell them for scandalous prices elsewhere.  However, foncer was sometimes an 
honourable action involving celebrated resisters such as Louise de Bettignies and Louise 
Thuliez (accomplices of Redier’s wife, Léonie Vanhoutte).144  Similarly, in his memoirs, 
Fernand Heusghem recalls that ‘contrebandiers’ provided much-needed goods for the 
occupied population.145  A distinction must be made, then, between simply crossing the 
border, and doing so specifically to procure goods which could later be sold (i.e. 
smuggling).  Some historians have made such a differentiation, or see a difference in 
treatment between fraudeurs and passeurs,146 and between black marketeering and 
‘ravitaillement clandestin.’147   
 
In reality, however, many occupés conflated the two categories – and more frequently 
focused on the negative side of smuggling.  On 7th April 1916, Blin wrote of ‘Le 
commerce lucratif des fonceurs’ which was ‘momentanément arrêté.’148  The word 
‘lucratif’ has inherently negative connotations when used in this period of penury.  For 
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the local newspaper Le Progrès du Nord, such actions were unquestionably negative.  
Reappearing after the liberation, on 22nd November 1918 a list of five grievances were 
published on the front page.  Two of these relate to ravitailleurs or fraudsters: ‘Les 
aigrefins de l’occupation sont toujours les maîtres du pavé’ and ‘Quelques-uns des 
ravitailleurs qui nous ont exploités sont toujours là.’149  In occupied Roubaix, François 
Rouesel remarked that there was only one way to procure food: 
c’était d’aller en chercher à la frontière belge ou d’en acheter aux 
fraudeurs.  Mais la frontière était soigneusement gardée par les troupes 
[…] Tous les jours, les prisons de Roubaix étaient remplies de malheureux 
qui avaient été arrêtés pour avoir rapporté quelque kilogs [sic] de pommes 
de terre de la frontière.150 
 
Rouesel was sympathetic towards such people but his attitude evolved as the occupation 
continued.  So frequent were such actions that by the end of 1916, ‘Le nom même de 
fraudeurs disparut pour faire place à celui de “fonceurs”, pour désigner ceux qui passaient 
la frontière pour en apporter des marchandises prohibées.’  Further, ‘La partie calme et 
sérieuse de la population faisait même à ces fonceurs un accueil sympathique, puisqu’ils 
lui apportaient, à des prix élevés sans doute, des produits d’alimentation qu’elle n’aurait 
pu se procurer sans eux.’151  This illustrates the moral minefield regarding the smuggling 
of goods and the existence of a black market.  Rouesel was concerned that the dishonour 
associated with being a fraudster had disappeared, which could be dangerous for the 
future: 
On oublie que la guerre ne durera pas toujours et qu’une fois la paix 
rétablie, il faudra rétablir en même temps la moralité publique, réagir 
sévèrement contre des fraudes si on ne veut faire de la jeune population 
ouvrière qui a désappris le travail et qui s’est habitué [sic] à cette existence 
irrégulière, une pépinière de fraudeurs capables de devenir ensuite des 
voleurs, puis des cambrioleurs et jusqu’à des assassins.152 
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A similarly negative view of ravitailleurs can be found in an undated poem concerning 
Lille, which called ravitailleurs unscrupulous ‘fieffés voleurs’ who had ‘l’assiette au 
beurre/Pour eux et pour les leurs,/Ils rognent nos rations/Pour emplir leurs bedons.’  The 
final stanza is perplexing, perhaps signifying the suspicion with which women in the 
occupied area were regarded, and maybe further crossover between sexual mauvaise 
conduite and criminal misconduct: 
MORALITÉ 
Cherchez toujours la femme 
Le mâle est dans la femme.153 
 
Others had a sharper understanding of the grey area of smuggling and black-market 
provision of goods.  Repatriated Nordistes noted that there were many ravitailleurs at 
Valenciennes, some of whom were ostensibly given permission to cross the border by the 
Germans – in return for a cut of their profits.  These ‘individus exempts de tout scrupule’ 
may have been ‘complices ou agents des Allemands et chargés de mission au cours de 
leurs déplacements en Belgique.’  However, at the same time the importance of the 
provision of goods by ravitailleurs for the population, and the confusing relationship 
between the two groups, was acknowledged: 
Les rapatriés de Valenciennes reconnaissent volontiers que la population 
entretien [sic] et provoque l’existence même des ravitailleurs, car si elle 
n’achetait pas les denrées que ceux-ci vendent, leur commerce tomberait 
de lui-même.  Mais si la population qui souffre des privations a des 
excuses, sa défaillance n’exclut pas le jugement sévère qui doit frapper ces 
mercantis, haïs de tous les habitants.154 
 
Thus the perception of ravitailleurs/fonceurs held by the occupied population at large 
and both occupied and non-occupied French authorities remained overwhelmingly one 
of suspicion.  Many interviews of rapatriés focus on this point.  It was often suggested 
that ravitailleurs/fonceurs were in the pocket of the Germans, procuring gold for the 
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latter, denouncing compatriots, or working for the German counter-espionage service,155 
even if their actions occasionally ‘rend service à la population.’ 156   
 
Whatever the perception of smugglers by the occupés, the occupants themselves drew no 
distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smuggling, an opinion that would be carried into 
World War II.157  Heusghem stated that when ‘contrebandiers’ were caught by the 
Germans, they were tortured.158  Little evidence corroborates this, but it is clear that the 
Germans took the matter seriously: in a single day in 1915, more than 100 ravitailleurs 
were arrested in Fourmies, although there was no fixed organisation dedicated to this, 
and the quantities of goods involved were quite meagre.159 
 
Barbed wire fences were built at the Belgian border, guarded by constant patrols.  
Initially implemented to prevent the emigration of young men from the occupied area,160 
these measures also targeted fraud and smuggling.  The Germans were concerned by any 
border crossing, for military and intelligence reasons.  For occupés, crossing the Belgian 
frontier was the best means of procuring rare items, as Belgium’s relatively more 
comfortable occupation made various goods easier to find here.161  The importance of the 
border for both the French and Germans is evident in the few existing statistics for the 
border town of Wattrelos.  From January to September 1916 a total of 32 people were 
injured attempting to cross, buy or sell goods at the border, 30 of whom were shot by 
German sentries; 11 of these 30 were killed.  Most (19) were adolescents or children – 
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the youngest was a nine year-old girl shot by a sentry.162  Often the role of smuggling is 
explicit, such as the case of a 48 year-old woman from Roubaix killed when attempting 
to cross the border with a sack of potatoes on 23rd August 1916.163 
 
Other preventative measures existed.  In summer 1916, in Roubaix it was forbidden to 
remain by the border or outside houses located on the border, even for the inhabitants164 
– people were punished for this.165  In Tourcoing in April 1918, the Germans attempted 
to turn the population against ravitailleurs/fonceurs in a poster regarding the recent 
increase of pâtisseries made with goods acquired by cross-border smuggling.  They noted: 
‘ce ne sont que certaines personnes devenues riches par les bénéfices de guerre et par un 
commerce illicite, qui profitent de ces friandises, tandis que la grande majorité de la 
population en est privée.’166  The food in question was confiscated, and henceforth a fine 
of 1,000 Marks and three months’ imprisonment became the punishment for making 
foodstuffs using fraudulently-acquired ingredients.167   
 
The French police also did not differentiate between ‘positive’ smuggling and the black 
market, unlike its Second World War counterpart.168  Instead, pre-war attitudes towards 
fraud and smuggling continued, although French policemen were less heavy-handed.  
Those suspected of smuggling or possessing contraband were arrested and questioned,169 
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sometimes revealing that they purchased goods from German soldiers.170  It is unclear if 
further action was taken against such individuals. 
 
Yet movement between the frontiers should not necessarily be viewed as an explicitly 
criminal act.  The borderland between Belgium and France had been fluid for 
generations, thus Nordistes crossing the frontier may have simply been attempting to 
return home, or may not have regarded such a movement as implicitly criminal.  
However, once again it is hard to view a clear distinction between survival and 




False money attracted much attention.  The occupation had restructured the local 
economy significantly, and the gold franc – either appropriated by or hidden from the 
Germans – was replaced by communal, municipal or regional bons.171  This local money 
existed in tandem with German Marks.  Despite restrictions on movement, financial 
transactions were possible across communal boundaries, especially via soldiers 
transferring money from one commune to another.  This led to a complex situation in 
which numerous local currencies circulated in any given area.  Such confusion opened 
the door to abuse, particularly falsifying bons from another locality from the one in 
which it was being used.  Verification of these bons was made difficult by travel and 
communication restrictions.  The bons themselves were easily manufactured.  The 
legitimacy of bons could only be verified by the signature of the mayor of the commune 
from which the money was issued, a mayoral stamp, and the relevant number located on 
the money.  Thus to falsify money, a basic printing press and an ability to forge the 
mayor’s signature was required. 
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The falsification of bons was widespread, as evidenced by lists of valid and invalid bons 
presented by Germans to French municipalities to combat fraud.172  These documents 
also demonstrate the number of local currencies: one poster contained no fewer than 67 
separate, legitimate bons for the Nord, Somme and Pas-de-Calais.173  These lists were 
issued at the demand of mayors, such as the mayor of Lille.174  From 1916, cases of 
occupés arrested for the manufacture and distribution of false money increased.175  By 
early 1917, the mayor of Lille informed the Kommandant that ‘Tous les jours, nos 
caissiers reçoivent des billets faux et le seul moyen d’éviter toutes ces pertes est de 
prescrire aux petites communes de retirer immédiatement les bons qu’elles ont émis.’176  
So widespread was the problem that it affected the French administration, such as in 
November 1917 when the Recette Municipale de Lille made a payment to the Germans, 
accidentally containing three false notes.177 
 
In many cases, the counterfeiters could not be discovered.  The police of Tourcoing 
encountered this impasse frequently between 1917 and the end of the occupation, when 
falsification was particularly acute.  116 falsified billets were seized between April 1917 
and February 1918,178 and at least 38 procès-verbaux regarding falsified money took 
place from December 1917 to February 1918.  Unsurprisingly, nearly everyone found in 
possession of false money denied having created it or implicitly did so by giving a 
detailed explanation of how they came to be in possession of it.179  The investigating 
police officers usually believed such stories – reports contain key phrases concerning the 
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respectability of interviewees, such as being ‘bien considéré,’180 ‘honorablement connu’ or 
possessing ‘bonne foi.’181  The notion of respectability once again comes to the fore: these 
were respectable people who were not betraying the national and local community in the 
same way as those engaging in other forms of mauvaise conduite. 
 
Yet most discoveries of false money in Tourcoing were made at CANF depots and 
centres,182 again raising the possibility of some occupés undermining the relief effort in a 
reconfigured moral economy.  However, it could simply be the case that CANF 
buildings were under increased scrutiny and surveillance, meaning false documents were 
more likely to be discovered here. 
 
Both the German and French authorities put considerable effort into combating this 
perennial thorn in their side.  Sometimes Germans were suspected of trading in falsified 
money,183 but occupés were the main perpetrators.  Falsifiers of money were listed in the 
Bulletin or posters,184 in French police reports,185 and in letters between German and 
French authorities.186  Just like other types of fraud, falsification of money was perceived 
by Germans and French alike as a disrespectful act leading to negative consequences for 
all those in the occupied area. 
 
Speculation and War Profiteering 
Money could be made in other ways.  Although not technically a crime, war profiteering, 
often confused with speculation, was perceived in a negative light.  The Commissaire 
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spéciale at Évian himself bought into such a worldview, noting in the summary of an 
interview with a man from Douai in April 1917 that some ‘commerçants sans scrupules’ 
were ‘en possession de sommes considérables, gagnées au dépend de leurs malheureux 
compatriotes’ by reselling essential goods at scandalous prices.  Yet ‘On constate au 
contraire que des familles de grands industriels, très connus, reviennent avec des sommes 
peu élevées.’187 
 
A woman from from Roubaix had remarked that:  
Le gros commerce profite de la situation et en abuse; les négociants 
gardent des conserves (thon, sardines, etc) qu’ils avaient achetées avant la 
guerre, et ne les revendent que lorsque ces denrées ont atteint des prix 
exorbitants.  Les habitants souffrent naturellement de ce manque de 
patriotisme provoqué par l’appât du gain.188 
 
Similar testimony emanated from St-Amand-les-Eaux.189  Such a worldview existed 
elswehere, but in the occupied area it showed the slippage between mauvaise conduite 
and mauvaise conduite criminelle.  Morally dubious, often criminal acts were perceived 
to be commonplace.  This perception itself bred a new facet of the culture de l’occupé. 
 
Fears for the Present and the Future 
Concerns about increased criminality, especially among the young, extended beyond the 
police.  The Bulletin of 16th June 1916 noted that: ‘La longue inaction que nous 
subissons est funeste aux gamins (et aussi aux propriétaires),’ before detailing the theft of 
vegetables from a policeman’s garden committed by an 11 year-old.190  Other occupés 
agreed that the period of mass unemployment combined with the general effects of the 
occupation to erode the work ethic and morals of the population.  The occupation was 
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an affront to respectability – and mauvaise conduite, criminal or otherwise, was the most 
visible form of this. 
 
Rouesel wrote extensively on the perceived threat of crime, in the present and the future.  
He wrote that ‘on oublie’ that numerous thefts and pillages took place in Roubaix and its 
environs, mainly at night.  Animals were stolen from fields, material from factories, and 
some people even broke into inhabited houses, armed with revolvers.  Among the ‘rares 
arrestations’ that took place, ‘il se trouvait beaucoup de tout jeunes gens, même 
provenant de familles honorables, qui ne seraient jamais devenus cambrioleurs s’ils 
n’avaient commencé par foncer à la frontière.’191  He concludes: 
Voici ce qu’il est bon de se dire et de répéter, car si une réaction sévère ne 
se produit pas aussitôt après la la guerre [sic …] nous serons exposés à 
avoir une génération composée en partie d’apaches pour succéder aux 
braves et honnêtes ouvriers roubaisiens que nous avons connu [sic] 
jusqu’ici.192 
 
This criminal misconduct was exemplary of a wider disrespect for the government.  He 
believed that this should be corrected in schools, where children should learn that they 
owe not just a blood debt to the Patrie, but a civic debt to the government.193   
 
The real situation was not as monochrone in its moral shades, as the diary of Blin 
demonstrates.  Writing in response to the negative treatment of occupés by non-occupied 
French, he admitted that ‘Sans doute, nous ne sommes pas sans reproches […] Une 
jeunesse irréfléchie & bruyante, heureuse de vivre dans une molle oisiveté s’est trop 
souvent fait remarquer par son manque de cœur & son absence de sens moral.’  
However, after mentioning ‘mercantis’ and women nicknamed ‘la viande aux soldats,’ he 
maintains that ‘la population reste, dans sa grande majorité, digne de la France, digne des 
enfants qu’elle a envoyés au-devant l’ennemi pour sauvegarder l’honneur & l’intégrité de 
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la Patrie!194  In this rebuttal of the tarnishing of the occupied population as unpatriotic 
and too friendly with the Germans, Blin also demonstrates the ways in which this was to 
some extent true.  Most importantly, he highlights the popular belief that the occupation 
was teaching the young inhabitants nothing but laziness and crime.  This concern 
reappeared a few months later: 
Assassinat rue de l’Epeule; un adolescent égorge une mère et sa fillette.  La 
guerre prépare, dans nos régimes, une triste génération.  La distinction 
entre “le mien & le tien” ne se fait plus: la conscience est étouffée par la 
lutte pour la vie.  Que de voyous en herbe!  l’oisiveté [sic] fait éclore tous 
les vices: maxime bien vraie et d’un réalisme malheureusement tangible en 
ce moment.195 
 
Early 1917 seems to have been the point from which this problem attracted more 
attention.  In May, the Commissaire Central of Lille informed the acting Préfet of what 
he labelled ‘un danger social certain, une menace pour le bon renom et la prospérité de 
l’école laïque.’  Since the occupation: 
le nombre des adolescents déférés au Parquet pour vols de toutes natures 
devient inquiétant.  Au début, la majorité des délinquants était fournie 
par des jeunes gens ayant dépassé l’âge scolaire et se trouvant, par suite des 
circonstances, livrés à l’oisiveté forcée. 
A l’heure actuelle, les écoliers réunis souvent en bande commettant 
fréquemment des vols qualifiés avec une dextérité que n’acquièrent pas 
toujours les véritables professionnels.196 
 
He provides examples of recent arrests of such ‘bandes,’ before noting that there were 
numerous isolated cases, not to mention those who had not been caught or identified by 
the police.  He concluded: ‘Il existe donc un véritable danger de propagation que le 
personnel enseignant pourrait peut-être essayer d’enrayer dans la mesure de ses 
moyens.’197 
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In April 1917, député du Nord Henri Ghesquière wrote a letter to the mayor of Lille: ‘Je 
me fais un devoir de vous signaler les actes de vandalisme que l’on peut relever dans tout 
Lille, mais que je constate dans le quartier que j’habite avec une inquiétude pénible.’198  
After describing how children in his quartier were destroying urinals and trees, he 
concluded: ‘Que penser sur ce que deviendront ces enfants quand on voudra les sortir des 
milieux d’oisiveté et de vice où ils auront contracté les habitudes de vol, de mendicité, de 
pillage et de saccage dont ils s’accoutument?  On n’ose y penser!’199  He asked if police, 
educational, or labour measures could be taken to fix this problem, and seemed to end on 
a threat: ‘Je vous soumets […] ces bien tristes réflexions en espérant qu’elles pourront 
provoquer quelques mesures utiles, ne serait-ce pour donner l’impression que l’autorité 
française n’a pas du tout abandonné ses droits.’200 
 
Later that month, the Commissaire Central agreed with Ghesquière, but argued that it 
was not his responsibility ‘rechercher les voies et moyens à employer pour conjurer le mal 
qui constituera, il faut le reconnaître, un véritable danger social, d’autant plus grand que 
les mauvaises habitudes résultant de l’oisiveté auront contaminé d’autres éléments que 
ceux de la jeune génération.’201  Fears of idleness, although often inextricably linked to 
vagabondage and child criminality, are here seen as separate from the latter.  Either way, 
a concern for the occupation’s effect on the moral well-being of the youth is evident. 
 
The Germans were not immune from this fear and acknowledged the problems youth 
crime posed for them.  Von Graevenitz wrote to the mayor of Lille in May 1917, stating 
that recently ‘gamins’ had caused ‘dégâts importants’ to railway lines, by pulling apart 
fences and walls.  Only some perpetrators had been arrested but, as they were minors, 
their parents were punished with ‘détention’ for ‘manque de surveillance.’ 
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Partout […] on remarque un nombre insolite de gamins oisifs qui rôdent 
et profitent de toutes les occasions pour mal faire. Ces bandes d’effrontés 
volent systématiquement tout ce qui se trouve sur les véhicules militaires 
ceux de la poste [sic], du ravitaillement ou de fourrages; importunent les 
militaires et les soldats de garde, leur jettent des pierres, etc.202 
 
The damage to railway lines was understood by the Germans as sabotage, rendering such 
actions dangerous for the perpetrators, the town and the population as a whole.  Von 
Graevenitz held the town responsible and ordered the mayor ‘réagir énergiquement 
contre le dévergondage croissant de cette Jeunesse, par des mesures appropriées 
(occupation imposée dans les écoles, organisation d’exercices de gymnastique, sous la 
surveillance des maîtres; occupation forcée dans les services publiques, etc).’203 
 
The Commissaire Central believed that the facts represented more of a danger for French 
society, ‘et ce n’est pas sans appréhension que l’ont peut envisager l’avenir en présence du 
résultat qu’ont déjà donné jusqu’ici l’oisiveté des uns et l’inconduite des autres.’204  He 
reminded the mayor that, for more than a year, he had ordered his men to intervene 
upon seeing wayward youths whenever possible.  They were then to take them home, 
getting the parents to promise to send them to school or at least maintain surveillance 
over them.  Yet, he argues:  
Ce moyen a pu réussir quelquefois, mais la plupart du temps, c’est un 
coup d’épée dans l’eau.  L’autorité familiale n’existe plus dans beaucoup 
de ménages par suite du départ du père, de la faiblesse de la mère et chose 
plus amère à constater, souvent par l’inconduite de celle-ci.  Dans ce 
dernier cas, la présence régulière de l’enfant à la maison constitue une 
gêne pour la mère et alors elle ne fait aucun reproche sur les absences 
prolongées et répétées; l’enfant jouit d’une liberté autant plus grande qu’il 
la sent encouragée.  Il a vite fait des prosélytes et une bande est 
constituée.205 
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The Commissaire continued by highlighting recent police measures – including 
procuring the names of of 90 ‘vagabonds’ – and proposing further ideas.206  However, the 
Inspecteur Générale de l’Enseignement technique had a different perspective: the 
‘oisivité’ of numerous children was because the majority of young people were not able to 
attend their courses as they could not travel to and from class without a pass, which the 
Germans would not provide.207  Whatever the case, ‘le nombre des vagabonds des deux 
sexes augmente.’208  This was not just a case of young men or boys engaging in criminal 
and unrespectable acts, but also young girls and women – although the latter also had 
links to sexual mauvaise conduite, as demonstrated.  They were assumed to be adult in 
terms of their sexual choices but, like boys, required further control in the wider, moral 
sphere. 
 
Youth ‘vagabondage’ and delinquency also comprised general destructiveness, as occurred 
in Tourcoing, where children used makeshift slingshots to damage street lights.209  The 
police were ordered to combat this, and increased surveillance near schools.210  These 
actions constituted not only a moral and social danger for the occupied region, but 
potentially a patriotic danger.  Even youth criminality could cross the ill-defined bridge 
to full-blown mauvaise conduite.  For instance, in Lille in April 1918, ‘jeunes gens’ 
knocked on inhabitants’ doors or threw stones at their windows.  When the inhabitants 
reprimanded them, the latter were ‘injuriées grossièrement.’  More seriously, ‘ils font avec 
l’armée occupante le logement,’ indicating to the Germans that a house was empty when 
the inhabitant was merely momentarily absent.  The youths told the Germans to break 
the door, which they saw as a ‘farce.’  The investigating policeman noted: ‘Les parents de 
ces jeunes gens sont bien considérés mais pas assez énergiques, car à plusieurs reprises je 
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leur ai signalé leurs mauvaises conduites.’211  There was thus a blurring of criminality and 
mauvaise conduite among youths, as elsewhere.  An anonymous denunciation of ‘un 
groupe reunis [sic]’ sent to the mayor of Lille in June 1918 reinforced this: it was noted 
that the fifteen-year-old son of a neighbour engaged in trade with the Germans rather 
than work, and encouraged other boys to do the same.212 
 
Thus youth criminality and delinquency posed a major problem for the local French 
authorities, who believed the two to be linked.  There are a few indicators of the reality, 
such as the lists drawn up by the police of children found ‘vagabondant’ during school 
hours and subsequently taken to police stations.  Only incomplete lists for 1917 remain, 
focusing on just a few arrondissements of Lille.  Nevertheless, they indicate 427 children 
of both sexes ‘arrested’ at least once from January to May 1917 alone.213  This explains 
the large number of measures taken to curb this problem.  By February 1918, a massive 
operation was underway.  The aim was surveillance, splitting the entire population of 
Lille’s 3,616 adolescents aged 14 to 17 into groups of 30, and charging members of a 
newly created ‘commission centrale de la répression du vagabondage’214 with monitoring 
their activities – one member per group.  They were particularly concerned with acts of 
vagabondage, and had to indicate when intervention was required.  Members of the 
committee were drawn from notables and other respectable individuals.215   
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On 6th June 1918, the recteur of the Université de Lille216 congratulated the mayor for 
the commission’s work and the implementation of what he perceived to be liberal polices 
from which French society could benefit, even after the war.  He ended by noting that ‘la 
jeunesse française dont l’héroïsme et l’abnégation font l’admiration du monde entier, 
devra être préservée à tout prix du double fléau qui aurait vite faite d’anéantir en leurs 
germes les plus belles vertus: la paresse et l’inconduite.’217  These charitable works 
represent a form of unity within the wider disunity of criminality, delinquency, and 
mauvaise conduite.  Indeed, the mayor himself mentioned the unity of cause in his 
opening address to the first reunion of the commission on 18th April 1918:   
Des hommes sont venus à nous de tous les horizons politiques, de toutes 
les classes sociales, réalisant une fois plus l’union sainte.  Une même 
pensée nous animera tous, celle de maintenir la population dans un étiage 
morale qui lui permettra de réparer, dans la mesure du possible, des 
ruines, et de panser ces blessures.218 
 
This was met with rapturous applause from the members of the commission, further 
proof of respectable society’s concern with youth misbehaviour. 
 
Criminality in Context 
The problem of criminality during the occupation highlights yet further avenues of 
action open to the occupied population.  Criminality was a sub-set of mauvaise conduite, 
arguably the most frequent form; it was a struggle for survival, but one which often came 
at the expense of compatriots.  Such was the scale of criminality that local notables feared 
for the future of local French youth.  However, the potentially selfish, unrespectable, and 
unpatriotic actions studied so far were not the only responses to the occupation.  Just as 
in the Second World War, the occupied Nord of 1914-18 saw choices made on both side 
of the moral-patriotic spectrum.  Many memoirs, histories, and other works on this 
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occupation have highlighted the unity and resistance of the local population faced with 
the occupier.  Part I has demonstrated that complete unity was never more than a myth.  
Part II will now demonstrate, on the other hand, that certain occupés did respond to the 







Part II: Popular Patriotism and Resistance avant la 
majuscule 
 
The occupied Nord was not filled exclusively with cases of mauvaise conduite and crime.  
The spectrum of possible activity, whilst limited, still allowed for moral-patriotic choices.  
Indeed, precisely because actions were limited, the consequences of every decision were 
exemplified and exaggerated.  Those engaging in mauvaise conduite were placed on one 
side of the spectrum; ‘patriots’ and those opposing the occupier on the other.  Criminals 
existed in a borderland, although were usually associated with mauvaise conduite.  Most 
interwar texts dealing with the occupation, and even some recent histories, perceive the 
occupés as ceaselessly patriotic and opposing the Germans as much as possible.1   Becker, 
for example, notes that the Germans were shocked by ‘la résistance compacte, massive, de 
la population à l’occupation.’2  This non-capitalised ‘resistance’ will be studied in this 
part of the thesis.  This is neither the Resistance nor the ‘resistances’ of the Second World 
War – opposition here was rarely organised, never armed, and faced its own constraints 
and unique circumstances. 
 
Three main categories of resistance are proposed: respectable resistance, symbolic or 
‘performative’ opposition, and active resistance.  The following chapters explore each of 
these.  I will provide tentative conclusions about the nature, extent and effect of such 
actions.  By reconfiguring resistance, as collaboration has been remoulded into mauvaise 
conduite, my aim is to explain modes of conduct that were both between and beyond the 
concepts of collaboration and resistance as understood for the Second World War.3  
Taylor has criticised the focus in Second-World-War historiography on ‘occupation 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Redier, Allemands; Paul Bardou, Eugène Jacquet et ses Amis: Histoire de Quatre 
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polities,’ the concentration on the extremes of resistance and collaboration4 – but here 
such a focus allows for a move towards a comprehensive study of occupied life from 1914 
to 1918.  Indeed, the thread of respectability running throughout both the ‘dark’ and 
‘light’ sides of the occupation weaves a convincing tableau of an occupied culture de 
guerre.   
 
The term ‘resistance’ has been interpreted and utilised in a variety of different ways by 
historians, sociologists, and anthropologists – among others.  Even for scholars of Nazi-
occupied Europe, who deal with the topic in depth, there is no consensus on the 
definition and limits of resistance.5  The contested meaning of this analytical concept has 
been examined,6 but the intricacies of the debate are not engaged with here, despite (and 
partly because of) arguments against definitions so all-encompassing that the term 
becomes meaningless.7  In the following chapters I will seek to provide an explanation for 
the use of the term ‘resistance’ to describe the phenomena studied.  Further, historians 
working on occupied France or Belgium in the First World War often label certain 
actions as resistance without the need for much (or any) analytical or theoretical 
                                                 
4 Taylor, ‘Black Market,’ p.155. 
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justification.8  Such is the consensus in the historical community that the January 2010 
biannual conference of the the Musée de la Résistance of Bondues focused for the first 
time on resistance in occupied France and Belgium during the First World War, rather 
than the Second.  In this sense, it is one of the most studied and documented 
phenomena of occupied life.   
 
Armed Resistance Explained Away 
To explain why there was no armed resistance to the Germans during the occupation, we 
must return to late-summer 1914.  Soon after war was declared and it became apparent 
that the Germans were launching an invasion via the north, local French authorities 
forbade armed resistance on the part of the civilian population.  The mayor of Roubaix, 
for example, offered advice to the population in the event of the Germans arriving: 
 Ne commettez aucun acte qui pourrait servir de prétexte à des 
représailles terribles. 
Si jamais un individu se livrait à un acte contre un soldat 
allemand, dans les circonstances présentes ce serait une folie criminelle.  
Un fait de ce genre ne pourrait être que l’œuvre d’un agent provocateur. 
  Cela ne se produira pas à Roubaix. 
 Nous comptons absolument que la population roubaisienne 
donnera un bel exemple de calme et conservera tout son sang-froid.9  
 
Similar advice was proffered in Belgium.10  This proclamation echoes the reticence of 
many rural communes to encourage non-military armed resistance during the Franco-
Prussian war,11 linked to what has been dubbed the ‘légende noire’ of peasant behaviour 
in 1870.12  Indeed, what applied to many mayors in 1870 also applied in 1914: their first 
reflex was to disarm their administrés to ensure that they were not tempted to use such 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Emmanuel Debruyne and Jehanne Paternostre, La Résistance au Quotidien, 1914-
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weapons, and to show goodwill towards the invader.13  Across the Nord, especially in 
Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, the population was asked to deposit all weapons at designated 
municipal buildings.  Such a policy, intended to reduce armed conflict with the 
Germans, occasionally later led to different conflict, such as the German discovery of the 
weapons depot in Tourcoing’s hôtel de ville in 1916.14 
 
Once the Germans arrived, they demanded that the population deposit remaining 
weapons at the Kommandantur.15  For local notables such Rouesel, this policy was 
acceptable because ‘les civils ne devant prendre aucune part aux hostilités, les armes 
pouvaient être un danger pour la sécurité des troupes et en les supprimant, l’autorité 
allemande évitait un conflit possible qui eût pu causer un incident dangereux pour la 
population.’16 
   
Naturally, not everyone complied.17  As such, the Germans searched for and 
requisitioned weaponry throughout the occupation.18  Pained by the idea of providing 
weapons for the enemy, Blin wrote: ‘Adieu! Armes plus ou moins blanches, fusils, 
revolvers etc.. [sic] En route pour l’All. [sic].’  Yet handing in weapons was for many a 
logical, if difficult, decision.  An occupé caught possessing a weapon faced the death 
penalty,19 although in actuality imprisonment and forced labour were the most frequent 
sentences.20 
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17 For example, ADN 9R556: Extrait des Procès-verbaux de la Commandanture de Lille, 8th November 
1914.  The mayor of Noyelles-lez-Seclin was found in possession of a revolver on the final date for 
handing in weapons. 
18 ADN 9R516: German poster, Lambersart, 5th May 1917. 
19 ADN 9R717: German poster, Général Commandant l’Armée, 25th November 1915, article III; ADN 
9R719: German poster, Roubaix, 30th June 1917.  Léopold Moulard was executed for possessing a 
revolver and munitions. 
20 See, for example, ADN 9R716: German poster, Roubaix, 21st July 1915.  Guillaume Alphonse 





Whether requisitioned by force or voluntarily handed in, weapons were therefore hard to 
come by and dangerous to own in occupied France.  Also, the concentration of Germans 
made armed resistance seem futile and suicidal.  Troop numbers were higher in larger 
localities, particularly those with vital railway links or near the front, such as Lille-
Roubaix-Tourcoing, Cambrai or Valenciennes.  To give an idea of the scale of the 
German presence, from June to August 1915 a total of 169,191 Germans used 
Tourcoing’s tramway alone;21 from September to November 1915, the total was 
194,328.22  Not all formed part of the army of occupation, but such a distinction was 
probably unimportant to the occupés.  The presence of tens of thousands of armed 
Germans, the difficulty in acquiring weapons, and severe restrictions on liberty of 
movement and communication undermined the feasibility of armed resistance.  Further, 
the weakened physical state in which the population found itself may have discouraged 
opposition.  A photo taken in June 1917 shows forced labourer Jules Claeys, weighing 
just 38kg after three months’ forced labour (see Fig. 6).  It should be noted, however, 
that Claeys had in fact engaged in a different form of resistance by refusing to work in 
the first place, and then once forced into a labour battalion, refusing to work on railways, 
for which he was tortured.23  Yet many other sources attest to the poor physiological and 
psychological state in which most occupés found themselves,24 which would have 
discouraged more overt acts of resistance. 
 
There were isolated incidents of civilian violence, such as the alleged shooting of German 
sentries (one of whom died) by two members of the occupied population in Roubaix in 
October 1917.  One of the ‘meurtriers’ was shot and killed whilst trying to flee the 
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German police during a follow-up inquiry.25  A handful of other examples of individual 
armed or violent resistance exist,26 but they remain the exceptions that prove the rule.  
The occupied population did not engage in Werner Rings’s ‘Resistance Enchained,’ 
mainly used in the context of Jewish ghetto revolts in World War II.  This resistance 
comprised ‘the desperate fight of those who were cut off, without help, and with 
practically no hope of surviving.’27  The occupés were cut off, but although living 
conditions were bad, there was hope for survival; they were receiving help, both directly 
from the Allied aid organisations, and indirectly from the Allied armies’ struggle against 
the Central Powers.  Further, widespread civilian resistance usually occurs with the defeat 
of conventional forces,28 when all hope of military victory is lost.  From 1914 until 1918, 
the Allied armies fought the Central Powers militarily; it was not the role of occupés to 
do so.  The nature of the war of attrition, in which huge armies made small gains at great 
loss, and the flat plains of the Nord (lacking mountainous or wooded terrain useful for 
guerrilla warfare) also detracted from the possibility of armed resistance.  Despite being 
convinced by material conditions and patriotism that they lived at the military front,29 
the occupés remained above all civilians, not combatants. 
 
However, the difficulty of engaging in armed resistance was not the only factor 
explaining its absence.  The aforementioned decision of French municipalities to 
discourage resistance also played a role, and the factors influencing their decision can be 
applied to the population at large.  Why was armed opposition discouraged?  The answer 
is fear of reprisals, linked to the memory of the Franco-Prussian War and the invasion 
atrocities, and the importance of international law and respectability. 
 
                                                 
25 ADN 9R732: Commissaire Central de Roubaix to Anjubault, 13th October 1917. 
26 See, for example, AN F23/375: ‘Département du Nord, Récompense Honorifique, Proposition en 
faveur de M. Debiéve [sic] Arthur, Commegnies, rue de Sarloton,’ 28th May 1923.  
27 Marrus, ‘Jewish Resistance,’ p.103. 
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The French authorities wanted to avoid bloodthirsty and costly urban warfare involving 
civilians, which could even lead to social disorder – the memory of the Paris Commune 
would have been strong in the Catholic Nord, although few occupation documents 
reference this period.  Authorities did not wish to give the Germans any pretext for 
reprisals, as happened in the Franco-Prussian war after franc-tireur attacks on the 
Prussians.30  Despite this, but precisely because of commonplace franc-tireur attacks in 
1870-1,31 the Germans saw francs-tireurs everywhere during the invasion and responded 
in kind.  Emmanuel Debruyne argues that atrocities played a major role in the 
discouragement of armed resistance among the population of the invaded and later 
occupied regions.32   
 
Isabel Hull has also emphasised the foundational role of 1870-1 for the German 
military,33 and demonstrates its institutionalised violence of the pre-war campaign against 
the Herero.  Here, the Germans used tactics such as concentration camps, deportations 
and atrocities to force civil obedience,34 with much success.  Similar tactics were 
employed during the invasion and occupation of northern France, thus for Hull this 
occupation shared with the occupations of the Eastern Front (traditionally seen as more 
severe)35 an extremely ‘important factor in determining the spiral of extremity: 
untrammelled military power.’36  This persuaded local notables and the wider population 
of the foolishness of resistance. 
 
Another key reason for French authorities discouraging civilian armed action was their 
desire not to breach the 1907 Hague Convention, which forbade such activities unless 
                                                 
30 Audoin-Rouzeau, 1870, p.262. 
31 Ibid., p. 136-7, 214. 
32 Debruyne, ‘Resistance: the prequel,’ p.3.  Paper given at the International Society for the Study of the 
First World War 2009 conference, e-mailed to the author. 
33 Hull, Absolute, p.109, 117. 
34 Ibid., p.73, 79, 211. 
35 See, for example, Liulevicius, War Land. 





the population was organised into clearly identifiable, armband-wearing groups.37  These 
resistance units would be crushed by the Germans, and also ran contrary to the French 
government’s abandonment of the invaded regions, whereby even fortress cities like Lille 
were declared ‘villes ouvertes.’38  Guerilla resistance, breaching the Hague Convention, 
would give the Germans a legitimate pretext for reprisals, ‘to prove the enemy right.’39  It 
would also show a lack of respect for the law, and if anything distinguishes this 
occupation and particularly the resistance that took place, it is a devotion to, almost 
adulation of, the law, and the importance of general bourgeois respectability.  Naturally, 
international law was also crucial to the Allied governments’ understanding of the war.40  
I now examine invocations of the law and other forms of ‘respectable resistance.’
                                                 
37 Annexe to the Hague Convention, section III, article 1. 
38 Trenard and Hilaire, Lille, p.183. 
39 Debruyne, ‘Resistance: the prequel,’ p.3. 
40 See, for example, Nicoletta F. Gullace, ‘Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and 
International Law during the First World War,’ The American Historical Review, 102:3 (June 1997), 
pp.714-747; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Germany’s Violations of the Laws of War, 1914-15: 
Compiled under the auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (London, 1915; originally Paris, 





Chapter I – Notable Protests: Respectable Resistance (Coups de 
gueule polis) 
 
Throughout the occupation, French notables protested against German demands and 
policy.  Such behaviour was commonplace across occupied France and Belgium,1 not just 
in the Nord.  Studying such resistance at first appears rather unadventurous, as for many 
writers it is a proven fact.2  Yet the form, style and content of these protests provide an 
insight into the culture de l’occupé, and reinforce the importance of respectability.  This 
worldview and its concomitant behaviour, although not exclusively Nordiste or even 
uniquely French, were nevertheless deeply rooted in the Third Republic.  The ‘bourgeois 
Republic’ is often perceived as a ‘République des avocats,’3 built on notions of notability 
and with its own norms for public discourse which defined what was respectable – 
although not always involving polite discussion.  Yet when the limits of acceptability 
were breached or an affront to honour occurred, it was common for politicians to resolve 
matters by a duel.4  Notable protests, in some sense verbal-textual duels, therefore 
represent French, bourgeois, Third Republic-inspired resistance par excellence.  
 
                                                 
1 De Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.222-3; Emile Cammaerts, Through the Iron Bars (Two Years of German 
Occupation in Belgium) (London, 1917), p.32, 58, 61-3; Frédéric Dauphin, ‘Le clergé paroissial en 
Belgique: la perception de l’occupation allemande,’ Revue du Nord, 80: 325 (April-June 1998), p.378; 
Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.61; Fleury, Sous la botte, vol. I, p.47, 73, 221-2, 247; Becker, Oubliés, p.78-
9; Blancpain, Quand Guillaume, p.45-6, 74.  
2 Cliquennois-Pâque, Lille, p.VIII; Jean-François Cardon, ‘La gestion municipale à Cambrai pendant la 
Première Guerre mondiale,’ mémoire de maîtrise sous la direction de B. Ménager (Lille III, 1994); Carine 
Cnudde-Lecointre, ‘Monseigneur Charost, évêque de Lille durant la Grande Guerre,’ Revue du Nord, 80: 
325 (April-June 1998), pp.355-366; Vandenbussche, ‘Le pouvoir municipal’; Debarge, ‘Fourmies 
occupée’; Annie Deperchin, ‘Un établissement pénitentiaire pendant la Grande Guerre: Loos,’ Revue du 
Nord, 80: 325 (April-June 1998), pp.337-354.   
3 However, this term is contested.  See Gilles Le Béguec, La République des avocats (Paris, 2003), 
especially pp.3-5; idem (ed.), Avocats et Barreaux en France 1910-1930 (Nancy, 1994), pp.92-4.  For the 
bourgeois Republic, see Jean-Pierre Azéma and Michel Winock, La troisième république (1870-1940) 
(Paris, 1976), pp.126-39; Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic from its 
Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914 (Cambridge, 1984), (trans.) J. R. Foster, pp.341-2; Roger Magraw, 
France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century (Cornwall, 1983), pp.225-254, 362-75. 
4 Piers Paul Read, The Dreyfus Affair: The Story of the Most Infamous Miscarriage of Justice in French 





An explanation of precisely what is meant by ‘notable’ is necessary.  The mid-nineteenth 
century meaning comprised haute/grande bourgeoisie dynasties whose economic 
situation allowed them to rule politically, without taking a salary.  With the introduction 
of professional, paid politicians under the Third Republic, the influence of the ‘original’ 
notables waned.5  By 1914, the concept had evolved to include Gambetta’s couches 
nouvelles: the middle classes of the petite bourgeoisie, petite paysannerie, landowners, 
members of the liberal professions, functionaries, and even industrialists.  They formed 
the backbone of the Third Republic, as voters and politicians,6 and tended to have radical 
political leanings.7  Consequently, the contemporary use of ‘notable’ is rather ambiguous, 
encompassing those in positions of authority who were theoretically respected by their 
fellow countrymen and the Germans.  This included members of the local French 
administration as well as bishops and industrialists.  One occupation diarist writes of 
‘notables’ as comprising ‘la haute société’ or ‘la tête de la population.’8   
 
Occasionally it was the Germans who ‘designated’ people as notables,9 using them as 
middle-men responsible for the communication of German demands and the behaviour 
of the population.  Other times the population itself categorised individuals as notables.  
For instance, municipal councils provided the Germans with a list of hostages – the most 
explicit demonstration of the notables’ role as guardians of the population.10  The hope 
was that the local population would respect the notables enough to avoid engaging in 
acts of resistance, for which the hostages could be killed, although killings were rare 
                                                 
5 Hamman, Transformations, pp.22-24. 
6 Azéma and Winock, La troisième république, pp.126-45; Mayeur and Rebérioux, Third Republic, pp.5-
41; Magraw, Bourgeois Century, pp.209-34; Hamman, Transformations, pp.22-24, 322-331. 
7 Azéma and Winock, La troisième république, p.136. 
8 ADN J1933: Rouesel manuscript, ‘Déportation en Allemagne de deux cents notables de la région 
occupée,’ p.1-2.  For a guide to notables of the Lille métropole, see ADN 124J4: Guide de la Vie 
Flamande: “Masques Lillois” (Lille, July 1906). 
9 See ADN 9R755: typewritten note, n.d., n.a., entitled ‘Quelques réflexions’; ADN 9R515: Anjubault to 
Kommandantur of Lille, 5th January 1918; ADN 9R1229: Procès-verbal, M. Lesquel, 16th January 1919; 
Jules Hélot, Cinquante Mois sons le joug allemand. (L’occupation allemande à Cambrai et dans le 
Cambrésis) (Paris, 1919), p.272. 





beyond the invasion period.  Thus being a notable was not always beneficial during the 
occupation, even if it did have some advantages such as increased freedom of movement 
or better access to goods.11  Despite the multifarious nature of notability, this chapter 
focuses on what might be called ‘municipal resistance’ or ‘administrative resistance’ in the 
context of the Second World War.12  Such opposition has left many traces, and in its 
form and content constitutes a respectable form of resistance. 
  
Social interactions between occupier and occupied followed a set of unwritten rules: 
respect and politeness had to be shown, even to the enemy, and this dedication to 
respectability discouraged more ‘outrageous’ actions that could be classified as more 
‘evident’ resistance.  Written and verbal exchanges were couched in polite language, 
seemingly demonstrating respect between the author/speaker and the recipient.  This 
partly reflects contemporary bourgeois social mores and French letter-writing etiquette, 
yet also provided an acceptable outlet for grievances and potential resistance.  
Respectability meant not only an adherence to social conventions, but also to legal ones – 
the law represented the bedrock of the Republic, and was central to French culture.13  
The infusion of courtesy and judicial reasoning was at the heart of this respectable 
resistance, one in direct opposition to perceived German barbarism – mockingly referred 
to as Kultur by Allied populations, both occupied and non-occupied.14 
                                                 
11 ADHS 4M513: report nº1175, 21st April 1917, summary of interviews with 470 people from 
Tourcoing. 
12 H. Michel, The Shadow War (1972), (trans.) R. H. Barry, p.195, cited in Foot, Resistance, p.9.  Jean 
Moulin famously engaged in such resistance: Jackson, Dark Years, p.166.  For 1914-18, see Debarge, 
‘Fourmies occupée,’ p.294. 
13 Annie Deperchin has noted that ‘Les Français sont très légalistes.’  Idem, ‘La Justice et la Guerre du 
droit,’ at Historial de la Grande Guerre: Colloque – Grande Guerre et Justice, October 2010, accessed 
online on 3rd October 2011 at http://www.historial.org/Centre-international-de-
recherche/Actualites/Colloques-du-Centre-de-recherche/Colloques-passes/Grande-Guerre-et-Justice 
14 See ADN 15J87: memoirs of G. Momal, Doyen of Troisvilles, chapter VIII and X.  For the wider 
context of the clash of civilisation vs. Kultur, see: Horne and Kramer, Atrocities, pp.229-61, 291-325; 
Kramer, Dynamic, p.180-196; Christophe Prochasson, ‘Les intellectuels,’ in Encyclopédie, pp.665-676; 
Anne Rasmussen, ‘Sciences et scientifiques,’ in Encyclopédie, pp.684-7; Smith et al., France, pp.53-9; 
Annette Becker, War and Faith: The Religious Imagination in France, 1914-1930 (Oxford 1998; 
originally Paris, 1994), (trans.) Helen McPhail, especially p.11-2; Ruth Harris, ‘The “Child of the 
Barbarian”: Rape, Race and Nationalism in France during the First World War,’ Past and Present, 141 






Not all notables intended their protests to be a form of resistance per se – instead seeing 
it as safeguarding the interests of their population.  Yet often the Germans recognised it 
as such, and the desired outcomes could be perceived as resistance. 
 
Protestations Polies? 
Oscar Fanyau, former mayor of Hellemmes,15 wrote to the Kommandant of Hellemmes-
Lille on 23rd October 1916.  Fanyau had refused the German demand of 16th July 1916 
that the occupied population declare all metal in its possession, and explained his 
decision in a letter, stating: 
Très sincèrement , je [sic] vous dirai que, si je n’ai pas fait la déclaration 
des métaux […] c’est parce que ma conscience s’y refuse. 
 
Ne voyez pas dans mon abstention une refus [sic] d’obéissance ni un 
manque de respect à l’Autorité allemande, mais ne demandez pas à moi, 
Français, qui ai eu l’honneur de servir son pays, comme officier de 
déclarer et de livrer des métaux pour fabriquer des projectiles destinés à 
tuer mes frères; ceci serait contraire à mon honneur et à mon patriotisme. 
 
Prenz [sic] ces métaux, l’Autorité Allemande connait [sic] les cuivres et les 
bronzes qui se trouvent dans ma maison, depuis deux ans, ils sont à la vue 
des nombreux officiers et soldats qui ont logé chez moi.  Ils ont, du reste, 
été consignés par deux fois, en octobre 1915 par un sous-officier et 
dernièrement , [sic] 31 Août, par deux gendarmes qui ont visité ma 
maison. 
 
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l’assurance de ma 
considération distinguée.16 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
mémoire de maîtrise sous la direction d’Annette Becker (Lille III, 1999); Jean-Yves Le Naour, ‘“Bouffer 
du Boche” – Animalisation, scatologie et cannibalisme dans la caricature française de la Grande Guerre,’ 
Quasimodo, 8 (spring 2006), pp.255-261.  Accessed online on 29th June 2009 at http://www.revue-
quasimodo.org/PDFs/8%20-%20LeNaourBoches.pdf 
15 ADN 9R506: Seánce du Conseil Municipal d’Hellemmes, 31st October 1916.  Fanyau was mayor from 
1904-1912. 





The language used is polite, the desire for respectability visible – and the accompanying 
moral-social conundrum evident.  Fanyau did not wish to disobey the German authority, 
to which he proffered respect, but neither could he disobey his patriotic conscience.  His 
conclusion is illustrative of the often performative nature of resistance during this 
occupation: as long as he had refused the Germans’ order and was not seen to give in to 
their demands, he was willing to allow the Germans to take the metal.  This was, 
however, not enough for the Germans, who imprisoned Fanyau.  He died upon entering 
his cell, two days after writing the letter.17  The cause of death is unclear. 
 
The centrality of respectability had been visible from the outset.  In the aforementioned 
incident on 5th September 1914, during the Germans’ first incursion into Lille,18 
Lieutenant von Hoffel and other soldiers entered the Prefecture.  Von Hoffel burst into 
the office of Prefect Trépont, blaming him for ordering all men of military age to leave 
for the French front.  He blindfolded and physically assaulted Trépont, despite the 
protestations of the employees of the Prefecture and the French translator.  He then 
announced that Trépont would be shot, at which point the interpreter informed the 
Lieutenant that Trépont was a functionary holding the title of ‘Excellence.’  This had the 
desired effect: eventually Trépont was released.19  Such an incident demonstrates the 
strength of social mores and conventions.  Even the Germans, holding all the power in 
this situation, gave in once a certain logic of respectability was invoked.  This logic 
underlined the hundreds, possibly thousands, of notable protests occurring in the Nord 
during the occupation. 
 
A strong element of patriotism and duty to the Republic also underscored respectable 
resistance.  Trépont himself is proof of this: on 6th November 1914, he was taken to the 
                                                 
17 Ibid., ‘Tribunal de la Kommandantur,’ Schmidt to the Mairie de Lille, 25th October 1916; ADN 
9R506: Seánce du Conseil Municipal d’Hellemmes, 31st October 1916. 
18 Wallart, Nord, p.15. 
19 Cliquennois-Pâque, Lille, pp.32-7; Alexandra Richard, ‘Le préfet Félix Trépont, ou la difficile 
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Kommandantur, where the Germans asked him to collaborate with them, ‘sous 
conditions de menaces à sa personne.’  Trépont responded: ‘Au-dessus de ma personne, il 
y a mon devoir.’20  Yet, as with Fanyau, there is a sense in which duty overlapped with 
performance – not only did opposition have to take place, but it had to be seen and 
known to have taken place.  Intent and recognition were not mutually exclusive here, for 
the intent was often precisely for opposition to be recognised.  Perhaps these were self-
referential performances, cementing one’s position as a notable – it was expected that 
notables would resist, thus one was a notable because one was seen to resist.  These elites 
were proving to themselves, as well as the wider population and the French government, 
that they were worthy of their position. 
 
This performative aspect was not lost on the population, who seemed receptive to this.  
Occupation diarist Maria Degnitère mentions municipal opposition to the Germans 
fairly frequently, using formulations such as ‘M. le maire de Lille écrit une lettre superbe 
au gouverneur protestant contre cette nouvelle mesure inique.’21  She was aware of other 
letters of protest,22 suggesting the wider population had access to these.  More occupation 
diaries and post-occupation works attest to the population’s knowledge of municipal 
opposition and the success it occasionally engendered, with some diaries even containing 
typewritten copies of letters of protests.23  Indeed, the British and unoccupied French 
were themselves aware of this phenomenon during the war.24    
                                                 
20 Richard, ‘Le préfet,’ p.63. 
21 Becker, Journaux, Degnitère diary, 1st May 1916, p.199. 
22 Ibid., 16-20th June 1915, p.181; 18th April 1916, p.197. 
23 See, for example, ADN 74J224: Trollin diary, 20-24th June, 6th July, and 20th August 1915, and 19th 
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The Germans were under no doubt as to the performative nature of such opposition, 
seeing it as an attempt by notables to avoid negative repercussions after the war.  They 
perceived these actions as resistance, as the following quotation from a March 1916 note 
from the Kommandant of Tourcoing to the mayor illustrates: 
[D]epuis un certain temps la Mairie se complait [sic] à montrer une 
résistance passive qui ne peut absolument pas être supportée, en 
fournissant des explications tortueuses et en posant des questions 
injustifiées.  La Commandanture n’a pas envie de lire des lettres qui sont 
manifestement écrites dans l’intention, pour la Mairie, de se justifier “plus 
tard” auprès du Gouvernement. 
La Mairie voudra donc, à l’avenir, laisser de côté tous les faux 
fuyants, et déclarer simplement, si elle est en état on [sic] non d’exécuter 
l’ordre donné.25 
 
Some important issues are raised here.  Firstly, the recognition of such actions as passive 
resistance is evidently crucial to the comprehension of them as such.  This is not the only 
example of the Germans explicitly seeing notable protests as resistance or ‘révolte 
ouverte.’26 
 
Further, the German belief that French notables were engaged in a process of deliberate 
obstruction, an attempt at slowing down decisions and policy implementation, may have 
been justified.  It is plausible that this was a key motive behind notable protests and other 
aspects of notable relations with the occupiers.  Notables mention this explicitly only 
rarely.27  Such opposition took place in the Second World War, and is described by 
François Marcot as ‘freinage administratif,’ although he categorises it as a form of 
‘opposition’ distinct from actual resistance, because it lacks an element of transgression.28  
Yet the pattern outlined is suggestive for this occupation: notables could ‘freiner la 
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machine allemande’ until the risk was too great for their own security.29  In the occupied 
Nord, the sheer number of letters of protests and traces of other forms thereof is striking 
and justifies the application of this model.  The Germans became increasingly frustrated 
with having to respond to French complaints, and it seems feasible that Kommandanten 
would have spent a considerable amount of time doing so.  So too did French notables, 
but perhaps this was for them the best means of passing time which would normally have 
been spent working in a fully-functional political-economic sphere.  ‘Freinage’ is 
examined further below. 
 
It is not clear whether all notables perceived their actions in the same light as the 
Germans, whether there was always a ‘performative intent’ or even intent to resist or 
disrupt.  Yet many believed it was important, for the occupied population, but also for 
the non-occupied French and perhaps for posterity, that they were seen to resist 
somehow.  It could be argued that, for the occupied population, all actions and forms of 
behaviour inevitably had a performative element.  Notables were being judged by the 
wider occupied population, and the Germans, but were also aware of the judgement of 
the French government.  This was taking place in the present, but also potentially in the 
future.  A few cases mention this categorically: the mayor of Halluin, during a heated 
exchange of letters with the Kommandant concerning the cessation of work in the 
commune’s factories, spoke of the duty he and the population had.30  His duty meant 
that he refused to force workers to recommence work, and to pay the wartime 
contribution demanded, which he explained thusly:     
Je ne puis oublier, en effet, qu’il y a 2.500 Halluinois sous les drapeaux, 
parmi lesquels mes 5 fils; je ne voudrais pas qu’un seul puisse me 
reprocher un jour d’avoir aidé à forger des armes contre eux, au mépris du 
patriotisme et des exigences de la loi naturelle elle-même.31 
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However, he was happy to pay those contributions whose ends were not linked explicitly 
to the manufacture of arms and the continuation of the war effort.32  Similarly, acting 
Prefect Anjubault was keenly aware of the shadow of the French government looming 
over him and his fellow occupés.  When interrogated in August 1916 by a German 
conseilleur de justice for protesting against the requisition of metals, he stated: ‘ce n’est 
pas à moi mais à mon gouvernement seul qu’il appartiendra, plus tard, d’approuver ou de 
désavouer les actes des Français durant l’occupation.’33  As such, was the intent of 
respectable resistance actually to resist, or simply self-serving and future-looking, covering 
one’s position to avoid prospective accusations?  Perhaps the two were not mutually 
exclusive: resistance was often the aim, in the sense of opposing the efficient 
implementation of German policy, or avoiding aiding the German war effort.  Yet a 
sense of duty, inextricably linked with an awareness of future judgement by the French 
government,34 did underline such resistance.  The two combined to create respectable 
resistance. 
 
Many French notables hoped that respectability would be met with respectability, and 
when this was not the case they expressed shock and disgust.  In February 1915, the 
mayor of Tourcoing complained that there seemed to be a shift in the attitude of the 
Germans.  Until then, ‘la courtoisie a régné’ in the relations between the German and 
French administrations, but the recent change caused the mayor great concern.  He asked 
how he could fulfil his heavy functions ‘si l’on use d’aussi peu de déférence à mon égard?’  
He could only do so ‘si je jouis de l’indépendance nécessaire et parfaitement conciliable 
avec la respect [sic] des lois comme avec les égards dûs aux représentants du pouvoir 
occupant, égards auxquels je n’ai pas manqué vous le savez.’35  Such a complaint could 
appear representative of early-occupation naïvité; years later, it seemed clear that the 
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Germans often demanded respect without offering it in return.36  However, this did not 
halt letters of protest.   
 
A similar sentiment, and the powerlessness of the French administration in reality, is 
visible in a letter from the mayor of Lille to von Graevenitz in December 1916.  
Regarding the punishment of the entire city in response to an alleged attack on German 
soldiers in the faubourg des Postes,37 the mayor noted: 
La population de ce faubourg a déjà été punie, et deux mois plus tard, 
alors que les coupables ont été arrêtés vous rendez responsable toute la 
population intérieure de la Ville qui n’a, pour ainsi dire, aucune relation 
avec ce faubourg et qui n’a cessé de montrer depuis deux ans l’attitude la 
plus digne. 
Nous sommes donc condamnés sans avoir pu nous défendre, 
 Je [sic] n’ai aucun moyen d’en appeler de ce jugement et suis forcé 
de le subir, mais ce ne sera pas sans avoir élevé une énergique 
protestation.38 
 
Even from within this subordinate position, the mayor felt it necessary – and perhaps 
beneficial, although to whom is unclear – to raise an official complaint. 
 
Often respectable resistance contained underlying irony or humour – or perhaps simply 
naivité combined with unfortunate phrasing.  A complex case illustrates this.  On 20th 
June 1915, the Germans informed the municipalities of the towns of Roubaix and 
Valenciennes that they had to pay a 150,000-franc fine for the Allied bombing of 
Alexandria and Haïfa.39  Four days later, the acting mayor of Roubaix wrote to the 
Kommandant, arguing against the fine.  He did not understand why these two towns, 
thousands of kilometres from the site of the bombardment, were chosen above others.  
He also complained about the most recent fine of 100,000 francs levied on the town for 
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the alleged shooting of a German sentry by an occupé.  Regarding this latter point, he 
used polite language to deliver a direct argument, noting that the alleged shooting was an 
event which, he stated, 
nos enquêtes très approfondies auprès des habitants du quartier n’ont pas 
parvenu à établir et qui nous permet de croire que cette sentinelle a pu 
être sujette à des hallucinations communes aux soldats en temps de guerre, 
[par conséquent] l’Administration municipale, contrainte et forcée, a 
consenti à payer cette amende parce que les faits reprochés se seraient 
passés sur le territoire de notre ville et qu’ils pouvaient être exacts, bien 
que personne n’ait pu le démontrer.40 
 
Here, the municipal council disagreed with the Germans, but through the form and 
content of its language gave the appearance of respecting them and social conventions 
enough to cede to their demands.  Yet the suggestion that this German could have been 
hallucinating and the lack of proof appears rather provocative and mischievous in tone. 
 
With regard to the 150,000-franc fine, the municipality refused to pay, seeing it as 
contrary to international law.  It asked the Kommandant ‘de vouloir bien transmettre la 
présente à M. le Chef du Quartier Général allemand.’41  Thus resistance took the form of 
a polite protest, allowing opposition to the Germans whilst remaining respectable.  The 
German response was to send 25 municipal councillors of Roubaix to Güstrow as 
hostages.  It is not clear when they were transported, but they returned on 11th August 
1915,42 presumably because the contribution was paid, as had happened in other cases.43 
 
Despite the effusion of courtesy in the language used by French notables, the Germans 
occasionally did not approve of the linguistic content of letters of protest.  In August 
1917,  Aunjubault complained that the Kommandant of Baisieux had changed the dates 
of school holidays from those he had established, concluding: ‘La solution de questions 
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de cette nature n’ayant aucun rapport avec les besoins d’une armée d’occupation, je 
demande à l’autorité supérieure allemande de faire rapporter la décision prise sur la 
Commandanture de Baisieux.’44  Von Graevenitz was not pleased with Anjubault’s 
formulation, informing him:  
dans vos rapports avec les autorités militaires allemandes, vous devez vous 
appliquer à prendre un ton plus respectueux et vous servir de la langue 
allemande. 
La fermeture de l’école de Baisieux a eu lieu pour des raisons 
militaires.  Il n’y a pas eu de motif pour modifier les mesures prises par la 
Commmandanture locale.45 
 
This is the only indication of French notables being told to use German in their letters.  
German demands were usually transmitted in the original language with translations, but 
this is not the case for French-language documents.  Most of the time French notables 
were free to write in French. 
 
Frequency and Form: Resistance as Refusal and Reproach 
The target and form of notable protests varied greatly, but one of the most frequent 
examples involved German demands for lists of occupés.  The Germans constantly asked 
for such lists, presumably in order to better ‘know’ and thus exploit the population.  
They were especially interested in potential labourers, mostly unemployed men or men of 
military age; but they also wanted information on those who could be repatriated, 
reducing the strain on the German military to police and generally provide for them.  
Both relied on the logic of control and efficiency.  This information was kept by the local 
French administration, and the simplest means of access was for the French 
administrators to hand over the documents.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reality was far 
from simple. 
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The mayor of Roubaix refused on 8th January 1915 to give the Germans the list of the 
classes of 1914 and 1915, for which he was threatened with deportation.46  Four days 
later, he refused a further demand for the classes of 1916 and 1917.  The Germans 
changed tactics: another refusal meant the population would be deprived of flour.47  If 
this did occur, it did not dissuade such resistance among other notables.  In March 1915, 
the mayor of Tourcoing ‘est arrêté.  Prétextes invoqués: refus de fournir la liste des 
chômeurs; refus de verser un nouvel acompte sur la contribution de guerre.’48  The mayor 
of Lille was acting similarly at this time – the Germans demanded a list of 1,200-1,500 
‘indigents susceptibles d’être rapatriés en France,’ but the mayor informed Governor von 
Heinrich: 
Je regrette de ne pouvoir vous fournir cette liste car ma situation de 
Magistrat élu de cette population m’interdit absolument de m’asseoir à 
une mesure qui aurait pour but d’éloigner de leur foyer, contre leur gré, 
un grand nombre de mes concitoyens. 
Je ne doute pas, Excellence, que vous ne reconnaissiez qu’il s’agit 
ici pour moi d’un devoir de conscience auquel je ne puis me dérober.49 
 
The final sentence illustrates the respectable nature of such resistance, born out of a sense 
of duty and a humanitarian impulse.  The mayor hoped that the Governor, as a general 
loyal to his own country, would at least comprehend the decision, if not support it.  
Indeed, this was the case on certain occasions.  In August 1917, an unknown number of 
workers were ordered to present themselves at the Kommandantur of Wattrelos, with 
suitcases and provisions, presumably to be deported for forced labour.  The Commissaire 
de Police was ordered by the Kommandant to accompany them.50  In response, he 
approached the mayor, noting that he already suffered in giving these workers their 
summons, and that ‘il n’appartenait point à un Français de conduire un autre Français 
quel qu’il fut à l’ennemi.’  The mayor, however, reminded the Commissaire that this was 
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a German order, to be carried out under threat of imprisonment.  The Commissaire 
subsequently approached the Kommandant himself, arguing that: ‘comme fonctionnaire 
français je ne pouvais pas faire exécuter un ordre contraire à ma dignité et à mes 
sentiments patriotiques, que son loyalisme était assez grand pour comprendre la justesse 
de ce refus.’  The Kommandant ‘répondit que c’était bien,’ informing the Commissaire 
that he only had to sign a register of those workers present at the Kommandantur, rather 
than lead them there himself – described as a ‘solution heureuse.’51  Perhaps such an 
event, along with the ‘respectability met with respectability’ theory, was why the mayor 
of Lille ended another protest with: ‘Vous êtes soldat, Excellence, vous placez trop haut le 
sentiment du devoir pour vouloir exiger que je trahisse le mien.  Si j’agissais autrement, 
vous n’auriez pour moi au fond de vous-même que du mépris.’52 
 
Unlike some other forms of opposition, such as the affaire des sacs, administrative refusal 
to give the Germans lists was not confined to 1915.  Mayor of Lille Charles Delesalle 
refused to give the Germans various lists throughout the occupation, among other 
protests.53  For example, on 3rd January 1916, the Germans demanded the list of workers 
at the ateliers de la Société de la Gare du Nord, many of whom had not turned up for 
work recently.  They emphasised that such workers were not being used for war 
operations, but for tasks which assured the good functioning of Lille’s transport 
network.54  Delesalle responded that he could not access the lists of a private company 
and ‘d’ailleurs si j’avais cette liste en mains mon devoir me défendrait impérieusement 
d’intervenir auprès d’eux et d’influencer en aucune façon sur une décision qui ne relève 
que de la conscience de chacun.’55 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid., Commissaire de Police de Wattrelos to Prefect, 3rd August 1917.  
52 ADN 9R693: mayor of Lille to von Heinrich, 18th June 1915. 
53 Delesalle defended Lille ‘comme un beau diable.  Mais que faire, le couteau sous la gorge?’  Redier, 
Allemands, p.177. 
54 ADN 9R694: von Graevenitz to mayor of Lille, 3rd January 1916. 





The next day, von Graevenitz reiterated his order.56  Delesalle continued his refusal, 
explaining that the municipality had the right to requisition goods but not people; it had 
hitherto carried out all public works demanded of it by the Germans via its own workers, 
but in this instance the Germans would have to advertise for workers themselves.57  
Indeed, there are numerous examples of German-authored calls for volunteer workers, 
especially in Lille.58  The very existence of these ‘appels’ in an area in which the Germans 
were the dominant group suggests that this form of respectable protest could be, and was, 
successful.  This was at least the case until the Easter 1916 enlèvements, which the 
Germans justified in part by a lack of sufficient volunteers.59  Success was not guaranteed, 
though.  Across the Nord and beyond, municipalities and notables refused to give the 
Germans the lists they demanded throughout the occupation, and were subsequently 
punished – individual notables being imprisoned or fined, or entire municipalities 
fined,60 among other punishments. 
 
Perhaps because of the risk of sanctions, not all notables followed same course of action.  
In a letter to the acting Prefect in August 1916, the Commissaire de Police of Wattrelos 
insinuated that the mayor was complicit in providing lists of ‘jardiniers’ who could be 
forcibly employed by the Germans in the Motte factory in Roubaix.  The Commissaire 
himself had refused to provide the lists to Germans, but gave the information to the 
mayor, leaving the latter in a difficult position.  The Commissaire’s motives are evident: 
‘Quoique la Mairie ne m’ait absolument fait aucune remarque défavorable, j’ai voulu 
vous tenir au courant de ce fait et pour qu’à l’avenir il ne soit point dénaturé et pour vous 
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donner les raisons de ma conduite.’61  Was he fearful of future reproaches from the 
Prefect, the mayor, the French government, or others?  Whatever the case, the 




Notable protests were mostly made on an individual basis, but there is some suggestion 
of pseudo-centralisation.  Trépont, who himself had written numerous letters of protest, 
ordered this and other forms of opposition.62  Indeed, this was the very reason for his 
deportation to Germany in February 191563 and his replacement with German-approved 
Anjubault.64  Anjubault was no mere puppet, however, despite Trépont’s accusations in 
his memoirs.65  Indeed, Anjubault wrote numerous letters of protest.  He complained, 
among other things, about the 1916 deportations,66 the use of French military medical 
personnel in the occupied area,67 and the use of civilians for military ends,68 especially 
children.69  Consequently, Anjubault invoked the ire of the Germans on many occasions, 
and was among the four Lillois hostages taken in July 1915 for the alleged harbouring of 
escaped Allied prisoners of war.70  He was eventually sent to Antoing in Belgium with his 
family in January 1918, although the motives behind this are unknown.71 
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Jules Hélot’s wartime diary, published in 1919, provides a case study hinting at the pre-
meditated, loosely organised nature of some respectable resistance.  As president of the 
Chambre de Commerce of Cambrai, Hélot was an influential notable who, he claims, 
encouraged and led respectable resistance across various communes.72  Hélot appears 
from the outset to have been more headstrong than other notables: on 17th November 
1914, the Germans demanded a 59,000-franc war contribution from the municipality of 
Cambrai.  Under the threat of requisitioning works of art from the museum and library, 
the municipal council decided to pay 20,000 francs; Hélot suggested that they give 
nothing and ‘offrir nos personnes comme otages, car à cette exigence, une autre 
succédera, sans qu’on puisse en voir la fin.’  The council rejected this tactic.73  Hélot was 
consequently displeased with the behaviour of others, and preached resistance:  
Qui ne risque rien, n’a rien, et les fonctionnaires ont tort de ne pas faire 
comme nous, de ne pas payer un peu d’audace; après tout, on ne risque 
que d’être détenu quarante-huit heures, en mettant les choses au pis. Il 
n’en serait pas ainsi, sans doute, s’ils savaient ce qui se passe dans ces 
réunions, où je prêche et exalte le patriotisme et la résistance à leurs 
exigences; ces conférences ressemblent quelque peu, ma foi, à des réunions 
de conspirateurs.74 
 
Indeed, Hélot’s idea of resistance involved vigorous protests, not simply inaction.  In 
January 1915 he expressed anger at the percepteur of Mœuvres, who was 
convaincu qu’il fera tout son devoir en se refusant à faire la recette autant 
qu’il le pourra; tâcher de ne rien faire est le seul effort qui lui paraisse 
digne d’être tenté. Voilà la mentalité de fonctionnaires […] Si encore les 
chefs de service étaient là pour les remettre dans le droit chemin!75  
 
He contrasts this with the behaviour of the percepteur of Clary, who that morning went 
to the Chambre de Commerce to deal with the loans required and to speak about the 
latest German tax.  This fonctionnaire ‘a parfaitement saisi la nécessité de refuser 
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jusqu’au point de faire casser la corde, et il va préconiser la résistance que j’ai 
recommandée.’76  The logic and intent behind Hélot’s respectable resistance echoed that 
of others: 
J’estime que par dignité personnelle, et pour défendre nos intérêts 
nationaux, nous ne devons céder qu’à la force […] Cette résistance, en 
dehors des raisons primordiales énoncées, s’impose également pour éviter 
le danger de voir discuter le remboursement plus tard, par nos 
administrations, sous prétexte que nous aurions cédé trop facilement aux 
injonctions de l’ennemi, ou que nous n’aurions pas agi en prenant toutes 
les précautions indispensables, dans la mesure du possible.77 
 
Such resistance was occasionally successful, but Hélot perceived it in terms of buying 
time.  On 21st January 1915, he went to Noyelles to confront the officer in charge of 
requisitioning and met with success: ‘En présence de ma résistance, il a abandonné ses 
demandes; évidemment il y reviendra, mais c’est au moins du temps gagné.’78  Similarly, 
he noted the next month: ‘Je prêche partout la résistance par inertie, ne répondant à la 
brutalité que par des atermoiements.  Mais cela devient très dur et il importe de soutenir 
les uns et les autres dans leur bon vouloir.’79  He spoke of ‘la force d’inertie’ but admitted 
that notables should cede when collective reprisals were likely80 –  and that ‘chacun restait 
en face de sa conscience, qu’il ne fallait pas faire du donquichottisme.’81  Nevertheless, 
they should be willing to accept personal punishments: ‘Je disais encore aujourd’hui à des 
maires que j’excitais à la résistance et qui se plaignaient de leur situation si critique et si 
menaçante: Nos chers soldats sont bien plus méritants que nous, ils sacrifient leur 
personne sans réticence.  Comment pourrions-nous nous plaindre?’82 
 
However, as the realities of occupation entrenched themselves, Hélot’s attitude became 
more flexible: ‘depuis que j’ai constaté qu’ils étaient arrivés à dominer tellement le pays 
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sous leur joug, et qu’ils ne reculeraient devant rien, je suis résigné à concevoir que de 
deux maux il faut choisir le moindre.’83  Still, despite constant punishments, Hélot 
continued to preach various types of resistance and certain notables continued to practice 
it throughout the length of the occupation.84  Hélot advised municipal councils of 
different communes, who consulted him, to resist as much as possible, which many did.85  
Tactics included lying to the Germans about the amount of money or goods a commune 
possessed.86  This was sometimes successful – in September 1915, Hélot proclaimed: 
‘Décidément la résistance, les atermoiements, ont souvent du bon,’ giving the example of 
the German demand for 32 million francs from the municipality of Cambrai, increasing 
by 100,000 francs a day, eventually reduced to 16 million.87   
 
By July 1916, Hélot had helped to create a syndicate of communes for mutual economic 
aid, but the Germans saw this as an opportunity to extract more money from the 
occupés.  The syndicate was unanimous in choosing resistance, and Hélot decided on a 
respectable form – a letter: ‘Ils ont tous approuvé les termes du refus de nous soumettre à 
ces ordres.  Conçue très ferme et très digne, cette lettre que j’avais voulue polie dans la 
forme a donc été adoptée.’88  In late 1917, members of the syndicate all agreed ‘sur 
l’impossibilité de résister utilement,’ but acknowledged that Hélot should nevertheless 
send a letter of protest in his name ‘disant que je me fais l’écho des doléances de tous.’89  
Respectable resistance had thus morphed from frequent, pseudo-organised notable 
protests based on a genuine hope for policy reversal or at least buying time, into rare 
individual protests carried out in the understanding that they were in vain.  Other 
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instances of respectable resistance seem more spontaneous,90 but a common factor 
between both planned and spontaneous protests was the primacy of judicial reasoning. 
 
Law: an Illusory Shield and a Blunt Sword 
Notables constantly referred to the law to justify and bolster their protests.  In particular, 
they cited the 1864 Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention, representing 
humanitarian and international law respectively.91  Becker has written on the importance 
of these conventions for the occupés,92 calling the Hague Convention ‘un mantra 
toujours répété’ but which ‘ne les protégeait guère.’93  The problem was the ill-defined 
juridical status of military occupations, dealt with by article 43 of the Hague 
Convention.  Military occupations represented a situation that was neither war nor 
peace, yet both at the same time.94 
 
Further, the Hague Convention had been undermined by caveats and non-compliance 
during the signing of the accords.  Russia, Austria and Germany reserved the right not to 
apply article 44,95 which banned belligerents from forcing an occupied population from 
providing information on the army or means of defence of another belligerent.96  The 
wording of the Convention was extremely ambiguous.  A distinction was drawn between 
the ‘army of occupation’ and the ‘fighting army,’ especially in the oft-cited article 52, 
which begins: ‘Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from 
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation.’97  
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However, identifying precisely where the needs of the army of occupation finished and 
where those of the wider fighting army began was not easy.98 
 
French notables continued to rely on a legal form of protest despite this, and despite 
Germany’s disregard for international agreements in her 1902 manual on the laws of 
war,99 the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914,100 or other acts flouting international 
law.101  Of course, all belligerents violated international law in some way during the 
war.102  The role of the law in notable protests was at its strongest when forced labour or 
manufacturing goods for the enemy were the targets of criticism.  On 1st April 1916, the 
Kommandant of Loos received two letters of protest concerning the events of the 
previous morning, involving 30 young men from the commune being forced to work in 
railway construction in Sequedin.  The first was from the mayor of Loos, who invoked 
article 52 of the Hague Convention, which forbade belligerents to force occupied 
populations to take part in operations against their own country.  The reason for this 
lesson in international law was clear: the municipality considered the construction of a 
railway behind a battlefront as analogous to the construction of trenches or fortifications.  
As such, it ‘ne saurait, en aucune façon, s’associer à cet acte de travail obligatoire,’ and 
considered its duty to ask the German authority ‘de ne pas continuer à faire participer ces 
jeunes gens de la Commune aux travaux en question.’103  
 
The second letter was from Anjubault, demonstrating further the language of respectful, 
legal protest.  He noted the considerable importance of railways in modern warfare and 
that, without even mentioning the Hague Convention, since the international conference 
of 1874 in Brussels 
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la doctrine prohibait la réquisition de travaux sur les voies ferrées comme 
constituant pour les populations l’obligation de prendre part aux 
opérations de guerre contre leur patrie. 
Cette théorie étant admise depuis plus de quarante ans dans un 
sens favorable aux habitants de pays occupés, j’ai l’impérieux devoir 
d’intervenir auprès de l’Autorité supérieure allemande pour lui demander 
de mettre fin à la contrainte dont sont actuellement victimes des jeunes 
gens de la commune de Loos.104 
 
In the long term, neither letter had a substantial impact – the Germans did not accept, or 
ignored, these legal protests. 
 
L’affaire des sacs 
Numerous letters of protest contained similar stylistic, polemical flourishes and logic.  
Article 52 of the Hague Convention was cited frequently, especially concerning the 
manufacture of sandbags, gasmasks, or other work with potential military ends.  This was 
most noticeable in June 1915 with the affaire des sacs.105  At this time, the Germans had 
ordered many occupés to create sandbags, fencing and other material which they claimed 
would be used for purely defensive or non-military purposes in the occupied area.  Once 
it became clear that such goods were being sent to the front and/or in response to 
physical and verbal attacks from compatriots, the workers making them refused to work 
– in Becker’s words, they ‘mènent le combat’106 – primarily in the Lille-Roubaix-
Tourcoing area and its environs.107   
 
It is hard to pinpoint when the workers first stopped, but by 18th June Governor von 
Heinrich wrote to the mayor of Lille, demanding that he use ‘toute son influence pour 
déterminer les gens à reprendre le travail.’  The Governor, aware of the importance of 
performance and judgement for the occupés, added: ‘Pour garantir les ouvriers contre les 
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désagréments après la conclusion de la paix, le Gouvernement est prêt à leur délivrer un 
certificat constatant qu’ils ont été forcés au travail.’  In the case of non-compliance of 
workers, the city’s administration would be charged with manufacturing the sandbags.   
If even that did not work, the raw materials would be sent to Germany, and the costs of 
transport and manufacture levied on Lille.108  The response of the mayor was 
unequivocal: 
Je regrette devoir vous faire respectueusement remarquer qu’il m’est 
impossible d’entrer dans vos désirs. 
Obliger un ouvrier ou un patron à travailler est absolument 
contraire à mon droit; lui conseiller de travailler, absolument contraire à 
mon devoir, que me dicte impérieusement l’art. 52 de la Convention de la 
Haye. 
[… The proposed solution] ne peut même pas être envisagée, car 
mon devoir de Maire français me l’interdit plus formellement encore. 
Quelque risque personnel que je puisse encourir, je regrette donc 
ne pouvoir vous donner satisfaction.109 
 
The disagreement continued for a few days.110  Eventually, the mayor spoke to the head 
of the military police.  He was very courteous, asking the mayor precisely what 
punishment would make him acquiesce, and how the situation could be resolved 
amicably.  The transcript of the conversation demonstrates the frankness with which the 
two spoke to each other, and the strength of the mayor’s resistance (see Fig. 7).111  The 
final German response included a 6pm-5am curfew and a suspension of laissez-passer for 
the western part of Lille.  A poster stated that the population’s conception of article 52 of 
the Hague Convention was false – the work demanded did not comprise operations 
against France.112   
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On the same day, in the commune of Halluin, where the mayor had also protested 
against work involving sandbags,113 the Germans put up another poster.  Acknowledging 
the role of article 52 as the basis of current disagreements, the Kommandant stated that it 
was neither up to him nor French notables to decide who was right, because they were 
not competent; it would be the work of diplomats after the war.  For the moment, ‘c’est 
exclusivement l’interprétation de l’autorité militaire allemande qui est valable […] 
Aujourd’hui et peut-être encore pour longtemps […] il n’y a qu’une seule volonté et c’est 
la volonté de l’autorité militaire Allemande.’114  In other circumstances, the Germans 
used their own comprehension of the Convention to justify their actions, such as war 
contributions allegedly justified by Article 49.115  In this instance, the Germans wanted to 
stop all resistance: 
Je puis vous assurer que l’autorité militaire Allemande ne se départira sous 
aucune condition de ses demandes et ses droits, MÊME SI UNE VILLE 
DE 15.000 HABITANTS EN DEVRAIT [sic] PERIR. 
[…] C’est le dernier mot et le bon conseil que je vous donne ce 
soir: revenons à la raison et faites en sorte que tous les ouvriers reprennent 
le travail sans délai, autrement VOUS EXPOSEZ VOTRE VILLE, VOS 
FAMILLES et votre personne même AUX PLUS GRANDS 
MALHEURS.116 
 
Despite these events, the mayor of Lille was unwavering.   On 3rd July 1915, he told von 
Heinrich ‘vous sévissez contre une immense population innocente qui jusqu’ici a fait 
preuve, malgré ses souffrances, du plus grand calme.’  The reason was that some workers 
refused ‘de leur plein gré et après réflexion’ to manufacture sandbags for the trenches ‘à 
l’heure où leurs maris ou leurs frères se font tuer héroïquement devant ces mêmes 
tranchées’; and because the mayor ‘refuse d’intervenir et de conseiller de faire ce qu’il 
considère en son âme et conscience comme un crime contre sa patrie.’  Von Heinrich 
demanded 375,000 francs for the confection of 600,000 sandbags.  The mayor 
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responded: ‘Je regrette ne pouvoir acquiescer à cet ordre.’117  The recevreur municipal 
and adjoint au maire were arrested, and the Germans forced their way into the Recette 
Municipale to take the money.118  Meanwhile, eight leading confectionneurs had been 
arrested, seven of whom were sent to Germany on 2nd July.  They returned to Lille on 7th 
August, presumably because work had recommenced in their factories,119 which 
happened elsewhere after the arrest (or threat thereof) of factory owners120 – although this 
was not always the case.121  
 
Industriels Insoumis? 
Contrary to the mayor of Lille’s insistence that the decision not to work was down to 
individual workers, industrialists themselves appear to have played an active role in the 
affaire.  Many refused to continue supervising work for the Germans, although they did 
not necessarily encourage their workers to stop.  This was the case for Tourcoing-based 
industrialist M. Couvreur, threatened with arrest and transportation to Germany.122  He 
had ‘faisait travailler pour les Allemands depuis plusieurs mois’ and despite his altered 
position, emphasised that his employees were free to continue working.123  What 
accounted for his change of heart?  The popular mood of rebellion and apparent revenge 
against those working for the Germans?  The realisation that the gabions and fences his 
factory was making were probably being used for trench construction?  Whatever the 
case, Couvreur made his decision following a discussion with fellow industrialists.  This 
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is mirrored in Invasion ’14 when industrialist Hennedyck faced a dilemma: ‘If he worked 
for the enemy he would be guilty of treason; on the other hand, if he refused, he would 
be leaving those of his fellow mill-owners in the lurch who had kept their works running 
under orders from the enemy, to say nothing of exposing the working population to 
reprisals.’124  He was shown his ‘duty’ by the workers, and finally persuaded other 
industrialists to lead resistance – despite arguments that it was their duty to safeguard 
French industry for after the war – which led to their imprisonment and transportation 
to Germany.125 
 
The reality was no less agonising or dramatic for industrialists.  Again, an awareness of 
future judgement combined with a performative element to shape conduct.  In the 
middle of the affaire des sacs, the Syndicat des Fabricants of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing 
stated that it ‘s’occupe et se préoccupe avec un intérêt louable des questions qui surgiront 
au moment de la reprise du travail après l’occupation.’126  But it emphasised the extreme 
importance of the question of recent German orders that French industrialists work for 
the German authority in tasks with a clear military end.  The troubling dilemma, it said, 
‘est celui-ci: “Ou bien vous travaillerez, ou bien nous nous emparerons de votre usine…”’  
The Syndicat admitted that ‘La force prime ici le droit.’  However, it had some questions 
and potential answers: 
Sans blâmer la décision que chacun croira devoir prendre, n’y a-t-il pas 
lieu cependant de protester collectivement… et… de plus, n’est-il pas bon 
d’examiner les conséquences possibles de ce travail forcé? 
Il est tout d’abord indiscutable qu’une protestation unanime de 
tous les industriels du pays – qui sont une puissance à ne pas négliger, 
aura plus de force qu’une protestation d’industriels isolés devant l’Autorité 
allemande, devant nos ouvriers, et devant le Gouvernement français, qui, 
ne l’oublions pas, sera le juge en dernier ressort. 
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Cette protestation, dira-t-on, sera platonique devant l’Autorité 
allemande.  C’est possible.  Mais quand un droit est violé par la force, la 
protestation s’impose malgré tout, et elle frappe d’autant plus qu’elle 
ferme un bloc. 127 
 
The notion of a token protest demonstrates the understanding of this resistance as futile 
and performative.  These employers were aware of the judgement of fellow occupés, 
particularly their workers, whom they hoped to both impress and inform: 
Et devant les ouvriers? […] il semble qu’une protestation générale et 
collective de toute l’industrie viendrait renforcer sensiblement celle que 
peut formuler l’industriel.  Car il ne faut pas que les ouvriers disent que 
les patrons n’ont pas le courage de protester tous ensemble et 
énergiquement quand ils se sont sentis menacés.  Déjà, ils laissent 
entendre que les patrons gagnent de l’argent en travaillant pour les 
Allemands… Que leur intérêt est satisfait…. et… les mauvais esprits sont 
tout près [sic] à les rendre complices.  Le silence patronal pourrait aussi 
être interprété dans ce sens. 
Dans cette protestation collective, on pourrait en même temps 
faire savoir à l’ouvrier qui l’ignore, que l’Autorité allemande n’a pas le 
droit de le forcer à travailler et d’aller le chercher entre deux gendarmes.  
C’est aux patrons à éclairer leurs ouvriers.128 
 
The Syndicat also perceived a legal justification for resistance.  It was ‘indiscutable’ that 
manufacturing sandbags for trenches breached the Hague Convention.  Agreeing that a 
collective refusal was stronger than an isolated protest, the Syndicat questioned what the 
consequences of such action vis-à-vis the French government after the war could be.  It 
reasoned that during the occupation an industrialist refusing to work could be 
imprisoned, and ‘Son industrie est accaparée par les allemands [sic] qui la font marcher 
ou la détruisent.’  However, after the war the French government would probably repay 
the industrialist for damages ensued.  The alternative was less favourable: to manufacture 
sandbags was to play a part in war operations: ‘c’est comme si l’on travaillait pour 
                                                 






fabriquer des obus, des balles!.... C’est un crime de Lèse-Patrie indéniable, qui pourra être 
imputé à l’industriel, qui a consenti à faire travailler lui-même.’129 
 
Its conclusions were subsequently unequivocal: 
il est possible qu’un refus absolu à opposer aux allemands, [sic] avec toutes 
ses conséquences, soit le seul admis et soit la seule ligne de conduite 
qu’accepte le Gouvernement français, et que la raison très louable de 
vouloir sauvegarder [sic] une industrie et le gagne-pain des ouvriers ne soit 
pas jugée suffisante pour une justification.130 
 
Yet not everyone agreed on this point.  In their desire for respectability and their 
adulation of the law, some industrialists called upon legal advice to guide their actions.  
The owners of the P. Dumortier Frères factory in Tourcoing drafted the council of four 
lawyers from Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing during the affaire des sacs.131  They were 
consulted in particular on the legality of allowing workers to turn corn into flour and 
load it onto canal boats.  The industrialists had previously not permitted this,132 in 
response to their workers refusing to carry out the task.133  Upon being asked again to 
authorise this work, lawyers suggested that doing so and even giving the Germans their 
maximum requisition demand would be acceptable from a legal-patriotic viewpoint, 
because it would also provide food for the rest for the occupés, and prevented the 
Germans from requisitioning the entire stock.134  It was believed that the Germans would 
allow Dumortier Frères to keep 25% of its stock in return for co-operation.   Despite this 
advice, the industrialists still asked the mayor to confirm if, in these conditions, ‘notre 
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travail […] ne constituerait pas un crime contre la Patrie et ne saurait nous être 
reproché.’135  It is unclear if the mayor agreed with this view. 
 
However, former bâtonnier Eugène Delemer repeated the logic he had used to advise 
Roubaisien industrialists on the legality of making sandbags: ‘dans ce cas, vous ne vous 
exposeriez à aucune responsabilité pénale ou autre, cela parce que […] il n’y a ni crime ni 
délit là où il n’y a pas volonté, et il n’y a pas de vlonté [sic] lorsqu’on agit sous lempire 
[sic] de la contrainte.’136  For Delemer, then, authorising the manufacture of sandbags 
and other goods for the enemy was acceptable if it was done under the threat of force.  
But what about doing so freely?  Even in this hypothesis, Delemer argued, for Dumortier 
Frères, ‘il n’y aurait pas culpabilité’ because the code pénal only punished treason, 
comprising providing the enemy with goods with the express aim of helping ‘ses 
entreprises’ or ‘servir ses desseins’ – ‘or, rien de pareil évidemment, ne pourrait jamais 
vous étre [sic] imputé.’  Further, the code only concerned goods, whereas the owners 
would be providing labour – the corn had already been requisitioned, therefore no longer 
belonged to the owners.137  Providing labour was thus not the same as directly furnishing 
goods.  However, Delemer concluded that ‘Si nous nous plaçons au point de vue moral 
et patriotiques, ou simplement de l’opinion publique, il n’est pas douteux un seul instant 
qu’il vaille mieux s’abstenir, à moins d’en étre [sic] réduit à ne pouvoir se dérober.’138 
 
The law therefore did not always favour all-out resistance.  It was not just industrialists 
who sought legal advice; throughout the occupation, two professors of international 
law139 provided the mayor of Lille with a legal perspective on potential actions, at his 
request.140  The collection of letters between the mayor, the Germans, and these experts 
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constitutes compelling evidence for respectable, legal protest.  These jurists concluded 
during the affaire des sacs that any work aiding the manufacture of sandbags constituted 
participating in operations against their own country.  Sandbags, they argued, were the 
crucial aspect of the war, and participation in their manufacture could conceivably count 
as intelligence avec l’ennemi.141  Other issues were more complicated, such as furnishing 
goods to the Germans, the municipality’s responsibility in paying unemployment or 
other benefits, and the requisition of occupés.142  The mayor’s respectable protests, many 
of which contained a legal aspect, were greatly informed by this advice – for instance, the 
refusal to pay a new war contribution in June 1916, understood as contrary to 
international law.143  This legal resistance served as an example for other communes, such 
as Cambrai, where administrators did not have access to legal council.144 
 
Beyond the Hague Convention 
When occupés were involved, whether voluntarily or forced, with even more explicit 
military tasks like digging trenches, local notables and the acting Prefect unsurprisingly 
echoed earlier protests, again drawing on article 52.145  Article 46 of the Hague 
Convention was also invoked.  This article protected ‘Family honour and rights, the lives 
of persons, and private property.’146  Understandably, notables like Anjubault referenced 
article 46 when protesting against the Easter 1916 enlèvements.  For him, ‘Ce serait 
faillir à mon devoir que de ne pas m’élever formellement contre une semblable décision, 
de nature à ajouter aux souffrances de la population la plus cruelle des douleurs morales, 
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celle que peut causer la destruction du foyer familial.’147  These events in particular, but 
also later deportations, sparked outrage across the occupied area and beyond; in the Nord 
many mayors and other notables provided a chorus of protests referencing article 46.148   
 
Françoise Thébaud suggests that such protests along with worldwide outrage, especially 
by the King of Spain, led to the cessation of deportations in November 1916.149  In these 
and other protests, French notables often referenced the Germans’ own rules of warfare.  
For example, the mayor and députés of Tourcoing argued that ‘de pareilles mesures non 
seulement heurteraient les données les plus élémentaires du droit des gens, mais aussi 
seraient en contradiction flagrante avec tous les principes proclamés par l’Etat-major 
allemand lui-même dans son “Exposé des lois de la guerre”.’  This document stated that 
civilians in an occupied area should not be considered as enemies in the active sense of 
the word; for the authors of this protest, the German policy of deportation ‘ressemblerait 
à des actes de guerre contre une population civile paisible.’150  Other claims of German 
contradiction and hypocrisy abound.151 
 
Invocations of international law lasted throughout the occupation.  As late as January 
1918, Anjubault protested against the taking of hostages in Habourdin following the 
killing of a German soldier by an occupé who subsequently committed suicide.  He 
noted that this was an individual act, and if the author had still been alive, he would have 
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been punished as an individual.  Further, the use of collective punishment was forbidden 
by article 50 of the Hague Convention.152  He asked that the hostages be released, and 
three days later they were liberated.153  It is not clear if this was a direct result of 
Anjubault’s protests, and it must be noted that he had made similar protests two years 
previous,154 so the Germans evidently did not agree with the juridical point.  
 
Sometimes notables invoked breaches of the 1906 Geneva Convention.155  Others 
protested against German policies using French law, which was theoretically guaranteed 
to exist in the occupied territory under article 43 of the Hague Convention.156  Notables 
therefore often refused German demands because they broke French law, or because 
under the Third Republic notables did not possess the powers to carry out these 
demands.  In December 1916, the Inspecteur de l’Assistance publique informed the 
Prefect that he could not send an orphan to work for the Germans, as per their demands, 
because French law only allowed orphans to be housed with people who had undergone 
serious scrutiny, and who could assure the material and moral well-being of the child.  
The German authority did not meet these criteria!157  The Inspector was frequently 
arrested for his numerous acts of respectable resistance,158 and his predecessor had also 
been arrested for refusing to force the pupilles to work for the Germans, a refusal which 
the Prefect saw as just.159 
 
In another instance, the Inspecteur primaire of Cambrai was imprisoned for refusing to 
allow the German officer charged with the surveillance of schools to accompany him in 
his visits – because French law forbade entry into the schools for persons other than those 
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designated in a law of October 1886.160  As a fellow teacher noted, the Inspector ‘s’est 
trouvé dans la pénible alternative ou de transgresser la loi française ou de désobéir à 
l’autorité occupante.  Comme il est toujours français, je présume qu’il a estimé son devoir 
était d’obéir aux lois de son pays.’161  A similar tone was taken by the guards at the prison 
of Loos, who refused to carry out manual work for the Germans in March 1917;162 they 
were punished with forced labour, which the director of the prison saw as an affront to 
their dignity as French functionaries.163 
 
Again, the Germans attempted to persuade notables that they did not have to fear 
negative judgement for breaking French laws.  In January 1916, Anjubault was ordered 
to incarcerate a 13 year-old boy and a 14 year-old girl in the Colonie industrielle de 
Saint-Bernard.  He responded that this was an establishment exclusively for males, and 
that a Prefect cannot order an incarceration – to do so would be an abuse of power for 
which he would be held personally responsible.164  Von Graevenitz accepted the point 
concerning the girl, but re-stated the order regarding the boy, whilst reassuring 
Anjubault’s conscience: 
La Préfecture est suffisamment couverte par cet ordre, à l’égard de 
l’autorité qui est placée au-dessus d’elle, si elle devait peut-être craindre 
qu’il puisse lui être fait plus tard des reproches, parce qu’elle a pris, en 
temps de guerre, une mesure qui avait pour but d’empêcher qu’un jeune 
français [sic], sans parents, reste sans aucune préservation.165 
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In any case, the director of the Colonie refused the German demand, citing article 66 of 
the code pénal.  However, he later admitted that ‘Malgré mes protestations énergiques, 
j’ai dû céder d’accepter cet enfant.’166   
 
Many similar cases occurred.167  The latest example, a demonstration of how little the 
strategy of respectable resistance changed, was a letter from Anjubault to the 
Kommandantur in September 1918.  The Germans had demanded that money gained 
from the harvest be used to pay the workers of Sequedin.  Anjubault replied that such a 
decision was beyond the authority of the Prefect, because the money belonged to the 
individuals whose harvest had been requisitioned.168  Years of vain invocations of such 




Clergymen played their own role in respectable resistance, perhaps most famously the 
doyen de Saint-Christophe of Tourcoing, who engaged in a different form of opposition 
in August 1916.  Rather than protesting to the Germans, he instead preached resistance 
to German requisitions (particularly of copper),169 for which he was sentenced to 10 
years’ imprisonment in Germany.  This was a widely-known event both during and after 
the occupation,170 representative of the few occasions of non-protest notable resistance.171  
However, the doyen had engaged in notable protests earlier that year, criticising the 
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Easter 1916 enlèvements.172  Further, there existed cases of clergymen resisting German 
demands, such as refusing to ring the church bells for alleged German victories,173 or to 
allow the Germans to requisition bells.174 
 
Higher up the ecclesiastical hierarchy, bishops utilised the same protest tactics as other 
notables.  The bishop of Lille, Mgr Charost, was especially vocal, aiming to protect the 
Church, its goods, and fellow Christians.175  He often directed the Germans’ attention 
towards individual cases of arrested occupés, asking for leniency.176  Further, Charost 
protested against the deportations of 1916,177 and against requisitions of church material 
such as bells,178 or of clergymen.179  He criticised requisitions of industrial and other 
material whose disappearance would endanger the economic prosperity of the Nord.180  
Indeed, whilst the doyen de St-Christophe preached open resistance to the requisition of 
copper, Charost protested in a letter to the Kommandant of Lille.  He highlighted the 
‘caractère infiniment respectable’ of the reasons leading the population to refuse the 
German demand for copper.  The letter concluded: 
De quel front oseraient-ils penser aux morts et soutenir demain le regard 
des survivants s’ils faisaient ou annonçaient la livraison des engins de 
guerre qui les décimeront. 
Je me suis borné à représenter exactement l’état d’âme public.  J’ai 
l’espoir que cette situation, méritant au plus haut point d’être prise en 
considération, orientera l’autorité allemande vers une solution qui sauve la 
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conscience et l’honneur d’un peuple à qui il ne restera bientôt plus que 
cela.181 
 
This was another polite but firm protest.  Yet this resistance was not based on loyalty to 
the Republic.  Charost held the view that the war and especially the occupation was a test 
from God in response to the sins of the Republic,182 although he remained staunchly pro-
France,183 evoking victory in his pastoral letters and sermons, much to the ire of the 
Germans.184   
 
Similarly, the bishop of Cambrai, Mgr Chollet, preached a patriotic message which 
strengthened the morale of the population,185 although his attitude of ‘resistance’ has 
been questioned.  Eric Bukowski argues that he continued the pre-war ‘bataille religieuse’ 
and used the occupation as a means of accentuating his role in the town.186 Bukowski 
notes that Chollet’s actions alternated between compromise with and resistance to the 
occupier, but concludes that Chollet did engaged in resistance via personal protests to the 
Germans, or including his name on the municipal protests.187  Religious notables 
therefore also engaged in respectable resistance,188 although not all clergymen confined 
themselves to notable protests.189 
 
Despite differing political views, Catholic forms of resistance were, overall, not too 
dissimilar to Republican forms – both expressed patriotism and a faith in the Allied or 
                                                 
181 Charost to von Graevenitz, n.d., cited in Cliquennois-Pâque, Lille, p.246-7. 
182 Voeux pour la nouvelle année présentés à l’archevêque le 30 décembre 1915, Archives Diocésaines, 
cited in Cnudde-Lecointre, ‘L’Eglise,’ p.43. 
183 See AMT H4A28: ‘Lettre de S.G. Mgr. l’Evêque de Lille prescrivant une Neuvaine de prières 
publiques pour la clôture du Temps Pascal,’ n.d. 
184 ADN 9R585: Commissaire Central de Police of Lille to Prefect, 28th Oct 1916; Cnudde-Lecointre, 
‘Monseigneur Charost,’ p.363. 
185 ADHS 4M513: report nº711, 9th February 1917. 
186 Bukowski, ‘Cambrai,’ p.63. 
187 Ibid., p.63-4. 
188 Martin-Mamy sees the two as part of the same phenomenon: his work contains an appendix entitled 
‘Les protestations des autorités civiles et religieuses.’  Martin-Mamy, Quatre ans, pp.186-255. 





French victory, no matter what ‘France’ meant to them.  Both drew on shared notions of 
respectability and social norms so important to Nordistes, whether Catholic or not; and 
everyone desired Allied victory as the short-term goal. 
 
Resistance Restrained: Punishments and Successes 
How successful was respectable resistance?  If ‘success’ means the withdrawal or softening 
of policies against which notables protested, or the general amelioration of occupied life, 
then its success was questionable.  Despite the respectable nature of protests, the 
Germans were frequently frustrated by them, perceiving them as performative nuisances, 
‘freinage administratif’ or full-blown resistance.  Such frustration usually resulted in the 
threat of further fines or punishments for the notables, municipality and the 
population.190  If resistance continued, punishments were applied.   
 
Occasionally letters of protest unequivocally exacerbated the situation.  For example, on 
19th May 1917, the Directeur des Musées et de l’Ecole Nationale des Arts industriels 
wrote a letter to the Kommandant of Roubaix, protesting against the requisitioning of 
teaching material and quoting the Hague Convention.  The furious Kommandant came 
to the school immediately after receiving the letter, screaming insults at the Directeur, 
after which everything imaginable was requisitioned, instead of the more limited planned 
requisitions.191  Other notable protests often led to increased fines and punishments,192 
although many notables were suspected of some form of opposition to the Germans 
throughout the occupation, whether justified or not.193  Another German response was 
simply to refuse further communication on the subject.194    
 
                                                 
190 ADN 9R515: Kommandant of Hellemmes to mayor, 24th October 1916. 
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1917). 
192 See, for example, ADN 9R515: von Carlowitz, Gen. Commandant en Chef, seemingly to Mairie of 
Hellemmes, 1st November 1917; Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.162, 345, 353-5, 457-8. 
193 See ADN 9R797: handwritten note, n.a., n.d. 





M. Welhoff, a notable working at the Recette Municipale of Lille, refused in July 1915 
to hand over the keys to the safe to allow the Germans to take 375,000 francs required 
for the manufacture of sandbags.  He continued his refusal, even when imprisoned, and 
eventually the Germans simply broke into the safe themselves.195  He must have known 
that this was a probable outcome, yet he maintained his resistance, presumably feeling 
that it was his duty, or hoping that this would delay the Germans (it did, for a day).  
Here, resistance failed in one sense (the Germans still accessed the money), but succeeded 
in others (a slight delay occurred, and Welhoff never acquiesced).  It is also interesting 
that the Germans sought co-operation, rather than commencing with brute force. 
 
Sometimes official protests did bear fruit, such as in late July 1918, when the Procureur 
de la République secured the release of one of two French policemen accused of 
exceeding their limitations in investigating a criminal case.196  Judging each instance of 
resistance on a case-by-case basis proves impossible given the lacunae in the archives, but 
examples of wholly successful resistance are considerably rarer than those of failed 
resistance.  Even notable protests which initially had a favourable conclusion eventually 
ended with accusations of resistance and the threat of punishment.  The theatre of Lille 
provides a case study.  In November 1915, the Germans ordered that the municipality 
had to facilitate the building works needed to complete the theatre, including providing 
information.197  The mayor opposed this, explaining that the municipality had existing 
contracts with entrepreneurs, many of whom were living in Paris.  He concluded: 
Nous avons témoignés la meilleure volonté à exécuter vos ordres pour 
tous les travaux concernant les besoins de l’armée allemande […] 
La preuve en est dans l’exécution de plus de 3.000 ordres donnés 
par vous […] 
Mais, nous n’avons pas le droit d’aller plus loin, et vous ne 
voudriez pas exiger de nous qu’à l’heure où notre population souffre de 
                                                 
195 Cliquennois-Pâque, Lille, pp.136-42, ‘Procès-verbal des incidents qui se sont produits à la Recette 
municipale les 5 et 6 juillet 1915.’ 
196 ADN 9R220: Procureur de la République à Lille to von Graevenitz, 29th July 1918; von Gravenitz to 
Procureur, 31st July 1918. 





tant de besoins que nous ne pouvons satisfaire, où nos ressources ne 
suffisent pas à atténuer de profondes misères, nous dépensions 
d’importantes sommes d’argent pour des œuvres de luxe et de plaisir.198 
 
Three days later, the Governor informed the mayor that ‘En raison de la demande que 
vous m’avez faite personnellement […] et de votre lettre […] je renonce pour le moment 
à faire terminer les travaux du Nouveau Théâtre par des ouvriers de la Ville.’  However, 
he reserved the right ‘de faire achever ces travaux par des soldats’ if the town did not fulfil 
its promise of installing heating in the old theatre by 20th November.199  This resistance 
thus seemed successful.  Yet within a month an unknown incident had taken place which 
caused the Governor to insinuate that municipal employees had refused to give him the 
plans, incorrectly stating that these plans were in Paris.  He alleged a specific employee 
had lied more than others, and ended by stating:  
Cet incident m’engage à exprimer à nouveau mon opinion que la 
Municipalité pourrait s’épargner à elle-même et à ses concitoyens 
beaucoup de désagréments, si elle imposait comme devoir à ses employés 
subalternes d’abandonner cette résistance passive qui paraît si souvent 
dans leurs relations avec les autorités allemandes.  L’expérience aurait dû 
montrer à l’Administration de la Ville qu’une pareille résistance est tout 
de même sans résultat et que les autorités allemandes ne se laissent pas 
pour cela détourner de la poursuite de leur but.200 
 
Many notables would probably have agreed with the final sentence.  Most acknowledged 
their subordinate position and the ultimate futility of resistance.  Pierre Dumont, 
interpreter at the mairie of Lille said as much in his diary: 
On est décidé à la résistance, au risque de passer de mauvais jours, et… de 
cèder [sic] ensuite.  On consulte des ouvrages de Droit International, on 
adresse des réclamations au Gouverneur, mais la conclusion est invariable: 
“payez… sinon… !” 
C’est le culte du pot de fer contre le pot de terre; et pourtant il 
faut résister, par principe.  Pendant des semaines il y aura échange de 
longues lettres, on luttera le plus longtemps possible jusqu’au moment où 
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l’autorité allemande dira: “En voilà assez, payez sinon…(suivra [sic] la liste 
de mesures de rigueur.)”201 
 
This sums up both the nature of and logic behind respectable resistance.  Other notables 
reinforced such a view.  Yet more references exist of the ultimate uselessness, vanity and 
futility of resistance.202  By the publication of Gromaire’s work in 1925, the fruitlessness 
of resistance during the occupation was widely accepted.203   
 
It is probable that, given the large amount of paperwork comprising respectable 
resistance and the Germans’ response, resistance as ‘freinage administratif’ was mildly 
successful.  Overall, though, the pragmatic results of notable protests were limited.  Yet 
occupés were aware of notable resistance, so perhaps it was successful in a morale-
boosting sense.204  The population may have felt pride and a sense of optimism as a result 
of such resistance.  The population itself, however, was also engaged in its own resistance 
with similar morale-boosting effects.  It is to this symbolic resistance that this thesis now 
turns.
                                                 
201 ADN 74J241: Dumont papers, 19th June 1916. 
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(possibly the Prefect); ADN 9R584: report, seemingly by the Commissaire de Police of Lille, 12th 
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9R374: L’économe de la colonie de St Bernard, ffons Directeur, to Prefect, 11th May 1915. 
203 Gromaire, L’Occupation, p.14-15, 56, 164, 167-8, 214. 





II – Symbolic Resistance (Coups de cœur) 
The wider population engaged in acts of symbolic patriotism constituting a different 
form of resistance.  This ‘symbolic resistance,’1 ‘moral opposition,’ or ‘religion 
patriotique’2 demonstrated both the population’s loyalty to France and/or the Republic, 
and its refusal to be subdued by the Germans.  Perhaps the widespread patriotism of the 
occupés studied here was a marker of the Third Republic’s success in fostering and 
promoting national identity and ‘civic nationalism,’3 if not always allegiance to the 
Republic.  In the heavily Catholic but economically developed Nord, the policy of 
Catholic ralliement to the Republic was largely successful.4  The female composition of 
the occupied population does not dissuade from this, as the Republic had also been 
inculcating its daughters with a unique form of patriotism, even preparing them for 
wartime duties.5  However, even anti-Republican, Catholic education had taught that 
France was great,6 fostering its own kind of loyalty to the patrie.  Patriotism may also be 
explained by the Union Sacrée informing the French civilian culture de guerre, which 
reached and influenced the population of the Nord before the occupation.  Once 
invaded, the French saw the patrie as violated; none more so than the occupés, who 
experienced this first-hand.  Yet ‘passive resistance’ and open (non-violent) hostility to 
the Germans was not unique to occupied France in 1914-18,7 thus the circumstances of 
war and occupation evidently constituted important causal factors.  Sometimes cases of 
                                                 
1 Becker, Cicatrices, p.253. 
2 De Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.122. 
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France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 2002), (trans.) Jay Winter and Helen 
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4 Robert Gildea, France 1870-1914 (London, 1996), p.44. 
5 See Darrow, ‘Joan of Arc.’ 
6 Ibid., p.273. 





‘everyday resistance’8 existed, subversive acts carried out by a subordinated population, 
not necessarily patriotic per se.  Yet the resistance examined here often had a 
performative, symbolic element, whether ‘everyday resistance’ or something different. 
 
‘Symbolic resistance’ here comprises a variety of acts attesting to the patriotism of the 
occupés, and consequently nearly all banned by the Germans.  The disparate actions 
studied include singing songs, writing poems, telling jokes or using humour to mock the 
occupation and occupier.  Other actions examined are wearing or displaying national 
colours, demonstrating humanitarian impulses towards Allied prisoners of war, and 
preventing successful German requisitions.9  Many such actions have an explicitly 
performative element to them, and are more ‘passive’ than ‘active’ resistance – 
nevertheless, engaging in such activities usually contradicted German regulations, thus 
was recognised by the Germans (at least) as a form of resistance. 
 
The intent behind these acts, difficult to discern, rarely appears to have been to resist the 
Germans in any pragmatic sense.  Mostly, it was simply a desire to express patriotism, 
but in doing so to resist moral-cultural domination and humiliation by the Germans.  
Indeed, the population’s patriotism was so strong that some found any sign of German 
culture humiliating and insulting.  Trollin described the opening of Lille’s theatre as a 
‘Suprême insulte!!’10  After seeing the replacement of the French flag with the German 
one at the hôtel de ville – a commonplace policy11 – Blin remarked, ‘Ô honte!’12  
Furthermore, many Catholics perceived the presence of Protestant Prussians in their 
                                                 
8 Scott, ‘Resistance without Protest,’ p.419.  He originally outlined the concept in Weapons. 
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10 ADN 74J224: Trollin diary, 25th December 1915.  Original emphasis. 
11 See Ramirez, ‘Les villes,’ p.11; Isabelle Dejardin, ‘Tourcoing pendant la Première Guerre mondiale: une 
ville occupée (1914-1918),’ mémoire de maîtrise sous la direction de R. Vandenbussche (Lille III, 1995), 
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churches as a profanation – not only did Protestant mass take place here, but sometimes 
churches became barracks.13 
   
Some may have wished to express pro-French or pro-Allied sentiments precisely because 
of German orders to the contrary, demonstrating freedom of expression and thought in 
opposition to German control.  Once the population had become ‘prisonners,’ as Trollin 
put it,14 acts of rebellion kept morale high by undermining the gaolers’ power. 
 
For Becker, ‘Ces petits actes patriotiques au jour le jour sont symptomatiques […] d’une 
volonté sans faille de montrer son refus de l’ordre allemand […]’15  The German order 
was one society, but a parallel, French, rebel society existed,16 one of ‘résistance civile au 
quotidien chez les anonymes’  involving thousands of ‘petits gestes aussi anodins’ such as 
crossing the road to avoid a German.17 
 
Symbolic resistance was therefore a means of undermining the Germans presence, 
perhaps also of surviving the occupation with some dignity intact.  What specific forms, 
then, did symbolic resistance take? 
 
Humour 
Numerous sources attest to the French population’s strong sense of humour during the 
occupation.  This was perhaps merely a form of dealing with a difficult situation, but as 
with the occupations of World War II, it could also be resistance.18  Just as Chad Bryant 
has demonstrated for the Czech Protectorate in Word War II, in the occupied Nord of 
1914-18 jokes constituted a particular form of resistance against a regime that demanded 
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total conformity and obedience.19  Ambiguous jokes provided a safer form of 
opposition.20  However, Bryant outlines the problems and multiple meanings jokes offer: 
The motivations and intentions in telling a joke might have been selfish.  
Joke-telling might have acted as a ‘safety valve’, a harmless vent that 
allowed Czechs to continue working in factories while maintaining a 
vague sense of patriotism and integrity.  Other jokesters might have had 
little or no regard for the fate of the national collective […] we might see 
such acts of ‘resistance’ as small, personal and calculated victories – 
opportunities seized at a moment in time. Then the victory disappeared.21 
 
This model is equally applicable to the occupied Nord.  The use of humour also allowed 
the occupés ‘to make sense of an absurd world, or at least laugh it away for a few 
seconds.’22  Some contest the notion of humour as resistance, particularly regarding the 
occupation of 1940-44, but admit nevertheless that jokes could be subversive forms of 
opposition and irreverence.23  Humour provides a covert outlet for opposition by the 
oppressed,24 yet also suggests passivity, an admission that little can be done to alter the 
situation in any meaningful way.  This does not mean that oppressed peoples are the only 
constituencies expressing humour: the Germans also did so, such as in cartoons and jokes 
published in Liller Kriegszeitung, often linked to notions of cultural superiority (see Fig. 
8).  The occupés similarly expressed their cultural identity through humour, and in this 
sense resisted the German presence.   
 
Occupation diarists provide the richest source base for jokes and humour.  Diaries 
themselves have been perceived as an act of resistance.25  Indeed, it was forbidden to 
possess ‘écrits hostiles à l’Allemagne,’26 which diaries could conceivably represent; some 
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20 Ibid., p.140. 
21 Ibid., p.148. 
22 Ibid., p.149. 
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24 Hollander and Einwohner, ‘Conceptualizing,’ p.540. 
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were punished for committing this offence,27 and for possessing diaries.28  The RAF later 
attested to the difficulty of keeping diaries and the ingenuity required to hide them 
during the occupation.29  Here, the understanding of diaries as resistance is not as 
extreme as that of Becker, who even sees resistance in the grammar and syntax of 
diarists.30  It is not necessary to read between the lines to see resistance in diaries, 
primarily visible in jokes. 
 
Trollin chronicled anecdotes and jokes, but these appear only until mid-1915.  He noted 
in January 1915 that at Ronchin a German asked a child why he was not at school, to 
which the child replied, ‘Why are you not in Paris?’31  He recounts a similar incident in 
April 1915: some children were playing soldiers, performing marches, when a German 
officer passed by, complimenting them.  One of the children told the officer ‘N[ou]s 
savons faire aussi le pas de Paris.’  The officer told them to do so, and the boy marched 
backwards, at which point ‘L’officier n’ajoute rien et s’en va.’32  Perhaps this rather 
triumphalist humour, underlining the Germans’ failure at the Marne and their inability 
to advance since, had died down past 1915.  Nevertheless, it represents resistance to the 
notion of German superiority and victory. 
 
There was an animal-based mockery of the Germans.  One joke recounted a German 
officer telling an Alsacien-Lorrain, a civilian living in the Nord with whom he lodged, to 
serve him the best meal he had.  The Alsacien served up a dish of milk in which potatoes 
were floating.  “Qu’est-ce que cette bouillie?” asked the officer, “chez n[ou]s on donne 
cela aux cochons.”  The civilian responded: “Et chez nous aussi!”33 
 
                                                 
27 ADN 9R719: German poster, Roubaix, 5th February1917. 
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A further porcine joke involved Germans requisitioning a farmer’s pigs.  He implored 
them to leave him at least one. 
- Oui, à condition que v[ou]s le nommerez Joseph 
- Ah! non; je ne veux pas déshonorer le saint 
- Et puis, après tout, nommez-le Guillaume si v[ou]s voulez 
- Encore moins, car je ne veux pas non plus déshonorer mon cochon.34 
 
Yet humour was not restricted to jokes.  Mockery and laughter were a common reaction 
to German posters, policies, and parades.  Englishman J.P. Whitaker’s account of the 
occupation of Lille and Roubaix noted:  
One of the dire threats announced on the posters over which we had 
many a quiet laugh, was: “Anyone guilty of this offence will be sent to 
Germany.”  If the authorities had only known it, this was not the best 
way to impress their serfs.  Their remark was “l’Allemagne doit être un 
pays terrible”.35 
 
Correspondingly, Trollin recounts how in March 1915, on the first day of a new curfew 
in Lille, ‘c’est drôle; on rit d’une fenêtre à l’autre en se moquant.’36  Following the 
German killing of carrier pigeons, Blin mixed humour with optimism, exclaiming: ‘Les 
pigeons sont morts, mais non les canards!’37  In Roubaix, when it was made compulsory 
to give an egg a day to the Kommandantur in 1915, ‘On fit des chansons à la gloire des 
poules récalcitrantes et patriotes, qui se refusaient à pondre à la cadence requise.’38  
Perhaps humour was the inevitable result of a tragi-comic situation, whereby in this 
instance the Germans allegedly requested eggs from chickens of both sexes.39  In 
Troisvilles, the population laughed at a German poster ordering the muzzling of cats.40  
Humour was thus a common response to the occupation. 
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Lillois Martin-Mamy’s published occupation diary contains many amusing anecdotes.  
When he and others were taken hostage, they were ordered not to talk, so asked their 
guards if they could ask questions or say thank you.41  The hostages were ‘Partagés entre 
une forte envie de rire, une profonde indignation et une certaine inquiétude.’42   A later 
comment is insightful: ‘Il faut rendre à ses ennemis la justice qui leur est due.  Les 
Allemands nous ont apporté ici l’humiliation, la misère, la faim, le vol et l’assassinat 
juridique; mais ils nous ont apporté aussi la gaieté.  Pour des Français c’est un cadeau 
important.’43  In particular, Lillois found German parades involving goose-stepping 
highly amusing: ‘Amusés et narquois ils regardent et rient.  Ils rient parce que le spectacle 
est d’un comique irrésistible, et puis ils rient encore, parce que d’avoir ri ils se sentent 
vengés.’44  This sense of vengeance represents a cornerstone of the logic and intent behind 
occupation humour.  Martin-Mamy wrote that German officers misinterpreted such 
laughter as German culture bearing fruit, believing the Lillois to be happy: ‘Ils regardent 
et ne comprennent pas.  On ne peut pas être un Barbare [sic] et comprendre l’Ironie 
[sic].’45   
 
Not all Germans were this naïve.  French laughter was so common that a poster was put 
up in Lille forbidding laughter in front of posters.46  Similarly, in Tourcoing, because 
clandestine publications (studied later) demonstrated that most announced German 
victories were false, every time a church bell rang for an alleged victory, the population 
laughed.  The Kommandatur eventually banned the population from laughing in public 
altogether.47 
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The widespread employment of humour betrays its almost cathartic, pro-survival 
properties.  Redier notes: ‘On se moquait d’eux tant qu’on pouvait.’48  Despite the 
harshness of the occupation, ‘Plutôt que d’en pleurer, mieux valait en rire.’49  This logic 
was mirrored elsewhere: ‘We should have felt doubly prisoners if we had not made fun of 
our jailers, and to be prisoners only once was quite sufficient.’50 
 
Songs and Poems (Verse Versus the Germans) 
Humour was also expressed in the songs and poems composed and performed during the 
occupation.  Indeed, ‘Les chansons populaires de refus’ were ‘particulièrement vivaces 
dans le Nord.’51  Redier hints that singing was for those who could not engage in polite 
protests: ‘On chantait ou, si on pouvait on faisait mieux: on leur brûlait la politesse.’52  
The content of songs and poems highlights their role as forms of resistance, similar to 
those of the Second World War.53  Collections of such work were published after 1918, 
and provide the bulk of evidence for this section.  Naturally, it is possible that some of 
these were edited or even fabricated entirely after the event.  Yet they remain convincing 
enough to be used for informative analysis.  Humour was not the only sentiment 
expressed, but it is the one which will be dealt with first.  A rapatrié from Valenciennes 
noted in early 1917 that children performed a song, even in front of Germans, which 
directly spoke to, mocked, and criticised the Kaiser.  The chorus was: 
Par ton orgueil, ta lâcheté, 
Tu fais verser du sang, des larmes, 
Le monde entier est écœuré 
Et veut te passer par les armes; 
C’est à Berlin que nous voulons 
Venger nos pères et tous nos frères. 
Prends garde Guillaume l’espion 
                                                 
48 Redier, Allemands, p.136. 
49 Ibid., p.144. 
50 Yerta sisters, Six Women, p.174. 
51 Becker, Cicatrices, p.256. 
52 Redier, Allemands, p.148. 
53 See Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, pp.189-96; Ian Higgins (ed.), Anthology of Second World 





Pour tes Prussiens nous avons des Canons.54 
 
It is hard to imagine such violent lyrics being sung in front of Germans without negative 
consequences for the performer.  Whether these children intended to resist, or recognised 
such acts as resistance, is unknown; this was probably the case, even if resisting simply 
meant expressing anti-German sentiment and/or annoying the Germans. 
 
Most songs and poems were written in ch’ti.  This suggests that the composers/singers 
believed they were engaging in resistance, or at least in dangerous activities.  The use of a 
dialect that even Germans who spoke French would find hard to understand meant that 
occupés could display anti-German sentiment with a reduced possibility of discovery or 
reproach.  The benefit of German non-comprehension combined with the strong sense 
of localism/regionalism to make ch’ti a useful language of resistance.  In face of German 
cultural and military domination, Nordiste identity was reinforced – an identity that was 
not only ‘not German,’ but also regional and national at the same time.  Further, texts in 
the primarily oral patois may have been easier, or more probable, to circulate amongst 
the Nord’s industrial and agricultural populations, likely to speak the patois on a regular 
basis.  Given the lyrics of such works, it is clear that local and French identity here 
worked in unison. 
 
Labbé composed and performed songs which aided the morale of the population – he 
‘trouvait de soudaines inspirations pour rallier avec une intarissable verve la haute 
bouffonnerie dont l’attitude et l’allure des soldats allemands à Lille nous offraient 
journellement le spectacle.’55  His song ‘Les All’mands à Lille’ provides further evidence 
that the population ridiculed German spectacles.  In this instance, Labbé mocks the poor 
musical quality of the daily parade of the 39th Hanoverian Landsturm regiment.  The 
refrain is unambiguous: 
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L’ Landsturm a 
L’ Landsturm a 
Tant fait rire à Lille 
Qu’ lontemps dins no’ ville 
On s’in souven’ra.56 
 
A similar song entitled ‘La parate’ (the parade) explains that even the memory of 
Landsturm parades still made the French laugh after the occupation – but at the time, 
the population was crying with laughter.57 
 
German celebrations were thus prime targets for this resistance.  A poem of 1915 mocked 
German victories:   
Ils annonc’nt leus succès baroques. 
A nos églis’s ils sonn’nt les cloques; 
Pour el fauss’ gloriole i sont forts.58 
 
Labbé composed an irreverent ditty for the celebration of the Kaiser’s birthday on 27th 
January 1915, seen from the perspective of two pigeons.59  An anonymous Lillois author 
also wrote a song for the same occasion, based on ‘L’Angelus de la mer.’  The language of 
the second verse is evocative of the disdain, even hatred, some occupés felt towards the 
Germans and especially the Kaiser: 
La déesse est garnie d’vos drapeaux germaniques 
Mais d’in haut les coulons 
Déposent din vos couleuirs des p’tites crottes symboliques 
Cha rimplace les fleurons 
Comme ches oiseaux, tous les citoyens de Lille 
In font autant su l’portrait d’vot Kaiser 
Malédiction su’ lui et tout s’ famille 
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S’planche s’rot bien mieux à côté d’ Lucifer.60 
 
Labbé called the Kaiser the Antichrist,61 and the view that the Kaiser was evil and 
responsible for the war was widespread during the occupation,62 representing the culture 
de l’occupé which dehumanised the ‘barbaric’ enemy without the aid of Allied 
propaganda.  It was against such barbarity that the occupés resisted – by denouncing it in 
songs, a personal, moral victory was achieved. 
 
Many more songs contained strong anti-German emotions.  One recounts the requisition 
of goods, noting that all that remained was the Germans – ‘cheull’ peste’ and ‘chés 
rafleux prussiens’ – and ultimately mocking German ‘Kulture [sic].’63  Another calls the 
Germans vampires and ‘sales boches.’64  Labbé often accused the Germans of lying, 
particularly via their posters and publications, as evident in the titles of the songs 
‘Minteux!... Minteux!... Minteux!…’ and ‘Mintiries Boches.’65  This sentiment was 
echoed by a contemporary song not written by Labbé mocking ‘Les Trois Canards’ – Le 
Bruxellois, La Gazette des Ardennes and the Bulletin de Lille.66 
 
Ducks were not the only birds causing a stir.  Stronger emotions are evident in poems 
concerning German orders to kill animals, seen by the occupés as the height of cruelty.67  
The obligatory killing of pigeons was perceived in one poem as ‘L’ massacr’ des pigeons 
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innochints,’ in which the birds are just as much heroic victims of the war as the occupés 
themselves: 
Nos gracieux pigeons domestiques, 
Oisaux aux idé’s pacifiques, 
Ont ainsi répandu leu sang, 
L’ mêm’ qué l’ civil non combatant.68 
 
This poem contains what the author insists was the true story of a woman who did not 
declare her pigeon because it was infirm.  She was sent to a military tribunal and 
sentenced to a 400-mark fine, but the pigeon itself was ‘deported’ to Germany, never to 
be seen again.69  Yet sometimes the Germans decreed that the French population was 
mistreating various animals,70 leading certain occupés to claim that the Germans were 
perfect humanitarians when it came to animals.71   
 
German barbarism and lack of humanity was a recurring theme.  The Germans are 
portrayed as smelly,72 greedy,73 drunkards,74 who lacked solidarity, often fighting between 
themselves.75  However, the focus was not always on the Germans; the patriotism of the 
occupés provided the subject for numerous works.  They were shown to express 
humanitarian concerns for Allied prisoners of war, offering them aid.76  In a sonnet 
written in April 1915, Labbé stated that the rest of France should know that the Lillois 
remained hopeful for victory, and above all remained French.77  He praised the relief 
work of the Fourneaux économiques de la guerre,78 but at the same time attacked 
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‘pessimistes,’79 war profiteers,80 and especially women engaged in relations with the 
Germans.81  Similarly, a printed poem in ch’ti appears in Blin’s diary in February 1918, 
criticising theft and moral decline resulting from penury.82  A 1919 publication 
contained an enormous 139 poems written, in standard French, in Lille during the 
occupation, and touching upon all of the above themes.83 
 
These song and poems were taken seriously by the Germans, when they heard and 
understood them.  Labbé was arrested in October 1915 and was sentenced to nine 
months’ imprisonment.  He was sent to Anrath and eventually spent a year at 
Holzminden, where he continued to compose songs.84  In Cambrai, one Mlle Schneider 
was imprisoned for 10 days for composing anti-German poems.85   
 
The composition of original songs was not the only way music could be used for 
resistance.  One of the most frequently cited events of the occupation was the singing of 
the Marseillaise, evidently representing patriotic expression and opposition to the 
Germans, and often punished by them.  Blin notes that one man was sentenced to four 
weeks’ imprisonment for having done so;86 Degnitère mentioned ten people imprisoned 
for the same act, carried out on 14th July 1915,87 and a teacher in Villers-Plouich was 
imprisoned for four months for having encouraged her pupils to sing the Marseillaise and 
for ‘avoir tenu des propos Francophiles.’88  Blin also stated that the deportees of Easter 
                                                 
79 Ibid., p.54, ‘Les Pessimistes.’ 
80 Ibid., p.11, ‘Chin qu’on vo’ pendant la guerre (Occupation de Lille par les Allemands).’ 
81 Ibid., p.10-12; p.47-8. ‘Les Bochartes’ (5th August 1915); p.49, ‘A l’ Poubelle les Paillaisses à Boches.’ 
82 ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 1st February 1918 – poem entitled ‘Bonne Histoire (En Patois du Crû), 
Caroline au Ravitaillement,’ n.d., n.a. 
83 Alfred Dujardin, Lille captive 1914-1918.  Rimes et fantaisies (Lille, 1919). 
84 Abbe, A la guerre, preface, p.2. 
85 Bukowski, ‘Cambrai,’ p.79. 
86 ADN 9R225: Blin diary, 29th October 1915. 
87 Becker, Journaux, Degnitère diary, 14th July 1915, p.183. 






1916 sang the Marseillaise and Flotte petit drapeau whilst being evacuated,89 and a 
multitude of sources attest to such singing among evacuees, deportees and forced 
labourers across the Nord and beyond.90 
 
However, some people did manage to sing the Marseillaise unpunished, such as M. 
Caudrelier, a corrupt member of the local CRB of Râches.  He allegedly sang the 
Marseillaise not only in the presence of, but with the German secretary to the 
Kommandantur on 14th July 1916.91  This case was exceptional, and for the most part, 
‘Dans le contexte de l’occupation, La Marseillaise, comme L’Internationale, apparaît 
comme un chant séditieux.’92  Singing it expressed French pride and patriotism, in turn 
linked to a determination not to become simply a German-administered territory.   
 
A similar motive lay behind the resistance to the use of ‘German time’ (an hour ahead of 
French time), obligatory for all timekeeping devices from late 1914,93 further 
complicated by the introduction of Daylight Saving in April 1916.94  Some historians see 
this as a cornerstone of the ‘Germanisation’ of the occupied area,95 as well as a tactic of 
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humiliation,96 and it is likely that occupés shared such a view.  Indeed, this would explain 
the resistance that took place: Degnitère used French time in her diary, putting German 
time in brackets;97 Blin admitted that using German time would be better on a pragmatic 
level, but that it went against his patriotism.98  Such was the lack of conformity to this 
regulation that the Germans had to carry out visits to verify clocks,99 or stop people in 
the street asking them for the time – if they gave French time, they would be punished.100  
In order to avoid punishment but maintain resistance, Blin stopped the clock in his 
school altogether: ‘elle cessera de marquer l’heure.’101  By doing so, Blin and many others 
like him demonstrated patriotism and opposition to German rule. 
 
Trooping the Colour 
This sentiment was further expressed through the colours of the French flag, evidently a 
strong symbol of patriotism,102 a motif visible in occupation poetry – where occupés 
perceived French troops to be fighting for the ‘cher drapeau,’103 and Bochartes as 
betraying their flag.104  For résistante Louise de Bettignies, who refused to sing in 
German in a German prison, this was to betray the flag – symbol of all she stood for.105  
Such was the symbolic power of flags that a man from Escarmain was considered suspect 
by evacuated occupés because he presented the Kommandant with the German flag.106  
Flags were also used as a symbol of joy at the liberation, with populations waving French 
                                                 
96 Allender, Survivre, p.60-1. 
97 Becker, Journaux, Degnitère diary, 1st January 1915, p.168. 
98 ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 3rd May 1916. 
99 Ibid., 27th June 1916. 
100 Cottel, Wallers, p.50. 
101 ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 27th June 1916. 
102 Nivet, ‘Femmes,’ p.289. 
103 AML 4H291: Mlle Munch to mayor, 9th November 1918, contains a poem written in Pérenchies ‘en 
1916 contre les civils français et Belges [sic] faisant de bon grè [sic], des tranchées pour les Allemands.’ 
104 Labbé, A la guerre, ‘Les Bochartes’ (5th August 1915), p.47. 
105 Deruyk, Louise, p.204-5. 





and Allied flags to greet Allied armies.107  Quite where the flags came from is unclear, but 
some observers assumed that many hid them in the hope of victory.108 
 
On 22nd February 1915, Blin remarked: ‘Des femmes arborent la cocarde tricolore: 
bravade, exaspération, patriotisme?’109  Whatever the response, the effects of such actions 
were clear, as he noted three days later: ‘Cocardes tricolores, pour témoigner que les 
femmes françaises ont du cœur.  Froide & digne audace.  Ces nœuds épinglés un peu 
partout charment la vue: c’est ravissant & émotionnant à la fois: c’est de la franche 
manière française.’110  Two days later, Blin noted that a group of children comprising the 
‘“Sévignettes” se parent de rubans tricolores et chantent la Marseillaise.  Conséquence: 
M. L’Inspr primaire est appelé à la kmdntre.’111  Indeed, during the affaire des sacs period, 
the Germans became increasingly frustrated with such displays of French patriotism.  
Degnitère noted on 4th March 1915 that:   
Il passe à Lille 200 prisonniers français hirsutes […] Grande émotion chez 
les Lillois.  Les Lilloises portent maintenant ostensiblement la cocarde 
tricolore.  Cela déplaît aux Allemands qui prétendent que nous sommes 
sous leur domination; ils en arrêtent plusieurs.  Rassemblement; un soldat 
donne un coup de croisse dans la foule, d’où nouvelle effervescence.112 
 
The next day occupés were punished for crying ‘Vive la France,’ and by 6th March, all 
insignias were banned,113 as was the wearing of national colours in any form.114 
 
Yet on 24th March 1915, the Kommandant of Roubaix explained to the population, via a 
poster, that: 
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Jusqu’à maintenant j’ai toléré que des petits drapeaux aux couleurs 
nationales soient placés sur les tombes des soldats français et anglais. 
Ma tolérance a été remerciée de la façon suivante: Il y a quelques 
jours on a placé d’une manière provoquante [sic] et sans goût un drapeau 
tricolore de trois mètres de hauteur sur les tombes des soldats. 
J’ai puni les coupables ainsi que le conservateur du cimetière de 
peines d’emprisonnement et j’ordonne: 
Il est interdit de placer sur les tombes des soldats des objets 
quelconques aux couleurs nationales des puissances alliées contre 
l’Allemagne, par exemple des drapeaux, des rubans, des cocardes, etc.115 
 
This ban was enforced – that day, the conservateur and gardien of a cemetery in Roubaix 
were imprisoned for 3 and 5 days respectively for having left a French flag on the grave of 
French soldiers.116  By 14th July 1915, German measures appeared to be working, as Blin 
was lamenting that the ‘drapeaux tricolores restent cachés,’ despite the fact that he had 
seen ‘un “patriote” en chapeau montant!’117  Yet some ‘gamins se sont amusés à piquer de 
petits drapeaux tricolores sur des bouchons qu’ils ont ensuite lancés dans le canal.’118  
Numerous similar actions occurred.119  In Lille, a widowed cabatière hung two French 
flags from her building in May 1916, causing a French policeman to ask her to remove 
them.  She refused, so the policeman had to do so himself, and the Germans seized the 
flags.120   
 
Small, almost hidden, symbols were used to demonstrate allegiance to the Allied cause.  
In September 1915, Blin remarked: ‘Ceci fait plaisir à voir: les magasins de lingerie 
exposent à leur étalage des motifs pour broderies, porte-journaux, pelotes, etc avec 
l’effigie du roi Albert, de Poincaré, du gl [sic] Joffre, drapeaux & fleurs tricolores comme 
armements.  D’où & comment arrivent ces “blancs-la”?’121  Such actions continued 
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throughout the occupation.  As late as August 1918, Blin noted that bookshops were 
selling cards containing the French flag and a heart on them (the Catholic patriotic 
symbol), which people wore underneath their coats, occasionally showing them to 
French passers-by.122  Again, Catholic and Republican symbols could both be used to 
reinforce a sense of Frenchness and opposition to the occupiers.  Due to space 
constraints, the role of religion in resistance cannot be studied in detail, but this has been 
dealt with by others.123 
   
Nevertheless, as with some of the above cases, explicit displays of patriotism were mostly 
reserved for national and religious holidays, especially Bastille Day.  In Tourcoing, 
Le 14 juillet 1915 fut l’occasion d’une manifestation patriotique.  Chacun 
sortit vêtu de ses plus beaux effets et portant à la boutonnière les couleurs 
françaises.  Cette manifestation du souvenir et de l’espérance fut 
immédiatement interdite.  Tous alors remplacèrent les rubans tricolores 
par des fleurs naturelles.  Dépeindre la rage de l’occupant serait 
impossible, et amendes de pleuvoir.124 
 
This ‘état constant […] de rébellion latente, amena la Kommandatur à ordonner, le 18 
août 1915, la création d’une carte d’identité.’125  The following 14th July in Roubaix, 
there was a ‘Manifestation au cimetière: couronnes et bouquets sont déposés sur les 
tombes des soldats français et anglais – Quelques “patriotes” ont revêtu redingote et 
haute de forme.  Plusieurs jeunes filles se sont mises en tricolore, et c’est tout: la lassitude 
et le découragement sont trop profonds pour réagir.’126  That same day in Douai, flowers 
in the national colours were left on the tombs of French soldiers.127 
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On 1st November (La Toussaint) 1916, Blin attempted to place flowers on the graves of 
Allied soldiers.  He was forbidden from doing so, but noted that the tombs were already 
flooded with flowers.128  The graves of Allied servicemen were a focal point of patriotic 
expression, and by extension resistance to the Germans.  In January 1915, Blin 
successfully placed flowers on the graves of two British airmen, which were already 
‘couvertes de bouquets, de palmes, de souvenirs touchant témoignage de la pieuse 
reconnaissance de ceux à qui les aviateurs ont apporté des “nouvelles” au prix de leur 
existence, sublime sacrifice et bien émouvant.’129  The symbolism of the Allied dead was 
evident.  Funeral services were held for these servicemen,130 which combined grief and 
patriotism.  Indeed, in October 1916 the mayor of Lille refused to participate in a 
ceremony for killed German personnel unless the Germans offered to do the same for the 
tombs of killed French soldiers – which they did.131 
 
Living Allied soldiers also proved conduits for a certain type of resistance.  Many occupés 
greeted Allied prisoners of war marching through towns and villages – an event 
particularly frequent in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing,132 but not exclusive to these towns.133  
Many believed that the German goal was to demoralise the occupés, but the effect 
seemed reversed.  Occupés smiled at prisoners of war, shook their hands, gave them food 
and goods, shouted ‘Vive la France’ or ‘Vive l’Angleterre,’ even cried.  Such events were 
particularly commonplace in 1914 and 1915,134 causing the Germans to forbid these 
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actions and to punish contraventions135 – in Lille, during one night in March 1915 over 
400 people were arrested for this.136  However, the occupés continued to carry out these 
acts throughout the occupation,137 meaning that as late as May 1918 the Germans had to 
‘rappelle à nouveau à la population’ the list of restrictions concerning prisoners of war, 
the breaching of which was perceived as ‘résistance passive.’138  In August 1918, people 
were still engaging in and punished for such resistance.139   
 
The intent of these actions is clear: Trollin noted that a crowd surrounding Allied 
prisoners ‘manifeste violemment sa foi patriotique.’140  Even a German onlooker 
appeared to understand what was taking place: 
La Grand’ Place [sic] est barrée tout autour.  Les habitants se rassemblent 
par milliers.  Un bruit sinistre les a attirés de tous les quartiers de la Ville 
[…] Un frisson parcourt la foule […] 
Sur le balcon de la maison voisine, plusieurs dames tirent à la 
dérobée leurs mouchoirs et envoient aux prisonniers un salut discret… En 
bas, sur la place une Française au tempérament particulièrement ardent ne 
peut malgré le danger, maîtriser ses entiments [sic] patriotiques et crie 
d’une voix perçante: “Vive la France!”  On l’arrête.  La voilà aussitôt 
décontenancée; ensuite elle tente de résister.141 
 
Yet it may also be argued that the population was expressing a desire to boost the morale 
of the prisoners of war (which seemed to work),142 as well as a humanitarian impulse.  
Allied prisoners, especially Russians, in the occupied area were generally treated badly by 
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the Germans,143 despite German claims to the contrary.144  They were used for front-line 
forced-labour operations – as were German prisoners of war by the Allies145 – meaning 
the occupés frequently came into contact with them, experiencing their maltreatment 
first hand.  Consequently, perhaps the intent of the above actions was not resistance but 
compassion, although the two were connected: by showing compassion to Allied 
prisoners, the occupés expressed a desire for Allied victory, and humanitarian motives 
inextricably connected with their own understanding of the war – a war of civilisation 
against barbarism.  This compassionate resistance may be a forerunner to the 
humanitarian ideas underlining some of the resistance of the Second World War, as 
championed by Rod Kedward.146 
 
Resisting Requisitions 
The refusal of the occupés to hand over goods requisitioned by the Germans is well 
documented across occupied France and Belgium.147  It is difficult to establish the true 
nature and extent of this, as the acts were as hidden as the objects themselves – a 
common problem in studying resistance.148  Further, the intent behind such actions may 
not have been as heroic or patriotic as it might seem – some may simply have hidden 
goods out of a desire for survival or economic self-interest.  Others may have been 
engaging in the black market, and simply did not want the authorities (whether German 
or French) to find out.149  Yet these actions were understood, at the time and afterwards, 
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to represent a form of resistance – however problematic this may be.  Debarge sees the 
motives as a combination of economic resistance, a desire not to furnish goods which 
could be used against the patrie, and to preservation of property.150  This seems a likely 
explanation, as occupés perceived their non-compliance as a form of resistance, a means 
of withholding resources from the Germans.   
 
Such was the view of the Yerta sisters in the Aisne, who hid their mattresses so that ‘the 
enemy of France’ could not sleep on them.151  Similarly, in Wallers inhabitants left their 
mattresses out in the rain so that they would be unfit for use.152  In Tourcoing, many 
people sold items before they could be requisitioned,153 and one man said that he would 
rather hide his car than give it to the Germans.154  Indeed, Tourcoing in particular saw 
much resistance to requisitions.  Here, factory owner M. Sion hid cotton reserves for two 
years before being discovered,155 and hiding copper was commonplace156 – despite the 
mayor’s belief that the population should declare its goods given the professionalism of 
German search teams.157 
 
German efficiency meant that hiding places became increasingly rare as the occupation 
went on, but occupés still attempting to withhold goods from the Germans.  All over the 
Nord, as elsewhere,158 people refused German requisitions and concealed goods.159  Even 
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156 Ibid., p.145. 
157 ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 8th October 1917. 
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priests hid materials from the Germans.160  Despite the commonplace occurrence of such 
actions, this was not an easy task, often owing to denunciations161 and meticulous 
German search teams, as David Hirsch relates.162  It seems that many individuals 
managed to hide a small number of items, whereas others hid thousands of kilogrammes 
of goods – such was the case for M. Coquelet of Valenciennes, who hid 20,000kg of 
potatoes;163 or Ernest Lecopyer from Fourmies, who concealed 30,000kg of copper.164  In 
Roubaix, cloth worth two million francs had been hidden until March 1917.165  
However, few people succeeded in hiding goods for the duration of the occupation, and 
uncovering concealed items usually created a knock-on effect making further 
concealment more difficult.   For example, in January 1917, the discovery of hidden 
goods in some factory basements led to a massive search of all basements in Lille-
Roubaix-Tourcoing.166   
 
Those found guilty of withholding material were threatened with fines up to 1,000 
Marks and up to three months’ imprisonment.167  For those hiding military material, the 
penalty was more severe.168  These punishments were commonplace throughout the 
occupation,169 and certain individuals later received recognition from the French 
government for their suffering and patriotism, in the form of the Médaille des Victimes 
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de l’Invasion.170  Others were investigated171 and punished172 for their role in denouncing 
the owners of hidden goods. 
 
What is clear, then, is that many people sabotaged requisitions by hiding material and 
goods that they were supposed to declare.  Indeed, doing so seemed like a reflex action, 
the natural thing to do when asked to furnish the occupier with further resources.  
Numerous occupés thus put patriotic and/or material interest above their own self-
preservation, because they risked harsh penalties if caught.  In doing so, they forced the 
Germans to spend time and resources finding material. 
 
Passive Patriotism 
Many occupés expressed their patriotism throughout the occupation via the use of 
symbolic forms of resistance – from humour to hiding goods, and even more disparate 
actions not studied here.173  This patriotism was bound up in hatred of the ‘barbaric’ 
Germans and, due to the circumstances of the occupation and the importance of 
respectability, led inevitably to non-violent means of asserting opposition to the occupier.  
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Whilst not aiding the Allied victory or having any real military value, symbolic, ‘passive’ 
resistance allowed the occupés to retain their identity in their own no-man’s-land.  It 
allowed them to maintain and preach faith in the Allied victory, which remained 
widespread throughout the occupied area,174 despite the suffering experienced.175  It also 
provided a morale boost, and ultimately allowed the occupés to remain above all French, 
without resorting to the perceived ‘barbarism’ of their enemies.  In this way, a certain 
form of respectability was maintained.  This was cultural resistance, central to the 
occupied culture de guerre and to occupied life.  Understanding both mauvaise conduite 
and resistance highlights the complexities of the occupation experience. 
 
What might be perceived as more ‘active’ forms of resistance did exist, although these 
were even rarer, and were never as ‘active’ as those of the Second World War.  This is the 
subject of the final chapter of this section of the thesis. 
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III – Active Resistance (coups de poker, coups d’éclat) 
Active resistance here means actions more easily classified as resistance, often organised, 
and more evidently comprising a purposeful infringement of German rules than previous 
resistances.  Such acts were riskier, punishable by the harshest penalties.  They represent 
resistance as conceived by Debruyne or Becker.1  ‘Active’ resistance rarely meant armed 
or violent resistance,2 but it did mean aiding escaped Allied prisoners of war, involvement 
in espionage and escape networks, and clandestine publications, whose organisation and 
morale-boosting effects represent a crossover between symbolic and active resistance.  
Finally, explicit refusals to work for the Germans are also included; perhaps a 
controversial categorisation, but one justified by the severity of the punishment inflicted 
on those engaging in such actions, and the clear moral-patriotic choice made.  Active 
resistance is not devoid of symbolism or respectability, although there is an indescribable 
quality which makes these actions appear to some more obviously resistance than 
respectable or symbolic resistance.  Indeed, many of the acts studied here constitute the 
most commonplace examples of resistance cited and commemorated from 1918 onwards, 
even though they never involved more than a minority of occupés. 
 
Patriotic Publications and Clandestine Correspondence 
The clandestine press of the occupied Nord was miniscule compared to that of Second-
World-War France.3  Yet a handful of publications did exist in the Nord, the most 
celebrated of which resulted from a highly organised operation: in Roubaix, Abbé Pinte, 
industrialist M. Dubar, professor of Pharmacy M. Willot and other collaborators 
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fashioned an illegal radio receiver to pick up Allied transmissions from the Eiffel Tower 
(although they were not the only people to do so).4  This information was used from 
February 1915 to create a clandestine newspaper whose name changed many times – 
including La Patience, L’Oiseau de France, L’Echo de France and Le Journal des 
occupés… inoccupés.5  The publication lasted until the imprisonment of the editors by 
the Germans in December 1916,6 and according to one source the circulation was 250 
copies every month7 – mainly in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area, but sometimes copies 
reached Douai and even Belgian towns.8  It is impossible to know how many people read 
these publications.9  The full story of this journal is compelling, but due to space 
restraints cannot be covered here.10   
 
What can be studied, however, is its form and content.  Apart from some local news and 
Allied communiqués relating the international situation, there was a lot of overlap with 
symbolic resistance, as both humour and patriotism underlay the publication.  A frequent 
theme is the call for the occupés to remain dignified and patriotic: one issue of La 
Patience contains the slogan ‘Ce qui fait la grandeur de la Patrie, c’est la valeur morale de 
ses enfants.-  Soyons forts, soyons généreux, pour faire une France plus forte et plus 
généreuse encore!’  This is followed by a similar message: ‘Soyons forts.C’est [sic] devant 
l’épreuve que se révèlent les caractères et “nul ne se connaît tant qu’il n’a pas souffert.”’11  
The message preached is clearer in the following issue, the front page of which contains 
the following quotation underneath the title: ‘Savoir montrer, autour de soi, malgré les 
tristesses de l’heure présente, une patience inlassable, une invincible confiance, c’est servir 
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modestement mais non sans grandeur les intérêts de la Patrie.’12  This slogan is found in 
other issues,13 demonstrating the way in which suffering was turned into martyrdom and 
heroism, as well as the importance of respectable conduct.  The tagline changed along 
with the paper’s name: in November 1915, La Liberté had under its title, ‘Souffrons en 
silence avec confiance et patience en attendant l’heure de la délivrance qui sonnera 
bientôt.’14  For Becker, these calls to prudence demonstrated how the occupés wished to 
avoid extreme opposition to the Germans, and by doing so condemned German 
practices.15  This logic works well with my notion of respectability.  Indeed, this was the 
officially-sanctioned attitude – occupied populations were praised for their strength, 
endurance and patience, as the French President himself stated in Tourcoing on 21st 
October 1918.16   
 
Humour is visible throughout these publications.  In one issue a copy of an article 
entitled ‘Les Bavarois à Lille’ from a German-published paper is republished, with 
sarcastic underlining of incorrect facts.17  Another issue contains the tongue-in-cheek Ten 
Commandments of von Heinrich, such as ‘Après 5 heures ne sortiras/Sous peine 
d’emprisonnement.’18  Many other articles mocked the Germans and show contempt for 
their perceived barbarism.  Such is the case for a poem entitled ‘Occupation,’19 and the 
‘Silhouettes de Boches’ series.20  Humour was even added to editorial details and adverts.  
La Liberté noted that its administration and editorial board was located at the Banque de 
France which had become the German Wirtschaftsausschuss (economic committee) at 
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16 AMT H4A26: Tourcoing Libéré 17 Octobre 1918. Proclamation de l’Administration municipale.  
Visites: du Général Commandant des troupes britanniques, de M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres, 
de M. le Président de la République, ‘Allocution prononcée dans l’hôtel de ville de Tourcoing, le 21 
Octobre 1918, par M. le Président de la République, en réponse au discours de bienvenue M. 
Vandevenne, adjoint, faisant fonctions de Maire de Tourcoing,’ p.13-15. 
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Roubaix; its telegraphic address was said to be the Kommandantur of Lille.  In December 
1915, La Vérité gave a different location for its administration and offices: ‘Ne pouvant 
être un emplacement de tout repos, ils sont installés dans une cave automobile.’  
Regarding the ‘annonces,’ the paper stated: ‘Les affaires étant nulles sous la domination 
allemande, nous conseillons à nos clients de réserver leur argent pour des temps 
meilleurs.’21 
 
Certain mock adverts highlight those places where the Germans were welcomed too 
readily.  The description of the Taverne Royale in Lille is demonstrative: ‘Débauche 
soignée, préparée, malaxée et épicée par des mains maquillées à la française.  Très 
hospitalière aux allemands [sic].  Tarif gradué pour soldats, sous-officiers et officiers, 
même supérieurs.  Dépouillement complet des scrupules, des dignités, des pudeurs et des 
troncs.’22  The female owner of the Taverne was even investigated by French authorities 
after the war for intelligence avec l’ennemi, and that copy of La Vérité used as evidence.  
It is not clear what the investigating authorities’ conclusions were, but the 
documentation suggests that she was guilty.23   
 
The journal’s attitude towards the Taverne is representative of a wider tonal shift in late 
1915, with anger and disgust at the Germans and those engaged in mauvaise conduite 
sitting prominently alongside positive patriotism.  By December 1915, La Verité not 
only published the mock adverts above, but also contained a lengthy article criticising the 
‘immondes femelles’ of its title, in which the following line was repeated: ‘Ah! les viles; les 
dégoûtantes, les immondes femelles!!!’24  Similarly, the previous month in La Liberté, the 
original call to patience was accompanied by a call for shaming: 
en attendant la délivrance prochaine que chacun fasse son devoir en 
dénonçant au moment voulu toutes les personnes ayant eu des relations 
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avec l’armée allemande, qui ont favorisé celle-ci; toutes ces femmes et filles 
impudiques qui se sont données ou vendues aux prussiens, etc.  Prenez en 
note, aidez-nous à les démasquer, en attendant le jour prochain où nous 
pourrons faire justice.25 
 
The target of this resistance was thus not only the Germans, but also ‘tainted’ occupées – 
‘Dans notre prochain numéro nous donnerons la liste des filles et des femmes ayant eu 
des relations avec des soldats de l’Empereur.’26  It is unclear why this change took place – 
perhaps it was reflective of the reality of occupation, perhaps simply anger on the part of 
the editors at the fact that occupés had denounced the publication in May 1915.27 
 
Pinte, Willot and Dubar also urged people to resist German requisitions,28 as well as 
informing them of the risks of possessing a clandestine publication.  Readers were told to 
pass on copies, but eventually to burn them, relaying news verbally instead.  In order not 
to endanger the population, and to fool the Germans, the publications stated that they 
were published outside of occupied France.29  Some copies even bore a rubber stamp 
stating that they had been dropped by airmail.30  These details31 are impressive given the 
extreme difficulty in publishing this work in a period of shortages and paper requisitions. 
 
Such precautionary measures were ultimately vain: the Germans dismantled the 
organisation, and the main collaborators were condemned in April 1917, with Pinte, 
Willot and Dubar sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.32  There can be no doubt that 
these men saw their actions as patriotic resistance – Pinte is alleged to have said, just 
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before his sentence, ‘La mort sur les champs de bataille, la mort ici…, [sic] c’est toujours 
pour la France.’33  Freed at the Armistice, by 1922 Pinte and Dubar had been nominated 
for the Légion d’Honneur (Willot had died in 1919 as a result of his imprisonment).34  
All three eventually received this honour,35 and other collaborators were nominated for 
various awards.36  L’Oiseau de France had also received the Prix Buisson from the 
Académie Française in 1920.37  Indeed, so well known were their exploits that they were 
parodied in Invasion ’14.38    
 
Despite the German dismantling of the Patience network, its resistance was relatively 
successful.  Access to news from the outside world had a great, positive impact on the 
occupés.  Blin noted in January 1915 that ‘Le baromètre moral, remonte, remonte, 
changement d’impression dû à l’arrivée des derniers journaux qui ont franchi le front.’39  
In March 1915 he had been given a copy of the Journal des occupés… inoccupés,40 and 
in late July he found a copy of L’Hirondelle de France in his letterbox.  He followed the 
instructions carefully: ‘Il est recommandé de la brûler après lecture.  Je brule donc, et 
c’est avec une sorte de religieux respect que je regarde la feuille se consumer.’41  In May 
the following year, Blin wrote that ‘L’“oiseau de France” messager aérien nous apporte 
dans ses îles la vérité & le réconfort.  Sois le bienvenu, vaillant oiseau!’42  It is unclear, 
however, whether Blin meant the publication L’Oiseau de France, or whether he was 
using the term as a nickname for French planes dropping Allied publications – a 
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commonplace event during the occupation, and the subject of Mousseron’s 1917 poem 
‘L’Osiau [sic] d’ France.’43  Either way, the confidence-inspiring effect of both resistance 
and Allied papers is clear.  The municipality of Tourcoing certainly valued the 
publication – in its response to the Commission Historique du Nord’s post-war 
questionnaire on the occupation, it described La Patience as ‘l’œuvre admirable de 
propagande patriotique, jetée en plein milieu de la propagande germanophile pour 
ranimer notre foi sur l’avenir et vérifier nos espérances.’44  Indeed, such was the value of 
Allied or patriotic publications that rapatriés complained when planes stopped dropping 
these in their area.45   
 
After the arrest and sentencing of the Patience collaborators, there is little trace of other 
resistance publications apart from the aforementioned Les Vidanges.  As the title 
suggests, this publication focused entirely on naming and shaming those involved in 
mauvaise conduite, perhaps due to a potential lack of a wireless and thus a means to 
access news.  The name may also have been ironic, as some Lillois had misheard the 
name as ‘Vie d’Anges.’46  Its descriptions of suspect women contained deeply 
mysogynistic humour.  One woman was said to be an ‘Infecte personnage ayant de 
l’infection pour les boches… [sic] Femelle remarquable par sa laideur et ses nombreuses 
connaissances avec la pommade mercurielle.’  A list was given of ‘Quelques adresses où ils 
passent des scènes n’ayant d’exemples que celles de la race porcine.’47  Suspect individuals 
(mainly women) were thus not only named, but their addresses given.  Similar articles 
appeared in Belgian clandestine papers in 1917.48  It would seem that the aim of this was 
to encourage reprisals, mainly after the occupation, but perhaps also during.  Judging by 
the testimony of rapatriés, by March 1917 at least two issues of Les Vidanges had been 
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published,49 and people did remember those whose names appeared in it.50  The authors 
were allegedly two men, MM. Gabiot and Godinne, who had been imprisoned by March 
1917 following a denunciation.51  Interwar historian of Lille’s occupation, Pierre 
Baucher, incorrectly dated the publication as existing ‘vers 1915,’ but also demonstrated 
its infringement of respectable norms:  
Les auteurs crurent y devoir désigner, dans les termes les plus grossiers, les 
noms de ceux qui trafiquaient avec les Allemands, des femmes de tous 
rangs qui recevaient les ennemis, ainsi que les maisons où elles 
demeuraient.  Il faut dire, à l’honneur des Lillois, que cette ignoble feuille 
qui n’eut qu’une courte existence souleva leur réprobation, que la police 
allemande s’émut, découvrit et punit les rédacteurs de ces dénonciations si 
basses.52 
 
This resistance was unrespectable and not appreciated by everyone; both part of and 
transgressing the culture de l’occupé.  One could be unrespectable in upholding 
respectable norms, just as one could engage in resistance but also in mauvaise conduite. 
 
Clandestine publications did exist in the occupied Nord, but were very limited in scale 
and form compared to occupied Belgium.53  Others may have existed, but there is little 
evidence of this.  La Patience and Les Vidanges demonstrate that some small cases of 
organised resistance did take place, and emphasise the importance of humour and 
respectability within this opposition.  Unable to resist physically, some occupés organised 
this ‘résistance morale par écrit.’54  The intent of such publications was seemingly morale-
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boosting, via both mocking the Germans and contradicting their propaganda-laden 
news.55 
 
Patriotic publications appeared in other forms.  It was difficult, but not impossible, to 
access Allied or even German papers, offering precious news on war developments which 
differed from the propaganda of the Gazette des Ardennes.  Certain individuals, and 
occasionally employees of the mairie, translated German papers and distributed them 
among the population.56  Le Matin appeared relatively frequently because it was read by 
German officers,57 and French papers were dropped by Allied planes and balloons, 
including Le Cri des Flandres and Le Courrier de l’Air.58  However, access to such 
publications could be costly, often involving secret reading groups where one person 
would read the papers to a roomful of people, for a fee.59  Some occupés introduced 
French papers into occupied territory and distributed them freely, for which they were 
punished.60  This was clearly resistance to the German monopoly on information. 
 
So too was engaging in correspondence with unoccupied France or other occupied 
communes.  This was commonplace during the occupation, with the smugglers and 
passeurs carrying letters as well as goods; sometimes the Spanish ambassador transported 
letters.61  However, the number of letters sent and received diminished as the occupation 
                                                 
55Debruyne and Paternostre, La Résistance, p.18.  See also de Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.242. 
56 For example, in Lille, 62 Frenchmen (including the mayor) were permitted to receive French 
translations of German-language papers – see AML 4H29, passim.  For such translations, see AML 4H30 
and 4H60; ADN 9R753: Commissaire Central de Tourcoing to Prefect, 2nd February 1916; Trochon, 
Lille, p.121. 
57 ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 16th February and 28th March 1916.  
58 Trochon, Lille, p.117 and 121; NA WO106/45: Propaganda and Intelligence Schemes – Aerial 
dropping information to Agents, 1916-1920.  For example, on the week of 6th July 1918, in a sortie 
particularly focused on Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and Valenciennes, 4,985 copies of Le Courrier de l’Air 
were dropped by British planes. 
59 Trochon, Lille, p.122; Whitaker, Under the Heel, p.62-3. 
60 See, for example, AN F23/375: Récompenses Honorifiques aux Otages, Médaille de la Reconnaissance 
Française, Proposition en faveur de M. Vanlaton Eugène, from Lille, 3rd February 1921. 





went on, particularly after 1915.  Nevertheless, attempts continued62 – Whitaker even 
managed to engage in two-way correspondence with his mother in England.63  Other 
letters also arrived in France and England.64  The mayor of Lille was called in front of a 
German judge in August 1916 because his letter protesting against the enlèvements of 
April 1916 had been published in Allied papers.  When asked how his letter arrived in 
unoccupied France, he stated: ‘Je l’ignore.  Elle a pu filtrer peut-être par une lettre qui 
aurait réussi à passer ou bien elle a été emportée par une personne qui a évacué le 
territoire occupé.’65 
   
One avenue of transportation was thus via rapatriés.  This was also the case for a nine-
page typewritten letter from M. Bouqueniaux from Trélon, smuggled by Mlle Sol, in 
which he wrote: 
Que c’est bon d’envoyer des nouvelles vers la France, car nous ne 
comptons guère comme français depuis 30 mois, où nous sommes 
encerclés par une griffe de fer qui nous opprime et nous sépare du reste du 
monde.  Nous ne savons rien de ce qui se passe dans notre chère France 
[…]66 
 
The sense of engaging in an act of resistance via correspondence is palpable: 
le soir on est épié par des agents de police “Boche” qui passent pour 
écouter aux portes et aux fenêtres […] Vous voudrez bien excuser les 
fautes d’impression et d’orthographe, mais nous devons par instant cesser 
notre travail pour écouter si nous ne sommes pas surveillés, de sorte que 
nous sommes distraits.  La machine fait du bruit […]67  
 
                                                 
62 See ADN 9R716: German poster, Roubaix, 21st April 1915; ADN 9R719: German poster, 15th 
Febraury 1917; Trochon, Lille, p.116-17; Salome, ‘Valenciennes,’ p.72-3; Molina, ‘Les femmes,’ p.14; 
Bajart, ‘Les femmes,’ p.25. 
63 Whitaker, Under the Heel, p.63-4. 
64 ADN 74J223: Ministère de la Guerre – Etat-Major – 5e Bureau – Contrôle Postal Militaire, 23rd June 
1916; Le Temps, Le Figaro and Le Matin of 29th July 1916. 
65 ADN 9R822: Comparution de M. le Maire devant le Juge pour la publication, en France, de lettres de 
protestation contre l’évacuation forcée par l’Autorité allemande,’ 7th August 1916. 
66 ADHS 4M513: report nº881, 6th March 1917, M Bouqueniaux, from Trélon, to M Jourdain (Moulain 







Bouqueniaux’s actions were risky: people caught transporting or engaging in illicit 
correspondence were punished.68  In some cases, entire towns were chastised: Tourcoing 
was fined 20,000 francs in August 1915 because ‘de nombreux habitants s’étant livrés 
pendant des mois entiers et jusqu’à ces derniers temps à une correspondance illicite.’69  
However, individuals involved in these acts were not always unwavering patriots and 
resisters: occasionally women engaging in or suspected of mauvaise conduite trafficked 
correspondence,70 perhaps using their intimacy with the Germans to their advantage.  
One woman from Lille allegedly helped a French secret agent to transport letters between 
France and the occupied area, but was in fact working for the German secret service, 
giving the documents to the latter.71  Again in Lille, a network called ‘Radolpha’ 
transported correspondence, but its agents were considered suspicious by rapatriés.72  
Other methods existed: in January 1915, the Kommandant of Lille complained that 
letters were being sent via Red Cross personnel, via prisoners of war, or even via German 
officers.73  
  
This correspondence undoubtedly raised the morale of the occupied population, 
providing a much-needed link to the outside world and circumventing German 
dominance.  The defiance represented by such letters can be exemplified by Blin’s diary 
entry of January 1915: ‘Affiche verte: Herr Kmdt nous informe que toute 
“correspondance entre les pays occupés et l’intérieur de la France est formellement 
                                                 
68 See, for example, Becker, Journaux, Hirsch diary, 21st November 1915, p.256; ADN 74J224: Trollin 
diary, 6th August 1915; ADN 9R745: German poster, Roubaix, 21st April 1915, and Tourcoing, 24th 
August 1915; ADN 9R716: German poster, Roubaix, 20th September 1915; ADN 9R227: Inspecteur 
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ADN 9R719: German poster, Roubaix, 15th February 1917; ADHS 4M513: report nº684, 6th February 
1917(Maubeuge) and nº503, 17th January 1917 (Solesnes). 
69 ADN 9R745: German poster, Tourcoing, 12th August 1915. 
70 See, for example, ADHS 4M513: report nº1031, 16th March 1917.  Mlle Desfontaines from Lille, 
nicknamed ‘La Marquise,’ possessed great influence at the Kommandantur but also had ‘un service de 
correspondance organisé entre Lille et Bruxelles.’  See also ADHS 4M513: report nº971, 13th March 
1917. 
71 Ibid., report nº965, 12th March 1917.  
72 Ibid., nº1185 and 1199, 23rd April 1917. 





défendue”.  Piaule piaule!  La correspondance continuera.’74  By proving that the 
Germans did not have complete control, and providing information and occasionally 
mirth, clandestine publications and correspondence reinforced the confidence of the 
occupés and thus constituted non-violent resistance. 
 
Avoiding Work 
Non-acquiescence to German demands for workers has already been mentioned.  Here, 
the frequency and extent of such actions will be outlined.  Refusing to work for the 
Germans comprised active resistance because of the choice being made, the open defiance 
it represented, and the punishments incurred.  Further, in some cases refusal to work led 
people to hide from the Germans in a manner not too dissimilar to maquisards of the 
Second World War. 
 
Refusal to work is considered one of the most widespread phenomena of the occupation.  
Becker states that ‘Par patriotisme, le refus du volontariat fut massif,’75 and argues that in 
all occupied zones inhabitants refused to work for the enemy’s war effort, sometimes 
leading to forced labour.76  Yet obligatory work posed new problems, proving 
considerably harder to resist, with most refusals carried out in vain.77  Thus whilst the 
phenomenon of refusal was widespread, it was mainly limited to the early occupation;78 
later, instances never involved more than a handful of individuals at a time.  This is not 
surprising given the brutal treatment of those refusing to work.  Normal practice 
involved imprisonment – accompanied by a diet of bread and water or complete 
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76 Ibid., p.176. 
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78 Isolated incidents of mass refusal did continue.  For example, in March 1916 the Kommandantur of 
Lomme punished the commune for refusals to fabricate fences.  AML 4H121: Prefect to Kommandant of 





deprivation of food79 – threats and actual cases of shooting,80 beatings,81 and general 
maltreatment and torture.82  The most infamous practice was the use of fields and the 
‘poteau’: men were forced to stand – or were tied to a post – in a field and left for hours 
on end, often in cold or wet weather, sometimes naked or in their underwear.  They were 
taken in again once they agreed to carry out work, usually signing an engagement of 
voluntary work.83  It was reported in 1917 that at Saint-Saulve, 16-year-olds experienced 
this, and with every continued refusal to work, the wire attaching them to the post was 
tightened.  Most only gave in ‘après avoir eu les mains en sang.’84  Many were sent to 
work on the trenches or other front-line duties as further punishment,85 mirroring the 
treatment of Allied prisoner-of-war forced labourers.86 
 
Despite this, some small-scale refusals did take place, even if only temporarily.  This was 
the case in Templeuve, where in early July 1916, the Germans established a munitions 
depot, and ordered the municipality to provide 18 workers.  The municipality refused, so 
the Germans responded with threats and demands for 30 workers.  Faced with another 
refusal, the Germans forcibly rounded up men on 22nd July, threatening to shoot those 
                                                 
79 ADHS 4M513: report nº519, 18th Janaury 1917 (Sous le Bois); nº524, 18th January 1917 (St-Rémy-
du-Nord); nº491, 16th January 1917 (Somme/Nord); nº481, 16th January 1917 (Roisies); ADN 9R252: 
‘Déclaration du Pupille PIVION Emile […],’ n.d. 
80 ADHS 4M513: report nº481, 16th January 1917 (Roisies); ADN 9R698: ‘Jeudi 14 Juin.  Dourges.  Rue 
de Fives’; Bukowski, ‘Cambrai,’ p.73. 
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H4A32: Adjunct to mayor of Bondues to mayor of Tourcoing, 1st July 1915; ADN 9R252: ‘Déclaration 
du Pupille PIVION Emile,’ and Directeur de la Colonie de St Bernard to Prefect, 30th July 1916; 
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Maubeuge were said to have been tortured.  See also Redier, Allemands, p.271. 
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Maubeuge and other areas in the Nord.  See ibid., report nº773, 19th February 1917; nº780, 20th 
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Police of Denain to Sous-Préfet of Valenciennes, 24th December 1918, p.9-10. 
84 ADHS 4M513: report nº737, 14th February 1917. 
85 Ibid., report nº551, 19th January 1917 (Hirson); nº548, 19th January 1917 (Leval).  





who resisted.  Among these men were Louis Delebassée, Lucien Dhélin and Etienne 
Martin, and these three ‘opposèrent à toutes les tentatives d’embauchage la résistance la 
plus formelle.’  They were imprisoned; Delebassée was released after a week due to 
illness, but for 39 days ‘on expérimenta sur Martin et Dhélin toutes les trouvailles les plus 
ingénieuses de la répression allemande, sous forme de “prison dure” et de “prison 
noire”.’87  In November 1916 the mayor of Templeuve asked the Prefect to inform the 
French government of their ‘courageuse attitude.’88  The mayor had also aided Martin by 
providing him with an ID card and a job, with the hope of ‘le mettre à l’abri du racolage 
de la main d’œuvre.’89  
 
Further, another man had responded to the first call-up by hiding in the countryside, 
remaining untraceable for six weeks.  The mayor believed that these four men honoured 
the commune by their ‘salutaire exemple de la résistance,’ even though three of them 
eventually gave in to ‘l’engrenage allemand.’  Everyone else around them contented 
themselves with the notion of ‘l’inanité de la résistance’ and passivity, and often criticised 
the four.  Out of a sense of duty, these men risked life and liberty, ‘Et ce fait tout simple 
et [sic] malheureusement assez rare pour mériter d’être signalé.’  The mayor believed that 
Martin was the only man ‘de notre petite région’ who resisted victoriously, derserving to 
be especially honoured – he should receive compensation from the government when the 
time came.90 
 
The rarity of attempted resistance to forced labour, and the even less commonplace 
occurrence of successful resistance, is evident.  In May 1917, another refusal occurred in 
Templeuve.  76 women were asked to work on German trenches; all refused, agreeing 
instead to work on agricultural tasks.  However, two sisters refused ‘poliment, mais 
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catégoriquement’ to work for the Germans in any form at all.  They were threatened with 
deportation to Germany, but this was not carried out.  The Germans confined the 
women to the outskirts of the town, trying for nine days to get them to engage in other 
tasks: ‘L’offre des travaux de jardinage les plus bénins rencontra auprès d’elles une 
résistance souriante, mais irréductible.’  The new Kommandant (‘un fort brave homme’) 
facilitated – initially – a more positive conclusion: 
Ne pouvant reculer, puisqu’il avait reçu ses ordres, mais hésitant à prendre 
les grandes mesures, intérieurement obligé d’autre part d’admirer le rare 
esprit de devoir de ces jeunes filles, il proclama une fois de plus qu’en 
temps de guerre le travail est une règle ne souffrant aucune exception.  
Mais il finit par nous concéder qu’à l’extrême rigueur, si elles étaient 
employées par la commune, on pourrait fermer les yeux tout en affirmant 
que le principe était sauf.91 
 
This was a temporary ‘salut’ for the women, who stated their logic: “Du moment où c’est 
pour des Français, nous serons balayeuses de rues, si on nous le demande.”  They did this 
for five weeks, but ‘Malheureusement certaines femmes, sans avoir apporté les mêmes 
risques ou tenté aucune résistance, envièrent leur indépendance relative.’  This led to a 
denunciation on 28th June during a roll-call of ouvrières, who said that ‘elles se mettraient 
en grève si ces 2 personnes n’étaient pas contraintes au travail pour les allemands [sic].’  
The next day, the sisters were imprisoned and ‘condamnées au pain sec et à l’eau.’  Their 
philosophical response was: “On ne meurt pas pour manger du pain sec et boire de 
l’eau.”  Poor conditions led to one of them becoming seriously ill.  They eventually 
appeared before a Conseil de Guerre, where other occupés labelled them as ‘meneuses.’  
One was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment and a 5,000-Mark fine, the other to a 
2,500-Mark fine.  Once again, the mayor asked that these individuals receive recognition 
and compensation after the liberation.92  No evidence of such compensation has been 
discovered. 
 
                                                 






However, compensation was forthcoming for at least 27 Nordistes from various 
communes,93 demonstrating the geographical scope but also the infrequent occurrence of 
this resistance.  Nevertheless, refusing to work for the Germans was the most common 
reason for awarding a medal and/or financial compensation after the war.  Also, some 
individuals were awarded the same compensation for being forced to work, rather than 
refusing to work.94  Further, not all mayors were as accommodating as the mayor of 
Templeuve: the mayor of Saint-Rémy-Chaussée allegedly denounced a man who refused 
to work for the Germans and escaped from German labour.95 
 
The reasoning behind refusals echoes that of notable protests.  One forced labourer wrote 
to his ‘Chère Julie,’ telling her: ‘Plutôt la mort que de faire des tranchées.  Nous sommes 
ici 500 civils lillois.  Pas de traître parmi nous.’96  Another wrote to his mother in June 
1917: 
Ce matin ils nous ont fait lever à 3 h. 15 et partir à 4 h. 15 pour aller 
travailler aux tranchées mais nous avons refusé, mais ils ont mis dans les 
trous 1 heure car, chère mère, je ne veux pas travailler pour tuer mes 
frères; ce soir ils vont nous donner des feuilles pour signer, mais nous 
allons répondre non.97 
 
Not everyone withstood the pressure – another forced labourer, evidently distraught, 
wrote that he and his comrades had been forced to build trenches ‘pour tuer nos pères, 
nos frères et nos cousins.’98 
 
Yet for non-forced labourers, even absence from work was seen as a hostile act against the 
German army, punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment.99  A clear-cut refusal to work 
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awarded the Médaille des Victimes de l’Invasion, 3rd class. 
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was punished by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 Marks, as those in 
Tourcoing who attempted to prevent men from working in June 1917 were reminded.100  
Some went beyond temporary absenteeism, however, opting instead for a life in hiding to 
avoid having to work for the Germans.  Van der Meersch’s character Alain did just this, 
and faced the wrath of fellow occupés who were angry at him for provoking the Germans 
– eventually they denounced him,101 just as with the sisters from Templeneuve above or 
in other real-life cases.102  Writing in particular about these évadés, van der Meersch 
noted that: 
It was no unusual thing during the war to see young people deliberately 
outlaw themselves and, under the pressures of necessity, take to a life of 
novel and dangerous excitement as a result of which they got into bad 
company, became demoralised by long periods spent in German prisons, 
were corrupted, lost their social status, and sank beyond the hope of 
recovery, though their first step down the slippery slope took, more often 
than not, the form of an act of heroism.103 
 
Thus unrespectability, mauvaise conduite, and resistance were never completely separate 
from each other.  This life of adventure and heroism did exist, and at least 11 Nordistes 
were given medals for such behaviour after the war.  One man from Eppe-Sauvage 
successfully hid for three years; captured in July 1917, he was imprisoned for a year then 
sent to a forced labour battalion.104  He was nominated for the Médaille de la 
Reconnaissance Française, but was only awarded the Médaille des Victimes de l’Invasion, 
3rd class,105 which all 11 received.  Another man from Douai hid for two years,106 a 
Tourquennois for one,107 yet only two men remained undetected: one from Mouchin 
from February 1917 until the Armistice, another from Tourcoing from mid-1917 until 
                                                                                                                                                 
99 ADN 9R745: German poster, Tourcoing, 14th May 1915. 
100 ADN 9R746: German poster, Tourcoing, 28th June 1917. 
101 Van der Meersch, Invasion, p.47-8. 
102 ADN 2U1/446: CAN, nº71, 16th October 1922; Odor and Rigole, ‘Brassards rouges,’ p.25-6. 
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the Armistice.108  The remaining six hid successfully for at least a month each.109  
However ineffectual it was ultimately, resistance in the form of avoiding carrying out 
work for the Germans did occur; although this was always small-scale, usually individual, 
and was rarer than some have made out.   
 
Crossing the Line 
Civilians 
The weight of occupation, including being forced to work against one’s country, was too 
much to bear for certain individuals.  They took evasion a step further, and attempted to 
escape the occupied area entirely, mostly in order to join the Allied armies and aid the 
war effort.110  Such a response to occupation was fairly widespread, and occurred 
throughout the four years.  In Douai, in just two months of 1917, about 150-200 men 
succeeded in crossing the Belgian then Dutch borders, for which the town was 
punished.111  Apparently, a Jesuit priest helped these men, giving them false laissez-passer 
– he was responsible for aiding 500 men to get to Holland before being denounced and 
imprisoned.112  Denunciations of those involved in such resistance were relatively 
commonplace.113  Occasionally, the Germans used agents-provocateurs who claimed to 
be passeurs offering safe passage to Holland, only to arrest and imprison the men who 
took up the offer.  This led to the arrest of over 70 Frenchmen in Denain.114  However 
impressive such numbers may be, they never reached the heights of the Belgian analogue.  
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About 32,000 Belgians managed to reach the army of Yser via Holland,115 despite similar 
problems of denunciations116 – although they of course did not have as far a journey.  
 
Priests also played a role in Denain,117 and Cambrai, where in February 1917, ‘beaucoup 
de jeunes gens cherchent a [sic] regagner par la Hollande les lignes Françaises [sic]; ils 
voyagent la nuit.  A cet effet il existe une organisation secrète; ces jeunes gens se 
dissimulent le jour dans les presbytères et les prêtres les recueillent et facilitent leur 
évasion.’118  Holland was central to any escape – apart from one story of forced labourers 
at the front making their way towards the British during an advance119 – and was also 
one of the major territories for spies during the war.120 
 
German ordinances hint at an authority responding to and attempting to gain control of 
a genuine problem.121  In Valenciennes, a poster of October 1915 highlighted cases of 
attempted escape.  The German perception of the logic behind such attempts was ‘la 
crainte d’encourir, à la conclusion de la paix, des punitions sévères par les autorités 
françaises pour avoir manqué d’entrer, présentement au service de l’armée.’  The German 
authority stated that no military tribunal could legally or morally make such a 
judgement, and that it was ‘persuadée que l’intelligence et le bon sens de la population 
vont s’opposer énergiquement à ces idées erronées et déraisonnables et servir à empêcher 
toute tentative de se soustraire au contrôle dans l’intérêt même des contrôlés.’122  In 
reality, attempts to escape were probably motivated more by a genuine desire to join the 
French army or simply to reach unoccupied France, than by a fear of post-war French 
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judicial reprisals.  Some men may have felt it was their duty to at least try to join the 
army; other occupés occasionally looked down on those who had made no attempt.  
Rapatriés from Caudry bemoaned that with the number of mobilisables remaining there, 
two whole army divisions could be formed.123  Similarly, Blin noted in February 1918: 
Trop de mobilisables n’ayant pu réussir à quitter notre région ont accepté 
trop facilement une situation qui les mettait à l’abri des dangers de la 
guerre […] Le devoir était d’essayer de gagner l’Angleterre par la 
Hollande.  Passer ou être pris; les moyens n’ont pas manqué pour s’évader 
et beaucoup de “décidés” y sont parvenus.124 
 
Further sources suggest that leaving the occupied area was easier than might be 
expected.125  The Times reported that its own correspondent left occupied France via 
Belgium and Holland in December 1914, by bribing Germans.126  However, in 1917 
rapatriés from Valenciennes, Saint-Saulve and Anzin complained that the copies of Le 
Petit Journal and Le Matin which occasionally appeared in the occupied area sometimes 
detailed the ruses people used to escape.  These publications implied that doing so was 
easy, involving a simple bribe to German sentries.  The result was an increase in the 
number of sentries, thus making escape harder in reality.127  Indeed, a clandestine letter 
sent to London in 1916 stated that although many men attempted to escape to Belgium, 
only some succeeded – the rest were killed like rabbits, every week.128  This was true: in 
Douai, a man tried to leave the occupied area by dressing as a woman, but was shot dead 
at Hénin Liétard.129  A handful of people received (sometimes posthumous) honorary 
compensation from the French government after the war for such attempts.130 
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Those wishing to reach unoccupied France were aided by passeurs, as in the Second 
World War.131  These people were not always perceived as unequivocal resisters, and were 
often held in suspicion by the population, just as with fraudsters – some were 
fraudsters.132  This scepticism extended to non-occupied French authorities: M. Aliotte 
from Vieux-Condé had helped young men reach Holland during the occupation, and 
was subsequently nominated for the Médaille de la Reconnaissance Française after the 
war; his case was rejected, as despite his courageous conduct concerning such men, he 
had also been imprisoned for 15 months for theft!133  Others were considerably more 
respectable, such as Princesse Marie de Croÿ of Bellignies.134  Whatever their motives, 
these guides also helped to transport an even more dangerous ‘cargo’: Allied servicemen. 
 
Allied Servicemen 
Whether soldiers having lagged behind the retreat of 1914, escaped prisoners of war, or 
downed airmen, there were a surprising number of Allied servicemen who wanted to 
avoid the Germans in occupied France.  Such men had two options: remain in hiding 
until the end of the war, or attempt to return to Allied lines.  Often the two were 
combined, with servicemen hiding for a certain period and eventually escaping.  
Harbouring Allied servicemen – providing them with food, clothes, shelter, or medical 
care – and aiding them to escape was one of the most explicit forms of resistance.135  It 
was also one of the most risky: Allied servicemen behind German lines were supposed to 
give themselves up immediately, and the population had to inform the Germans of such 
men.  Any serviceman found in civilian clothes would be killed, and any civilian who had 
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aided them would be guilty of treason and punished accordingly.136  Nevertheless, many 
occupés did aid Allied servicemen – one of the most well known and commonly 
documented acts of occupation resistance,137 for which numerous archival sources 
provide evidence across the Nord.138  Unsurprisingly, communes closest to the front saw 
more examples of this, so many cases took place outside the Nord, especially in Saint-
Quentin.139  Clearly, for the Germans this was resistance, and many French people also 
recognised such acts as resistance or at least patriotic opposition.140  So too did the British 
and French governments both during141 and after the war.142  
 
Attitudes to Allied servicemen altered over time: in Douai, among the 20 soldiers in 
hiding was André Cochain.  Initially looked after by the Desplanque family, who had 
two sons at the front, he was treated like one of their sons.  He stayed with them until 
February 1915, when he feared denunciation by a woman who had five children at the 
front.  Consequently, he moved hiding places, staying with Mme Lévy.  For the first few 
months, she ‘fut très bonne pour lui, et secourait aussi les blessés et soldats français,’ but 
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soon ‘elle fit la connaissance d’officiers allemands; ceux-ci fréquentaient son salon et 
parfois restaient chez elle à une heure très avancée de la nuit.’  By mid-1916, after she 
had met with high-ranking Germans, including members of Kronprinz Ruprecht of 
Bavaria’s staff, Cochain no longer felt safe, and left without telling Lévy.143  This case 
highlights the blurred line between resistance and mauvaise conduite the occupés walked.  
It also suggests that as the occupation went on, a certain amount of complicity with the 
Germans may have been necessary for survival, thus resistance lessened. 
 
To facilitate the passage of Allied servicemen out of the occupied area, some created 
organised escape networks, precursors to those of World War II.  One of the most 
famous examples was the Comité Jacquet: based in Lille, its leaders were Eugène Jacquet, 
Georges Maertens, Ernest Deconnink, and Belgian Sylvère Verhulst.  These men aided at 
least 200 Allied servicemen, many of whom they also helped escape across the Belgian 
and Dutch borders.144  They carried out their actions with the knowledge and assistance 
of numerous other occupés, who kept their secret, provided shelter and food, or actively 
led men across the border.145  The downfall of the Comité was the ‘Mapplebeck’ affair: in 
March 1915, English aviator Corporal Mapplebeck was attacked and had to make a 
forced landing on the outskirts of Lille.  The Comité provided him with nourishment 
and shelter, eventually assisting him in escaping the occupied area.  Once returned to his 
unit, Mapplebeck went on a sortie over Lille and dropped a note, humorously thanking 
von Heinrich for his hospitality.  Mapplebeck was doubly foolish, as he had kept a diary 
during his time in Lille, and hid it in Jacquet’s house.146  He started a chain of events 
ending in the execution of all four members of the Comité on 22nd September 1915, and 
the arrest of over 200 others suspected of involvement.  Jacquet himself expressed shock 
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at the consequences of the Mapplebeck affair: ‘Jamais je n’aurais cru qu’une affaire qui 
m’était tombée par le hasard serait devenue aussi lourde et m’aurait amené de tels 
ennuis!’147 
 
The manner in which the Comité members faced their death demonstrates much about 
the intent of such resisters.  In a joint letter to their friends, the four men wrote: 
 Mes chers amis, camarades 
 Nous voilà au but!  Dans quelques instants nous serons fusillés. 
 Nous allons mourir bravement en bons Français, en brave Belge. 
 Debout!  Les yeux non bandés, les mains libres 
 Adieu à tous et courage 
 Vive la République 
 Vive la France.148    
 
They perceived their sentence as a sacrifice for France, highlighting the strength of their 
patriotism and the sense of duty which led them to carry out such actions.149  Yet within 
their actions there also lay an element of respectability, which Jacquet himself was keen 
to reinforce in his last letter to his wife and family: ‘Nous sommes acquittés du fait 
d’espionnage.  C’est assez juste.  L’ANGLETERRE aura donc à faire son devoir envers 
vous.’150  Jacquet also reinforced the vision of his actions as a duty to France: ‘LA 
NATION sera là, les Amis aussi, et tu pourras dire que ton Mari est mort comme un bon 
Soldat [sic] face à l’ennemi, sans avoir jamais tremblé!’151 
 
The population of Lille were informed of the execution via a poster.152  The entire affair, 
particularly the perceived heroic-sacrificial ending, had a profound effect on the 
population of Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, evidenced by the frequency with which diarists 
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mentioned these events.153  The German sentence was undoubtedly aimed to discourage 
a repetition of the Comité’s actions, but above all it made martyrs out of the four men.  
Suprisingly quickly, the story of the Comité reached beyond the occupied area,154 and by 
the end of the occupation it had become legendary (see the next chapter). 
 
A similarly celebrated case was that of Louise de Bettignies and her accomplices, such as 
Louise Thuliez,155 Léonie Vanhoutte,156 and many others157 – one estimate puts the 
number of collaborators at 80.158  De Bettignies was in fact working for and financed by 
both British and French intelligence,159 and created the service Alice,160 so called after her 
codename, Alice Dubois.  The service comprised an escape network, but she and other 
members also engaged in espionage, transmitting military intelligence such as train and 
troop movements to the Allies.161  Their network was more comprehensive than that of 
Jacquet, lasting longer, and succeeded in joining together two pre-existing networks.162  It 
was responsible for the successful escape of about 1,000 servicemen.163  The full story of 
de Bettignies and her network is fascinating.164  Like the Comité Jacquet, many members 
of de Bettignies’s network were eventually discovered and punished by the Germans.  De 
                                                 
153 ADN 74J241: Dumont papers, 12th and 27th July, and 22nd September 1915; ADN 74J225: Blin diary, 
22nd September 1915; ADN 74J224: Trollin diary, 24th September 1915; Becker, Journaux, Degnitère 
diary, 26th July and 22nd September 1915, and Hirsch diary, 21st September 1915, p.183, 186 and 244. 
154 The Times (14th and 18th February 1916). 
155 Louise Thuliez, Condamnée à mort (Paris, 1933); AML 4H78: L’Écho, 27th March 1919; McPhail, 
Silence, p.138-27; Thébaud, Femme, p.61-3. 
156 Antier et al., Espionnes, p.194 (spelt Van Houtte); Olivier Forcade, ‘L’espionnage féminin ou un 
nouvel héroïsme au combat en 1914-1918,’ in Trévisi and Nivet, Les femmes, p.368-9; Antoine Redier, 
La guerre des femmes: Histoire de Louise de Bettignies et de ses compagnes (Paris, 1930), p.33-65.  
Redier eventually married Vanhoutte – Deruyk, Louise, p.55. 
157 ADN 16J99: Memoirs de Madeleine Berroyer de November 1914 à Juin 1916; Molina, ‘Les femmes,’ 
p.19; Dejardin, ‘Tourcoing,’ p.46-7. 
158 Wallart, Nord, p.47. 
159 Deruyk, Louise, p.101. 
160 Known by the British as the ‘Ramble’ network: Antier et al., Espionnes, p.139. 
161 Ibid.; Wallart, Nord, p.47.  
162 Deruyk, Louise, p.60. 
163 Forcade, ‘L’espionnage,’ p.368-9. 
164 See Redier, La guerre; Deruyk, Louise; Antier et al., Espionnes, pp.138-42 and 194-5; Mauclère, 
L’Orage, p.66-9, 87, 107-8; Nivet, ‘Femmes,’ pp.293-6; McPhail, Silence, p.147-55; Thébaud, Femme, 





Bettignies herself was arrested in October 1915 and died in prison on 27th September 
1918,165 thus the many honours she received were posthumous.166  It is noticeable that 
many of these celebrated resisters were caught in 1915, after which active resistance was 
more difficult and thus less frequent. 
 
Some French escape networks tied in with Belgian ones.  Thus men aided in France by 
de Bettignies were helped further in Belgium by Edith Cavell167 – indeed, Thuliez 
worked with both women.  As such, patriotism for a single homeland may not have been 
central to the motivations of these resisters, although the Belgian-French border had 
always been a fluid one, and the wartime alliance further reinforced notions of shared 
identities.  
 
Not all occupés were willing to incur the risks involved in harbouring and assisting Allied 
personnel.  Many engaging in this form of resistance were denounced, which occurred in 
particular in Lille, Le Cateau, Roubaix, La Polie, Fourmies, and Haubourdin, and 
beyond the Nord.168  The Comité Jacquet had been denounced, and the suspected 
denunciator of Cavell may have been involved in damasking the service Alice.169  In 
Cambrai, the Directrice of the Hospice Général helped 100 French soldiers return to 
France, but was denounced by two Frenchmen and a French woman, and condemned to 
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ten years’ imprisonment.170   Some may have denounced others out of fear of German 
reprisals if they discovered the men themselves.  Others may have wanted to win German 
favour, to improve their personal situation, or to enact vengeance.  These denunciations 
had severe consequences, including the death penalty for the denounced.171  
Consequently, some denunciators were punished after the war.172   
 
What was the overall intent behind, and effect of, harbouring Allied personnel and 
escape networks?  Given the high numbers of men killed in Western Front battles, the 
number of Allied servicemen – or potential servicemen in the form of civilian males – 
who successfully escaped the occupied zone seems relatively small, and it is questionable 
whether their presence in the Allied military would have turned the tide of battle.  
However, in aiding such men, occupés asserted their patriotism, their humanitarianism, 
their willingness to defy the Germans, and their wish for an Allied victory.  They also 
adhered to their principles, reconfiguring their moral-patriotic compass so that for them 
their actions were always justified, falling within respectability, much like the belligerents’ 
very genuine belief that they had ‘right’ and law on their side.173 
 
Returning soldiers to Allied lines was a minor moral-patriotic victory which occupés 
linked inextricably to the Allied victory.  There was, for this and other forms of 
resistance, a non-military value to the actions, which could take on new meanings in the 
inter-war period.  However, for some, like de Bettignies, the victory was even more real 
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Espionage and Allied Secret Services 
The Allies were naturally interested in the information that occupés could provide them, 
and subsequently recruited numerous people like de Bettignies, often refugees and 
rapatriés sent back to their locality.174  In occupied France and Belgium (and 
Luxembourg), 6,000-6,400 individuals worked for Allied secret services in espionage and 
escape networks.175  Most operated in Belgium but some, like members of La Dame 
Blanche, crossed into the Nord.176  Each ‘service’ contained about 20-30 people, with the 
largest ones working for the British,177 although there was considerable competition for 
recruitment among Allied secret services, even among the various branches of the British 
intelligence services.178    
 
Yet it was not easy to recruit people to engage in activity ‘aussi déconsidérée que 
l’espionnage.’179  The occupés were, as ever, concerned with social respectability, and to 
enter into these services, the pejorative connotation of espionage had to be removed.180  
Both occupied and non-occupied French people during the war (especially in 1914) 
experienced spy-mania, a psychosis about spies, epitomised by the Mata Hari affair.181  
The French Secret Service collected considerable documentation on suspected spies 
during the war.182  For many, a gendered understanding of espionage meant it was seen 
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as feminine and negative,183 relying on seduction and betrayal.  Indeed, many spies 
during the war were female, especially agents in the occupied area, and it was not 
uncommon for them to be labelled by certain people as prostitutes, among other 
typologies.184  The perception of ‘loose’ women and prostitutes as potential spies by 
fellow occupés has already been mentioned; the occupied populations differed little from 
their free compatriots in this respect.  However, the idea of a traitorous spy like Hari was 
accompanied by that of a patriotic spy, or spy-martyr,185 such as Marthe 
Richer/Richard.186  Still, those working for the British in occupied Belgium wanted to be 
recognised as soldiers, not ‘vulgar’ spies,187 echoing somewhat the sentiment of Jacquet’s 
last letter.  Tammy Proctor argues that, given that female espionage was portrayed as a 
hidden evil tied to sexuality, after the war female Allied agents in the occupied territories 
were largely forgotten because they fit neither the ‘horizontal collaborator’ nor the 
‘martyred victim’ label.188  Olivier Focarde agrees that such women were seen as victims 
first, then resisters.189  Male agents faced fewer questions as to their motives and 
respectability, and although many men did engage in espionage, the understanding of 
spying as mainly feminine lasted throughout the occupation. 
 
The initial decision to engage in espionage for the Allies represented a desire to 
contribute in some way to an Allied victory and subsequent liberation of their homeland.  
Some agents working for the Allied secret services were paid, whereas other refused to 
accept money except operational costs.190  Motives varied from a sense of adventure, 
financial gain, a certain freedom (especially for women), to patriotic, religious and moral 
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conviction.191  Agents in the occupied area were perceived by the British to have been, 
generally, working for patriotic reasons; and they hailed from diverse social classes, from 
priests and gendarmes to seamstresses, smugglers, and railway officials.192  These agents 
were trained and sent to occupied France and Belgium via balloons and parachutes.193  
Their job was observation: watching railway lines,194 and noting down information on 
military units.  Many other occupés, probably at the instigation of Allied agents, engaged 
in this task, including entire families taking shifts at observation posts.195   
 
In the Nord, it is hard to evaluate the total number of people who engaged in this 
resistance, but there is evidence of Allied agents and espionage networks operating 
here.196  In June 1915, Blin allegedly spoke with a French secret agent,197 which seems 
probable.  For example, agents Lefebvre and Faux had been dropped by the British at 
Vieux-Condé by balloon on the night of 26-7th February 1917.  They sent a pigeon back 
on the 27th asking for more pigeons, but the RFC could not fulfil the request due to bad 
weather conditions.198  In the meantime, according to a rapatrié, Lefebvre had given 
many women of Condé news of their mobilised husbands.  One local woman denounced 
him, but Lefebvre himself ‘was not very audacious, and when arrested, soon confessed 
and denounced his accomplice.’199  Like all belligerents, the Germans took espionage very 
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seriously,200 thus both Levebvre and Faux were condemned to death, and executed on 
31st January 1918.201   
 
Another death was that of British agent Jules Bar, a miner from Trith-Saint-Léger, near 
Valenciennes.  Captured after jumping from a British plane, he was executed on 26th 
June 1917.  In his last letter, Bar noted that he left behind other members of his 
network, and echoed the sentiments of Jacquet: ‘Je mourrai sans peur, car je crois avoir 
fait mon devoir […] Je marcherai au poteau sans faiblesse, car je veux faire voir aux 
Allemands comment un Français sait mourir pour sa Patrie.’202  It is not clear whether 
Bar’s network survived him. 
 
Janet Morgan argues that none of the agent-balloonists sent into France by the British in 
December 1917 and January 1918 had been able to set up a network, and many died.203  
Such plans included the creation of a service ‘L.L.’ to monitor railway movements on the 
line Sallaumines-Billy-Montigny-Hénin-Liétard, and the line Lens-Beaumont-Douai.  
This information was to be transmitted to GHQ.  A similar ‘service G.G.’ for Hénin-
Liétard was to be created.204  It is not known if these plans came to fruition.  
Nevertheless, after the war, the British I(b) considered such networks to have been 
extremely useful: ‘This information was of vital importance in drawing up the enemy’s 
order of battle.  It had a direct effect on the operations and movements of our own 
forces, and became therefore the first objective of out Secret Service.’205  Despite such 
praise, it is unlikely that this resistance actually turned the tide of any battles, given the 
nature of trench warfare. 
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In Lille, Belgian teenager Léon Trulin and his friends photographed military installations 
and passed on the information to the Allies.206  Denounced by a friend, Trulin was 
executed on 8th November 1918.207  As with the Comité Jacquet, Trulin’s case became 
rapidly well-known, seen as emblematic of occupation resistance:208 Martin-Mamy 
described him as ‘un soldat sans uniforme.’209  Other Nordiste agents were decorated by 
the British government.210  Some were punished by the Germans – although not all were 
genuine spies211 – for transmitting information to the Allies and were thus later rewarded 
by the French government.212  Spying was therefore reconfigured from a dishonourable 
action to a respectable one worthy of official praise, although the local populations rarely 
expressed their opinion on Allied spies.  The aid they offered such agents during the 
occupation suggests that they had accepted Allied intelligence operations as legitimate, as 
opposed to treasonous, unrespectable, pro-German spying.  However, lacking the 
performative aspect of respectable resistance, espionage could never be as widespread or 
acceptable as the former. 
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Useful information was usually transmitted back to the Allies via carrier pigeons, which 
had been parachuted into the occupied area.213  The British Secret Service in particular 
put a lot of effort and resources into methods of transporting pigeons and agents into 
occupied France and Belgium.214  From March 1917, in certain localities pigeons were 
dropped on a regular basis, depending on the weather.  This was the case in Vieux-
Condé, Valenciennes and Douai.215   
 
Beyond exchanging information with designated agents, another form of resistance born 
out of the static fronts of trench warfare was created.  From early 1917 in the ‘Pigeon 
Dropping Stunt,’ the British sent questionnaires asking the occupés to detail information 
on military units and movements (see Fig. 9).  The questionnaires were to be returned by 
pigeon or, from early 1918, by inflatable balloons dropped with them.216  The Germans 
were aware of these questionnaires, but this did not dissuade everyone, and certain 
Nordistes were punished for espionage involving carrier pigeons.217  Many completed the 
questionnaires: indeed, so confident were the British that they were concerned about 
adding instructions informing the occupés to disguise their handwriting in case of 
discovery by Germans.  Yet they did not wish to dissuade occupés from responding.218  
Their French collaborator responded that: 
As far as the Flemish population are concerned the question of disguising 
the handwriting is not of so much importance, but I know how much the 
French people are fond of glory, and, unless they are warned, I am afraid 
some of them will be sticking their names to the bottom of the message 
just to show how they are trying to help their country.219 
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These fears were well-founded.  A man from Valenciennes completed a questionnaire, 
which was intercepted by the Germans; he was discovered and killed.  In 1928, the town 
erected a monument in his honour.220  The only message successfully retrieved from the 
balloon system was found on a German wire during a British raid – and the sender had 
‘been indiscreet enough, in spite of definite instructions to the contrary, to sign her full 
name and address.’221  At least three people from Nomain were killed in October 1917 
after their completed questionnaires were discovered, one of which was ‘imprudemment 
signé.’222  These deaths meant that it was not the Germans who ultimately prevented 
further information from being transmitted, as the British noted: 
No measures which the enemy thought fit to adopt in occupied territory 
were capable of preventing either the despatch of the balloons or the 
picking up of the pigeons and subsequent despatch of the information by 
the inhabitants.  Many of them unfortunately were shot, but this in no 
way deterred others, although we were later asked by the French 
Government to desist for a period from putting this operation into 
practice.223 
 
Nevertheless, the consequences of successfully transmitting information were sometimes 
spectacular.  In Wallers, on 6th August 1918, an airdropped pigeon was found with a 
letter asking for the occupés to provide militarily important information.  It was passed 
among the inhabitants until someone knowing relevant details was found – this person 
noted that at Lourchies there was a depot of numerous munitions trains.  A farmer sent 
the pigeon back, and just four days later Allied planes bombed the depot, destroying it 
completely.  The two men were decorated after the war for their actions.224  In general, 
I(b) was surprised by the results of the ‘Pigeon Dropping Stunt.’  It had predicted a 5% 
return of questionnaires, but on average received 40%, sometimes more.  The 
information ‘in most cases was of a very high order and had the advantage of being fresh 
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and rapidly transmitted.  For instance, the balloons were usually despatched at about 11 
o’clock at night and many of the messages were received at 9 o’clock the next 
morning.’225  The official British history of carrier pigeons in the war also attests to the 
success of the scheme and the valuable information provided,226 as do French Deuxième 
Bureau documents.227  Many occupés, including Nordistes, therefore engaged in this 
resistance: which explains the monuments to the carrier pigeons of the war still standing 
in Lille and at Le Cateau.228 
 
The Tip of a Small Iceberg 
Many other forms of active resistance took place across the Nord, from relatively rare acts 
of sabotage,229 to frequent fabrication of documents (mainly ID cards and laissez-
passer).230  Although never more than the actions of a minority within a minority, most 
forms of active resistance represented a desire to oppose German cultural and military 
control, to improve the morale of fellow occupés, to remain in contact with the outside 
world, and to participate in the war effort.  Even within the morally suspect world of 
active resistance, many remained convinced that they were doing the right, the 
respectable thing, and balked at any suggestion otherwise.  Active resistance, by never 
comprising armed resistance, retained an air of respectability for many, but perhaps that 
was simply self-justification.  For those participating in it, it was a duty, an honourable 
means of joining the war effort and increasing the chances of Allied victory – or at least 
decreasing the possibility of a German one.  The overall effects of active resistance, or of 
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any of the forms of resistance studied, are difficult to judge, but resistance in this 
occupation certainly provided a blueprint for that of 1939-45.231 It also allowed the 
occupés to maintain their identity, and to give them a sense of purpose.  As resister curé 
Delattre said, ‘Je suis prêtre plus que jamais; je suis Lillois plus que jamais; je suis 
Français plus que jamais.’232  Resistance meant that occupés felt less helpless, and could 
be proud of their locality and its apparent defiance.  At a time when mauvaise conduite 
was perceived as widespread, resistance provided a counter-example of how to behave, 
and further fanned the flame of patriotism.  The culture de l’occupé was centred on 
patriotism: it criticised those engaging in unbecoming behaviour, especially regarding 
Germans, and lauded those resisting as best as possible.  
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Part III – Beyond the Occupation 
 
Before drawing final conclusions, it is necessary to examine the way in which mauvaise 
conduite and resistance were remembered or forgotten after the war, and to contextualise 
the Nord’s occupation experience.  This will allow for a deeper understanding of these 
themes and the occupation experience more generally, demonstrating how they were 
reshaped and reinterpreted from 1918. 
 
I – Epilogue: Remembering and Forgetting 
Mauvaise conduite in Memory 
Mauvaise conduite remained in local (and, to some extent, national) conciousness for a 
short period after the liberation, but this memory was weak and soon became occluded, 
overshadowed by stronger memories.  The memory was centred on the punishment of 
those having engaged in misconduct, and was visible in the regional press and the 
punishments themselves.  
 
Pressing Matters 
In the last few months of 1918, the regional press maintained a keen interest in the 
persecution of such individuals.  As well as reporting some high-profile cases, such as the 
fate of the editor of Belgian collaborationist paper Le Bruxellois,1 Le Progrès du Nord ran 
a campaign against war-profiteers, ‘mercantis,’ ‘ravitailleurs,’ ‘accapareurs,’ and those who 
had had friendly relations with the Germans.  The 22nd November 1918 issue contained 
the aforementioned list of ‘simples contestations’ on the front page, remarking ‘Les 
aigrefins de l’occupation sont toujours les maîtres du pavé’ and ‘Quelques-uns des 
ravitailleurs qui nous ont exploités sont toujours là.’2  A few days later, an article criticised 
mercantis who had engaged in ‘infâmes complaisances’ with the Germans.3  The paper’s 
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outrage was palpable the following day.  In the middle of the front page was the 
following notice: 
ILS SONT REVENUS!  Si vous vous promenez dans les rues du Centre 
ou si vous pénétrez dans les grands cafés, vous y rencontrerez, retour de 
Bruxelles, la plupart des bandits qui se sont enrichis pendant l’occupation 
en travaillant avec les Boches.  Il faut que ce scandale cesse!4  
 
Underneath this proclamation was an article entitled ‘L’INSOLENTE CANAILLE,’ 
expanding upon the above statement.  It was even suggested that these people were being 
protected by those in positions of authority.  A similar proclamation was published the 
next day.5 
 
Another article described the social inversion and subtleties of occupation life.   
‘Monsieur X,’ a nobody before the war, was now an important person to whom others 
doffed their hats in the street.  He had hoarded goods during the occupation, then re-
sold them for the highest price ‘avec la complicité de ses amis Boches [sic].’  He had 
frequented the cafés of the Grand’ Place, where he ‘prononçait de grands discours 
patriotiques, anéantissait 30.000 ou 40.000 Boches par jour,’ but when the Germans left, 
so did he.  Now back in Lille, he walked the streets, ‘distribuant d’un air protecteur (car 
il a maintenant des amis influents) des poignéss [sic] de main toutes empreintes de 
sympathie.’ 
 
In December 1918 an article reported a conversation between two mercantis, overhead in 
a café in Lille.  The men had left Lille with the Germans because they feared ‘justice,’ but 
as soon as they realised that no-one was being punished for their occupation behaviour, 
they returned.6  This notion that suspect persons were not being punished, or were 
perhaps even being protected, was shared by the wider population, as revealed by the 
French military’s contrôle postal of Lille.  One Lillois wrote of a man he knew was guilty 
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of ‘des relations suspectes’ during the occupation: ‘De la façon dont nos Alliés envisagent 
le délit de “commerce avec l’ennemi”, je m’attends à le voir bientôt béneficier d’une 
ordonnance de non-lieu et remettre en liberté.’  He concluded: ‘C’est à vous dégoûter 
d’être resté français.  Je suis écoeuré et ne demande qu’à m’éloigner de cette malheureuse 
ville de Lille si éprouvée et tant critiquée.’7  However, another former occupé stated that 
most people had engaged in commerce with the Germans.8  Perhaps this moral-patriotic 
grey zone, full of complicity and criticism, was why the memory of mauvaise conduite 
faded rapidly. 
 
Nevertheless, the campaign of Le Progrès had some success: on 18th December, it 
reported on ‘Le traître Hubert,’ a ravitailleur, German agent, and correspondent for the 
Gazette des Ardennes, who had brought to the paper’s attention by a reader in response 
to its article on mercantis.9  The following day the paper boasted: ‘La campagne que nous 
avons entreprise ici même contre les drôles du temps d’occupation commence à porter ses 
fruits.’  One C. Dauphin, allegedly an accomplice of Hubert and fellow contributor to 
the Gazette, had written to the editor.  He denied any association with Hubert and 
claims of denunciation or commerce with the enemy, but did admit that he had written 
one article for the Gazette, which was approved by the mayor of Lambersart.  He 
outlined his logic: ‘Si j’ai eu des relations avec quelques soldats dont la mentalité me 
paraissait bonne, c’était uniquement pour le bien à faire autour de moi: je ne voyais que 
le service à rendre, considérant que les faveurs que j’obtenais, avec les mains toujours 
garnies, ne pouvaient constituer un crime.’10  A few days later, Le Progrès refuted 
Dauphin’s claims and highlighted the key to notions of mauvaise conduite, responding 
with: ‘Un crime, non, mon pauvre Dauphin, mais tous les honnêtes gens à l’esprit vous 
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diront […] que personne de propre n’a le droit d’avoir des relations amicales avec “des 
soldats ennemis qui leur paraissent bons.”’11   
 
Cases of those arrested or sentenced for bad occupation behaviour – trafficking in gold, 
‘affaires de mœurs’ involving Germans – were reported in December 1918.12   Other 
papers mentioned mauvaise conduite in late 1918, but never seemed as outraged as Le 
Progrès.13  The memory of mauvaise conduite was thus alive and well in the last months 
of 1918, at least in the pages of the regional press – and presumably in the minds of the 
former occupés. 
 
Articles on this theme are rarer after 1918, but some examples do exist.  On 20th October 
1919, Le Progrès published an piece entitled ‘La chasse aux embochés’ detailing the arrest 
of a Lillois for intelligence and commerce with the enemy.  The sentences of 11 
collaborators of the Gazette were also reported.14  In 1921, industrialists of Lille who had 
complied with the German order to create sandbags faced legal action at the Parquet.  La 
Croix du Nord of 21st March 1921 printed former acting Prefect Anjubault’s version of 
events.15  Another paper published an interview with the lawyer of one of the accused 
arguing for the innocence of the industrialists.16  This argument won the day, and all of 
the accused were acquitted, the judge ruling that they had been forced to work by the 
Germans.17  Such acquittals, Nivet argues, ‘font scandale,’ and led the editor of the 
socialist La Bataille to note, ‘Seuls les imbéciles ont confiance dans la justice de leur 
pays.’18 
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Yet what was the reality of punishments?  Were the former occupés justified in 
complaining about apparent clemency? 
 
Limited Punishment 
Punishments in the Nord were limited compared to events in politically complex 
Belgium or Alsace-Lorraine,19 and especially to the post-World War II épuration, when 
new crimes were created to facilitate punishment.20  As Martinage has demonstrated, the 
number of those taken to court for and/or found guilty of intelligence avec l’ennemi or 
commerce avec l’ennemi was surprisingly low in the Nord – at least according to court 
records.21  Between 1918 and 1925,22 123 people accused of intelligence avec l’ennemi 
appeared before the various cours d’assises of the Nord, of which 83 were tried in the 
cour d’assises of Douai.  Of those, 43 were condemned, with punishments ranging from 
minor correctional sentences up to twenty years’ imprisonment in an ‘enceinte fortifiée’ 
or deportation.23  The rest were acquitted.24   
 
This court was not the only avenue through which suspect individuals passed: Nivet 
notes that Conseils de guerre judged such people until October 1919; and in 1920, ‘la 
justice civile du Nord’ judged hundreds of such cases, although not all ended in a trial.25  
The parquet of Valenciennes hosted 24 affairs of intelligence avec l’ennemi in July 1923 
alone.26  Other sources attest to the punishment of suspect activity, such as the archives 
of the women’s prison in Rennes.27  Yet, overall, the number of punishments for 
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mauvaise conduite remained small.  This is not to say that the French government did 
not take accusations of misconduct seriously.  Nivet believes that ‘jusqu’à la fin des 
années trente […] la fraction, marginale, de la population du Nord ayant collaboré avec 
l’ennemi ne bénéficie donc d’aucune clémence.  Elle reste la face noire de la France 
héroïque de 1914-1918.’28 
 
The apparent lack of widespread punishment may also be due to the fact that many 
denunciations leading to investigations were ostensibly ‘inexacts,’ based on rumour or 
born out of personal quarrels, with many ending in a non-lieu.29  Only the high-profile 
cases were taken to court, and evidently only those who had broken laws could be 
punished.  As the preliminary investigative documents regarding the Nord demonstrate, 
many more individuals were found, or admitted, to be guilty of breaching the limits of 
respectability – but judicial punishment for this was not possible.  This was noted by 
central government,30 and criticsed by the local population.  
 
The official punishment of ‘collaborators’ could be perceived as a way for both central 
and local government to remove the dark side of the occupation from the wider collective 
memory – or at least to be seen to fulfil local demands for retribution, albeit on a small 
scale.  Once a certain number of key individuals had been punished, and the objectives of 
one form of memory were met, that memory could potentially weaken.  This was not a 
memory that could be celebrated, but perhaps it could be dealt with and disposed of.  
Thébaud suggests this regarding female misconduct, asking: ‘Que sont devenues ces 
“mauvaises femmes” après l’arrivée des troupes françaises?  Certaines déjà ont été tondues 
comme le mentionne Grenadou.  D’autres jugées; quelques-unes se sont suicidées.  Et 
puis on a oublié…’31 
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The rather limited number of punished individuals, on the other hand, may have given 
the impression that those who had engaged in mauvaise conduite were a minority – as 
opposed to the ostensibly commonplace resistance, and widespread suffering.  This 
appears rather contrary to the large numbers of complaints the former occupés made 
about occupation conduct of numerous compatriots, both during and after the 
occupation.32  The extent of the official inquiry into these suspects does suggest a belief 
among French authorities that the ‘Boches du Nord’ moniker33 could have had some 
truth to it; yet the end results hint at a desire to minimise the perception of wide-scale 
misconduct.  However, this may have been simply an acknowledgement by the 
investigators/judges of the realities of the occupation, of the moral-patriotic grey zone in 
which many lived.  Whatever the reasoning, the slow wait for and small number of 
punishments did not satisfy the local populations, although it paved the way for a 
narrative of patriotic resistance during the occupation.  Although aspects of mauvaise 
conduite are mentioned in some inter-war texts,34 and in recent histories,35 resistance and 
suffering dominate.  
 
Remembering Resistance 
From the liberation onwards, a narrative of widespread, multifarious resistance among 
the occupés was crystallised.  On 19th October 1918, the mayor of Tourcoing gave a 
speech to visiting Prime Minister Clémenceau, outlining the experience of occupation.  
He detailed the suffering at the hands of the Germans, set against the resistance of the 
population, particularly concerning the refusal to work for or to hand over metals to the 
Germans.  The passive resistance of the former mayor, at that time imprisoned in 
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Germany, was also highlighted.36  Clémenceau responded by praising the courage, 
valiance and endurance of the population of French Flanders.  He professed admiration 
for the mayor’s actions, and disgust at German crimes, before promising that: 
 Rien ne sera oublié […] 
Maintenant, soyons tout à la France […] qui a fait de vous de 
véritables combattants, alors que vous étiez sous la botte de l’Allemand. 
La bataille, vous ne l’avez pas moins bien menée que nos soldats 
eux-mêmes.  Vous avez donné le bon exemple, et quand on fera un jour 
l’histoire de cette guerre, elle serait incomplète si on ne mentionnait pas 
avec honneur la résistance des grandes villes du Nord de la France, comme 
Lille, Roubaix et Tourcoing.37 
 
A few days later, President Poincaré also visited Tourcoing.  The mayor welcomed him 
with an address in which he drew on and reinforced Clémenceau’s comments.  He 
evoked the idea that ‘les Flamands n’ont jamais supporté la tyrannie’ to explain why, 
‘sous la botte de l’étranger, nous sommes restés calmes et dignes, vaillants et forts, 
certains du triomphe de notre cause, de la victoire définitive.’38  The official line on the 
occupation experience was taking shape.  Poincaré merely cemented the narrative by 
professing: 
Vous, vous avez vécu pendant plus de quatre ans sous la domination 
étrangère, vous ne vous êtes pas laissé [sic] émouvoir, vous ne vous êtes 
pas laissé [sic] ébranler, et, pas une heure, vous n’avez désespéré de la 
France. 
        (Bravos) 
C’est à vous que doit aller toute la reconnaissance nationale, à vous, en 
même temps qu’à ces admirables armées françaises et alliées […]39 
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Both Clémenceau and the President therefore acknowledged the sufferings of occupation 
and agreed with the narrative espoused by the former occupés, one of sacrifice for France.  
They also rubber-stamped the idea of widespread resistance and dignified conduct on the 
part of the occupés.  The new Prefect further reflected this view in his first proclamation 
to the population, stating that he knew ‘les souffrances inouïes qu’elles [les populations] 
ont supportées; le courage et l’abnégation admirables qu’elles ont montrés leur ont acquis 
pour jamais des titres à la reconnaissance du pays tout entier.’40 
 
This gratitude was primarily expressed through medals awarded to certain categories of 
former occupés.  Those having engaged in acts of heroism and bravery were awarded the 
Légion d’Honneur, sometimes posthumously: this was the case for at least 28 
Nordistes.41  Others were awarded the Médaille de la Réconnaissance Française, created 
in 1917.42  Potential recipients could and did nominate themselves; others were 
nominated by their mayors, although successful applications had to be accompanied by 
supporting documentation in both cases.43  There was a small window in which former 
occupés could apply, from April 1922 to December 1923.  By the end of 1923, 4,257 
such applications had been received, although only 2,885 examined.44  Applicants also 
included those believed to have gone through an extraordinary experience, often 
providing a civic or patriotic service during the occupation.  Thus the director of the 
Galeries Lilloises was nominated for his role in extinguishing the fire in the hôtel de ville 
in 1916, and helping inhabitants evacuate their property.45 One man from Saint-Amand-
les-Eaux requested the medal because he had injured himself falling off a wagon during 
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German requisitions – his request was denied.46  A successful candidate was Mme Allard 
from Valenciennes, who had worked for the Red Cross during the occupation, tending to 
evacuees and prisoners of war.47  At least 87 Nordistes applied for and received the 
Médaille de la Réconnaissance Française.48 
 
Other symbols of gratitude and compensation were available, most hinting at dignified 
behavior and some fulfillment of duty or resistance.  On 30th June 1921, the Médaille des 
victimes de l’invasion was created at the request of the Ministre des régions libérées.  It 
was awarded initially to hostages, deportees, those imprisoned by the enemy, or who had 
been subjected to forced labour, but from April 1922 it could also be given to those who 
had experienced serious brutality or ill-treatment.  Depending on the judgment of the 
investigating committee, recipients were awarded a bronze, silver or vermeil medal.49  
The medal came with a certificate highlighting that the recipient had been awarded the 
medal ‘en vue de perpétuer dans sa famille et au milieu de ses concitoyens, le souvenir de 
ses vertus civiques dans les régions envahies, au cours de l’occupation ennemie.’ (See Fig. 
10).  Even this medal from the national government, then, seemed to be geared towards 
local remembrance. 
 
On 14th March 1936, a law came into force creating the Médaille des prisonniers civils, 
déportés et otages de la Grande Guerre.50  It could not be awarded to those already in 
possession of the Médaille des victimes de l’invasion.  Its goal was ‘commémorer le 
souvenir de leurs sacrifices et honorer leurs actes de dévouement à la Patrie, en 
reconnaissance des épreuves qu’ils ont dû subir pour elle au cours de la guerre 1914-
1918.’  In total, more than 10,400 of these medals were awarded to inhabitants of the 
                                                 
46 AN BB32/3: Médaille de la Reconnaissance Française concerning M. Auguste Alloy, 12th March 1923. 
47 Ibid., Mme Allard.  
48 See ADN 6Z39; ADN 4Z34: République Française, Sous-Préfecture de Douai, Médailles des Victimes 
de l’Invasion 1914-198 et de la Reconnaissance Française; ‘Active Resistance’ chapter. 
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entire occupied zone,51 including to at least 107 Nordistes.52  Many Nordistes applied for 
and received the other medals.53  Foreign decorations were further conferred on former 
occupés, usually those having engaged in resistance to the benefit of Allied powers, which 
was the case for numerous Nordistes.54  Among the recipients of such medals include 
celebrated resisters such as de Bettignies, Trulin, members of the Comité Jacquet, La 
Patience, and their accomplices.55  
 
Medals, particularly the Légion d’Honneur or the Croix de Guerre, were also awarded to 
entire communes, towns and villages.  The narrative of suffering, sacrifice, and resistance 
was thus yet again reinforced.  Among others,56 Valenciennes was awarded the Croix de 
Guerre,57 as was Crèvecœur-sur-l’Éscaut which, ‘Détruite par les bombardements, a fait 
preuve de la plus belle attitude sous les obus et au cours des souffrances de 
l’occupation.’58  Cambrai and Douai received the Légion d’Honneur in September 
1919.59  The latter was described as a ‘ville douloureusement meurtrie par quatre années 
d’une dure occupation,’ which had ‘puisé la force de résister à toutes les souffrances et de 
préparer même, autant qu’il était en son pouvoir, sa renaissance à sa pleine vie 
française.’60  Beyond these citations, at least 140 localities in the Nord (most of which 
had been occupied) received the L’orde de l’Armée in the early 1920s.  Such distinctions 
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were awarded for their alleged dignified and patriotic suffering during the occupation.61  
Stock phrases and themes appeared, such as ‘digne et courageuse/la plus belle attitude’62 
or ‘la foi en la victoire.’63   
 
Whether to towns or individuals, symbols of gratitude and commemoration were 
awarded for experiences of extreme suffering and of extraordinary heroism or patriotism.  
Indeed, a link was drawn between the two, fitting into the culture de l’occupé according 
to which suffering the occupation was itself heroic and patriotic.  The extreme suffering 
of combatants, however, was the apogee of this rather paradoxical worldview – and no 
matter how much the occupés had suffered or resisted, their experience would never be 
able to trump the more universal trench experience in national memory.  For a variety of 
socio-cultural and political reasons, France would and could never be as grateful to her 
formerly occupied populations as she was towards her former combatants. 
 
On the local scale, the occupation cast a long shadow, and the official narrative appeared 
again and again in the inter-war years, in varied forms.  Occupation behavior was not the 
only subject of interest – in the immediate post-war period, the local press reported on 
and called for reparations, for instance.64  Indeed, the Treaty of Versailles eventually 
called for Germany to pay for loss of property and life in the occupied regions,65 although 
Keynes saw the amount demanded as excessive.66  The developments concerning 
reparations highlighted suffering and appealed to a sense of justice, but the resistance 
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narrative allowed for pride, thus was the subject of many more articles for years after the 
Armistice. 
 
Resistance in the Press 
Local papers published many articles on resisters and resistance in the inter-war period, 
whether simply recounting certain acts, or informing people of the fate of those punished 
by the Germans.  Many such articles appearing in late 1918 crystallised the position of 
key resisters.  La Croix du Nord reported on the actions of the doyen of St-Christophe in 
Lille,67 and the service in November 1918 in memory of Léon Trulin68 – both perfect 
examples of Catholic resistance (two members of the Comité Jacquet, including Jacquet 
himself, had been atheists and rejected a religious burial,69 which may explain their 
absence in the pages of La Croix).  Catholic martyrdom was therefore linked to 
resistance, unlike in World War II, when the Church was associated with Vichy,70 and 
resistance with uncatholic suicide and taking control of one’s destiny rather than 
expiatory suffering.71  Indeed, the martyrdom of 1940-44 eventually revolved mainly 
around Jewish martyrdom.   
 
From 1918, Le Progrès du Nord detailed all types of resistance, from that of municipal 
councillors and mayors, to those who hid Allied servicemen from the Germans, as well as 
Jacquet and Trulin.72  It also published calls for stories of courage during the occupation 
to be sent in, from which the paper wished to create a Livre d’Or.73  It asked that those 
who engaged in acts of resistance make themselves known out of an explicit duty to 
memory: ‘Car il est des gestes qui ne peuvent pas demeurer méconnus, et des noms que 
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l’avenir doit retenir.’74  Similarly, L’Écho du Nord launched a ‘concours de récits et 
chansons sur l’occupation et la guerre’ in December 1918.  Although not just reserved for 
acts of resistance, these were the preferred subject: ‘Notre région a été occupée pendant 
plus de quatre années et nul historien ne pourra dire tout ce que nos populations ont 
enduré et tout ce qu’il leur a fallu de courage pour résister aux quotidiennes persécutions 
des Boches.’  It was seen as in the public interest to provide testimony of the horrors of 
this painful period.  Entries had to be a maximum of 200 lines and based on reality, with 
‘les actes d’héroïsme collectif et individuel’ the first suggested theme.75 
 
Throughout the interwar period, dozens of articles reported on the smallest 
developments regarding celebrated (mainly active) resisters.  Thus the posthumous 
awarding of the Légion d’Honneur to Trulin on 2nd June 1935 appeared in the 
publication of local historical society Les Amis de Lille.76  Les Amis used Trulin’s 
resistance as a way to both crystallise the positives of the occupation in public memory, 
and as a means to advocate peace.  It was remarked:   
Quel est le sens en effet de cette cérémonie si ce n’est de dire avec Léon 
Trulin notre horreur des carnages sanglants et notre volonté d’être des 
Hommes de Paix […] 
notre Nord a été pendant la guerre sans Peur et sans Reproche; [sic] sa 
population, qui durant la Paix, paye le tribut de l’argent, a payé pendant 
la guerre, outre le sacrifice des combattants, le tribut du sang et de la 
souffrance sans espoir.77 
 
Thus the sacrifices of the Nord became one with the sacrifices of combatants, and 
Nordistes rejoined the nation further by sharing the popular pacifist sentiment. 
  
The inauguration of the monument in Trulin’s honour – a wall of the Citadelle bearing 
his name – was reported in November 1935.78  The authors blended hagiography with 
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patriotism and religious virtue: one described the ceremony as ‘Le pèlerinage de la 
citadelle.’79  Most stories on Trulin, like articles on other resisters, offered a summary of 
his deeds, and demonstrated that the authors held him in high esteem.  Les Amis de Lille 
noted that ‘Avant d’être enfant, il a choisi d’être homme.’  Here, as became the norm, 
Trulin was portrayed as a child, although he was 18 at the time of his execution.  
Evidently, his youth made his deeds seem more heroic, and his death more tragic.  And 
what a death – Les Amis noted that Trulin showed no sign of fear faced with the German 
firing squad, refusing the blindfold, and proclaiming, ‘Mon Dieu, je vous demande 
pardon.  Vive la France!  Vive la Belgique!’  In his last letter to his mother, he displayed 
Christ-like sentiments: ‘Vivez en Paix et sans haine: Je fais grâce parce que l’on ne me la 
fait pas… Je pardonne à tout le monde amis et ennemis…’80  Just like Christ, ‘rendu à la 
vie par notre amour, de toute sa gloire, Léon Trulin est encore vivant.’81 
 
Throughout the inter-war period, similar articles were published about the Comité 
Jacquet,82 and numerous less well-known resisters,83 although surprisingly few articles 
deal with de Bettignies.84  All were alike in style, based on the awarding of medals, the 
creation of monuments, and sometimes the retelling of heroics – and always full of praise 
for the subjects’ alleged love of France and sense of duty.  The actions of these heroes 
were cast within a redemptive, heroic framework.  For example, in September 1932, Le 
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Réveil du Nord informed its readers that ‘Mme Jeanne Leclercq-Bourgeois fut une noble 
et courageuse héroïne qu’on n’oubliera pas demain au cours de la cérémonie du 
souvenir.’  At this ceremony the president of the organisation in memory of the Comité 
Jacquet described Leclercq-Bourgeois as ‘une des plus nobles et courageuses femmes qui a 
sauvé, par son héroïsme magnifique, l’honneur de toutes les femmes du Nord envahi.’85 
 
However, often the retelling of heroics represented not the effective continuation of a 
certain memory, but the rediscovery of such events.  Just as Darrow has argued for the 
case of de Bettignies, whenever there was publicity, the press discovered resisters anew, 
each time extolling how much they had done for France, and how much they had been 
forgotten.  Often journalists misspelled the names of key resisters.86  In some cases, the 
press was aware of the lack of a resilient memory and its role in keeping the flames 
burning: after publishing extracts from resister (and friend of de Bettignies) Louise 
Thuliez’s memoirs in December 1933, La Dépêche concluded in stating: ‘Mlle Thuliez 
n’a-t-elle pas raison de s’étonner que, sauf le monument élevé à Louise de Bettignies, il 
n’existe rien en France pour rappeler le sacrifice des martyres de la patrie. [sic]’87  The act 
of publishing her memoirs may be perceived as a salvo in the struggle against oblivion.  
 
A year before the publication of Thuliez’s memoirs, the president of the committee for 
the memory of Trulin published L’adolescent chargé de gloire, although this was not the 
first work on Trulin.  In its opening lines in the review of this publication, La Croix du 
Nord expressed its hope: ‘Un jour, quand nos petits enfants, devenus des grands parents 
[sic], conteront de belles histoires vraies à leurs petits fils [sic …] ils s’inspireront du livre 
qui vient de [sic] consacrer à Léon Trulin.’88  This was more a command than a desire – 
the same sentiment was expressed on the front page of Les Amis de Lille two months 
earlier, with the heading, ‘“L’Adolescent chargé de gloire” est paru: chaque famille lilloise 
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doit posséder ce livre.’89  This heading dominated from October to December 1932,90 
although the motives behind such publicity may not have been wholly patriotic 
considering that the Amis de Lille had edited this book.91 
 
Victimhood and resistance were the backbone of the official commemorative framework.   
However, this framework also seemed to press for a removal of the particularities of the 
occupation experience, calling for a speedy reunion with France and thus France’s 
wartime narrative.  By linking the fate of the occupés with that of the soldiers, the 
occupation experience was not only being glorified, avoiding to a large extent any shame 
or dishonour associated with either the initial Allied retreat of September 1914 or the 
mauvaise conduite of occupés; it was being absorbed into the national experience, thus 
removed of its specificity.  This was the beginning of the end for the occupation narrative 
on a national level. 
 
Ceremonies and Monuments 
Numerous ceremonies dedicated to occupation events and personalities took place in the 
inter-war period.  So too did the construction of monuments, although monuments 
directly relating to the occupation are rare in the Nord.92  Among these, active resisters 
and their deaths were the most frequently commemorated people and events.  Lille still 
has its monuments to the Comité Jacquet, Trulin and de Bettignies.93  Unlike 
monuments to suffering experienced on a collective scale during the occupation,94 
resistance was usually remembered symbolically through individual monuments, or in a 
more individualistic manner.95  Roads and town squares were named after resisters,96 and 
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personal tombs in cemeteries commemorated them97 – such as that in Lille’s eastern 
cemetery concerning Patience collaborators Willot and Pinte.98  Further, the lease on the 
tombs of the Comité Jacquet members was renewed at no charge for 30 years in February 
1920,99 then awarded permanently in December 1933.100 
 
Often ceremonies and monuments were the result of campaigning on behalf of 
organisations created to perpetuate a certain memory and to influence local policy in this 
regard.  Representative in this respect were forms of commemoration surrounding Trulin 
– around whom it was later said a ‘culte du souvenir’ was built101 – and the Comité 
Jacquet.  The creation and celebration of a monument to Trulin on the wall of the 
Citadelle in 1935 has already been mentioned, as has the ceremony surrounding his 
family being awarded the Légion d’Honneur on his behalf.  These were stages in a 
piecemeal but organised commemoration process, which saw Trulin’s resistance forever 
tied to that of the Comité Jacquet, and these five ‘fusillés Lillois’ in turn representing the 
respectable occupation experience.  In fact, Trulin had already been linked with the other 
fusillés during the war, as their families had been paid a monthly allowance by the 
municipality.102  The Caisse des Victimes du Devoir also offered financial recompense to 
the family of some Comité members, as well as other resisters.103  Trulin and the Comité 
Jacquet were thought of as equally worthy of remembrance, in this case comprising a 
financial duty to their families. 
 
                                                 
97 Becker, ‘Mémoire,’ p.342. 
98 Becker, ‘D’une guerre,’ p.457. 
99 AML 4H76: Séance of Lille’s Conseil Municipal, 9th February 1920. 
100 Ibid., séance of 9th December 1933. 
101 AML 4H75: Nord Matin (5th March 1978). 
102 AML 4H76: ‘Rapport du Directeur, Ville de Lille, Services Financiers,’ 18th November 1918.  The 
family of Maertens received 215F, of Verhulst 100F, and of Trulin 60F; Prefect to mayor, 30th January 
1919. 
103 Ibid., Secrétaire général du Conseil d’administration de la Caisse des Victimes du Devoir, to mayor, 





Trulin was awarded numerous decorations and citations posthumously in 1919 and 
1920,104 and on 30th September and 1st October 1922 fêtes run by the Comité du 
Commerce et des Fêtes du Vieux-Lille were held in his honour.105  The accompanying 
booklet summarised Trulin’s heroics, as well as those of his young friends, and his death.  
It contained a song dedicated to him, describing him as an immortal ‘enfant héroïque 
[…] un soldat tombé’ for Belgium, for ‘le Droit’ and ‘la Liberté.’106  These are the values 
for which Trulin is said to have died, linked to the notion of respectability. 
 
In May 1923, a poster called for as many Lillois as possible to aid in the posing of a 
commemorative plaque on the ‘Murs des cinq Fusillés Lillois’ (Trulin being one of the 
five).107  The ceremony attracted much attention.108  This plaque was not enough for 
those safeguarding the memory of these men, and eventually a full-blown monument 
entitled ‘Lille à ses fusillés’ was unveiled in March 1929 (see Fig. 11).  It cost 200,000 
francs, raised by contributions from the population at large with a subsidy from the 
municipality.109  Just one year before, however, some were unhappy about an alleged lack 
of commemoration regarding Trulin.  In November 1928, Les Amis de Lille wrote of 
Trulin, one of the ‘plus glorieuses’ victims of the war: ‘Ce petit héros a-t-il été connu, 
compris, apprécié à sa mesure, glorifié comme il le mérite?110  This was despite the fact 
that the monument aux fusillés had been planned since 1924,111 although even when it 
was unveiled it was controversial, not pleasing everyone.112  This was particularly the case 
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regarding Trulin, who appeared on the monument blindfolded despite his real-life 
rejection of a blindfold; the sculptor soon corrected the error.113  Further, his family 
protested against the position of Trulin on the monument – his likeness lying dead on 
the floor, next to the upright members of the Comité Jacquet.  They believed that ‘il a 
été traité en accessoire et que sa conduite méritait tout le contraire.’114  Consequently, a 
further memorial to Trulin was planned, paid for by public donations,115 and this statue 
of Trulin by himself was placed on the Avenue du Peuple Belge in 1934.116  (It can now 
be found outside Lille’s theatre). 
 
Yet Trulin’s memory still remained linked inextricably to that of the Comité Jacquet.  
When the anniversary of the execution of the Comité members took place on 20th 
September 1931, Trulin’s name was also mentioned in a poster entitled ‘N’oublions 
pas!!!’ created by ‘Le Comité des CINQ FUSILLÉS LILLOIS.’117  In fact, this committee for 
the memory of Trulin, Jacquet, Maertens, Verhulst and Deconninck had initially (and 
rather confusingly) been called the Comité Jacquet.  It was created in April 1920 and its 
goal was ‘perpétuer la mémoire d’Eugène Jacquet, de ses compagnons et, en général, des 
héros lillois fusillés pendant l’occupation: 1º en leur élevant un monument funéraire;- 2º 
en venant à l’aide de leur famille.’118  In fact, the mayor of Lille had already expressed, in 
October 1919, his desire to create a monument to the memories of these five men.119 
 
Alongside this group was the ‘Comité Georges Maertens,’ created sometime before 
September 1919, charged with receiving subscriptions to pay for a ‘sépulture digne de lui’ 
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in Lille’s eastern cemetery, and to provide financial aid to his widow.120  By September 
1919, enough money had been raised for the monument on his tomb to be built and the 
excess money given to his widow.  Maerten was the only genuine Lillois of the Comité 
Jacquet, a fact emphasised in the Comité Maertens’s booklet regarding the monument121 
– perhaps this is why he appears to be the only fusillé to whom a separate organisation 
was dedicated.  A model of the monument itself (Fig. 12) was unveiled in February 
1920,122 and the final product in a ceremony on 26th September 1920, involving key 
notables, veterans, as well as British, Belgian and French military detachments.123  The 
Comité Maertens thus fulfilled its objectives rapidly. 
 
The exact activities of the inter-war Comité Jacquet are unclear, beyond the yearly 
procession on 20th September.124  However, by 1937 the Ministre de l’Intérieur judged 
the Comité’s activity to be ‘insuffisante depuis plusieurs semestres.’ As such, ‘Il apparaît 
que ce groupement a rempli heureusement son but statutaire et qu’il ne saurait justifier 
son maintien comme Œuvre de Guerre dans les conditions de la Loi du 30 Mai 1916.’  
Its dissolution was ordered.125  Yet in 1939 the Comité returned with renewed vigour 
and purpose, as war approached.  On 1st June, the Comité wrote to the mayor of Lille, 
arguing: 
Pour coopérer effectivement à L’UNION […] qui, en présence des 
menaces extérieures, s’avère essentiellement au salut du Pays et de la 
Liberté, nous devons ranimer toutes les œuvres et toutes les activités qui 
tendent à rapprocher les hommes divisés […] 
[…] L’exemple glorieux de ces hommes […] ordonne 
irrésistiblement, à tous ceux qui cultivent pieusement leur souvenir, de se 
rapprocher, d’apprendre à se connaître, à s’estimer et à s’aimer.126 
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The Comité was to be enlarged, made stronger than ever, and its personnel (many of 
whom had died) replaced.127  The president then called for the Comité d’Honneur to be 
reconstituted – which did occur128 – and for a Journée des Fusillés to be celebrated 
regularly, although the onset of war appears to have prevented this idea from coming to 
fruition.  A link was thus drawn between the resistance of 1914-18 and the response to 
the upcoming war of 1939-45.129 
 
Beyond the fusillés and Trulin, other resisters were the subject of real or attempted 
commemoration via ceremonies and monuments.130  De Bettignies was also promoted 
within pantheon of heroes.131  However, monuments and ceremonies perversely provided 
concrete and short-term outlets for memory and commemoration.  They were receptacles 
into which memories could be poured and stored, sites of memory which provided a way 
of both remembering the occupation on certain occasions (anniversaries of deaths, for 
example), but forgetting the occupation experience on a daily basis.  The monuments 
were allegedly proof that the occupation was not forgotten, but once these memorials 
were built, the population could move on.  The goals of the organisations dedicated to 
the memory of resisters could be fulfilled – and once fulfilled, their purpose was 
undermined, and the memory of those whom they wanted to remember weakened.  La 
Dépêche in November 1932 – a year after the well-attended ceremony for the sixteenth 
anniverary of Trulin’s death132 – noticed this paradox: 
Ah! si les Allemands avaient eu un Trulin!  Que de poèmes, de pièces de 
théâtre, de films!  Nous, nous avons eu, rien qu’à Lille, Trulin, Derain, 
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Jacquet, Deconinck, Maertens, Verhulst, bien d’autres.  Estimez-vous 
que, malgré tous les monuments, nous mettions leur nom assez haut?133 
 
Redier wrote in 1937 that, ‘Dans cent ans, dans deux cents ans, la page douloureuse et 
hautaine qu’ont ajoutée les envahis à nos annales sera sans doute inscrite dans les 
mémoires et dans les cœurs.  Aujourd’hui il faut bien dire que ce n’est pas fait.’134  For 
Redier, there was a duty to remember the occupés and their resistance: ‘Quant aux 
envahis, honte à celui qui ne les honorerait point à l’égal des plus douloureux soldats de 
nos armées!  Honte à qui les nommerait sans un religieux respect!’135  Yet this was not the 
case, and even all the commemorations surrounding Trulin had not been able to realise 
Redier’s dream.  It seemed that the more events and people were commemorated, the 
more they were forgotten by the wider public – although Redier may not have been 
referring exclusively to the local populations of the occupied regions. 
 
A Waning Pre-Occupation: Remembrance After 1945 
Perhaps because of the Gaullist emphasis on resistance in the Second World War, 
perhaps also because of prevailing resistance memory before 1939, many post-1945 
articles in the regional press dealing with the occupation of 1914-18 focused on the 
various anniversaries related to the resisters of 1914-18, or on their deaths.136  Yet each 
time a resistance story appeared, it was presented as if for the first time, suggesting that 
these one-time local heroes had indeed been forgotten.  Again, the memory of Trulin 
proves exemplary.  By 1959, a Parisian stamp-collecting society wrote to the mairie of 
Lille to obtain details ‘concernant la date et lieu de naissance, faits de résistance, date et 
lieu du décès’ of Trulin, in whose honour a stamp had been issued in 1939.137  Similarly, 
in 1962, the adjunct to the mayor of Lille wrote a response to an amateur historian 
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inquiring about the monuments to Trulin existing in Lille.138  Even the memory of high-
profile resisters had been fading. 
 
This was not for want of trying.  In 1946, another ‘manifestation du souvenir’ was held 
on the anniversary of Trulin’s execution, about which an article was published in Nord-
Matin.139  La Croix du Nord published a brief article explaining the origins of the Rue 
Léon Trulin in 1954140 – in 1970, almost exactly the same text appeared in Nord-
Matin.141  Further articles appeared on Trulin,142 each time retelling his story in minute 
detail, often appearing to be based on Kah’s hagiographic account or previous reporters’ 
work – and sometimes the facts were incorrect.  All this is telling.  An article on Trulin 
published in Nord-Éclair in November 1990 detailed his story.  At one point, the author 
remarked that ‘En 1915, il quitte Lille pour s’engager dans l’armée française […]  On 
connaît la suite.  L’arrestation, la trahison de l’un des leurs, le jugement…[sic]’143  Many 
words – three columns – are devoted to ‘la suite,’ suggesting that these events were in fact 
not very well known.  However, the article concluded by contradicting this supposition 
somewhat, noting that each year the students of the école Léon Trulin – where a statue of 
Trulin had been placed in 1978144 – went ‘fleurir la stèle élevée en souvenir de celui [sic] 
dans le fossé de la Citadelle.’145  The same author again wrote about Trulin on the 
anniversary of his execution in 1995, for a different local publication.  His introduction 
is representative of the trends surrounding the memory of the occupation by this period, 
noting incorrectly that Trulin had never been awarded the Légion d’Honneur.146  This 
may be indicative of poor journalism as much as a fading memory, but the two are not 
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mutually exclusive (for the author would be expected to know these details if Trulin’s 
memory were alive and well). 
 
Further, numerous articles appeared regarding de Bettignies, whether celebrating her as a 
local heroine,147 commemorating her arrest or death148 explaining the story behind 
monuments and works of art dedicated to her,149 or even reporting the death of her 
oldest brother as a means to discuss her heroism.150  The deaths of her co-resisters were 
also reported.151  Recent articles on de Bettignies are visible on the website of local 
newspapers.152  Yet, as Darrow noted, asking a Nordiste or Lillois who de Bettignies was 
usually elicits the response that she was probably a resister of the Second World War.153 
 
Likewise, the Comité Jacquet has received a certain amount of press attention since 1945, 
with articles similar in style and content to the above,154 including reports of the death of 
Jacquet’s daughter,155 and of a collaborator of the Comité.156  The repetitiveness of the 
stories, their similarities, and the constant rediscovery of old heroes suggests that even the 
official occupation narrative of resistance had been reduced to a journalistic memory – a 
regional memory held and promoted by those with an interest in and knowledge of local 
history.  Clearly, these reports attempted to evoke the heroism of the occupation, perhaps 
to locate the experience of 1914-18 within the resistance myth that grew out of the 
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Second World War.  But the occupés of 1914-18 had been neither combatants like the 







II – Conclusions 
Beyond Occupied France, 1914-1918 
From the initial German presence in September 1914 until their departure in October 
1918 – and beyond – the experience of military occupation marked Nordistes 
profoundly.  Theirs was a different war, set aside from the national experience, with only 
compatriots from other occupied departments understanding what they had lived 
through.  All occupied French departments experienced hardship, suffering, mauvaise 
conduite, criminality, and resistance.1  All struggled with the memory of occupation.2  
However, local specificities meant that Nordistes had faced a slightly different form of 
occupation.  The populous and urban nature of the department meant that trends seen 
elsewhere were exemplified or distorted.  Its position next to the Belgian border and 
proximity to the front – thus its militarised status – meant that daily sufferings were 
more extreme.  If all occupied populations were ‘rats de laboratoire’ in the First World 
War,3 then Nordistes were the most important test subjects in France.  Yet the way in 
which the population of the Nord responded to occupation was representative of a wider, 
French trend: the culture de l’occupé, a unique and often more spontaneous form of the 
French culture de guerre, was born from occupation itself.  This was a culture created in 
response to genuine experience, not from Allied propaganda or official narratives, 
although it did rely on shared national tropes and pre-war mores.  The wider French 
culture de guerre and concomitant support for the war began to collapse through internal 
contradictions after the indecisive battles of 1916,4 whereas the culture de l’occupé 
changed little throughout the war – even crystalising after it.  This was partly because the 
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occupés had little choice but to find ways of dealing with and understanding occupation, 
but Nordistes were not the only people faced with this challenge. 
 
To what extent was the culture de l’occupé an international phenomenon?  Belgium had 
a peacetime culture not radically different to that of France and especially the Nord.  Its 
strong Catholicism, its economy and geography echoed the specificity of the Nord.  Yet 
Belgium’s occupation, although more complete, was less severe.  Its juridical situation 
was different, as most of the country was under civilian, not military control.5  Perhaps 
because of the importance of Belgian neutrality and the country’s very existence linked to 
international law, respectable resistance in particular was strong, especially written and 
other protests emanating from local notables such as mayors or the Bishop of Brussels.6  
Symbolic resistance was also present,7 but most noticeable was the greater extent of active 
resistance, with hundreds more espionage-escape networks and clandestine publications.8  
On the other side of the spectrum, variations of mauvaise conduite occurred.  There was 
more ideological ‘collaboration’ in the form of Flamenpolitik – the Germans’ attempt to 
pit the Flemish-speaking population against the Francophones, by providing the former 
with political and other benefits.9  Relations between Belgian women and Germans 
existed, and prostitution was a problem.10  As in the Nord, populations were expected to 
mantain a certain ‘distance patriotique’ from the Germans,11 and anyone transgressing 
these norms would face opprobrium and potentially punishment.12  Indeed, during and 
after the liberation, popular violence (head-shaving and other assaults on persons and 
property) and legal repression occurred on a much greater scale than in France.13  This 
                                                 
5 Becker, Cicatrices, p.123-4. 
6 See, for example, The Times (6th December 1919); de Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.120-1. 
7 De Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.122-3. 
8 Debruyne and Paternostre, La Résistance, p.19. 
9 Ibid., p.29-30; de Schaepdrijver, Belgique, pp. 251-85. 
10 Aurore François, ‘From Street Walking to the Convent: Child Prostitution Cases judged by the Juvenile 
Court of Brussels during World War One,’ in Untold War, pp.151-77; Majerus, ‘Prostitution.’ 
11 Xavier Rousseaux and Laurence van Ypersele, ‘La Grande Guerre comme contexte,’ in Patrie, p.27. 
12 Ibid., passim; de Schaepdrijver, Belgique, p.115-116. 





was probably because almost the entire country had been occupied, thus the government-
in-exile wanted to reassert its authority but also remove the stain of occupation, which 
was the only national memory of the war.  Local populations sought revenge against 
nationwide traitors, some of whom had displayed ideological treason.  Yet the culture de 
l’occupé in Belgium was essentially the national culture de guerre. 
 
Farther east, experiences differed.  Two-thirds of the Kingdom of Romania had been 
occupied by the Central Powers from 1916 to 1918.14  The occupation was similarly 
accompanied by daily requisitions, forced labour, and repression,15 but involved stronger 
ideological collaboration, as the occupiers used local elites as administrators on a grander 
scale than in the west.16  Pro-German politicians took over government ministries, seeing 
it as an opportunity to shape the development of the country and reverse certain pre-war 
trends.17  Some among the wider population had friendly relations with the occupiers,18 
but even here there were examples of passive resistance and open hostility.19 
 
Ober Ost, the Eastern-Front occupation of 2.9 million people,20 had a racial dimension.  
There were similarities to the occupations of northern France, Belgium and Poland, but 
it was different in its purely military rule (excluding natives from administration) and in 
the ideological terms in which the military state in the East was built.21  The Germans 
attempted, unsuccessfully through repression and forced labour, to remake the East in 
Germany’s own image, to force Kultur on the allegedly barbaric population, thus 
creating a military utopia.22  As such, some more extreme versions of the culture de 
l’occupé occurred: resistance, for instance, took the form of banditry, which reached 
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crisis proportions in 1917.23  Resistance increased as the Germans’ wartime situation 
worsened, involving a secret press, more armed resistance, and smuggling.24  Arguably 
more so than the Western Front occupations, Ober Ost’s successes and failures marked 
the next conflict, by shaping German views of the East.25 
 
The Occupation: 1940-44 
During the Second World War, similar cultural frontiers were drawn up and breached by 
the French, although rarely with direct reference to the occupation of 1914-18.26  
Nevertheless, notions of correct and incorrect behaviour were developed,27 the latter 
often labelled as a variation on the political term ‘collaboration’ – such as ‘collaboration 
horizontale’ to denote sexual relations between French women and Germans.28  
Naturally, this occupation was different because after the Armistice the French and 
Germans were no longer at war.29  Ideological, political and economic collaboration was 
more frequent, largely because of the complex political constitution of France from 
1940-44, with Vichy’s État Français engaging in an official policy of state collaboration, 
and others adopting the ideology of collaborationism.30  The black market, smuggling 
and crime appeared again as means of survival,31 and there was a variation on the notion 
of respectable social norms.  For instance, socialist Jean Texcier recommended in his 
1940 resistance tract Conseils à l’occupé that Frenchmen should be ‘correct’ with 
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Germans without being friendly.32  Yet he addressed himself only to men, encouraging 
punishment of women who consorted with the Germans.33 
 
Resistance also occurred on a larger scale, with even more varied forms, but especially 
clandestine/armed resistance in the latter years of the war.34  The more expansive 
geographical and ideological scope of the occupation, and the fact that Vichy was the 
legitimate authority – having replaced the Third Republic35 – meant that once the Vichy 
regime was overthrown, popular and legal ‘épurations’ were beyond anything imaginable 
in 1918.36 
 
The occupation of 1940-44 differed in other important ways from that of 1914-1918.  
Perhaps the most striking difference is the existence of the quasi-legal Vichy regime, and 
the different phases of occupation, with only partial occupation until 1942, which saw 
the complete occupation of the country – the latter more similar to occupied Belgium in 
1914-18.  These factors altered responses to the occupation and refracted choices, 
creating a kaleidoscopic array of moral conundrums and political preferences.  The 
importance of ideology is evident, especially the role of the Communist Party, whose 
official line shifted from acceptance of the Germans (due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact) until Operation Barbarossa in summer 1941, at which point its members were 
encouraged to resist the Nazi presence.  Communists thus played a leading role in many 
forms of resistance,37 and throughout the resistance there were internecine squabbles 
based on political wordlviews.38  There was no Communist Party in the occupied Nord 
of 1914-18, and few political or ideological disagreements among those opposing the 
Germans. 
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Another product of ideology was the treatment of Jews, with Vichy pursuing home-
grown and Nazi-encouraged anti-Semitism, culminating in complicity in genocide on 
the part of French officials and aspects of the wider population.39  The Jewish experience 
has since become, retrospectively, the dominant memory of this occupation: many 
French saw themselves as victims from 1940 to 1944, but now the Jews are the 
emblematic victims.40  Thus guilt dominates the memory of 1940-44, whereas the inter-
war memory of the occupation of 1914-18 was based on pride and anger – the French 
had been both victims and resisters, according to the official narrative.  Indeed, suffering 
became resistance.  This may explain the patriotic evocations of French historians 
studying the occupation of 1914-18. 
 
The occupation of 1940-44 ended with a crescendo of violence.  Armed resistance grew 
rapidly from 1942-3, faced increasing suppression, and was eventually re-invented after 
the Liberation.41  The occupied Nord in 1914-18 saw the reverse: it began with much 
violence, but was followed by a period of stabilisation, ending with a relatively peaceful 
liberation.  The population’s faith in the Allied victory and the willigness of notables to 
consult lawyers demonstrate that the occupés of 1914-18 were thinking in the long term.  
They were certain about the future, whereas the fate of occupés of 1940-44 became 
increasingly unclear, even as the tide turned against the Nazis.  Without the civil war 
elements of 1940-44, after 1918 occupation behaviours would not be scrutinised as 
greatly – thus did not have to be remade or exaggerated.  Also, the memory of the 
occupation of 1940-44 went through various stages: focused on the Gaullist Resistance 
until the tide turned in the 1970s and the Vichy Syndrome proper began.42  There was 
not enough time for the memory of the occupation of 1914-18 to be rethought, so it is 
unhelpful to compare these memories too closely. 
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Perhaps the complexity of 1940-44 prevented a more singular culture de l’occupé 
developing in the vein of that of 1914-18 in the Nord, although naturally even this 
notion is an over-simplification of experiences and events – albeit one that aids our 
understanding of this particular occupation, and perhaps others.  The culture de l’occupé 
of the Nord in 1914-18 was bound up with pre-war mores and tied to the Third 
Republic, whereas aspects of the occupation of 1940-44 were knowingly in direct 
opposition to such values.  
 
The Nord, 1914-18 
Nevertheless, in many ways the occupation of the Nord in 1914-1918 created precedents 
for that of the whole of France in 1940-44.  Nowhere was this more visible than in the 
underlying feature of the culture de l’occupé – the moral-patriotic framework dictating 
what was correct and incorrect behaviour.  Particularly regarding mauvaise conduite, 
there initially appears to have been little difference between the views held by the occupés 
and those held by non-occupied French authorities.  Espionage and denunciation, 
commerce with and working for the enemy, all made one suspect.  Yet whilst non-
occupied authorities – especially the military – also focused on intimate or sexual 
relations with the Germans, this comprised a category apart.  For many occupés, 
however, there was no real distinction between illegal and legal misconduct, between 
intelligence avec l’ennemi or commerce avec l’ennemi, and sexual/friendly relations.  
Both were, in their view, morally repugnant and comprised treason.  In this sense, the 
culture de l’occupé was less forgiving than the French culture de guerre – despite the 
daily battle with the complexities of the occupation in which the occupés engaged.  For 
the latter, a certain form of respectability was crucial: it was unbecoming to be on 
friendly terms with the enemy, especially if such relations led to expressions of joy, 
amusement, or to the dereliction of duty or abuse of power on the part of a representative 
of the Republic.  The occupied Nord was undergoing a period of immense suffering, and 
the only respectable way to behave was to suffer with dignity – not to compromise 





Those who transgressed these norms became the object of disdain, although, beyond the 
attacks of 1915, rarely of violence.  Indeed, the liberation was accompanied by 
surprisingly few popular reprisals, perhaps because of the centrality of respectability and 
faith in the law to the culture de l’occupé: it was hoped that the Republic would punish 
suspect individuals, and when this did not happen on a large enough scale, the 
population was disappointed.  Yet the common belief in widespread mauvaise conduite 
meant that thousands of people who were investigated for or suspected of breaching 
respectable norms were not always guilty.  The reality of mauvaise conduite is hard to 
assess, but the belief in widespread misconduct was central to the culture de l’occupé. 
 
Another response to occupation in 1914-18 was an apparent rise in criminality – or at 
least frequent examples of criminality.  With a weakened French police force, high levels 
of penury and unemployment, and problems of food supply, this is unsurprising; 
although the fact that numerous crimes were committed in a region under intense 
German surveillance is striking.  For some occupés, the moral economy was altered, with 
crime becoming an acceptable form of survival.  Theft provided the most obvious route 
to material well-being, but fraud and speculation also allowed many to increase their 
means.  Yet for the majority of occupés, such acts were irresponsible, exploiting and 
threatening the lives of compatriots and the functioning of relief operations.  They 
represented a lack of solidarity, and clear examples of unrespectability. The youth of the 
Nord were often perpetrators, thus it was believed by some that high levels criminality 
threatened the future of the department.  By engaging in mauvaise conduite and 
criminality, certain Nordistes betrayed their compatriots and proved that the Union 
Sacrée was as much a myth in the occupied area as it was elsewhere in France. 
 
However, other occupés engaged in acts that defined the other extreme of the culture de 
l’occupé.  Local notables engaged in respectable resistance, a form of opposition to the 
Germans reflecting all that the culture de l’occupé prized: patriotic sentiment, opposition 





perceived duty.  The respect shown in the language and content of letters of protest, 
however performative, tied into the culture by avoiding rash actions which could further 
endanger the lives of compatriots and at the same time demonstrating the perceived 
moral superiority of the occupés.  Regardless of its success or failure, respectable 
resistance fed back into the representations and understandings comprising this culture, 
highlighting the injustice of the situation, proffering examples of belle conduite, and by 
proxy ostracising further those engaging in mauvaise conduite.  For the wider 
population, symbolic resistance provided an outlet for patriotic sentiment and thus 
another form of opposition to the German presence; it strengthened local and national 
identities, exacerbating the position of those who breached the acceptable norms of this 
community – such individuals became veritable community aliens.   
 
Occasionally, active resistance occurred, comprising the most explicit and dangerous 
refusal of the German presence.  Such acts were perceived as noble and heroic 
incarnations of patriotism, thus the purest adherence to the culture de l’occupé – and 
indeed to wider French culture de guerre.  Active resistance gave certain occupés a sense 
of agency, and reinforced their understanding of themselves as combatants in the war – 
they were both victims and, eventually, victors.  It was this understanding that was 
emphasised in the inter-war period via local memory, which sought to remember the 
sufferings of the occupation at the same time as the professed heroism and dignity of the 
occupés.  National memory and recognition focused on similar themes, but it was on the 
local level that this separate experience was most remembered, whether through texts, 
ceremonies or monuments.  The notion of widespread mauvaise conduite was largely 
erased from this altered inter-war culture de l’occupé, one praising heroes and victims, 
itself representing a particular response to the occupation.  Yet despite an embryonic 
form of the duty to memory held by some Nordistes, this culture and the remembrance 
of the occupation had begun to fade by the late 1930s.  This occupation was a lived 





narrative of the war.  Many wanted to forget or to look to the future, and even those 
supporting remembrance appear to have lost enthusiasm as time passed. 
 
The larger occupation of 1940-44 and its important cultural ramifications for the French 
finally overshadowed the collective memory of the occupation of 1914-18.  Although 
some echoes of this painful past did survive, the understanding of what occupation 
meant was forever changed, and French cultural consciousness linked (and links) the very 
word ‘occupation’ with that of the Second World War.  Yet themes now primarily 
associated with 1940-44 can be seen, reconfigured and with important differences, in the 
Nordistes’ response to and understanding of the occupation of 1914-18.  In this earlier 
period, a certain conception of treason and collaboration existed, as did examples of 
survival via criminality (including black marketeering and fraud), and resistance or 
opposition to the Germans.  Lacking some of the political complexities of Second World 
War France, the occupation of the Nord in the First World War nevertheless possessed 
its own unique attributes.  It was a considerably harsher occupation during a very 
different war, confined to a border region where identities had always been fluid.  
However, when faced with the national enemy, certain forms of identity crystallised, and 
with them a mutated form of the wider culture de guerre.  Cut off from the rest of the 
country, Nordistes had to make sense of the war, to understand it, and to survive this 
complex situation.  In short, they had to respond to the German presence, and despite 
the strict nature of the occupation, they did so in numerous ways, making complicated 
decisions.  The occupés were neither heroes nor villains, although they often saw each 
other as such; nor too were they simply the victims they and others portrayed them as.  
Instead, they were all and none at the same time – individuals trying to navigate the 
moral-patriotic minefield of the first total occupation.  Their own occupied war culture 
provided an intangible map, based on cultural norms as much as perception and rumour.  
It was a map that would be redrawn in the inter-war period, drawn upon occasionally in 






Encountering the Germans reinforced the patriotism for some; provided opportunities 
for others; led to suffering for many; but for all, it forced them to make choices about 
their responses to occupation.  The variety of choices made was greater and more 
complex than has been traditionally stated.  In total war, faced with total occupation, the 
occupied Nord became a cultural-patriotic battleground, and the victor was the culture 
de l’occupé.  Yet the victory was only temporary, and from 1945 until the 1990s, the 
occupation and its unique culture were largely forgotten.  This thesis highlights the 
complexities of this neglected occupation. 
 
The experience of occupation in the Nord was based around moral-patriotic norms and 
codes, comprising a reconfigured moral economy – a new consensus about what acts 
were considered legitimate or illegitimate.  Some adapted to the German presence with 
various forms of complicity, and others engaged in various forms of what James C. Scott 
has called acts of ‘everyday resistance.’43  Respectable and active resistance also occurred, 
as did criminality, all at different points on the spectrum of the new moral economy.  
The theoretical models of Thompson and Scott were initially based on pre-modern, pre-
industrial or non-western economies and societies, and in recent years the focus has 
migrated further from the industrial world.44  Yet the experience of the Nord 
demonstrates that there is no reason why these models should not apply to an industrial 
area. 
 
Further, a central element of both scholars’ analysis is their reluctance to establish a clear 
moral hierarchy: they see people drawing on a complicated range of traditions, making 
decisions to ensure their survival – no choice is inherently good or bad.  This approach 
works well for examining occupation, but is especially useful for examing that of the 
Nord in the First World War.  The historian must not view resistance as positive and, 
despite the literal meaning of the term, mauvaise conduite as negative.  These legitimate 
                                                 
43 Scott, ‘Resistance,’ and Weapons. 





objects of study should be seen as expressions of contemporary culture; any value 
judgements must be those of contemporaries, relayed and studied by the historian.  This 
approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of events.  Such subtlety is missing 
from most studies of occupied France in the First World War – Francophone historians 
in particular often view this occupation through the lens of the culture de guerre, which 
combines with the memory of 1940-44 to create an overly patriotic take on occupation.   
 
The concept of cultures de guerre has also been central to my thesis, allowing me to 
demonstrate the existence of a new variant, a culture de l’occupé, containing striking 
precursors to the occupied culture of 1940-44 – but with unique, interesting attributes.  
In combining theoretical notions surrounding the moral economy, resistance, and 
cultures de guerre, I have produced a history of responses to the occupation, and of 
choices made.  I avoid judgement, but that of contemporaries features prominently.  
Ultimately, I hope that my thesis represents a more nuanced history of the occupied 
Nord in the First World War, with potential implications for our understanding of the 




















Figure 1: Electoral map of 1914 for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais (the Nord is located to the 












































































































Figure 6: ADN 9R254, photo of Jules Claeys. 
 
 












Figure 7: ADN 9R693, extract of the transcript of the conversation between the mayor 
















Figure 9: NA WO 106/45, extract from a questionnaire dropped by Allied planes into 







Figure 10: AN F23/373: Médaille des Victimes de l’Invasion, 1914-1918, bronze, 























































Figure 12: Monument on the tomb of Maertens (photo from AML 4 H 76, booklet in 
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